Department of Oriental Studies

The Far East is a big "headache" for Russian government leaders, politicians, scientists and other public figures, not to mention the local population. There are many reasons for concern about the fate of this region within the Russian Federation. Among them, first of all, it is necessary to mention low rates of industrial growth. In 2005, for example, against the background of the overall, on average, Russian industrial growth of 4%, the Far East showed the lowest rate - 2.2%, as well as in Siberia (the same 2.2%), which is also experiencing significant difficulties in modernizing its economy. Both regions are also characterized by particularly negative demographic trends. In any case, even against the background of the natural population decline characteristic of the whole country, only in them is there a significant migration decline. There is a steady outflow of residents to warmer regions, where at the same time there is a relatively high level of economic activity1.

FAR EAST - "HALF-CUT HUNK"?

The Far East is relatively poorly integrated into the country's economic and social space. There are 1.1 people per 1 sq. km of its territory (on average in the Russian Federation - 8.4, in the Central District - 55.7 people), and in the most densely populated part - Primorsky Krai - only 12.7 people. The district produces only 6.4% of Russia's GDP. The bulk of its export products, more than 90%, are exported to non-CIS countries-compared to less than 85% in Russia as a whole. Despite the fact that the general figures include oil, which, as is known, does not belong to the main export goods of the Far Eastern region itself [Russian Statistical Yearbook, 2003, p. 35 - 37, 294 - 295, 303 - 304.].

In 2002, interregional migration of the population of the Far Eastern Federal District was distributed among the regions of the Russian Federation as follows ( % ): Central - 35; North-West - 10.4; Southern - 14.8; Volga - 13.3; Ural - 5.4; Siberian - 21.1 [RFE, 2003, pp. 122-123].

Industrial structure of the Far Eastern Federal District - main branches (2002,%): non-ferrous metallurgy-29.8; electric power industry-17.3; food industry-17.1; mechanical engineering and metalworking-13.6; forestry, woodworking and pulp and paper industry- ___

1 According to the 2002 census, the population of the Ural, Siberian and Far Eastern Federal Districts of Russia is 39,133 thousand people. Including Siberian-20,064 thousand people, Far Eastern-6687 thousand people. [Russian Statistical Yearbook..., 2003, p. 111, 115; Socio-economic situation..., 2003, N 12, p. 75 - 76, 403 - 404, 409 - 410; 2005, N 12, pp. 301-302].

page 5

Table 1

Population dynamics in the Far Eastern Federal District, 1970-2003 (thousands of people)

Population of the Far Eastern Federal District

1970

1979

1989

2002

2003

5780

6845

7950

6687

6643

Including the city

4126

5028

6027

5048

-

Including rural areas

1654

1757

1923

1609

-

-----

1970-2002 - population census data [Russian Statistical Yearbook..., 2003, pp. 76-79]; 2003-estimation.

Calculated from: [Socio-economic situation..., 2003, N 12, pp. 402, 408].

Table 2

Interregional migration of the population of the Far Eastern Federal District, 1999-2003 (thousands of people)

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Migrants

-59.9

-33.5

-60.3

-55.5

-27.7

-----

Sources: 1999-2000-11 months. [Socio-economic situation..., 2000, N 12, p. 392]; 2001-2003 - 12 months. [RFE, 2003, p. 122-123]; 2003-Socio-economic situation..., 2003, N 12, p. 407-408].

Table 3

Industrial production index, 1995-2003 (% of the previous year)

Regions

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

RF

97

95

102

95

111

112

105

105

108

Far Eastern Federal District

-

-

-

-

-

107

100

100

105

Primorsky Krai

99

91

95

93

113

103

85

102

-

-----

1995-to the average annual indicator for 1986-1990. Sources: 1995-2002 - [RFE, 2003, pp. 342-344; 2003- [Socio-economic situation. 2003, No. 12, pp. 273-274].

paper industry - 5.3; oil production-5.2; coal industry-4.5 [RFE, 2003, p. 345].

The share of Far Eastern Federal Districts in certain types of industrial products of the Russian Federation (2002,%): wood export -12.9; coal - 11.8; TV sets - 10.9; lumber - 4.5; electricity - 4.3 [RFE, 2003, pp. 350-351].

Foreign trade of the Far Eastern Federal District in 2002 (January-September, USD million) USA): export - 3033 (to countries outside the CIS-3023); share in the export of the Russian Federation-3.4%; import-1164 (from countries outside the CIS-1158), share in the import of the Russian Federation-3.2% [Socio-economic situation..., 2003, N 12, p. 358].

All this causes vague fears in the society of the gradual colonization of the territory of the region by Chinese migrants with the threat of its subsequent rejection by China. Or another option - economic reorientation to the Asia-Pacific region. However, according to some analysts, anti-Chinese sentiments in Russia do not have a solid foundation. If, of course, we rely on facts that are suitable and sufficient for correct scientific extrapolation into the future, and not engage in apocalyptic predictions and assumptions about the possible destabilization of the huge Chinese state under the pressure of negative economic and social trends. Those politicians and members of the public who, using the motives of idiosyncrasies-

page 6

Table 4

Far Eastern Federal District: production of certain types of industrial products (1990,1995, 2000, 2003)

1990

1995

2000

2003

Electricity, billion rubles kW-h

47.5

38.5

38.8

38.9

Oil, thousand tons

2026

1908

3781

3600

Coal, mln tons

49.8

33.9

28.4

30.7

Metal cutting machines, pcs.

839

530

82

0.0

Sawn timber, million cubic meters

5.4

1.0

0.7

0.9

Paper, thousand tons

215.5

14.0

9.5

0.3

Cement, mln tons

4.8

1.1

0.8

1.2

Shoes, million pairs

10.2

0.7

0.2

0.0

Canned food, million usl. cans

274

220

113

14

-----

Sources: 1990-2002 - [RFE, 2003, p. 357, 359, 362, 372, 375, 376, 377, 384, 390]; 2003 G. - [Socio-economic situation..., 2003, N 12, p. 308].

The hostility to foreigners in the Russian national consciousness and the fear of Chinese competition among the population of the Far East inflate the threat of the "yellow danger", partly out of self - interest, and partly out of an inability to go beyond ordinary consciousness themselves. At the same time, it is quite understandable that many specific facts that can give society a more accurate picture of what is happening in the Far East are ignored.

For example, it was enough for a researcher from Vladivostok, German Dudchenko, to take a closer look at demographic statistics than is customary in our country lately, and the frightening image of China hanging over the eastern outskirts of our country was presented in a different light [Dudchenko, 2002, p.143-149]. In fact, as if there is something to be afraid of. The Russian Far East is home to less than 7 million people with a population density of 1.1 people per square kilometer, while the northeastern provinces of the People's Republic of China are home to about 125 million people (124.4 people per square kilometer). But, as the author notes, it is not quite correct methodically to calculate the population density for subsequent comparisons, based only on the total area of administrative-territorial entities adjacent to the state border. There is a pattern in the distribution of population density throughout Northeast Asia that is common to both Russia and China. In both cases, it becomes smaller as you move from south to north, depending on the climatic conditions and position in relation to transport arteries. The conclusion about the absence of threatening demographic pressure is confirmed by direct comparison of Primorsky Krai with the neighboring Chinese province of Heilongjiang. The central district is most densely populated, while others, including the border areas, are less densely populated. According to this indicator, those located in the immediate vicinity of Primorsky Krai are comparable to the adjacent Russian territory.

