The conditions of global peace require significant changes in the understanding of international security, ways and means of ensuring it. From inter-State security, i.e. security in relations between States - and, as a rule, between a limited number of leading countries-it is necessary to move on to the security of the global world as a whole.

A complex long-term task of the first half of the XXI century is to maintain a flexible and stable balance between the parallel processes of transformation of traditional interstate security and the formation of global security; to create conditions for the convergence of these processes, and in the future their convergence into a global world order, which should be based not only on the consent of 1815 to 1991 1

The most important conditions for the effectiveness of the emerging world order are its legitimacy and consistency, the participation of systemic, i.e. responsible subjects of international relations in it2 . In this regard, the question of whether recognition of a subject of international relations is the main and obligatory sign of its legitimacy, consistency (i.e., readiness to act according to the norms and rules adopted in this system), a responsible approach to international security in its emerging global format, and what are the types and criteria of legitimacy of a subject of international/or global security.

This article examines the acute problem of legitimacy deficit - the progressive degradation of the legitimacy of interstate security and cooperation.

The study was carried out by Russian experts within the framework of the project of the Foundation for Advanced Research and Initiatives with the support of the Representative Office of the Taipei-Moscow Coordination Commission for Economic and Cultural Cooperation in Moscow.

1 The balance of interstate and global security is unlikely to be permanent, as the process of globalization is likely to be complex and cyclical. At the same time, global security can be formed only on the basis of previously reached agreements. "Dumping" agreements and rejecting the experience of the last 25-30 years under the pretext of" changed conditions"," outdated " documents and agreements, and replacing agreed approaches with unilateral actions is a dangerous practice that undermines the trust between partners that is so necessary for jointly countering threats to global peace.

2 For a detailed analysis of the problem of responsibility of States and other subjects of modern international relations, see [Lukashuk, 2004].

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There is also the informal nature of the formation of the global world order, and the problem of unrecognized states (NPGS) as one of the manifestations of the lack of legitimacy on the example of Taiwan.

LEGITIMACY AND RECOGNITION

The problem of legitimacy in the modern world is primarily political in nature. There are often situations when recognition of a given State/regime by one group of countries reinforces the motives for refusing to recognize it by another group of States competing with the first. Legitimacy "in international relations is related to the concept of recognition and is more often considered in the political rather than strictly legal sense" (see Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, 1998, p. 302). Such an understanding of legitimacy emerged in direct and close connection with the US policy towards Latin America, when the "Monroe Doctrine" was approved (1820s-1900s).

International legal (as opposed to diplomatic) recognition of a State can only be based on a legal understanding of the legitimacy of the State itself, the regime existing in it, and the ways in which they are formed and function. Other types of legitimacy based on confessional, socio-cultural, moral, ethical, ideological, and psychological factors should also be taken into account. The principles of "constitutionality"also play an important role in establishing the legitimacy and recognition of States and regimes3 and "democratic legitimacy" 4 .

Meanwhile, for all States - especially the leading ones - political and ideological preferences and real interests remain the main criteria when deciding whether or not to recognize new states and governments, especially in cases of their formation as a result of internal coups and profound transformations. In the transition from a revolutionary international order to a legitimate one (and vice versa), strength becomes crucial: the ability to impose and maintain a given world order to the stage of its development when it begins to be perceived as legitimate and natural, the only reasonable and possible one. This is the transition that the world order of the early 2000s is experiencing.

In a globalizing world, it is natural to expect the emergence and spread of universal legal norms and value criteria. At the same time, the adoption of any internationally recognized legal criteria, norms and forms of recognition of the legitimacy of a State/regime can lead to the opposite results. Situations are not excluded when, on the same grounds, a given State/regime can not only be denied legitimacy, but should also be denied it.

The situation becomes even more complex when the question arises of recognizing new or relatively new States, i.e., States that have existed for quite a long time but are not yet internationally recognized or not widely recognized enough.

Historically, a state is an entity that claims to exercise supreme power on its territory through an appropriate institution. These claims were realized by-

3 "The Tobar Doctrine", "the Stimson doctrine" - take into account the path of creating a new state, mainly by unconstitutional, illegal use of force; used in 1932, as a basis for non-recognition of the puppet state of Manchukuo created by Japan.

4 "The Wilson Doctrine", coming to power with the support of the people. On this basis, for example, the United States refused to recognize the Soviet government until 1933. Free and fair elections are usually recognized as a form of expression of such support. To date, however, many political technologies have been created that allow manipulating the mood of the electorate to achieve what is desired with the formal purity of elections as a procedure.

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They are united in the concept and phenomenon of sovereignty. In the modern world, however, the sovereignty of States, which is recognized politically and legally, is de facto increasingly limited by the demands on the State of its responsibility to the international community, its legal capacity and effectiveness. This is due to the increasing role of non-State actors in international relations, as well as, in many cases, the increasing importance of intra-country processes (primarily the spread of separatism) in the process of globalization.

Thus, there are prerequisites for determining the legitimacy of a state to a greater extent in accordance with the criteria of its life and legal capacity, social and other efficiency, rather than on the basis of the traditional interpretation of the principles of sovereignty. First of all, this applies to newly formed States or those that have just undergone a deep internal transformation.

If the existence of the foundations of "international law"5 is considered legitimate, then it can be stated that it does not solve the issue of recognition of existing or newly formed States. It only states and describes the practice that has actually developed in this area over the past two hundred years or so. In particular, international law does not say anything about the mandatory recognition of these states/governments/regimes by other subjects of international relations, about the grounds for refusing recognition, about the imperative consequences of non-recognition. It is also not clear whether the admission of a State to the UN is an act of recognition of that State by all other UN Member States. Finally, "international law" does not in any way link the refusal to recognize a State and the membership of an unrecognized State in international organizations. In practice, the admission or admission of NPGS to an international organization (UN, WTO, etc.) is usually blocked by one of the great Powers, if it is particularly interested in this. But the charters and fundamental documents of the UN and other international organizations do not contain provisions that would link the fact of non-recognition and the impossibility of admitting NPGS to them.

The theory of international relations and political science say almost nothing about the phenomenon of an unrecognized state. However, in the context of globalization, this situation is beginning to change. In the course of globalization, the problems of rogue States, failed states, changing criminal regimes, managing the consequences of international conflicts, and building post-conflict States have already been raised.

In the modern world, an unrecognized state is similar to a stateless person, with the difference that in relation to the latter, the legislation of all states prescribes in sufficient detail the status and conditions of his entry and residence in the host country, the conditions and criteria for obtaining citizenship [see, in particular: Buchanan, 2001]. None of the above-mentioned problems of their status in international relations has been resolved with regard to NPGS. The fate of an unrecognized state is difficult in all respects: the establishment of a new one takes decades, especially in international life.

