Despite the abundance of research works, including undoubtedly outstanding ones, the last century and a half of Japanese history still contains insufficiently studied subjects. I would venture to include among them a turning point in the new history of Japan-Meiji Yixing (1868), which in Russian historiography is usually translated as "Meiji restoration". For more than a hundred years, the debate about its causes, essence and nature has continued, but there is still no single interpretation of this key event that has stood the test of time and suits everyone. This is not to say that these problems have not been studied at all, but most authors, regardless of their socio - political orientation or belonging to a particular direction in historiography, looked at them as if from the outside, used ready-made schemes, as if not raising the question of their applicability to Japan. They proceeded from the idea of the universality and similarity of historical processes, and what did not fit into the schemes and did not find a place on the "pillar road of history" (as they imagined it) was declared "backward" and "marginal" or completely ignored. So there were concepts that seemed coherent and logical, but sooner or later they did not stand up to critical analysis and verification of facts and went into oblivion. Of course, the author of this work is far from thinking that he has found the only correct answers to all the questions or a universal approach to all the phenomena of Japanese history in the period under consideration - this is hardly possible. However, I would like to share some thoughts and observations with readers and offer my interpretation of events in a broader historical context. This, in turn, leads us to a series of comparisons-both because of similarity and"from the opposite".

Problems with interpreting the nature and essence of Meiji yixing begin with the translation of the term yixing itself into foreign languages. The need for a more or less unambiguous interpretation of this concept is also obvious to the Japanese, who can hardly limit themselves to the excuse that yixing is yixing, as if the meaning of this word is self - evident. If you follow the meaning of the hieroglyphs that make up the word yixing, then also - "connect" (in combinations), as defined by the best Russian hieroglyphic dictionary N. I. Feldman-Konrad ¹; the hieroglyph sin (atarasiy) it has the value "new" and does not cause any difficulties in translation or interpretation. The same dictionary translates yixing as "renewal" (!) with the mark "historical term" in the phrases to the hieroglyph I. So the common translation of the word yixing as "restoration" in this case belongs to historians, not philologists, and only reflects the views of specific interpreters of events. It is noteworthy that in one of the recent domestic Japanese-Russian dictionaries, designed for the general reader, the word-

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vo isin is translated without any reservations and explanatory litter as "restoration" and "renewal", which in Russian can hardly be recognized as synonyms ² .

Stable translation of the word yixing. in the sense of "renewal" in Russian historiography, it did not take root. Paradoxically, yixing translates as "restoration" and at the same time is interpreted as "revolution", which is at least strange from the point of view of common sense. The greatest objection to Meiji Yixing is the historiographical term "restoration", since it is traditionally and quite correctly applied to events of a fundamentally different nature, rather associated with the concept of"reaction". A classic example is the Bourbon restoration in France in 1814, when the dynamic, expansionist, in some respects undoubtedly revolutionary, although short-lived, Napoleonic empire was replaced almost unchanged by the old "ancien regime", which was easily crushed earlier by the revolution of 1789. Artificially "restored" with military and political support from outside, the new Bourbon regime turned out to be short-lived, and even the "most-favored-nation regime" on the part of the Holy Alliance powers could not give it viability. Drawing a clear line between the concepts of "reactionary" and "conservative", the leading ideologue of the German conservative Revolution, philosopher and publicist A. A. Kropotkin. Moeller van den Broek gave a very accurate portrait of the reactionary in his program book Das Dritte Reich (1922): "The reactionary imagines that the only thing we need is to go back to the old ways, to do everything exactly 'as it was before'. He has no desire to come to terms with the new. He believes that if he only gets his hands on political power, he can easily rebuild the world in accordance with the good old schemes. " ³ It is easy to see that there is not the slightest resemblance to Meiji Yixing.

So - "revolution"?! After analyzing the methods and pace of Meiji transformations (leaving aside their nature for now), we can confidently conclude: yes, revolution is in contrast to "evolution" as a process of gradual change that does not involve a radical violent change in the status quo. But what revolution? I believe that it is here that the most important point is contained, the center of gravity of the problem under consideration.