Vladivostok researcher Viktor Larin, for his part, believes that for Russia " economic considerations in assessing the role of Chinese migration in its own development are still in the last place. Politics plays the first fiddle. Everyone plays the Chinese card...". In fact, " the Chinese presence in the Far East is not at all the danger that its residents should be afraid of. A much greater threat, masked by noisy lamentations about Chinese expansion, is the theft of the natural resources of the Far East by resourceful Russians and their sale not only to China, but also to Japan, the United States, South Korea and other countries." Competition between Chinese migrants and local residents for jobs is rather weak, except for the "shuttle" business and individual crafts, but the latter benefits Russian consumers. In the industrial sphere, it is practically absent, even in agriculture. At the same time, the main idea runs through the author's text that Chinese migration highlights those well-known shortcomings in the organization of local administrative, economic and social life that are inherent in our Far East. The huge positive potential inherent in Chinese migration is being exploited

page 7

it is extremely inefficient and mostly not in the interests of the region itself "[Larin, 2001, p. 77-109].

From all this, it follows that Russia is in dire need of a deeply and comprehensively developed special strategy for the development of the Far East. But so far there is no such system, and therefore it is not clear what is meant to be laid in its foundations .2 Only the Energy Strategy of Russia until 2020, which was adopted by the Government of the Russian Federation in 2003, refers to the prospects for the development of energy resources in the eastern (Far East and Eastern Siberia) regions of the country. But even this is a rather general document, which contains little concrete information about how to solve the above problem. Moreover, on a number of principled positions, it only contains existing points of view (which, by the way, in some cases exclude each other) .3 Individual provisions of the Strategy related to the problem raised here will be discussed a little later. In the meantime, we can talk mainly about fundamental ideas and positions regarding the development strategy of the eastern regions of the country.

"IT'S COLD TO SWIM IN RUSSIA IN THE SUMMER"

Among them, the point of view of American researchers Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, described by them in the book "The Siberian Curse", is of particular interest.: how communist planning threw Russia into the cold " 4 . In their opinion, the current problems of Russia in its East are the consequences of Soviet labor-intensive "military industrialization", which focused on the development of heavy industry with an emphasis on the military-industrial complex and its uniform placement on the territory of the country. As a result, Siberia has developed an excess population and excess industrial capacity that is currently unviable in a market economy. Moreover, we can add that they are burdensome even in the conditions of the unfavorable demographic situation that developed in the USSR after the Second World War. "The Soviet State Planning Committee overestimated the availability of one of the most important resources - labor," Fiona Hill delicately commented on this point [Koksharov, 2004, p .73].5

In a number of regions of the country - without a sufficient resource base, with a cold climate and remote from other regions of developed industry - huge industrial centers have grown, where production costs are on average four times higher than in its European part. As a result, from the point of view of the authors cited, "Siberia is not sparsely populated, as some Russian politicians claim, but rather too densely populated." They estimate that 10-15 million people are" superfluous " for the geography and climate of Siberia and the Far East. In market conditions, all of them are

2 The complexity of developing a realistic strategy of this kind is indicated by the results of the investment rating of Russian regions calculated by the rating agency RA "Expert". On a twelve-step scale of investment attractiveness of regions (from the highest level "maximum potential - minimum risk" to the lowest - "minimum potential - extreme risk") The Primorye and Khabarovsk Territories are ranked at the 5th level-"medium potential - moderate risk"; the Sakhalin Region is ranked at the 7th level - "insignificant potential-moderate risk"; the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) is ranked at the 9th level - "medium potential - high risk"; the Amur Region is ranked at the 10th level -"low potential - high risk"; Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Kamchatka and Magadan Regions on the 11th - "insignificant potential - high risk" [Expert, 2003, N 43, p. 134].

3 For example, there is still no agreement even on where the gas that is planned to be produced in Eastern Siberia should be sent: for export across the eastern borders of the country or to the west deep into its territory.

4 For an interview with Fiona Hill, one of the authors of this book, see [Koksharov, 2004, pp. 72-78].

5 For dramatic reasons and consequences of the Soviet policy of labor resource mobilization, see [Aleksandrov, 1999, pp. 44-54].

page 8

they would have lived in areas with a milder climate and shorter distances (Koksharov, 2004, p. 73). This is also confirmed by demographic statistics on the directions of internal Russian migration. Nevertheless, even now, as before, it is necessary to support at the expense of the entire country the majority of local residents who remain on the ground, along with industry that operates with very low or even negative efficiency. The authors believe that the way out of this economically and socially unpromising situation is to shift the focus in the modernization of Siberia and the Far East from the labor-intensive manufacturing industry to the development of raw materials industries that can use capital-intensive technologies and a shift method of labor organization: oil and gas, forestry, and fishing. This is how oil and gas production enterprises in the north of Western Siberia have been operating for a long time. At the same time, they believe, it is necessary to implement programs for the systematic movement of the surplus industrial population from Siberia to warmer regions.

In this light, the authors ' view on the problem of Russia's national security on its eastern borders is also interesting. Touching on the topic of the threat of Chinese colonization of the Russian Far East, which is fashionable and actively inflated by some of our politicians, Fiona Hill notes (not in contradiction with the Russian researchers quoted above):: "The key reason for the Chinese presence in this region is the presence of the Russian population." Agricultural colonization there is limited by insufficiently favorable natural conditions. And from Northeastern China itself, the main flow of migrants goes not to Russia, but to the south and east of their own country - to the sea. As a result, she believes, Russia will retain sovereignty over its Far East, but economically it will be more connected not with the European part of the country, but with its Asian neighbors [Koksharov, 2004, pp. 76-78].

NOT AS A SINGLE COST

The conclusions of Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy , which are strictly liberal-economic in their ideology, seem to be largely justified. First of all, this concerns the influence of Soviet "military" industrialization on the deployment of productive forces in the Asian part of the country. However, in some aspects they require further discussion. First of all, it is not fully understood to what extent the Russian manufacturing industry, especially beyond the Urals, owes its low efficiency to objective reasons. For the authors, this is primarily a cold climate, then very long distances.

Undoubtedly, the additional burden on production costs, which is created by the cold climate and long distances of cargo transportation, cannot be discounted. However, it can be assumed that the legacy of the Soviet economic autarchy and planned distribution system played an even more important role in preserving low-efficiency industries in the Urals and Siberia. It was these reasons that predetermined the lack of incentives for technological progress in the domestic industry and, as a result,its low competitiveness in a market economy. It should still be borne in mind that the competitiveness of goods is based not only on their production costs, but also on many other factors, starting with rarity or abundance, demand, novelty in the market and quality. In addition, the hypothesis of the fatal role of economic and geographical factors in the fate of Russian industry does not explain why, nevertheless, it continues to rely on backward technologies that hinder energy saving, and energy saving is not considered an urgent task. Including in those regions that have a particularly cold climate.

The criteria for testing the hypothesis about the influence of cold climate and other unfavorable economic and geographical factors on the state of industry can be as follows:

page 9

It is supposed to provide data on the comparative energy consumption in Russia and economically more developed countries of the world. After all, in the latter, the main economic activity takes place, as a rule, in warmer climate zones than in our country. In fact, the results of such calculations are not as unambiguous as is usually expected from them. In order to determine the degree of influence of such factors on the conditions of economic development, in-depth research is required at both the micro and macro levels. Even so, the results may not be sufficiently satisfactory, since an economy based on a comprehensive social division of labor is a rather complex object for mechanical dissection in the interests of analysis. It is all built on a variety of relationships and interdependencies.