This fully applies to Taiwan. The genesis and history of the Republic of China are particularly complex: they are a direct consequence of the difficult and long struggle for independence and subsequent socio-political changes in China. Today, they are connected with the dynamics of globalization processes and with the beginning, although still largely hidden, confrontation between the United States and China.

5 A right in international relations is that which States (especially the most powerful and influential) have agreed upon among themselves. In addition, there are no rules that would oblige third States to join treaties between other participants in international relations. Within the framework of globalization, an attempt is being made to make such accession mandatory in some cases, and refusal to do so is punishable (attitude to the nuclear programs of Iran and the DPRK). The UN Commission on International Law, which has been operating since 1947, only develops proposals, which are entirely up to the States and their Governments to accept or not to accept [see: Akehurst, 1984; Evans and Newnham, 1998, p. 261].

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At the same time, recognition of a State and/or its existing regime is important not only and not so much for the country concerned. The 20th century gave many examples of how unrecognized or not universally recognized states (the USSR of the 1920s - 1930s, the Republic of China, the Federal Republic of Germany of the 1940s-1950s, Israel, etc.) existed and developed for decades without visible damage to themselves, and in some cases with the advantage of political "freedom of hands". The widest possible mutual recognition of States is necessary first of all for the most modern world community as the main sign that it has developed grounds for maintaining at least a minimum of international order, security, stability and legality. On the contrary, the absence of such recognition or the presence of extensive "white spots" on the map of mutual recognition is a clear indication of real and potential hotbeds of instability, tension, threats and conflicts. The presence of a politically significant number of unrecognized states is a sign of the instability of the international system and its high level of"insecurity".

From this point of view, the presence of unrecognized states in the Asia - Pacific region is one of the most important signs of instability in the region in international relations at the beginning of the XXI century.

The lack of recognition of a State or its ruling regime may be qualitatively different.

The lack of recognition of one State by a certain number of other States is not in itself a factor limiting the effectiveness of such an NPG in the world, especially since it can be the result of direct or indirect pressure from stronger States, great powers. Forms of non-confrontational resistance to such pressure can include various variants of de facto recognition: communications missions, trade and consular missions, etc. The formula of de facto recognition began, for example, in relations between the United States and China in the 1970s, when the United States, playing on the contradictions between the USSR and the PRC, secured a way out of the Soviet Union. wars in Indochina with minimal loss of face and international positions. Trade missions were used by the USSR to establish de facto diplomatic relations with Spain, the Republic of Korea, and in many other cases.

Very often, de facto recognition reflects not only the existence of problems in relations between certain countries or groups of States, but also the complexity and ambiguity of the internal political situation in the recognizing country. So, at one time, by accepting the de facto recognition of the Republic of Korea, the USSR and its leadership, led by Mikhail Gorbachev, sought not only to avoid complications in relations with the DPRK and China, but also, most importantly, to weaken internal ideological and political opposition to perestroika.

In the context of globalization, denial of recognition is likely to become one of the main tools for building and maintaining the global world order and determining the status of its participants. Diplomatic recognition will remain the traditional form in the foreseeable future. In turn, the lack of recognition preserves a rather high probability that an unrecognized entity may become an object of military, financial, economic or other encroachments from outside. This is the current situation of the Republic of China. For the international community, such a situation means lowering the level of security and continuing to threaten the maintenance of regional and, possibly, global stability.

The theory presents two doctrines of recognition.

According to the constitutional doctrine, international law does not provide an answer to fundamentally significant questions. For example, what number of recognitions is necessary for a recognized state to gain international legitimacy; whether the problem of such legitimacy is solved only by the number of recognitions, or whether a certain quality of recognition is necessary (whether the regime of a new "Hussein" will become legitimate if it is recognized by three, five, or ten other "Hussein"), etc. what is perhaps the main determining factor for pra-

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The subject matter of a new State is its recognition by the State from which it is being separated. Accordingly, the recognition of a new State by a certain third State (or States) even before the "mother" state did, it was usually qualified as "premature". Today it is clear that this rule is by no means universal. For example, it is hardly applicable in a situation where the "mother" state resorts to mass repression and, even more so, to genocide against the population of the part of its territory that claims self-determination. In such a situation, the international community not only can, but must also take the initiative to recognize the new State in order to save its population from victims and suffering. This blurs the scope of the concept of "premature recognition", which seemed unshakable only yesterday. However, it is still not clear who exactly can act on behalf of the international community in such a situation - the UN, another international organization, or just a group of influential states.

According to the declarative doctrine, recognition only fixes the fact of the existence of certain states or regimes in the world, facilitates the establishment of contacts and relations with them, but does not give any new quality to the recognized ones, i.e. it does not affect the fact and measure of their internal and international legitimacy. In fact, the declarative doctrine makes the act and fact of recognition insignificant, because nothing prevents States from adhering to the established principles and norms of international law and building relationships with indirectly or implicitly expressed recognition and even in the absence of such recognition. At first glance, this approach is more consistent with the traditions and requirements of political realism. However, it opens up unlimited opportunities for any self-proclaimed entity to unilaterally declare itself a State, its structure and practice - legitimate, depriving the international community of the opportunity to legally express its attitude to such an entity, the ways of its creation and methods of functioning. Examples of such entities are Abkhazia and Adjara (before the events of early May 2004). restoration of the unity of autonomy with Georgia), South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh (all on the territory of the former USSR). An uncritical adoption of a declarative doctrine would have many extremely negative consequences in the modern world. In particular, it would create a political, psychological and legal climate that is maximally favorable to separatism of any kind; the principles of the territorial integrity of the state and the inviolability of its borders would be threatened, etc.

The practice of international relations distinguishes between de jure recognition and de facto recognition. In the first case, the formal international legal principle is emphasized, which entails the full scope of obligations arising from international law. In the second case, the political principle is emphasized, and the scope of the resulting legal obligations is less broad and strict. The differences between the two are particularly important when recognition / non-recognition occurs in relation to States or NPGS that have mutual territorial claims, are separating from a larger or disintegrating State, or are in a state of interstate or civil war with each other. In such cases, political motives for recognizing or rejecting it unconditionally dominate, and international legal provisions and norms cannot provide either clear criteria or a quick procedure for making any decision by the international community.