Until recently, almost all Meiji Yixing researchers focused on its social, political, economic, less often ideological and general cultural aspects, and the spiritual, metaphysical, one might say, sacred side of the issue was either tacitly ignored or considered from a purely materialistic point of view as certainly less important, if not secondary, derived from the "material"side of the issue.. Such one-sidedness is fraught with serious errors even in relation to industrial countries, not to mention traditional society (which, I believe, can be recognized without the slightest stretch in Japan at the time of Meiji Yixing), where sacred values are of primary, determining importance both for the elite and for the entire society as a whole, i.e., for leaders, and for ordinary participants of events.

Therefore, the most widespread assessment of Meiji Yixing as an "incomplete bourgeois revolution"in Russian (and partly foreign) historiography until recently seems to be completely wrong. Its authors uncritically applied to Japan the standard European model of bourgeois revolution (such as the French Revolution or the revolutions of 1848) and saw that, despite all the apparent similarities, Meiji Yixing did not do much of what she was "supposed" to do according to their scheme, and at the same time did a lot of "reactionary"things for example, by returning full power to the emperor and restoring the support of the state

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on the traditional religion of Shinto. In fact, it is difficult to imagine processes that are more dissimilar in their spiritual essence than the traditionalist Meiji Yixing and the emphatically anti-traditionalist Great French Revolution (I note that the same can be said with full justification about Peter's transformations in Russia, with which Meiji Yixing has often been compared), even if there are formal similarities between them. The main thing is that revolutions never occur anywhere according to the schemes developed by someone else.

"Every revolution is necessarily preceded by a period of social decay, degradation, and political stagnation. Revolution takes place only in a "decrepit" society, which has become rigid and has lost its political and social energy, its life. Revolution in the etymological sense means "return", "transformation"... Revolution is what follows the degeneration of society, the period of social death, as a new life, as a new energy, as a new beginning... The energy of revolution is always the energy of life against death, the energy of freshness against mustiness, of movement against paralysis... A revolution cannot arise in a healthy and full-fledged society - there it simply won't make any sense." ⁴ Perhaps this does not apply to all revolutions in world history, because only a small part of them were accompanied by global spiritual shifts, but in my opinion, this characteristic applies entirely to Meiji Yixing: here there is a combination of "connection" and "novelty", which is indicated by the meanings of the hieroglyphs that make up the world. the word yixing. The etymological interpretation of" revolution " as "return" refers, of course, to the verbalized F. Nietzsche and M. Eliade's detailed study of the "myth of eternal return", which plays a significant role in the philosophy and mythology of traditionalists.

It is known that in Japanese there is also the word kakumei, which appeared to convey precisely the European concept of "revolution", i.e. to describe just those anti-traditionalist bourgeois revolutions mentioned above. It was borrowed from Chinese, which, in accordance with Confucian tradition, meant the forcible transfer of the" Mandate of Heaven "from one emperor to another, which, as we know, was categorically rejected by the Japanese tradition based on the" continuity in the centuries " (bansei ikkei) of a single imperial dynasty. Thus, the concept of kakumei has nothing to do with" rebirth "or" renewal", especially" renewal through return "("revolution" -yixing). Moreover, in the mass consciousness of Japanese people in recent decades, it is increasingly associated with the unattractive ideology and practice of leftist extremists, so there is a tendency to replace this "hard" term with a more neutral and "cosmopolitan" word riboryusen (like all borrowed foreign words, it is written in the syllabic alphabet katakana ).