For example, an initial comparison of data on energy consumption in Russia and the much warmer latitudes of the United States seems to confirm the conclusions of pessimists who claim that a country with such unfavorable climatic conditions and huge distances, such as Russia, is obviously doomed to be at the tail of the economic competition of world producers. Therefore, it must adhere to economic autarky until it independently or, better, in cooperation with other outsiders of technological progress from among the former Soviet republics increases its level of competitiveness. However, it is not known at the expense of what and how, since there is no one to compete with. After all, correspondence competition is just something like a boxing training "shadow fight". It cannot contribute to the necessary selection of appropriate technologies and production facilities, and, most importantly, bring in the large funds required for technological progress.

It would seem that those who noticed that "it is cold to swim in Russia in the summer" are right. Final total energy consumption for all types of fuel in the late 1990s (almost identical to the current one) in Russia (1999) amounted to 559.9 million tons of conventional fuel (CU), and in the United States - 1429.7 million tons [Russia in the modern world, 2002, p. 91,168]. According to the author's rough calculations, this means that in Russia, 0.063 units of CU per unit of GDP, and in the United States - 0.002 units, that is, about 3 times less. But it is impossible to determine without in-depth research how much of the difference is made up of higher costs in Russia for heating and lighting enterprises and residential centers, plus transportation costs, and how much is due to backward technologies and general disregard for energy conservation due to subsidized prices of basic energy carriers through the state budget. This practice was established from the very beginning of forced ("Stalinist") industrialization and continues to this day. Now it is largely forced, although Russian representatives in negotiations with the WTO continue to argue that administratively low prices for electricity and gas are a natural comparative advantage of our economy. Instead of recognizing that, in general, this is a tool not so much to artificially increase the level of its competitiveness, but rather to support "stuck" enterprises and stabilize the living conditions of the population at least at a low level.

This argument is far from simple and does not fit into the framework of the liberal paradigm of economics, but it is still far from over, and it is difficult to say on what basis a compromise can be reached. In addition, the problem of energy consumption is not limited solely to the question of its contribution to production costs. It should also be taken into account that this is one of the necessary conditions for ensuring a certain, already achieved level of quality of life of the population in the industrial organization of its housing and communal services. In the same United States, the total energy consumption per capita is approximately 5.3 tons of CU per year against 3.8 tons in Russia, and electricity -14.4 thousand kWh against 6.0 thousand kWh, which is very different from the above data on energy consumption per unit of GDP [Russia in the Modern World, 2002, p. 23. 39 - 41,167 - 168]. In short, let's repeat, more in-depth research is required here. Especially in the northern regions

page 10

our country, including the polar regions, has historically formed a number of large industrial cities with a developed economic and municipal infrastructure. Some of them (such as Norilsk with its famous "Norilsk Nickel") play a major role in Russian industrial production and exports. Therefore, local sentiment in favor of preserving them in their current form is generated not only by the economic complexity and high cost of the proposed resettlement programs, but also by the desire to support the existing structure of the manufacturing industry in the northern regions as a prerequisite for overcoming the one-sided raw material orientation of their economy. 6

ON THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY TO EUROPE AND BACK

It is also difficult to agree with the conclusion of Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy about the different prospects for integrating the Russian Far East into the economic space of Russia and the Asia-Pacific region. It is actually based on an approach to the Russian Far East as a separate territory that exists almost in isolation from the rest of Russia - a kind of analogue in the far east of the country of its extreme western outpost - the Kaliningrad Region, only even more disconnected from the "mainland" economically. This view is then projected into the future, since the authors have some reason to doubt the prospects for modernizing a significant part of the heavy industry in the Far East and Siberia. At the same time, they do not seem to understand how the export of Russian raw materials products to the Asia-Pacific region, starting with oil and gas, could contribute to the deep integration of these regions into the economic body of the whole of Russia. It follows as if by itself that each new step towards strengthening ties between the Russian Far East and the Asia-Pacific countries will move it further away from the main part of the country.

But maybe this is really true? As you know, this point of view (as well as the slogan "yellow danger") has gained considerable popularity among Russian specialists, politicians and the public on various grounds and for various reasons. However, there are also alternative strategic views. For example, there has long been a plan to turn the Russian Far East into an extreme link in the Russian east of the transport system, which will connect the Asia-Pacific region with Western Europe as a kind of bridge. And just recently, some new steps have been taken to develop the transport network between the east and west of Russia. This is the completion of the Baikal-Amur Mainline in addition to the Trans-Siberian Mainline, as well as a section of the Chita-Khabarovsk highway. In the latter case, for the first time in the history of Russia, it became possible to talk about direct road traffic on the route Paris-Berlin-Moscow-Vladivostok. Transport arteries, in turn, are known to become a kind of magnet for economic entrepreneurship, investment and labor.

Nevertheless, this idea, which would seem to be perfect, faces criticism as insufficient even to solve the problem of including Russia in the transcontinental Eurasian transport system. Not to mention its full integration into the economic space of this vast region. For example-

6 It is no coincidence that the issue of resettling "extra" people from the Russian North to climatically more favorable regions of the country was discussed at a field meeting of the Presidium of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation with the participation of President Vladimir Putin in Salekhard at the end of April 2004. Alexander Filipenko, head of the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, spoke out against the supporters of this idea by German Gref, Minister of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation, and Alexey Miller, head of Gazprom. [http://www.rusoil.ru/news/29.04.2004].

page 11

However, according to the Moscow political analyst Vadim Tsymbursky, "general arguments about our country as a' bridge between Europe and Asia 'are unproductive or even counterproductive, since they ignore the obvious asymmetry, its provisions regarding the EU and Asia-Pacific spaces" [Tsymbursky, 2000, p.19].

He is talking about the fact that after the collapse of the "Soviet empire", Russia ceased to be the immediate periphery of a united Europe. The EU's periphery now includes the Middle East and the Maghreb, as well as the Eastern European and Caucasian sectors of what it calls the "Great Limitrof".7 Through them, we can now export from Western Europe without Russia's participation, even to the Central Asian part of this belt. This is the situation that the initiators of the TRACECA transport corridor plan are trying to exploit, which, according to its authors, should connect post-Soviet Central Asia through Georgia and Azerbaijan with Eastern Europe and Turkey. "For Europe, Russia is a transperiferal land beyond the Limitrof, like Sub-Saharan Africa" [Tsymbursky, 2000, p. 20].

Polemicizing with the latest assessment of the geostrategic position of our country, V. Tsymbursky draws attention to the fact that, unlike Europe, for the Asia - Pacific region, the Russian Far East is a direct contact periphery. But at the same time, it is only a part of the country that extends far to the west and simultaneously touches the entire continental strip of the Limitrof, access to which is extremely limited for oceanic and coastal East Asian countries. Therefore, the best way for them to enter the countries of this belt, as well as the western regions of Eurasia, in order to enter the markets of Eastern, South-Eastern and, partly, Northern Europe, Transcaucasia, the Balkans and the Middle East runs through Russia.