The lack of a single recognition procedure and codified criteria for the conformity of a new entity with the status of a State endowed with sovereign rights is primarily due to the fact that it was more convenient for the international community to act outright, according to unwritten rules. What is really surprising is how until recently it was possible to work almost "without marriage", limiting the number of new states and almost preventing the appearance of unrecognized states. (By the early 1990s, there were only two unrecognized States-Northern Cyprus and Taiwan.)

It seems that until recently, an acceptable result was achieved largely due to the very qualities that the international community has been trying, at least declaratively, to get rid of in recent years. This refers to the predominance of the principles of power and balance of interests of great Powers over law and justice in international relations,

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state power over the law, morals, and human rights in the domestic politics of very many, if not all, states, finally, a rigid but disciplined split of the world into two opposing camps.

Globalization makes solving the problem of NPGS acutely relevant, as it objectively encourages all possible forms of separatism. Somewhat exaggerating, we can assume that in the context of globalization, states will be formed, recognized as socio-economic bankrupts and liquidated in much the same way as firms are created, go bankrupt and cease to exist today.

Therefore, the international community has practically no other way but to find, develop and implement, firstly, uniform criteria for recognizing new States, and secondly, legal mechanisms for their application.

CRITERIA FOR THE RECOGNITION OF NEW STATES AND THE MECHANISM FOR THEIR APPLICATION

Defining the criteria, it is advisable to critically analyze a number of seemingly indisputable provisions.

Thus, the right of nations to self-determination, sanctified by many UN documents, looks neither indisputable nor a priori .6 From a legal point of view, there is no clear and precise interpretation of the terms "people" and "nation". It is not clear how they relate to the term "nationality". From a practical point of view, the idea of self - determination of nations in a mono-ethnic version is also obvious-its implementation in the future may lead to the emergence of about three thousand states. It is obvious that in the modern world, the emergence of a new state inevitably leads to a violation of the territorial integrity of the existing state. Meanwhile, the legally indisputable and politically correct right of a State to preserve its territorial integrity is at least as important as the arbitrarily interpreted and politicized right of a nation to self-determination. Finally, the system of international relations must remain manageable under all circumstances. Because of this, the international community cannot but be interested in the strict selection of new States, i.e. in limiting their number. In such circumstances, considerations of political expediency naturally come to the fore.

The criteria for recognizing new states, therefore, should be strict and pragmatic, based on the primacy of the really possible over the ideally desired. At the same time, it is clear that it will not be possible to limit oneself to purely formal criteria for determining the state (the presence of a permanent population, a certain territory, and a government) in modern conditions. Essential criteria are needed to ensure that the rights and interests of both new and existing States are equally protected.

The first of these criteria is undoubtedly compatibility with the "parent" state (the"donor"state). Before considering the claims of a particular people to self-determination and the creation of their own state, it is necessary to establish whether they have reason to be dissatisfied or concerned about their position in the State from which they want to separate. In other words, whether these people are discriminated against on ethnic, religious or political grounds, whether they are at risk of genocide, etc. It is not difficult to see that the proposed criterion favors those "mother" states that pursue a balanced and humane internal policy, do not oppress national and religious minorities, i.e. are completely democratic. On the contrary, hypothetical new states that arise by separating from undemocratic ones,

6 The UN Charter declares the idea of self-determination not as a "right", but as a "principle". Only in 1952 did the UN General Assembly adopt a resolution entitled "The right of peoples and nations to self-determination".

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However, in the case of the harshly repressive "mother" states, they justly have good grounds for international recognition. This modality of the "compatibility" criterion seems productive because it not only limits the process of multiplying the number of States by dividing existing ones, but also indirectly encourages the latter to become democratic.

An equally important criterion for recognizing a new State can be formulated as not compromising the security of the"donor" state. In each specific case, the concept of security of the "mother" state needs to be clarified, taking into account the specifics. It is clear, however, that the right of any people to secede from the "mother" State (unless it is absolutely necessary) ends where the right of that State to ensure its own security begins.

A concrete example is the long-standing problem of Kurdish self-determination. This ancient, long-suffering people lives on the territory of three neighboring states (Turkey, Iraq and Iran) and in principle has the right to self-determination. Moreover, none of the three aforementioned states is perfectly democratic and does not have a "motherly" attitude towards the Kurds themselves. It is clear, however, that the emergence of a Kurdish state is fraught with a confusing and by definition bloody conflict between the three "mother" states and thus clearly threatens their security. Therefore, at least in the foreseeable future, a hypothetical Kurdish state could hardly expect international recognition. The efforts of the international community should be aimed at ensuring the legitimate rights, interests and national dignity of the Kurds in the current "mother" states.

Viability is the next criterion for recognizing a new state. The new state should be able to ensure its existence in isolation from the" mother " state, i.e., have a minimum sufficient economic potential, readiness for creative work, and a certain social stability. For the international community is not interested in the emergence of another dependent State.

The presence of borders with third countries or access to the sea as a criterion for recognizing a new state naturally complements and concretizes the previous two. It is quite obvious that an enclave State cannot be viable in isolation from the" mother " state, nor can it not pose a threat to its security.

Consent to the separation of the overwhelming majority of the population permanently residing in the territory that the people claiming self-determination consider their own is the last, but not the most important criterion for recognizing a new state. We are talking about a plebiscite, which can bring a credible result if two key conditions are met: the conduct of voting under reliable international control; the participation in the vote of all permanent residents of the territory, including those who were forced to leave it for political reasons. The need for strict compliance with the first condition can be illustrated by the example of Kashmir, where over the past 60 years it has not been possible to hold a plebiscite authorized by the UN Security Council, including due to the inability to put it under international control. The importance of the second condition can be easily seen in the example of Abkhazia, where almost the entire Georgian population was expelled. The results of the plebiscite on the separation of Abkhazia from Georgia cannot be recognized as legitimate without taking into account the will of the exiles. In general, to resolve such a fateful issue as the creation of a new state, it is obvious that the support of at least two-thirds of the residents of the territory claiming self-determination is required.

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The development and harmonization of universal criteria for the recognition of new States is undoubtedly one of the most urgent tasks of the international community. However, a hypothetical universal agreement on the above-mentioned (or other) criteria for recognizing new States is not sufficient without agreement on the mechanism for their application. The required mechanism will have to be created from scratch, making amendments to the charter documents of the UN, the International Court of Justice and other bodies of the international relations management system. The main problem is that the issue of recognition of new States should be transferred to the competence of the entire international community.