In Japanese historiography, the term kakumei was very rarely applied to the events of Meiji Yixing and did not receive" citizenship rights " in this capacity. Similarly, the term yixing was never used to describe revolutions or other events that took place outside of Japan. Describing the difference between these concepts in 1933, the philosopher T. Fujisawa pointed out "a strict distinction between the external revolution (kakumei) and internal update (csn)". The first is reduced to "a radical change in the existing political regime and economic structure, practically without affecting the materialistic mentality of modern man, "and the second" spiritually leads us to the ancient moral ideal." "The restoration of imperial rule at the dawn of the Meiji era," he continued, " was not so much a political revolution as many in the West believed, but a purely spiritual renewal (emphasis added). - V. M.); in the first place was put a return to the very beginning of our empire, created by the first Emperor Jim-

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mu " ⁵. A. Moeller van den Broek also emphasized first of all the spiritual, traditionalist aspect of the conservative's attitude to the revolution - in contrast to the purely political, materialist position of both the reactionary, who seeks to mechanically "freeze" the existing system, and the revolutionary, who is focused on its destruction "to the ground" ⁶ .

Far from being radical in any way, and more reactionary than conservative, Fujisawa deliberately downplayed the revolutionary character of Meiji yixing in order to contrast it with foreign revolutions, both bourgeois and communist. It should also be remembered that he addressed the English-speaking, foreign reader, trying, on the one hand, to give an "authentic" assessment of events as an authoritative Japanese thinker, and on the other-to translate and interpret the concepts of yixing and kakumei in terms accessible to non-Japanese. In this regard, Fujisawa followed the leading interpreters of Meiji Japan for the "civilized world" T. Okakura ("The Awakening of Japan", "The Ideals of the East") and I. Nitobe ("Bushido", "Japan and its People"), whose books, written in English at the beginning of the XX century, are still reprinted in Japan. However, it would be unfair to explain Fujisawa's interpretation solely for propaganda reasons. There is undoubtedly a rational grain in it, because for the Japanese, the concept of kakumei emphasizes not only the purely material, political side of the changes that are taking place, but also their initially violent and even not quite natural character, while the concept of yixing means a logical and natural result of the course of history, although the changes it determines can be radical and if necessary, combine it with violence.

The generalized interpretation of Meiji yixing as revolution (as opposed to "restoration" or "evolution") needs to be clarified, because it can also lead to misconceptions and mistakes. The transformations and ideas of Peter the Great ("The Great Peter was the first Bolshevik," M. Voloshin paradoxically but sagaciously remarked) and Robespierre, Marx and Lenin were revolutionary in nature. However, all these figures proceeded not only from the destruction of the former order "to the ground", but - with the exception of Peter, who was inclined to uncritically copy European models-and from the creation of a new, hitherto unprecedented order (society, state system, etc.), which has no analogues in the history of mankind. In contrast, Meiji Yixing not only destroyed the Tokugawa "ancien regime" that was in a systemic crisis, but replaced it with a viable "Meiji development model" ⁷ based on an organic combination of national traditional spiritual foundations with the latest foreign methods and technologies. Therefore, the author of this paper proposed and justified the interpretation of Meiji Yixing as a conservative revolution Not by chance, sir. Okawa, a leading representative of twentieth-century Japanese conservative revolutionary thought, who considered the main task of his associates to be "building a revolutionary Japan", in 1919. he also used the word kakumei in this sense, and in 1925 and later - exclusively yixing ⁹ .

The most general meaning of the conservative revolution is to destroy the existing degraded order of things in a revolutionary way and to create a new one based on Tradition, understood as a spiritual and historical constant, but existing in various concrete and national forms ^* . To one degree or another, all theorists of the conservative revolution proceed from the idea of the degradation of human society and civilization from the harmonious sacred

^* In this paper, the understanding of Tradition (total or integral Tradition) is based on the philosophy of R. Guenon and Yu. Evols.

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from the" golden age "of the past to the disharmonious, profane "iron age" of the modern world. They consider an essential return to the "golden age" not only possible, but also necessary, although it returns in a new external guise, taking into account all the changes that have taken place.