At the same time, the author does not share the widespread opinion that Russia's positions can be seriously threatened by the "Transcontinental Bridge" project, two branches of which out of three (the first is the Trans - Siberian Railway) are supposed to pass south of the Russian borders. One will follow the southern Silk Road (from Shanghai via Xinjiang, former Soviet Central Asia and Iran to Turkey and the Balkans), the other from India via Pakistan and Afghanistan to Iran, where it will connect with the Silk Road route. From his point of view, against the background of the real and potential "Balkanization" of the entire South Asian rimland, the last two routes look too risky and therefore unpromising [Tsymbursky, 2000, p. 20] .8

The author sees a significantly different version of the Trans-Eurasian railway system. It should also consist of three lines, the security of which, however, can be fully ensured. The first is the Trans-Siberian Railway, supplemented by BAM. The second is a branch that follows the northern route of the Silk Road through the Kazakh steppes and the Russian Urals to meet the Trans-Siberian Railway. The third is to run from Iranian ports on the Arabian Sea of the Indian Ocean through Central Asia on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea and then through Russia to Eastern and Northern Europe. At the same time, it will be competitive (or maybe additional? - Yu .A.) in relation to the international (also with the participation of Russia) project of the international transport corridor (ITC) "North-South"9.

7 According to V. Tsymbursky, the " Great Limitrof "is" a continuous belt of sovereign spaces that emerged with the end of the Soviet Empire, which stretched across the continent from Poland and the Baltic States to the Pamirs and Tien Shan, covering Eastern Europe with the Balkans, the Caucasus and "new", that is, post-Soviet, Central Asia. From a cultural point of view, this belt...It is formed by the overlapping peripheries of all the civilizations of the Old World " [Tsymbursky, 2000, pp. 3-4].

8 This can already be confirmed by the example of the impossibility of even seriously discussing the project of a transnational gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India.

9 The North-South corridor should provide cargo delivery from the Persian Gulf regions, India, and Pakistan to Iranian ports in the Caspian Sea, then by ferries to the Russian railway network, or by river-sea vessels through the internal waterways of Russia to the countries of Eastern and Central Europe and Scandinavia. At the same time, the length of the route is three times shorter than through the Suez Canal.

page 12

The goal of the Trans-Siberian project is, according to V. Tsymbursky, "to transform the position of the edge of the Pacific economic grossraum into the status of its leading edge. In this way, it would be possible to stake out for the Russian Federation a responsible function in creating income for the Pacific economies and thereby lay the prerequisites for including Russian industries and scientific and technological centers in the division of labor within this region." At the same time, it is important that all the lines of this road system, " converging in the Ural-Siberian communication core of Russia,.. we would connect the region that ensures the integrity of our country... with the Pacific space and make it a bulwark of the Asia-Pacific Region's geo-economic expansion to the west " [Tsymbursky, 2000, p. 15, 21-22].

As we can see, this scheme goes beyond the boundaries of simplified ideas about the role of Russia on the Eurasian continent solely in the form of a "bridge", a transit space between the West and the East. It seems that the idea of promoting the Asia-Pacific outpost to the Ural - Siberian region, which occupies the middle position on the territory of our country-one of its largest industrial centers-is the most important factor in the author's reasoning .10 However, even in this case, at least one question remains unanswered: what can be the contribution of Russia itself to the development of the Far East and Eastern Siberia with their integration into a single national economic body? In all the options discussed above, the main hopes are somehow placed on the economies of the Asia-Pacific countries, and Russian efforts are either explicitly or, for the most part, implicitly limited to creating favorable conditions for them on the territory of their country.

In general, this would seem to be nothing particularly surprising. Other options for involving the eastern regions of the country in the process of modernization as a natural part of the economic space of Russia, Eurasia and the global economy are very poorly viewed. The possibilities of technological re-equipment of traditional branches of their manufacturing industry are unclear. At the same time, Russia has absolutely no trump cards in order to successfully enter the fight for the mass markets of high-tech products in the Far East. The cheapness of the Russian labor force will not help in this case. These markets have long been captured primarily by Asian "tigers" from among the Asia - Pacific countries, whose ranks in recent years have also been decisively joined by China, our closest neighbor. At the same time, about a third of the Primorye economy is the military - industrial complex, but its development and peaceful conversion require large investments and a special regime of benefits, and the main Russian enterprises that have access to the Asia-Pacific arms markets are located outside this region.

Even the seemingly undisputed (and, in general, really reasonable) project of turning Russia into a transit space between Asia, from Northeast to Central, and Europe, from Central to Northern, is not without its problems. It seems like all the winds are blowing in our sails here. In the international market of container transportation (and now in the world more than 60% of goods are transported in containers, which are basically suitable for transportation in this way), Russian carriers can count on tens of billions of dollars. At the same time, it is growing by 8-10% per year, while the domestic Russian market is growing by 20-25% (see Klimenko, Rubanov, and Sivakov, 2004, pp. 36-42). At the same time, Russia already has a competitive advantage - the unique Transsib plus BAM transport system, which can reduce the time of container delivery from Southeast Asia to Europe by almost half compared to the sea route through the Suez Canal. However, in the lists of the world's largest container transport operators, Russian compa-

10 With a population of less than 7% of the total Russian population, the Ural Federal District accounts for 15.5% of the country's GDP. While the average share of the fuel industry in Russia is 19.9%, in the Urals it is 51.5%; in ferrous metallurgy-14.2% against 8.1% [RFE, 2003, p. 75, 77, 294 - 295, 344 - 345].

page 13

research institutes are not listed. Containers have not become a mass means of cargo delivery within the country either. Russian Railways (RZD) accounts for only 0.5% of the total freight traffic, and there is insufficient transshipment capacity. According to some experts, Russia will be able to reach only half of the current European level not earlier than in ten years. Container terminal capacity shortage threatens. The ports of the Russian North-West are already operating at the limit of their capacity, and the lack of port infrastructure will restrain the growth of container traffic in the coming years. The lack of container handling capacity is also felt in Novorossiysk , Russia's sea gateway on the Black Sea. Such a problem does not yet exist in the Far East (ports of Vanino, Vostochny, Vladivostok), but difficulties in the Russian Northwest and South make it difficult to implement the project of through cargo transit through Russia. There is also a catastrophic shortage of storage facilities, which is why the rental rates of warehouses are "prohibitively" high.

All of these, however, are, so to speak, "technical" difficulties that require only time and, of course, investment to overcome. But there is one difficult problem, without which the prospects of a transport corridor between the far east and the far west of Russia remain unclear in principle. This is an opportunity for Russian railways to compete with sea transport. There are currently about 7 million containers a year traveling from Southeast Asia to Europe11, but many experts doubt the possibility of switching this cargo flow to the Trans-Siberian Railway. Sea carriers have an important advantage - a lower delivery price. According to one estimate, the cost of transportation on sea lines is two times lower than on railways. We also have to take into account the problem of additional costs associated with the transit of goods through the territory of Russia. It involves payments to cargo owners for their delivery by sea to the Trans-Siberian Railway, sea transportation from the Baltic ports to Europe, as well as for two additional cargo transshipments. At the same time, according to many market participants, when deciding on the route of transportation, shippers are primarily guided by the price. Speed and quality are put in the next places.