The conditions for reaching such an agreement emerged only with the end of the cold war .7 It is important that a precedent has already been set for the recognition of a new State by the decision of the entire international community, and not just by the will of one or several great Powers. We are talking about East Timor 8 . The experience gained by the international community in dealing with the issue of East Timor may well be used to amend the UN Charter, which would allow this main body for managing international relations to take on the mission of recognizing new States based on the same criteria for all. Another, perhaps even more productive option , is to transfer the decision on the recognition of new States to the International Court of Justice, also with amendments to its Statute and Rules of Procedure.

Ideally, any public entity seeking recognition as a State should have the right to apply to an independent and impartial international body for a decision on the merits of its claims. Accordingly, the decision of the said international body on recognition or non-recognition of the new State should be binding on the international community as a whole. The latter is especially important: if the verdict on the recognition of a new state is mandatory, then it must necessarily be followed by the admission of the new state to the UN. In this context, the admission of a State to the UN becomes the highest and universal form of its international recognition.

TAIWAN AS AN UNRECOGNIZED STATE

The uncertain status of Taiwan is the island nation's most pressing problem. But it is also one of the most serious problems of regional and international security. In the "Taiwan case", the main opposition is concentrated-

7 Timid attempts of this kind were made after the First World War, when it was time to decide who exactly could be a member of the League of Nations. Then the first purely formal criteria for determining the state were developed, which were mentioned above. The search for optimal solutions was suspended even before the outbreak of World War II: the League of Nations was not able to unite all the states of the world; accordingly, membership in the League of Nations did not become a prerequisite for the international legal personality of a State. After the Second World War, the search did not resume: the split of the world into two camps excluded the possibility of agreeing on common rules for recognizing new states.

8 The former Portuguese colony of East Timor was annexed by Indonesia in the mid-70s of the last century after it tried to declare independence. In turn, the United States and its allies, guided by the logic of the "cold war", tacitly agreed to the annexation. In the late 1990s, the struggle of the East Timorese people for independence resumed. Under UN mediation and pressure from the entire international community, Indonesia was forced to negotiate with Portugal to grant East Timor "broad autonomy" and to hold a referendum on its future status under UN supervision. More than two-thirds of the participants in the referendum were in favor of independence, and attempts by the Indonesian army to restore the status quo through mass repression only accelerated the consolidated decision of the international community to recognize East Timor as a new State.

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dialects of the past period of bipolar confrontation. This problem, which has been transferred in a slightly modified form to the new period of economic and security globalization, has a destabilizing effect on security primarily in the Asia-Pacific region.

The problem of Taiwan is caused by the balance of forces and interests that has developed around it in different directions. A conflict involving attempts to solve this problem by force can be particularly large and destructive because of the power of the parties involved. It is no coincidence that Taiwan, like no other modern NPG, is constantly in the spotlight of international politics. The Taiwan problem is characterized by a number of characteristics, the totality of which radically and fundamentally distinguishes Taiwan from other NPGS, primarily new unrecognized states( NPGS), such as Abkhazia, Transdniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and South Ossetia.

Differences start with the history of occurrence. Taiwan emerged as a state entity much earlier than the vast majority of NPGS, shortly after World War II, in the process of becoming a global bipolar system that divided several states (in addition to China - Germany, Korea, Vietnam) into two politically and ideologically opposed parts with different socio-economic structures.

At first, the Taiwanese version was developed according to the general scenario of the development of divided states. The leadership of the Republic of China (KR), which evacuated to the island with its supporters, did not receive recognition from the socialist states, but maintained diplomatic relations with the vast majority of Western and "third world"countries. However, in the 1970s. Taiwan also lost the recognition of its former partners due to the West's reorientation towards Beijing, caused by the desire to play the "Chinese card" against the USSR. Since 1979, when official relations between the Republic of China and the United States were severed, the Kyrgyz Republic has been in deep diplomatic isolation. Unlike other parts of the divided states, Taiwan was sacrificed to big politics, in which, of course, the disparate size and potential of communist China and Taiwan, and the huge difference in their weight in international relations, played a decisive role.

Nevertheless, Taiwan has managed to preserve and use some of its foreign policy reserves through "pragmatic diplomacy", which allows it to currently have diplomatic relations with more than two dozen states, albeit small ones; maintain trade, economic, cultural, scientific, technical and other relations with almost one and a half hundred states; be (under the control of the United States of America). by various names) in more than a thousand international organizations, including the WTO, APEC, and the Asian Development Bank.

Thus, Taiwan's international isolation is not complete, and its international relations are at an unattainable height for other unrecognized States. In other words, it can be included in the list of NPGS only with certain reservations. In fact, Taiwan is de facto recognized by the international community. But the lack of de jure recognition severely limits Taiwan's legal personality in its relations with the outside world.

In terms of formal criteria, the Republic of China meets the criteria of sovereignty set out in the Declaration of Voluntary Sovereignty adopted in Montevideo in 1933: it has a permanent population, a territory within certain borders, a government and the ability to communicate with other States. However, it should be borne in mind that under the Constitution adopted in 1947 on the mainland and amended in Taiwan to this day, the borders of the Republic of China are fixed in the form in which they were as of 1947, i.e., including the entire territory of China. Article 4 of the Constitution states: "The territory of the Republic of China within its current State borders may not be changed except by a decision of the National Assembly." And since there was no such decision, for-

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Formally, the PRC and the Kyrgyz Republic exist within the same borders on a common territory. Beijing sees this circumstance as an argument in its favor when defending the "one-China principle". It is precisely because of this - in order to prevent the registration of new, real borders of the unrecognized Taiwanese state - that the PRC objects in an ultimatum form to changing its territory or name.

Taipei also has its own reasons for not changing the Constitution. To bring the legal side of the case in line with reality would be a step for Taiwan to further distance itself from mainland China. The official declaration of independence implies that the" territorial-border umbilical cord " connecting Taiwan with the mainland will be cut, which is not supported at this stage by the majority of its population and elite. The unsettled nature of this issue is certainly not paramount in solving the problem of recognizing Taiwan. However, if and when Taiwan's recognition is on the agenda, Taipei will need to clearly define and formalize its borders.

In general, Taiwan meets most of the essential criteria for the recognition of new States formulated in this article.

Taiwan as a State body has an unconditional viability. After relocating to the island, the Government of the Republic of China reproduced on a smaller scale (and with the amendment of the state of emergency, which was later abolished) all state structures and the system of laws, starting with the Constitution. At present, Taiwanese society, from the point of view of its internal structure, within the territory it actually occupies, has all the characteristics of a full-fledged state. Moreover, in terms of economic indicators, the level of well-being of the population and the degree of democratization, it is among the most developed countries in the world.