In the first half of the 18th century, the founder of the philosophical "school of national sciences" (kokugakuha), which became one of the spiritual, philosophical and ideological foundations of Meiji Yixin, Kada Azumamaro coined the term "Ancient Way" (kodo), meaning "the way of the sovereign and subjects and the veneration of legitimate emperors with a single pedigree" ¹⁰ . In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the most prominent Kokugakuha theorist Motoori Norinaga formulated the still very vague doctrine of the "Ancient Path" into a full-fledged traditionalist concept of the "True Path", the "Path of the Deity", equating these concepts with each other and using them to designate Shinto in its "primordial", "original" form, free from foreign influences and restrictions. "layers". Later, this concept, developed by his disciple and follower Hirata Atsutane, would play a significant role in shaping the spiritual side of Meiji Yixin. Almost at the same time, between 1793 and 1796, the Russian poet and thinker P. A. Slovtsov wrote the ode "Antiquity", which stands out in the history of both poetry and philosophical thought in Russia. Putting forward as an ideal "antiquity "("primordial time "in the modern terminology of M. Eliade), he contrasted it with both the already obsolete" old "and the not yet perfect"new". In the usual old - new opposition, the religious and spiritualistic traditions of the time (such as Freemasonry) favored the "old", and the rationalistic teachings preferred the "new". Slovtsov, on the other hand, completely rejects this opposition, becoming, as it were, above it: according to his interpretation, the "ancient" is not just older than the profane "old", but fundamentally different from it, because it is primordial, eternal and has a sacred character; for the same reason, the sacred "ancient" is fundamentally different from the profane "old". the profane "new", which in the course of time will inevitably turn into "old". In short, "antiquity" is a "sacred time," as opposed to the profane time of both "old" and"new." Before Slovtsov (and for a long time after), no one in Russia formulated so clearly traditionalist ideas." I think we can use Slovtsov's formula to describe the spiritual ideal of Meiji Yixing as a conservative revolution.

The study of the conservative revolution in the world-historical context allows us to identify its following essential features:: 1) orientation towards national spiritual, cultural and religious traditions, collectivism, patriotism, deism; 2) rejection of the materialistic and cosmopolitan "modern world "(a term coined by R. Guenon) as anti-spiritual and anti-national; 3) recognition of the revolutionary and rejection of the evolutionary path of struggle with the "modern world"; 4) acceptance of modern institutions, technologies, etc., if they are necessary to achieve the goals of the revolution and are subordinated to its spiritual principles; 5) rejection of individualism, materialism, atheism, cosmopolitanism, the spirit of"Protestant ethics". In other words, God is superior to man. Spirit is higher than matter, politics is higher than economics, the state is higher than the individual, the interests of the collective (state, nation, family, or other community) are higher than personal ones, and among collectives, preference is usually given to the large over the smaller. Of course, the specifics of each conservative revolution, as well as the teachings and movements associated with it, vary depending on the specific historical conditions in a particular society. We will now turn to them.

By the beginning of the Bakumatsu period ("the end of the Bakufu"; 1854-1867), the Tokugawa regime was experiencing a total systemic crisis that could no longer be overcome by peaceful means.

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reform from above (an example is the failure of the policy of Regent Ai Naosuke, who was assassinated by a representative of the radical opposition in 1859), i.e. without a radical change of elites ^* . As historical experience shows, such crises often lead to spiritual degradation and socio-political disintegration of society and the state, and even to disastrous transformations of the ethnic group. Nor could the violent "closure of the country" (sakoku) continue. But by this time, Japan had already formed, primarily on the basis of the "school of national sciences" and the "school of Mito" (Mito, gakuha), a capable traditionalist - oriented spiritual and political counter-elite, sufficiently structured and having a program of action in the current crisis conditions. There was a common understanding of the main goals and objectives, although there were significant differences on specific issues, compounded by the inevitable power struggle within the counter-elite itself. The creators of Meiji Yixing were aware of the inevitability of both a clash with the "civilized world" and carrying out revolutionary transformations as the only way to withstand external pressure. But they made a return to the integral Tradition the spiritual basis of the transformation.

One of the first measures of the new government (April 5, 1868) was the legislative registration of the " unity of ritual and administration "(saisei itti), which was not only a political act, but also a return to the ancient sacred principle of the unity of secular and spiritual power, royal and priestly functions - the basis of any traditional society. The fact that this was done at the very beginning of the Meiji transformations, in the neighborhood of the first steps towards the "discovery" of the country's internationalization, in my opinion, convincingly testifies precisely to the conservative-revolutionary nature of Meiji Yixing, and not to its "incomplete" from the point of view of European revolutionary canons.