Thus, the project of the Russian transit railway corridor, even taking into account the idea of turning its middle (Ural - south of Western Siberia) part into a powerful transport and industrial hub-an outpost of the Asia - Pacific economy to the west of them, requires serious justification from the point of view of competitiveness. Moreover, it is not entirely clear to what extent the Trans-Siberian Railway and the North-South MTC can be competitive or complementary to each other. Not that these doubts could erase the project as a whole, but the assessment of it as a competitive advantage of Russia in international freight transport markets (primarily from North-East and South-East Asia to Europe) requires clarification.

The struggle in the transport services market for control over the largest possible share in international traffic from the Asia-Pacific region, South Asia and the Middle East to Europe and the Middle East is constantly intensifying. Already, another initiative has been added to the TRACECA project, which may be competitive with the Russian Trans-Siberian Railway. Kazakhstan has announced its intention to build a transcontinental railway line in the direction of the Middle East. 3070 km of it will pass through the territory of Kazakhstan, 700 km through the territory of Turkmenistan and another 90 km through the territory of Iran. In addition, Turkey will have to build a new railway line to bypass the lake. Van and tunnels under the Bosphorus Strait. The new route will allow transportation by rail of goods from Asia-Pacific countries, which currently takes 18 days to transport by sea from Chinese ports to Rotterdam. At the first stage (until 2010), it is planned to transport 35-40 million tons of cargo by this route,

11 In terms of twenty-foot units (the conventional unit is TEU).

page 14

later - up to 100 million tons. Naturally, the proposed project attracted interest in China, Japan and the EBRD 12 .

PROBLEMS OF TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES

This, of course, does not mean denying or belittling the importance of developing the railway communications system in Eastern Russia in order to strengthen the integrity of its internal economic space and integrate it into the system of global economic relations .13 But the doubts that arise require an answer to the following question. What, however, should be the strategy that can ensure a comprehensive modernization of the Russian Far East and Transbaikalia? (By the latter, we mean the region's own economic development, its internal integration, its transformation into a full-fledged organic part of the Russian economy, as well as its inclusion in the system of economic relations of the Asia-Pacific region, not only to the detriment, but, on the contrary, to the benefit of solving all the other tasks listed above.) This leads us to turn to the only method of economic development of Siberia and the Far East mentioned above, which has not yet been specifically considered here - the use of its natural resources. First of all, about fish and forest resources, as well as about hydrocarbons.

The first two of these types of resources began to be developed in the Far East long ago. In 2003, this region accounted for 61.3% of the Russian fish catch, 20% of canned fish production, 20.7% of wood export, 13.3% of business wood, 9.1% of paper production [Socio-economic situation..., 2003, p. 44 - 45,54 - 55, 308]. However, to date, neither industry has become a "growth engine"for the region.

There are several explanations for this. In the fishing industry, conflicts have been going on for a number of years over the rules for allocating quotas for fishing and seafood. At the same time, the fate of numerous local fishing enterprises remains particularly unclear, since in Russia, as in the rest of the world, there is a shortage not of fishing capacity, but of fishing quotas. Poaching and illegal sales of fish abroad have become increasingly widespread, while the total catch of fish in the country, as recorded by official statistics, has decreased by almost 60% since the early 1990s .14 The export orientation of the fishing industry of the Far East, as well as the forestry and mining industry, has become one of the main factors that increase its investment risk rating [Expert, 2003, N 21, p. 106 - 107]. In the timber industry, the export market is dominated by roundwood and almost untreated raw boards, and profits from high prices are eaten up by transport costs, while the domestic market is limited by low effective demand. High-quality forest has already been largely cut down within the existing road transport infrastructure. The conditions for capital investment in this industry are considered insufficiently attractive by investors, especially in industries with high added value [Expert, 2003, N42, p. 124].

But even if there are major positive changes in these two industries, there is no clear answer to the question of how much this can do.

12 http://www.rusenergy.com/archives/23.04.2004.

13 Speaking at a meeting on the development of transport Infrastructure in the Far East and Trans-Baikal Territory on February 26, 2004, President Putin called modernization of the Far Eastern transport complex one of the priorities of Russia's Transport Strategy. This should be done in a comprehensive manner, developing various types of transport, communications, energy and communications. He emphasized the need for balanced development of the port industry, as well as railway and pipeline transport infrastructure [Kremlin.ru. 27.04.2004].

14 As they say, " every Russian sailor who enters a Chinese port feeds four Chinese people." Up to 80% of fish caught in the two-hundred-mile zone of the Russian Federation is sold directly abroad, not falling under the export item, according to the current legislation, since the customs border runs along the twelve-mile zone [Expert, 2003, N 42, p.60].

page 15

It is necessary to provide for a deeper integration of the region into the national economy. After all, both the forestry industry and fishing in the Far East can successfully develop, mainly as export industries focused on the Far Eastern neighbors, but relatively poorly connected with the economy of the rest of Russia. Naturally, as the problem as a whole has been comprehended, the eyes of politicians and analysts have increasingly turned to the oil and gas resources of the eastern regions of the country. But what is their potential?

OIL AND GAS - THE BUSINESS OF THE FUTURE

For a long historical period, since the 1960s, the north of the Urals has played a major role in solving any economic problems of all-Russian strategic importance related to oil supplies. The Tyumen Region alone provides about 70% of its total Russian volume. But in the eastern regions of the country, the oil and gas industry is still rather poorly developed. Of the 408 million tons of oil produced in Russia in 2003, the Far East accounted for 3,670 million tons, including 3,252 million tons produced in the Sakhalin Region and the rest in Yakutia. Siberia produced 14.3 million tons of oil, including 93.7% in the Tomsk Region. Natural gas production in the Far East in 2003 amounted to 3.6 billion cubic meters (including 2.0 billion cubic meters in Sakhalin); in Eastern Siberia-5.7 billion cubic meters (5.2 billion cubic meters in the Tomsk region) - respectively 0.62% and 0.98% of the total Russian (581 billion cubic meters) volume [Socio-economic situation..., 2003, N 12, pp. 302, 307, 308, 310].

In general, according to experts, the potential hydrocarbon resources of Eastern Siberia and the Far East are quite large. According to some of them, the initial potential hydrocarbon reserves of the region reach 42 billion tons of oil equivalent (te). Of the initial all-Russian reserves concentrated on the continental shelf (which is 30% of the total Russian gas reserves, more than 20% of gas condensate and 12% of oil), 13% falls on the shelf of the Siberian Arctic Seas and 11% - on the shelf of the Far Eastern Seas. But their geological and geophysical study makes only the first steps. So far, only 18.7 billion rubles have been localized by structure. tne of potential resources of the Okhotsk, Bering, East Siberian and Chukchi Seas, as well as seismic surveys were made, which only revealed the general geological structure of the shelf and delineated the boundaries of the main oil and gas basins.

It is assumed that the increase in gas reserves will be provided by the development of the Kovykta gas condensate field in the Irkutsk region, the Chayandinsky oil and gas condensate field in Yakutia, the same fields in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, and the Sakhalin shelf. In total, 11.3% of the initial raw material resources and 4.1% of Russia's proven gas reserves are concentrated within the Far Eastern Federal District - in Yakutia, onshore and offshore Sakhalin and the Kamchatka Region, in the Chukotka Autonomous District and Khabarovsk Krai. The annual contribution of this region to gas production may reach 100 - 110 billion cubic meters by 2020.In accordance with the guidelines of the Russian Energy Strategy until 2020, the share of Eastern Siberia and the Far East in Russian hydrocarbon production will reach 15%. Most of the rest (55-58% instead of 68% at present) will still be provided by Western Siberia [Vinogradova, 2003; Meshcherin, 2003; Glumov, 2002; Vinogradova, 2002; Recommendations of parliamentary hearings... ,2002].

