2nd ed., ispr. i dop. Moscow: IV RAS, 2001, 376 p.

The second edition of the monograph by Z. D. Katkova and Yu. V. Chudodeyev was the result of the authors ' attraction of additional materials and expansion of the topic itself, including the appearance of the previously missing fifth chapter on the Kuomintang. The authors comprehensively cover the stereotypes of mutual perception of the two great peoples of East Asia, carefully analyzing not only the ideology of the top leaders of both countries, but also the everyday consciousness of both ethnic groups.

Considering, however, that a critical understanding of this interesting monograph will serve more to develop the problems raised by the authors, I will allow myself to argue with them on some issues.

Z. D. Katkova and Yu. V. Chudodeev consciously and very clearly limit their research to the strict framework of the evolution of socio-psychological and political stereotypes of mutual perception of the Middle State and the Land of the Rising Sun - from the early Middle Ages to the mature phase of imperialism. The book's subtitle ("love or hate?") and the hieroglyphic formula-motto indicate this. tong wen as tong zhong ("one culture , one race") ¹ . It is difficult to argue with the authors here - this is their right, their own and justified position. However, with this approach to the problem, the fundamental differences between the Chinese and Japanese medieval models of society are beyond these stereotypes. For the reader, the question is extremely important not only about the evolution of mutual perception of the parties, but also about its causes.

When it comes to the period before the IX-XII centuries. In the history of the two countries, Z. D. Katkova and Yu. V. Chudodeev are based on the civilizational concept of their interaction. From the vast arsenal of Chinese culture, Japan borrowed hieroglyphs, fine arts, music, architecture, canonical works, Confucianism, Buddhism, as well as the system of education and chronology, clothing, type of housing, silk and porcelain production, agricultural culture, administrative divisions, taxation, criminal code, and much more. The power of this borrowing can indeed be explained from the standpoint of the civilizational concept, especially since until the end of the XIX century, the formation potential of Japan had practically no effect on relations between the two countries, and traditional China simply did not take it into account. Undoubtedly, all this gives the authors some grounds to consider the period before the "Meiji Revolution"from the same point of view.

Perhaps this approach is the only correct one until the historical milestone when the formation bases of Japan and China remained identical or the same. However, the study of the causes of the complex collision of the Meiji era leads to the conclusion that civilizational theory ceases to explain anything here. From the end of the XI-XII centuries, not the civilizational, but the formational moment comes to the fore. From this point on, the historical, primarily formational, "roads" of China and Japan diverge. Perhaps this is one of the reasons for changing the stereotypes of mutual perception of the two countries? Inter-civilizational perceptions undoubtedly stem from the civilizational sphere, which, in turn, is based on the formation foundation. In the "triune" system: external relations and perceptions-cultural layer-socio-economic base, the upper and middle layers ultimately rest on the lower.

page 207

Z. D. Katkova and Yu.V. Chudodeev gave an extremely modest place to the formation problems of China and Japan in their book, as a result of which the reader was surprised and difficult to explain the rapid breakthrough of Japan into capitalism.

The introduction of the Chinese administrative-command model of feudalism in Japan began in the middle of the seventh century and ended in complete failure in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The Yamato Land went its own way, choosing a different model of social evolution of a linear type from the Chinese version of cyclical walking in a standard circle. Already in the Middle Ages, instead of an Asian despotism of a bureaucratic type with an impersonal society and the absence of private ownership of land, Japan preferred the Western European model of private-personal feudalism ² Being a country of an extremely late" start " of feudalism, Japan passed through all three of its stages: early (VII-XI centuries), developed (XII-XVI centuries) and late (XVII-mid-XIX centuries). At the same time, China, which entered the stage of developed rent-bureaucratic feudalism quite early, so and I couldn't get any further. The Middle Empire has been stalled at this level for many centuries. A small island country, on the basis of feudal development, has already far outstripped the mainland giant - its "teacher".

Thus, for eight centuries (XII-XIX), the Yamato land, being identical to China in culture and race, became its antipode in terms of socio-economic structure and type of feudalism. It did not overtake him by the Meiji period, but several centuries earlier. Thanks to this, long before the "Meiji restoration", the formational aspect of development gradually came to the fore in the history of the two neighboring countries, rather than the civilizational one. It was he who gave birth not only to Japanese aggression in China, but also to the Japanese capitalist "miracle".

Why is it that one of the countries of the same type of civilization was able to move on to the next formation, and for the other this path was closed? In parallel with the formula of civilizational unity "one culture - one race" in the Middle Ages, its formative antithesis "different society - different system"actually emerged and became established (dui she-dui zhi). In this regard, the opinion of Zenro Tsukamato that up to the eighteenth century, Japan's development "was mainly due to the vigorous and continuous borrowing of Chinese civilization"is controversial ³ For many centuries, it has become a kind of "tradition" to ignore the fact that Japan and China are not only close to each other in civilizational terms, but also radically different models of feudalism. As a "tradition" of this kind, the historical "blindness" of the Chinese ethnic group was included in the system of socio-psychological and political stereotypes of mutual perception of the two countries. Naturally, questions arise: what is the place and role of Japanese-Chinese "blindness" in the system of their mutual perception; what are the reasons for traditional China's ignoring the fundamental difference between the Japanese model of feudalism and the social system of the Middle State; whether such ignoring can also be addressed to the Japanese side?

Noting the high professional level of the reviewed monograph, I hope that the authors will continue to develop their topic not only from the point of view of the civilizational "floor", but also taking into account the formation "foundation" until the end of the XIX century, i.e. the fundamental difference between the Japanese model of feudalism and the Chinese one. Thus, we are talking about a deeper and more comprehensive consideration of the problem of stereotypes of mutual perception of China and Japan.

notes

¹ According to the author of the review of the first edition of the book by Z. D. Katkova and Yu. V. Chudodeev, V. A. Korsun, the" image " of medieval Japan among traditional Chinese was based "precisely on the emotional and subjective perception of the cultural and historical traditions of existence" of the two countries. (Problems of the Far East. 1996. N 2. P. 134).

² For more information, see: Nepomnin O. E. Qing China and Tokugawa Japan: Two Models of Traditional Society // East-Russia-West. To the 70th anniversary of Academician B. S. Myasnikov, Moscow, 2001, pp. 598-625.

³ Half of the World. The History and Culture of China and Japan / Ed. by Am. Toynbee. L., 1973. P. 190.

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