In this connection, the somewhat unusual definition of Meiji Yixing as a "mystical revolution" proposed by the historian of religion A. A. Nakorchevsky deserves attention ^.12 Part of the Meiji elite tried to turn Shinto ^{or rather, its philosophical "version" developed in the first half of the 19th century by the philosopher of the "school of national sciences" Hirata Atsutane and known as Hirata} Shinto13 ) into a "full-fledged "state religion, while pursuing not only spiritual, but also ideological and political goals, which was the main goal of the Meiji government. supported by the leaders of some mystical schools and teachings within Shinto. For many reasons, it was not possible to fulfill the plan: "theocracy or ideocracy did not work out", as A. A. Nakorchevsky successfully summed up, and the "state Shinto" (kokka Shinto) that appeared later was significantly different from the Early Japanese version ^.14 I believe that this process should also be considered within the framework of the evolution of the "Meiji model of development" as a whole. However, the religious and spiritual transformations undertaken in the first years of Meiji - both successfully implemented and unsuccessful-were, in the terminology of A. Moeller van den Broek, clearly conservative (i.e., not reactionary) and were carried out in a revolutionary way, which reflects the conservative-revolutionary character of Meiji Yixing in Japan. overall. However, these events need further reflection and detailed research.

An understanding of the unity of ritual and governance has been inherent in Shinto throughout the historical period of its existence. So, from the verb matsuru comes not only the key concept for Shinto ritualism matsuri (performing a ritual; honoring kami deities ; performing a cult), but also matsurigoto (performing a proper ritual).-

^* The author of this paper adheres to the concept of changing elites of the Italian sociologist and economist V. Pareto, considering it the most adequate in the analysis of the events under consideration.

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actions; management; service) 15 . In this regard, we should recall the words of R. Guenon: "The social level can by no means become the area from which the correction of the current state of affairs in the modern world should begin. If, after all, this correction had begun precisely in the social sphere, with the correction of consequences, and not of causes (emphasis added). - V. M.) it would have no serious foundation and would eventually turn out to be just another illusion. Purely social transformations can never lead to the establishment of true stability. " ¹⁶ The Meiji Yixing leaders understood this and took care to sacralize their transformations (including those that were completely "earthly" in nature), because " true power always passes from above, and that is why it can only be legalized with the sanction of what is above the social sphere, that is, only with the sanction of the authorities." spiritual" ¹⁷ . The strength of true conservatism lies in its traditional, spiritual foundations, but this does not in any way mean that it is not viable in practical politics or remote from it. A. Moeller van den Broek, a thinker and at the same time a "man of action", tirelessly emphasized that " creative conservatism is more vital in the political field than in the real world." any other" ¹⁸ . I believe that this conclusion also applies to Meiji yixing and her results.

In Japan, the personification of such power, at least formally, both "heavenly" and "earthly" - was the emperor. Referring to the question of his spiritual role in post-Meiji Japan, American journalist X Bayes ^* wrote during World War II: "Hirohito is never the emperor of the Japanese in a more authentic sense than when he prays to their gods before the altar in the vestments of a priest. Perhaps the fact that he can perform these rites interests the Japanese more than the fact that he can appoint and remove prime ministers. The combination of priest and king in one person is a relic of the oldest epochs of mankind. In primitive tribes and ancient societies, the king offered sacrifices to the gods. The dual function that was universal at the dawn of society is now preserved only in Japan. " ¹⁹ At the same time, he was echoed by the Shinto expert J. R. R. Tolkien. Holtom: "The old communal form of religion that was normal in the West two thousand years ago now exists in Japan as a powerful social and religious force... In this country, community life and religion still form a single entity. " ²⁰ In these words, the motif of the "backwardness" and "primitiveness" of Japan and its traditional religion, which was widespread until relatively recently in European and American literature, is clearly heard, which, I note, was generally a characteristic reaction of the "civilized world" to everything that did not fit into its schemes and templates.