Further, the legitimacy of the current regime in its internal political aspects, both legal and non-legal, is not disputed by anyone. Indeed, the regime is formed in a non-violent way, as a result of the joint efforts of the ruling party and the opposition, i.e., all political forces in society; it is completely democratic: multi-party, elected from top to bottom through direct elections, and ensures a high degree of respect for human rights.

It is well-known that Taipei strives to follow the principles and norms of international law and comply with its obligations, wants to make and is doing its best to contribute to the development of the international community, and has repeatedly provided humanitarian assistance to various countries. Taiwan can easily be called a responsible subject of international relations, which, as was shown above, is one of the most important criteria and requirements for sovereign subjects of the emerging global political and security system.

Located on the island, the Republic of China has free access to almost all countries of the world and thus fully meets the criterion of geographical openness.

In principle, the Kyrgyz Republic meets the criterion of not harming the security of the "mother" state. The military potential of Taiwan and China is incommensurable, not to mention the presence of nuclear weapons in the latter. In terms of its image in international relations, Taiwan has traditionally been a" victim " of Chinese bullying. At the same time, the appearance of new types of weapons in Taiwan (primarily missiles) or statements about their appearance and plans for use, even if they are not official in nature, may provoke a sharp reaction from Beijing. This happened in June 2004, when there was information about the idea of Taiwan attacking "high-value targets" on the mainland, in particular the Three Gorges hydroelectric complex on the Yangtze River [Storm over the Yangtze, 17.06.2004].

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In accordance with the provisions of the 1979 joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States, the Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China on Mutual Defense was denounced, and the American armed forces were withdrawn from the island. At the same time, in accordance with the 1979 Law on Relations with Taiwan, the United States supplies Taiwan with weapons. It is fundamentally important that the Chinese leaders, while strongly protesting against Washington's military ties with Taipei, accuse the United States of deviating from previous Sino-American agreements, of violating China's sovereignty, but not of creating a threat to its security.

At the same time, the instability in the region, the degradation of the international legal framework in the military sphere (the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the dubious future of the NPT, the unresolved North Korean nuclear issue), as well as the general trend towards a massive build-up of military power and its modernization (this primarily concerns the PRC), make the implementation of security and not provoking a destabilizing situation-an increasingly difficult one for Taiwan. Beijing directly links the declaration of independence of the island with the use of military force against it.

The extent to which the Republic of China meets the criterion of popular consent to secession is difficult to determine today. Numerous public opinion polls on this issue are conducted on the island. However, their results are clearly influenced by Beijing's declared willingness to use force if Taiwan declares independence. Some respondents oppose independence precisely for this reason. At the same time, the most popular option among the island's residents is to maintain the status quo-a position in which Taiwan has been in for decades, and in which it has managed to make impressive progress. In fact, this option represents a certain type of independence from mainland China, curtailed only in some formal aspects, which did not prevent the United States and its allies from having diplomatic relations with the Republic of China in the 1950s and 1960s. This format does not prevent any of the current Taiwanese leaders from fighting for, or at least speaking out for, international recognition of the Kyrgyz Republic.

The criterion of compatibility with the "mother" State is specific for Taiwan. The Republic of China during Chiang Kai-shek's rule, as well as the PRC today, insisted on the status of a "mother", " one " state, which is the root of the Taiwan problem. Until 1971, it was the Kyrgyz Republic that had representatives in the UN Security Council. Given the specific nature of Taiwan, the traditional approaches outlined above - priority for obtaining legal personality recognition by the "mother" State, or the phenomenon of "premature" recognition - can only be applied to it in a limited way, with reservations. Currently, the situation is changing, as the current leadership of Taiwan aims to formalize the island's independent status, legitimize it and recognize it, while the opposition adheres to the "one China" formula. The official position of the People's Republic of China does not change, although there has been progress in it within the framework of the "one state - two systems" formula.

Arguing their position, the leaders of the People's Republic of China remind that historically Taiwan is part of China, and that, having been occupied by Japan, the island was returned to it in accordance with the Cairo Declaration of 1943, And since the Government of the People's Republic of China is recognized by the world community as the only legitimate government of China, only it For their part, the Taiwanese leaders say that the Republic of China has every reason to receive official recognition, since it is a de facto independent sovereign state and has all the necessary characteristics of such a state. The Government of the People's Republic of China, Taipei claims, has never had and does not currently have either actual or formal authority over Taiwan.-

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This territory is under the "de facto jurisdiction" of the Republic of China.

At the current stage, the initial incompatibility of both states, their socio-economic and political systems is gradually, very slowly, being leveled. The PRC is undergoing transformations that, although most experts are still wary of considering them irreversible, have already led to a significant change in the internal way of life in the country, but most importantly, to its deep involvement in the globalizing economy. The softened version of "one state, two systems" compatibility currently proposed by Beijing was put forward in 1995 by Jiang Zemin. In exchange for recognizing a unified China, Beijing promises Taiwan the highest degree of autonomy and the preservation of the entire way of life on the island, giving up the right to govern Taiwan, from deploying the Chinese armed forces there, and recognizing its right to its own armed forces. At the same time, it is emphasized that the PRC, as a great power, now feels its responsibility to the world community. However, on the island, these assurances are perceived with skepticism, and the question of compatibility remains, therefore, a subject of discussion.

In turn, various plans for future reunification with the mainland are also emerging on the island (the"National Unification Program" of the Kuomintang, the presidential concept of economic and then political integration based on the "Common Market" model, etc.). However, at present Taiwan considers unification with the mainland clearly unacceptable for itself. The arguments here are the incompatibility of the authoritarian one-party regime in China with the developed democracy of the Kyrgyz Republic, as well as a large gap in living standards on different sides of the Taiwan Strait. In the international community, such arguments, at least the first one, are taken quite seriously.

So, the sum of Taiwan's ratings in accordance with the proposed criteria shows that there are basic prerequisites for recognizing the state. Taiwan's unquestionable legal capacity, success in economic growth and improving democracy, legitimacy, compliance with generally accepted norms of political behavior, and responsibility in international affairs - all this creates an image of an advanced civilized state for Taiwan and helps strengthen its authority in the international community. It is incorrect to even compare Taiwan with other NPGS, with their tendency to degradation and criminalization. Thus, theoretically, Taiwan has all the grounds for international legal recognition.