According to the Ministry of Natural Resources, the development of the oil and gas complex in Eastern Siberia and the Far East will require $ 80-90 billion. for 20 years. Even the strategy for the development of the fuel and energy sector in this region has not yet been defined, and there are intense discussions around it. There is still a lot of fog in the plans for solving this problem. There is still no unified strategy for the development of the fuel and energy sector for the eastern regions of the country, and well-known proposals and projects contradict each other. There are at least three alternative scenarios. One of them focuses on the development of hydrocarbons-

page 16

development of transport infrastructure, oil refining, and gradual gasification in Eastern Siberia and Sakhalin. The second option provides for the priority development of large coal reserves in the same Eastern Siberia (Kansk-Achinsk and Irkutsk basins), which, among other things, will allow us to focus oil and gas production on export. The third option attaches great importance to the development of nuclear power and hydropower, also with the release of oil and gas for export.

As for oil, the plans for its development are almost entirely related to exports. With gas, the situation is more complicated. Here, several points of view on the strategy of its use are competing. Proponents of one of them consider it expedient to send large volumes of gas from the fields of the north of the Tyumen Region and Yamal to the East for gasification of Siberia and the Far East, as well as gas sales to China, Korea, and Japan. In their opinion, the Yamal-China-Korea gas pipeline could give an impetus to the development of the oil and gas industry in Siberia and the Far East, to a certain extent playing a role similar to the Trans-Siberian railway, which once provided a powerful industrial development in the eastern regions of Russia. In the future, it would be advisable to lay other gas pipelines, oil pipelines, product pipelines, roads, and power lines in the corridor of such a gas pipeline. Such a powerful infrastructure would create favorable conditions for domestic and foreign investors to develop new hydrocarbon deposits that gravitate towards this route.

In the easternmost region, Sakhalin Island is developing according to its own model, independent of its mainland, and views on the strategy of their use differ with respect to the mainland gas fields of Eastern Siberia and the Far East. In any case, the development of the largest Kovykta gas condensate field in the Irkutsk Region is at the forefront. At the same time, Gazprom, supported by the Ministry of Energy, linked it with calculations for connecting it to the Unified Gas Supply System of Russia (the connection point is Proskokovo in the Kemerovo region) - in order to compensate for the decline in gas production in the north of the Tyumen region (Nadym - Purtazovsky district). But the Chayandinskoye oil and gas condensate field (Yakutia) is considered by them as a base for gasification of the southern regions of Yakutia and the Amur Region, as well as export supplies to the Asia-Pacific region. According to an alternative point of view expressed by the management of the Russian-British company TNK-BP, which holds a license for the development of this field through its subsidiary, Kovykty gas should be supplied primarily not to the west of the country, but for export. Mainly to the countries of North-East Asia, including 20 billion cubic meters. m of gas to China. Later, the Chayandinskoye field may also be connected to this direction, and it is considered appropriate to export gas from it in a single channel with the Kovykta field (Batali, 2003).

SEARCH FOR NEW OPPORTUNITIES

In such an uncertain environment, the first practical step towards integrating the fuel and energy sector of Russia's eastern regions into the Eurasian integration process turned out to be a somewhat unexpected project to build a 2.5-thousand-kilometer oil pipeline from Angarsk, East Siberia (Irkutsk Region), to Daqing, the center of oil production in China. Under this project, which was previously agreed in 2002 between the Russian oil company YUKOS and the Chinese National Oil Company (CNOC), 20 million tons of oil were to be delivered to China annually from 2005, and 30 million tons in 2010-2030. Its main advantages were that Russian companies were offered a guaranteed channel long-term oil exports, and the government - a reliable source of budget revenues. At the same time, part of the oil produced in the north of Western Siberia by YUKOS and other interested companies could be used for supplies. Then, as development progressed, the deposits of Eastern Siberia were to be sequentially connected to the "pipe". About readiness to provide

page 17

Rosneft, LUKOIL and Sibneft immediately announced oil supplies to China. The cost of the project was estimated at that time in the range of $ 1.7 billion to $ 2.8 billion, and the Chinese side assumed the costs of building the system on its territory.

Nevertheless, the project had very serious critics, who saw several major shortcomings in it. First, strong doubts were raised about the feasibility of linking oil exports in eastern Russia to the Chinese market alone - to the state, which, although gigantic and rapidly developing, has not yet solved a number of its complex internal problems. Secondly, the categorical refusal of the Chinese from the route through the territory of Mongolia 15 prompted YUKOS to go for the option of a pipeline to the Chinese border through Russian territory through the Tunka Nature Reserve south of Lake Baikal. Lake Baikal, which immediately caused an active protest of environmentalists and the local community. Third, the plan to build a route from Eastern Siberia to China south of Lake Baikal did nothing for the development of the Russian Far East and its deeper integration into the country's economic space.

On this basis, in parallel with the preparation of the feasibility study for this project, Transneft has begun preliminary development of an alternative pipeline route with a capacity of 50 million tons of oil per year: from Angarsk to the territories north of Lake Baikal and ending in the Far Eastern port of Nakhodka. In this scenario, the prospect of involving both Eastern Siberia and the Far East in the process of accelerated modernization was seen, as well as a real possibility of rapid progress in economic and political relations with the Asia-Pacific countries. Especially with Japan, for which our country for many years presented itself as an uninteresting outsider. Meanwhile, economic penetration in the Asia-Pacific region can bring Russia what it needs most right now: large investments, advanced technologies, and transit goods flows. In short, what is needed to transform the Asian part of Russia-between the Pacific Ocean and the Urals - into a large industrial and transport complex, cementing the country's economic space stretching from the Baltic to the Pacific. While exporting oil to China alone can only provide money in exchange for oil and some jobs.

However, this project also had its own problems. The pipeline to the Russian Pacific coast is much longer and more expensive than to China - 4.8 thousand km and 5.0 - 5.2 billion dollars, respectively. In addition, it immediately appeared as a de facto alternative to the route to China, since there was no solid reason to believe that Eastern Siberia and the Far East would be able to supply both systems with oil simultaneously in this decade-with a total volume of 70 million tons per year. After all, to ensure the profitability of the Angarsk-Nakhodka system, its capacity should be at least 50 million tons per year, compared to 20-30 million tons for the Angarsk-Daqing project. Therefore, it is necessary to have at least 2 billion rubles on the balance sheet. According to the geological survey of Eastern Siberia (Yurubcheno-Takhomskaya zone, Talakan and Verkhnechonskoye fields), so far it is possible to count on no more than 500 million tons.Everything else is only within the forecast area (Azarova, 2002). Under such conditions, is it possible to focus on the Asia-Pacific region almost all the oil expected in the not too distant future in Eastern Siberia and the Far East? All the more so in light of the need to accelerate the economic development of this vast region itself. It is also unclear to what extent the oil of Eastern Siberia and the Far East can

15 Formally, this was justified by the reluctance to allow the pipeline to pass through the territory of a third country, in fact, it rested on border problems with Mongolia and the instability of the situation in Northwestern China.

page 18

be competitive in the Asia-Pacific region. True, it has a higher quality than West Siberian oil, but it should also be taken into account that in addition to oil from the Persian Gulf, Australia and Indonesia, oil from Sakhalin international consortia may appear on the Asia-Pacific markets after some time.