On the contrary, the Italian traditionalist theorist Yu. Evola considered following the principle of unity of ritual and management to be the key to supreme Harmony: "This was understood by ancient people, when they honored at the head of the hierarchy beings whose royal nature was fused with the sacred (emphasis added). - V. M.) and whose temporal power was permeated by the spiritual authority of a "more inhuman "nature"; "the traditional sacred king himself was a being of divine nature and treated the "gods" as his own kind; he was of a "heavenly" kind, like them, had the same blood as them, and as a result, it was the center-the affirming, free, cosmic principle. " ²¹ In his treatise Pagan Imperialism (1927), from which these quotations are taken, Evola does not mention a word about Japan, but many of his remarks are quite appropriate to it. Much less radical in his traditionalism than Evola, the American philosopher J. R. R. Tolkien was a great success. Mason in the same years sympathetically noted,

^* Interestingly, this militant anti-traditionalist in the same book described Meiji yixing as "restoration-revolution"!

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that "Japan is the only modern country that has kept its spiritual attitude to life unchanged from ancient times to the present" ²² .

The combination of traditional and revolutionary elements in Meiji Yixing is especially noticeable when addressing the problem of Japan's internationalization, its entry into the "civilized world", which was one of the most important tasks that the new government faced, as they say, on the next day ²³ . The internationalization of Japan was the key to its survival in interaction with the "civilized world", in relations with which two extremes were possible. The first is the rejection of everything foreign: let us recall the slogan of the traditionalist anti-Tokugawa opposition joi, "expel the barbarians". The second is its complete, uncritical copying, especially in conditions of severe external pressure. The first one was smart enough to refuse, the second one was strong enough to avoid. Having come to power and become the ruling elite, yesterday's counter-elite gradually abandoned the slogan of joi, first redirecting it... To China as a motivation for rejecting "Chinaism" in the spirit of kokugakuh's ideas.

The" golden mean " was found in the wakon - yesai formula ("Japanese spirit-European science"). During the Bakumatsu period, the philosopher Sakuma Shozan also proposed another version of my dotoku-seie gijutsu ("Eastern morality - Western technology"). "European science" included not only the use of steam and electricity, but also European ideas (freedom, civil rights, separation of powers), institutions (parliament, political parties) and customs, up to wearing tailcoats and smoking tobacco. However, due to the traditionalist orientation of most of the Meiji elite, all this " European science "was imbued with the" Japanese spirit " and was accepted not by itself and not completely, but only as necessary or suitable for the new Japan. What a contrast to Peter's transformations, which could be defined by the formula ekon-esai, "European spirit - European science"!

As early as the ninth century, the famous poet and statesman Sugawara Michizane insisted on following the wakon-kansai principle ("the Japanese spirit is Chinese science"):" these teachings are good as long as they do not distort the native feelings of the Japanese. " ²⁴ More than a thousand years later, in 1934, T. Shiratori, a conservative revolutionary diplomat and political analyst, said the same thing: "What is good for Japan is what it can absorb without losing its identity." ²⁵ The technological gap between Japan and Europe or the United States at the time of Meiji Yixing was significant and indisputable, so the new elite sought to catch up as soon as possible, with minimal losses and costs. Japan turned out to be a capable but quite independent student, despite the well-known craving for external copying of borrowed forms. As for the myth of its spiritual "lag" behind the "advanced" countries that emerged in the first decades of the Meiji era, it should be attributed to the costs of this complex process.

Meiji yixing taught an impressive lesson to both the "civilized world" and the still-unawakened Asia. Impressed by the pace and success of Japan's material progress, European and American observers initially saw it as a result of its perception and use of the most "progressive", anti-traditionalist teachings such as utilitarianism and positivism. The Japanese, including many thinkers and representatives of the ruling elite, were very fond of them themselves: just at this time, G. Spencer, S. Smiles, I. Bentham, J. Locke, J. St. Mill, A. Smith were very popular among them. However, the unsatisfactoriness of this "answer" gradually became apparent-first for the Japanese themselves, and then for the most visionary foreigners. Awareness of the spiritual significance of Tradition and related philosophical and ideological teachings in the success of the Meiji period

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It did not come immediately, but when it did, it had a significant impact on Japanese thought in the first half of the twentieth century, from K. Nishida and T. Watsuji to S. Okawa and M. Yasuoka.