In the current situation, the main obstacle to the real recognition of Taiwan is the position of the Government of the People's Republic of China, accepted volens nolens by the overwhelming majority of countries in the world: there is only one China, the Government of the People's Republic of China is its only legitimate government, and Taiwan is its province (or part). However, some States accept this formula in a somewhat smoothed-down form. The United States recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China, but at the same time does not explicitly recognize, but only "takes note of China's position that there is only one China, and Taiwan is part of China." However, this is nothing more than a nuance that does not change the general state of affairs: any state that has established diplomatic relations with the Kyrgyz Republic is automatically deprived of recognition by the PRC.

In this regard, in the foreseeable future, the most significant issues for Taiwan are::

* use all opportunities, including new ones related to the globalization of the world economy and security system, for the international legal legitimization of the Kyrgyz Republic;

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* Developing relations with China in a format that would minimize the possibility of using force and destabilizing the situation in the region.

It is also important to shape domestic policy and public opinion on Taiwan's independence and recognition, which would ensure, on the one hand, stability and conditions for sustainable economic development and democracy, integration into the global economy and security, and, on the other, readiness to move to a new status when and if the prerequisites for this arise.

THE PROBLEM OF TAIWAN'S INDEPENDENCE AND RECOGNITION: DOMESTIC POLITICAL ASPECTS

In the development of the Republic of China, as in the case of South Korea, homogeneous authoritarian elites with a strong military component played a critical role [Lieven, 2004], united by a national goal based on hatred and fear of communism. However, after the death of Chiang Kai-shek, both the domestic political situation and the approach to solving such a vital problem for Taiwan as relations with the PRC began to change. Currently, the approaches of its two main political forces to the formula "there is only one China" differ.

Let's start with the current opposition. The Kuomintang Party, which ruled the Republic of China for almost all of its history until 2000 and is now in opposition with its allies, accepts the "one China principle", but in its own interpretation, which is unacceptable for Beijing, and does not prevent it from seeking international recognition of the Republic of China. In their interpretation, "one China" is the Republic of China that has existed since 1911, as well as the future united Chinese state. At the present time, after 1949, China, as has happened more than once in its history, has been divided into two "real political subjects", or two states that are absolutely equal from a legal point of view, and therefore have equal rights to full membership in the international community. At the time of the split, "one China" only makes sense as a historical and cultural community of both its parts.

As part of this approach, Taipei abolished Chiang Kai-shek's "mobilization period for suppressing communist insurgency" introduced during the civil war in 1991, which was tantamount to recognizing de facto communist China in the territory it controlled. Until then, the Republic of China, even after the evacuation of its leaders to Taiwan, remained in their eyes the only legitimate state in the entire territory of China. Being, of course, an independent force, the opposition is at the same time an instrument in the internal life of the island, which transmits and enhances the "inhibitory effect" emanating from the PRC and the United States on the promotion of separatist tendencies.

A coalition of parties led by President Chen Shui-bian, who was first elected in 2000, rejects the "there is only one China" formula. Recognizing the reality of the existence of two Chinese states, but under pressure from Beijing, the current Taiwanese leaders have developed a peculiar position on the issue of independence of the island. They openly declare the sovereignty of the Republic of China, and that Taiwan "is already a sovereign and independent State," as set out in the 1947 Constitution. At the same time, President Chen Shui-bian says there is no need to declare independence in addition. Taiwanese leaders do not risk resorting to the legal procedures that are necessary to formalize the final separation of Taiwan from the mainland, the decision of the highest legislative body based on the results of the referendum. This is due, on the one hand, to the position of Beijing, and on the other hand, to the fact that the revision of the Constitution will be carried out at the same time.-

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It leads, as noted above, to fixing the current borders of the Kyrgyz Republic, which means "cutting the umbilical cord" connecting the island with the mainland.

The most important factor influencing the state of the Taiwan problem is the steady growth of separatist tendencies on the island since the 1990s, which is mainly due to the change of generations. The younger generations are free from nostalgia for the mainland, from close family ties with the Chinese across the Taiwan Strait. In addition, they enjoy a significantly higher quality of life. They grew up on new textbooks, in a new ideological field. Therefore, they do not want to recognize the jurisdiction of the PRC over the island and be dependent on the will of Beijing, even if the island, as promised, will enjoy the widest autonomy as a special administrative region. However, voting for Chen Shui-bian in the 2004 elections is not equivalent to voting for independence. Comparing the election results with the polls, we can assume that many people supported his program because it includes, along with the idea of Taiwan's de facto sovereignty, the rejection of the official declaration of independence.

For these reasons, the psychological alienation of new generations from their historical homeland will continue to increase. Taiwan's current leaders are seeking to push this process forward by trying to create a new, purely Taiwanese identity distinct from the mainland. The opposition, for its part, has successfully countered the idea of a special Taiwanese identity with the slogan: "all Chinese have one house, one roof." Currently, the self-identification of the inhabitants of Taiwan is so ambiguous that the separation of the inhabitants of the island and the mainland on the principle of national identity seems at best a matter of distant prospects. It is also obvious that the formation of a new Taiwanese identity based on nationalism and ethnic separatism is impossible by definition. (This is also the fundamental difference between Taiwan and the new NPGS, which are driven by ethnic separatism.) A productive option for finding a base for a new identity could be democratic patriotism. Such a formula, firstly, convexly demonstrates the differences between the Kyrgyz Republic and the PRC, and secondly, is understandable to the international community and is supported by it.

The formation of a Taiwanese national identity based on the opposition of the Chinese is also in conflict with the very significant and growing trade and economic ties between the parties. It was Chen Shui-bian who accepted Beijing's initiative to establish "three types of ties" with Taiwan (trade, economic, transport and postal), which the Kuomintang Party refused to do during her rule. In the fall of 2001, the Economic Development Advisory Council convened by Chen Shui-bian approved proposals to liberalize economic ties with China. This direction became a priority in the government's activities, and it was presented as the key to overcoming the economic crisis [Mozias, 2003, p. 55].

In the conditions of de facto established statehood, economic growth, and socio-political stability, on the one hand, and the threat of military intervention by the PRC in the event of legislative registration of independence, on the other, the task of gaining de jure independence and recognizing and legitimizing the country in the international community is unlikely to acquire the character of a national consolidating and mobilizing goal, idea. The dominant orientation of society towards maintaining the status quo, despite the growth of separatist sentiments, indicates the priorities of Taiwanese people, the main ones of which are ensuring security and opportunities for socio-economic development and preserving and developing democratic freedoms.

Under these circumstances, the declaration of Taiwan's independence, if it were to take place, would be an extremely risky political move for its leaders, not to mention the fact that the country's independence is a very dangerous one.