Proponents of the Angarsk-Nakhodka pipeline project have spoken out in favor of transferring certain volumes of oil from Western Siberia in this direction. But in oil companies interested in the Chinese option, this idea met with strong objections. The then head of YUKOS, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, said that the problem of West Siberian oil should be solved not in the East, but in the West, primarily through the creation of the Murmansk Pipeline System (MTS) with an eye to exporting oil to Northern Europe and the United States. And if the Chinese project is not implemented, the company's oil from the Yurubcheno-Takhom zone of Eastern Siberia will be sent to its Achinsk and Angara refineries instead of West Siberian oil (Khodorkovsky, 2003). And that, in turn, will be exported to the west. Vagit Alekperov, the head of LUKOIL, also took a similar position [Alekperov, 2003]. He expressed the opinion that in the North-East Asia region and in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, Russian companies will have to withstand fierce competition in a market already divided between European, South American, Middle Eastern, West African and Asian manufacturers. According to his calculations, the cost of delivering Russian oil to Yokohama will be at least $ 30. per ton, and from the Persian Gulf region only 9-10 dollars. In contrast, in the Chinese market, Russian oil could successfully compete with Latin American and Middle Eastern raw materials, which are too expensive to ship to mainland China.

The dispute between the supporters of each of the alternative projects ended, however, with a temporary compromise. In 2003, the government came up with the idea of laying a pipeline from Angarsk to the east to a certain point, where it should split into two branches - one to Nakhodka, the other to China. However, there is still the question of choosing the point of separation of the pipeline and the order of construction of each of the branches. In Yukos, where the route to China south of Lake Baikal was being worked out, Chita in Eastern Siberia was named, and Transneft, based on the convenience of transporting oil to the Pacific Ocean, suggested Skovorodino in the Amur region. In this case, the pipeline from Angarsk was planned to be built north of Lake Baikal, not far from its shore. The order of construction of each of the branch pipelines was to be determined depending on the prospects for providing them with oil: a maximum of 30 million tons per year for Daqing and a minimum of 50 million tons for Nakhodka. Naturally, given the low level of development of the oil resources of Eastern Siberia, the conclusion was that there could practically be only one option: from the point of separation first to China and only then, as the necessary oil resources are found, to Nakhodka.

But then big politics intervened. The discussion was increasingly influenced by the persistent desire of business circles, and then the Japanese government, to achieve a reversal of the export flow of Russian oil in its east in their direction. For this purpose, the Japanese strongly supported the project of an oil pipeline to the Pacific Ocean and at the same time offered large loans for its construction and for solving social problems of the Russian Far East - up to $ 7 billion in total. But only if Russia refuses to build an oil pipeline to China [see, for example: http://www.rusoil.ru/news/09.07.2003 ; 11.09.2003 ]. Such a strong interest shown by Japan in economic projects in Russia for the first time in the entire history of relations between them, and, moreover, in the absence of a peace treaty, began to increasingly incline the Russian state leadership towards the Pacific project. During the visit of then Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov to Beijing in September 2003, the Chinese side received only general assurances of its intentions to build an oil pipeline and promises to increase oil supplies by rail for the time being [http://www.rusoil.ru/news/24.09.2003 ]. According to Russian Railways President Gennady Fadeev, the transportation of YUKOS oil across Russia-

page 19

It is expected to increase from 6.4 million tons in 2004 to 15 million tons per year in 2006. Including 10 million tons via the Zabaikalsk-Manchuria border stations and 5 million tons via Naushki-Sukhbaatar. In the future, the position of supporters of the Chinese option became even weaker after the management of the YUKOS company was charged with tax evasion, fraud and other criminal offenses.

However, the final decision was not made immediately. This was prevented by at least two circumstances. First, the veto imposed in autumn 2003 by the Ministry of Natural Resources of the Russian Federation on both proposed routes-both south and north of Lake Baikal-for reasons of environmental safety. Second ,and most importantly, there was still uncertainty about the sources of oil for the Pacific Pipeline. There was a pause of uncertainty for a while. But in February 2004, It was interrupted by a statement from the management of Transneft about working on a new, adjusted version of the pipeline. Now it should start not from Angarsk, as before, but from Taishet-more than 500 kilometers further to the northwest. The route should end not in Nakhodka, but in Perevoznaya Bay of the Amur Bay. Preparation of a new feasibility study was supposed to take the whole of 2004, and another year-for design. The construction itself was undertaken by Transneft in 4 years [Kommersant, 16.02.2004; http://www.rusenergy.com/newssystem/opened/37/18.02.2004].

In the end, in the last days of December 2004, just before the New Year, the Russian government, after more than two years of disputes, doubts and hesitation, adopted a resolution on the construction of the Taishet (Eastern Siberia) - Perevoznaya Bay of the Amur Bay (near Vladivostok). It is also "Vostochny" or ESPO ("Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean"). In September 2005, Transneft submitted to the Government of the Russian Federation a feasibility study for a project from Taishet along the northern shore of Lake Baikal to Skovorodino and then to the Pacific Ocean (Perevoznaya Bay) with a branch to Daqing (China). The entire route from Taishet to Nakhodka is 4,130 km long. The pipeline will pass through Taishet-Kazachinskoe-Skovorodino points to Perevoznaya Bay, including 764 km in the Irkutsk Region (Taishet-Bratsk) at the beginning, and 1403 km in the Amur Region at the end. The oil fields of the Tomsk Region and the Khanty - Mansi Autonomous Okrug in Western Siberia, as well as the oil and gas provinces of Eastern Siberia (the largest of them are the Leno-Tunguska and Khatango-Vilyuiskaya), Verkhnechonskoye (Irkutsk Region) and Talakanskoye (Yakutia) fields are mentioned as resource bases [http://www.rasenergy.com/newssystem/opened/37/01.04.2004]. To supply the system with oil, initially 24 million tons of West Siberian oil should be used, which will be supplied by Yuganskneftegaz, which was confiscated from Yukos and eventually inherited by the state-owned Rosneft oil company. In April 2006 The feasibility study was still being reviewed by government departments before being approved by the Cabinet of Ministers, which was expected by May.

In general, as far as you can understand, calculations are based on several bases. The first of them is the hope of attracting Japan to develop the oil resources of Eastern Siberia 16 . The second is, as mentioned above, the possibility of partially using West Siberian oil, which is not excluded from the discussion. The third is the idea of connecting oil (and gas in a single corridor with it) from Yakutia to the ESPO system, proposed by the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), but not yet approved by the government of the Russian Federation. Its essence is to create the Trans-Siberian Trunk Oil and Gas Pipeline - ___

16 Already, two Japanese companies - Mitsui & Company and Mitsubishi Corporation-own a total of 45% of Sakhalin Energy shares. Four Japanese energy and gas companies have signed long-term agreements to purchase liquefied natural gas from Russia, securing the fate of the $ 10 billion project. dol [www.rasoil.ru/news. 01.07.2004].

page 20

networks of trunk pipelines in a common technological corridor that will link the main oil and gas fields of Yakutia and Eastern Siberia into a single system, in order to eventually bring them through Tynda-Skovorodino-Blagoveshchensk-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok to the port of Nakhodka. The route will be 6,224 km long.