Of course, during the 77 years of its existence (1868-1945), the" Meiji model of development " has experienced many radical changes that have largely changed and even distorted its original essence. Artificial conservation, "freezing" of the national-oriented ideology of Meiji Yixing by the ruling elite without due consideration of changing realities, led in the first one and a half to two decades of the XX century to a certain spiritual stagnation, to the decline of the influence of traditional values and to a new wave of uncritical perception of everything foreign as "advanced" in the era of "Taisho democracy". van den Broek was right to repeat that a revolution cannot remain "revolutionary" forever. A new sharp swing of the pendulum towards conservatism, nationalism and traditionalism in the first 10-15 years of the Showa era (1926-1941) brought to life the "neotraditionalist renaissance" of Japanese thought and at the same time the rise of militarism and chauvinism.

At the same time, many Western philosophers are gradually becoming aware that European civilization is experiencing an unmistakable spiritual crisis and that in the East (understood quite broadly!) there is a lot to learn. The enthusiastic reception given by Japanese intellectuals to O. Spengler's " Sunset of Europe "(by the way, it was translated by none other than the prominent traditionalist philosopher M. Yasuoka) is explained by their peculiar perception of the forecasts of the "grumpy sunset": in recognition of the old age and decline of the West, they also saw recognition of the youth and vitality of the East. traditional Eastern civilizations as an example of the degraded " modern world "of both the West and the Westernized East, which he harshly criticized; while condemning the" Westernized " tendencies of Meiji Japan in the general context of the internationalization of the East, he refrained from criticizing Meiji Yixing. J. Mason, developing the fashionable at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries A. Bergson's teaching about "creative intuition", pointed to Japan as its historical, physical embodiment and Shinto as a metaphysical embodiment. "The very fact that Japan's powerful Shinto revival coincided with the transition of its culture from the Middle Ages to modern progress shows how much creative potential there is in its mythology... Shinto is only enhanced by material progress, because in its myths life itself reveals a subjective knowledge of itself and everything"; "Shinto is always pure subconscious spiritual intuition" ²⁶ . Calling for spiritual harmony, for dialogue, and in the future for the synthesis of civilizations and cultures of the East and West, the same author wrote: "The West cannot borrow everything that the East offers in its entirety, nor will the full acceptance of Western materialist activism bring any benefits to the East. However, borrowing the utilitarian features of the West will not violate the spirituality and aesthetics of the East, just as the West will not lose its ability to make material progress by learning from the spiritual and aesthetic development of the East... Neither the East nor the West can be idealized at the expense of the other. East and West are partners for each other, because they are equally not self-sufficient. " ²⁷

I'll try to sum up some results. The definition of Meiji Yixing as a conservative revolution seems to be the most accurate and adequate at the moment, and allows for a more historical assessment of its prerequisites, nature and results than previously given. Meiji Yixing fulfilled all the main spiritual, political, social and economic tasks facing her and implemented all the reforms necessary for dynamic development in the context of rapid entry into the "civilized world", while relying on the integral Tradition in its original national forms. The conservative Meiji Yixing revolution, which took place in a traditional society, was primarily national, not class-based-

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ter (the class factor cannot be ignored, but in this case it is not the determining factor). Its previous interpretations were characterized by one-sidedness, primarily because Meiji yixing was uncritically applied to ideas about European bourgeois revolutions that took place in non-traditional societies and had a predominantly class character.

The historical experience of Meiji Yixing strongly demonstrates the universal nature of the phenomenon of the conservative revolution, and the applicability of this concept to the history of different countries and continents, and not just Europe, as it was done until now. At the same time, the unique national features of the Japanese conservative revolution (including those caused by the specifics of national forms of integral tradition) significantly enrich our understanding of this complex and multidimensional phenomenon as a whole.

notes

^{Feldman-Konrad N. I.} 1 Japanese-Russian educational dictionary of hieroglyphs, Moscow, 1977, p. 466.