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let's talk about the possible most negative consequences for the island. In the current situation, the probability of declaring Taiwan's independence should be recognized as extremely low. Another thing is that it can increase many times if the ratio of key external forces between China and the United States changes in favor of the latter, for example, if China continues to reform and breaks into chaos and the central government significantly weakens. But such a variant of the course of reforms on the continent is unlikely.

POSITIONS OF EXTERNAL ACTORS-CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES

There are serious concerns in Beijing that, at the height of separatist sentiment, Taiwanese leaders may at some point decide that the foreign policy environment offers them a unique opportunity to seize and declare Taiwan's independence. At the same time, they will proceed from the assumption that the United States, faced with a fait accompli, will be forced to take Taiwan under its protection, and the PRC will not dare to take extreme retaliatory measures and, in the end, will come to terms with the new reality. Beijing closely monitors all the nuances of Taiwan's political life and responds harshly to every separatist move, reminding them of their readiness to use force in a critical situation.

In addition to traditional ideological factors, an important role in determining the PRC's position on Taiwan at the current stage is played by: the balance of power within the ruling circles and the general course of reforms in the PRC; military potential; relations between the PRC and the United States; economic factors. The combination and balance of these factors can influence Beijing's policy. Its options range from a bet on gradual economic integration to a military solution to the problem. The most significant factors are the alignment of political forces and the development of reforms in China [see: China's New Leadership..., 2002; China's Prospects..., 2003; Chang, 2001].

It seems that at this stage, the Chinese leadership considers maintaining the status quo of Taiwan acceptable, at least for a fairly long time. Proclaiming "unification of the Motherland" as one of the highest national priorities, and the Taiwan issue as the main obstacle in US-Chinese relations, does not prevent the leaders of the PRC from successfully developing trade and economic cooperation with the United States and interacting with them on a wide range of international issues. On the eve of the 16th Congress of the Communist Party of China, China once again postponed the date of "military influence" on Taiwan and the "final date of unification" - from 2005-2007 to 2011, which can be regarded as a tactical success of the pragmatic wing in the Chinese leadership. However, the congress itself confirmed the "one China" hard line, which does not exclude the use of military force in the event of Taiwan's declaration of independence.

Paradoxically, in order to achieve as soon as possible the goals stated as a priority by the current leadership of Taiwan (declaring independence and obtaining recognition, including diplomatic recognition), Taiwan's interests are served by the development of the situation in China in the worst-case scenario. But in this case, not only security in the Asia-Pacific region and the world is in question, but also the physical survival of Taiwan. For a number of analysts do not rule out the possibility of using nuclear weapons in the conflict over Taiwan.

The range of experts ' opinions on the possibility of a military conflict is wide 9 . Today, US military cooperation with Taiwan has led to the creation of a situation where, as some Russian experts believe, "there is no purely military solution to the problem of Taiwan" [Bolyatko, 2003(2), p. 20]. At the same time, the Taiwan issue encourages an arms race in the United States.

9 These scenarios were considered by the Russian expert A. Bolyatko [Bolyatko, 2003(1)]; см. также: http://www.izvestia.ru/world/articlel28609; http://www.cbs.org.tw/2004/3/5; http://vip.lenta.ru/news/2004/03/19/taiwan/; Кашин, 2003. с. 122; http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/2003/AFP-291003.htm

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in the region as a whole, because neighboring countries cannot ignore the scenario of a full-scale conflict, including with the participation of the United States, in their military preparations.

Without excluding extreme scenarios, it should be emphasized that most experts consider their probability to be low. For economic factors, China's growing dependence on the global economy, and the priority of relations with the United States generally outweigh the impact of the factors discussed above. The most important argument against forcibly changing the status of the island is that a military clash in the Taiwan Strait will have a severe impact on the island's economy, and this, in turn, will deal a severe blow to the economy of the coastal regions of China and Hong Kong. In recent years, there has been a significant influx of Taiwanese capital to China. At the turn of the century, this process took on a large-scale character. According to statistics of the People's Republic of China at the end of 2002, 55.7 thousand enterprises were created there with the participation of Taiwanese investors, the accumulated amount of Taiwanese investments reached 61.4 billion dollars. [China Daily, 29.01.2003]. As the maritime regions ' economic ties with it expand over the years, the cost of an armed conflict with Taiwan will increase.

The widespread belief that Beijing will use Taiwan's mainland-based businesses, which are mostly the largest and most influential, as leverage over the island's authorities and eventually force Taipei to merge, seems rather dubious. Pressure on business inevitably leads to curtailment of economic activity, disorganization of economic life, and these processes affect not only their direct participants, but also entrepreneurs from third countries. And this is exactly what Beijing is trying to avoid in every possible way. Practice shows that the Chinese government creates favorable conditions for Taiwanese entrepreneurs, highly values their economic activity on the mainland and, as far as is known, does not allow itself to use it as a card in a political game against Taipei. It seems that a kind of additional insurance for the safety of Taiwanese investments may be joint ventures, which Beijing is calling for entrepreneurs from the island to create.

At the same time, the PRC is resisting Taiwan's attempts to expand its participation in international trade and economic formats at the regional level. Taiwan has been a member of the Asia - Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) since 1992, but its activities are still formal. Asia-Pacific countries cooperate mainly in sub-regional groupings and at the bilateral level, while Taiwan, because of its status, remains on the sidelines of these processes. The marginal situation may worsen if the projects proposed by Beijing at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries of the free trade zone "China-ASEAN" or even cooperation under the "10 + 3" scheme - the ASEAN countries, China, Japan and South Korea-are implemented. Beijing's strategy for relations with the European Union also includes a requirement for EU countries not to allow Taiwan to join international organizations where membership requires state status.

Finally, the emergence of an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait is hindered by another extremely important factor - psychological, which contains elements of morality and nationalism. It is hard to imagine that nowadays the Chinese will shoot at the Chinese just because they have different political views (or, even more so, leaders with different political views). Jiang Zemin's thesis "the Chinese do not beat the Chinese"is significant in this regard.

As for the United States, Taiwan is extremely important for them primarily as a strong point in their future geostrategic competition (or confrontation) with China. In addition, the West generally sees Taiwan as a model of a regime whose methods and results of economic management serve as a strong impetus for reform in the country.

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on the mainland. Therefore, the political and military support provided by the United States to Taiwan in order to maintain its status quo does not weaken over time, but rather increases. Some analysts ' assumptions that the United States would make concessions to China on the Taiwan issue in exchange for its assistance to the United States in its military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have proved untenable. It is important that the US position enjoys the approval of its Asian allies [ABC News. Oct. 23, 2003].

Having chosen the principle of "strategic uncertainty" in relation to Taiwan, the United States reserves the opportunity to provide it with any military assistance that it deems necessary, which is fixed in the Law "On Relations with Taiwan".

At the same time, the emergence of an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait is not in the interests of the United States, since its consequences cannot be beneficial for Washington, regardless of whether it intervenes in the conflict or remains on the sidelines. In fact, the United States has long since abandoned its support for Taiwan's claim to formal independence, although in previous decades separatist supporters who were persecuted on the island found refuge on their territory. Almost every new separatist action in Taipei aimed at further distancing itself from the mainland provokes a clear negative reaction in Washington. Remaining generally within the framework already outlined, the US position on Taiwan depends to a large extent on the state of Washington's relations with Beijing, as well as on the change of administrations in the White House. Democrats tend to pay more attention to supporting democracy, while Republicans, especially the George W. Bush administration, are more pragmatic, often turning a blind eye to violations of democratic freedoms in the name of achieving specific military and political goals.

Recently, there has been a renewed shift in Washington's approach. In the early summer of 2004, the Special US-China Commission on Economic and Security under the US Congress (established in 2000) addressed the President with a proposal to reconsider the "one China" policy towards the PRC and Taiwan. According to Congress, the trend of increasing strength around the Sino-Taiwan conflict requires a reassessment of the White House's policy in this direction. The commission's report said that the United States cannot ignore "China's military buildup" on the approaches to Taiwan. "Recent changes in the situation should make the US authorities think about ways to support Taiwan, which is trying to move away from the economic isolation that official Beijing insists on." However, the main thing in the report - the US principled attitude towards a peaceful solution to the problem-remains unchanged [http://lenta.ru/16.06.2004].

Washington also cannot ignore Beijing's recent "cooperative" policy, primarily its participation in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, its restraint in the UN Security Council, and its support for US anti-terrorist actions. China has also been very active in stabilizing the situation in the region, significantly improving relations with India and launching a number of multilateral initiatives. These include a political dialogue with NATO on security issues in Central Asia, the idea of "open regionalism" in Asia and the creation of a multilateral security system in the Asia-Pacific region, etc. Fearing that all key decisions will be taken in the G8 format, of which China is not a member, Beijing has recently shown interest in strengthening the role of the UN and the UN Security Council.

Few analysts do not emphasize Beijing's policy of participating in and using international institutions and organizations - a significant change in China's policy towards greater openness [Foreign Affairs, Nov. -Dec. 2003]. One of the reasons for this, of course, is the recognition of the de facto dominance of the United States and Russia.

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somehow compensate for it. The second reason is the rapidly growing dependence of the PRC on the world economy - that is, the economic factor.

The most likely scenario for the development of events around the Republic of China in the foreseeable future remains the preservation of the status quo of Taiwan as an unrecognized state, which the leaders of both parts of China will have to put up with, but without stopping fighting with each other to solve the Taiwan problem in accordance with their own calculations. Taiwan's current unique position is a sustainable result of a compromise of forces and interests between several parties. There are processes taking place in and around Taiwan, some of which make the current political situation of the island less stable, others, on the contrary, contribute to the consolidation of the status quo, and others play a dual role.

The growth of separatist tendencies on the island is certainly among the first. The modernization of the PLA's naval and air forces in the southern coastal provinces of China, its increasing weight in international affairs, and the growing political ambitions of the country's leaders push them to solve the problem by force, while at the same time preventing the final separation of Taiwan from China. Among the "preserving" processes are, first, the strengthening of the US military power and dominant position on the world stage, the "one-sided" nature of American policy; secondly, the increasingly deep involvement of Beijing in the system of world economic relations and the political life of the world community and, consequently, the growing dependence on those who determine the future of the United States. this system has the rules of the game. As a result, despite the intensification of separatism on the island and the rather tense state of relations "across the strait", the status quo of Taiwan can be considered relatively stable.

However, neither the option of maintaining the status quo, nor the option of declaring independence (which apparently meets the needs of a significant part of the Taiwanese public) does not promise Taiwan any real chances of any significant expansion of the circle of states willing to recognize it. Therefore, in all likelihood, Taipei should be expected to become more active in order not so much to establish itself directly in the international legal field, but rather to strengthen its position in the world by expanding its participation in the economic life of the region and increasing its own legitimacy in its non-legal aspects. It is also important for Taiwan to engage and actively participate in the fight against non-traditional threats such as pandemics, natural disasters, threats to information security, etc., along with further improving the island's governance system in accordance with the highest criteria of democracy.

list of literature

Bolyatko A.V. Taiwan: Modernization of the Economy and Prospects of relations with China / / MEiMO, 2003(1), N11.

Bolyatko A.V. Voenno-politicheskie aspekty situatsii v rayone Taiwanskogo proliva [Military and political aspects of the situation in the Taiwan Strait region].

Storm over the Yangtze / / Vremya novostei. 17.06.2004

Buchanan A. Secession. The right to secession, Human rights and Territorial integrity of the State, Moscow: Rudomino, 2001.

Kashin V. B. O nekotorykh aspekty amerikano-taiwanskogo voenno-tekhnicheskogo sotrudnichestvo na sovremennom etape [On some aspects of American-Taiwanese military-technical cooperation at the present stage]. Istoriya i sovremennost ' [History and Modernity], Moscow: RAS; Institute of the Far East, 2003.

Lukashuk, I. I. Pravo mezhdunarodnoi otvetstvennosti (Law of International Responsibility), Volters Kluver Publ., 2004.

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Mozias P. M. Ekonomicheskaya politika Taiwana [Economic Policy of Taiwan].

China's Prospects. Scientific report of IMPI No. 1. Moscow, 2003.

ABC News. Oct. 23, 2003.

Akehurst M. A Modern Introduction to International Law. 6th ed. L.: George Allen and Unwin, 1984.

Chang G. The Coming Collapse of China. N.Y., 2001.

China Daily. 29.01.2003.

China's New Leadership. A Qualified Power Transition // IISS Strategic Comments. Vol. 8. Issue 9. November 2002.

Evans G., Newnham J. Dictionary of International Relations. L.: Penguin Books, 1998.

Foreign Affairs. Nov. -Dec. 2003.

Lieven A. Uroki "kholodnoy voyny" dlya mideastochnoy politiki Bush-Jr. [Lessons of the "Cold War" for the Middle East policy of Bush Jr.]. 2.03.2004. http://inosmi.rian.ru/translation/ 208191

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http://www.cbs.org.tw/ 2004/ 3/ 5

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http://taiwansecuritv.org/AFP/ 2003/AFP- 291003.htm

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