^{Lavrentiev B. P.} 2 Pocket Japanese-Russian Dictionary, Moscow, 1989, p. 37.

^{Moeller van den Bruck} 3 Germany's Third Empire. L., 1933. P. 179.

^{Dugin A.} 4 Conservative Revolution, Moscow, 1993, pp. 337-338.

^{Fujisawa С.} 5 Some Fundamental Traits of Japanese Culture (1933) // Fujisawa C. The Essentials of the Japanese and Oriental Political Philosophy. Tokyo, <1934>. P. 301-302.

^{Moeller van den Bruck.} 6 Op. cit. P. 180.

⁷ For a substantial analysis of this problem, see: Molodyakova E. V. Meiji model razvitiya / / Reflections on Japanese History, Moscow, 1996; Markaryan S. B., Molodyakova E. V. Japanese Society: the Book of Changes, Moscow, 1996. Ch. 1 and 2.

⁸ For more information, see: Molodyakov V. E. "Meiji Yixing" - conservative Revolution // Problems of the Far East. 1993. N 6; for details, see: Molodyakov V. E. Conservative Revolution in Japan: ideology and Politics, Moscow, 1999.

⁹ Molodyakov V. E. Conservative Revolution in Japan: Ideology and Politics, pp. 154-157.

¹⁰ Cit. by: Mikhailova Yu. D. Motoori Norinaga. Zhizn i tvorchestvo [Life and Creativity], Moscow, 1988, p. 39.

¹¹ Text of an ode with historical and literary commentary: Poets of the 1790s and 1810s. l., 1971. ("The Poet's Library", large series).

^{Nakorchevsky A. A.} 12 Shinto. St. Petersburg, 2000, pp. 381-387.

¹³ For more information, see the sections written by A. A. Nakorchevsky ("Shinto in the Tokugawa era") and V. E. Molodyakov ("Shinto and Japanese Thought"): Essays on the History of Shinto. Vol. 1.Moscow, 2002 (in print).

¹⁴ For a theoretical analysis of the nature and reasons for the failure to create a state cult based on Hirata Shinto in the first years of Meiji, see Muraoka T. Hirata Shinto and the Ideological Control of the Meiji Restoration / / Muraoka T. Studies in Shinto Thought. Tokyo, 1964. I note that this work, which sharply criticized the use of religion for political purposes, was first published in Japan in 1938, at the height of the existence of the "state Shinto".

^{Kitagawa J.M.} 15 'Matsuri' and 'Matsuri-goto': Religion and State in Early Japan // Kitagawa J.M. On Understanding Japanese Religion. Princeton, 1987.

^{Guenon R.} 16 Krizis sovremennogo mira [Crisis of the modern world]. p. 70.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 74.

^{Moeller van den Bruck.} 18 Op. cit. P. 133.

^{Byas H.} 19 Government by Assassination. N.Y., 1942. P. 316.

^{Holtom D.C.} 20 Modem Japan and Shinto Nationalism. A Study of Present-Day Trends in Japanese Religions. N.Y.,1947. P.1-3.

^{Evola Yu} 21 Pagan Imperialism ,Moscow, 1992, pp. 7, 106.

^{Mason J.W.T.} 22 The Creative East. N.Y., 1928. P. 116.

²³ For more information, see: Molodyakov V. E. Three internationalizations of Japan //Japan: Turning the Page, Moscow, 1998.

^{Grigorieva T. P.} 24 Thirty years later / / S. G. Eliseev and World Japanese Studies, Moscow, 2000, p. 68.

^{Toshio Shiratori.} 25 The Reawakening of Japan // Contemporary Japan. V. III. N 1 (March 1934). P. 12.

^{Mason J.W.T.} 26 The Meaning of Shinto. N.Y., 1935. P. 42, 107.

^{Mason J.W.T.} 27 The Creative East. P. 12.

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