According to the authors of the plan, this will make it possible to comprehensively approach the development of large oil and gas fields in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, Irkutsk Region and Yakutia, providing Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East with oil and gas resources and simultaneously solving the problem of exporting hydrocarbons. Export to China and Korea can be arranged via branches from the main pipeline in the areas of Blagoveshchensk and Vladivostok, and to Japan, other countries of the Asia - Pacific region and the United States-by tankers. In Yakutia itself, according to its government, there are large oil reserves, and projected gas reserves are estimated at 12.1 trillion cubic meters, including 2.3 trillion cubic meters prepared [Prime-TASS, 16.02.2004].

The ESPO project received active support from Russian President Vladimir Putin. In June 2005, he personally discussed the prospects of the Eastern Pipeline at the G8 summit in Scotland, with Chinese President Hu Jintao and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, and then openly supported the Transneft project in the face of growing protest from environmentalists. The fact is that the project directly corresponds to his idea of offering Russia as a guarantor of the world's energy security, which, quite understandably, provides not only for increasing the volume of oil exports, but also for diversifying it in different directions. In this case - for the first time in large volumes to the East. During Vladimir Putin's visit to Beijing on March 21-22, 2006, the readiness of the Russian side to build a branch from the ESPO to China was confirmed. The total cost of the ESPO project is currently estimated at $ 11 billion, including $ 6 billion at the first stage (up to Skovorodino). In addition, an agreement was signed between Gazprom and CNPC on the supply of 30 to 40 billion cubic meters of gas per year to China after 2010, with the prospect of increasing them to 60 to 80 billion cubic meters. To do this, the Altai gas pipeline from Western Siberia to the Chinese border must first be built, and then gas exports from Eastern Siberia must be organized.

There is reason to believe that new projects for the development of pipe transport infrastructure in the east of the country (the Taishet-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline, gas pipelines from Western and Eastern Siberia to China, as well as a pipeline system connecting the territories of Yakutia, Eastern Siberia and the Far East), if implemented, would make a significant contribution to the integration of the Far East together with Siberia into the economic space of both Russia itself and the Asia-Pacific region, starting with North-East Asia. In addition, Rosneft has committed to deliver 40 million tons of oil to China by rail to the state-owned company CNPC by 2010. What is new would be the creation of infrastructure lines linking the far east of Russia with its Western Siberian and European parts. Moreover, not only horizontally, in the latitudinal direction (such as the Transsib and BAM or the Angarsk-Daqing oil pipeline), but also diagonally - in the case of connection to the Taishet-Pacific Ocean pipeline (plus Daqing) of fields in the north of Western Siberia, which, as is known, also provide oil exports to Europe. At the same time, the implementation of the plan of the Government of the Republic of Sakha would lay a vertical (meridian) link between the potentially hydrocarbon-rich Yakutia and the point of separation into two branches (to China and to the Pacific Ocean) of the Taishet oil pipeline. And if the gas fields of Eastern Siberia are connected to the Unified Gas Supply System of Russia, another line of integration of the Asian and European parts of the country would arise.

page 21

THE FAR EAST IS NOT A "WILD TAIGA"

Such a complex configuration of the economic space would help, among other things, to overcome the serious drawback inherent in the previously put forward plans for exporting hydrocarbons from the Russian East to the countries of Northeast Asia and, in the future, to the west coast of the United States. Namely, their complete (with the exception of relatively independent Sakhalin projects, which are implemented by international consortia) orientation exclusively to the export of hydrocarbons from Eastern Siberia. While Japan's attitude to the Pacific Ocean oil pipeline project is of great interest to foreign investors, a comprehensive program for developing the oil and gas resources of this vast region would in itself greatly contribute to its rapid prosperity. Moreover, it could become a reliable addition to the project discussed above to activate rail transportation along the system of international lines that terminate on the Trans-Siberian Railway, increasing the interest of the APR states in this particular route.

In this light, the prospects for the emergence of a complex complex of international multisectoral relations in eastern Russia are also clearer: in the field of foreign trade, transport transit, industrial division of labor, and the movement of advanced technologies. In short, everything that can give a strong new impetus to the development of the economy of this region and change the social situation in it for the better. And as one of the consequences, such a turn of events could fundamentally improve the state of national security of Russia on its eastern borders. In particular, to dispel the fears that the population is experiencing, and most importantly, sow some politicians in relation to the"yellow danger".

All these fears and demagoguery, as a rule, are built on the basis of a far-fetched idea of the Russian Far East as a "wild taiga", in which hordes of illegal migrants, uncontrolled by the Russian government, roam, creating prerequisites for subsequent territorial claims on the part of the Chinese state. It is obvious that the transformation of this region into an integral element of a single economic complex covering the economy of the Russian Far East, Eastern and Western Siberia, and the European part of the country, as well as included in the range of economic interests of foreign Northeast Asia, can radically change the strategic situation in the far east of Russia. It's one thing to demand respect for your borders in general. Another is to protect an economically developed and complexly structured space that is deeply integrated into both the national economy and the system of international relations. Nuclear missiles are not suitable for chasing down every illegal migrant with them. But it is very well suited as a deterrent weapon - to protect not just "Russian lands", but the territories developed and included in the Russian economy, the entire vast Eurasian continent and the Asia-Pacific region. Including China - that colossal neighboring state, which many in our country are so much afraid of.

list of literature

Azarova S. Nakhodka-yes! Nakhodka - no! // Oil and gas vertical. 2002. N 12 (http://www.ngv.ru/magazin/ ).

Alekperov V. Resource potential of Russia as a locomotive of the country's economic development (http://www.rusoil.ru/reviewtext/ 19. 08. 2003) .

Aleksandrov Yu. G. Perekhodnaya ekonomika: rossiiskaya versiya [Transition Economy: Russian version]. Moscow: IV RAS, 1999.

Batalii Yu. P. Priority development of the gas industry and the predominant participation of domestic producers are the main goals of the strategic development of the fuel and energy sector (http://www.rusoil.ru/reviewtext/ 18. 07. 2003) .

Vinogradova O. Kak delaetsya kontseptsii [How concepts are made]. 2003. N11.

page 22

Vinogradova O. Under the lying stone oil does not flow. Preparation for licensing of the Far Eastern shelf / / Oil and Gas Vertical. 2002. N 9 (http://www.ngv.ru/magazin) .

Glumov I. Morskie gorizony [Sea horizons]. Neftegazovaya vertikal [Oil and gas vertical]. 2002. N 9 (http://www.ngv.ru/magazin) .

Dudchenko G. Kitai i Dalnii Vostoke Rossii: k voprosu o demograficheskom disbalanse [China and the Russian Far East: on the issue of demographic imbalance]. Vestnik Evrazii, Moscow, 2002, N3(18).

Klimenko Ya., Rubanov I., Sivakov Dm. More interesting than oil // Expert. 2004. N11.

Kommersant. 16.02.2004.

Larin V. Posoltsy Podnebesnoy na Dalnem Vostoke: otvet alarmistam [Envoys of the Middle Kingdom in the Far East: a response to alarmists].

Forest industry. Special review / / Expert. 2003. N 42.

Meshcherin O. Good wishes. Energy strategy of Russia. The third attempt / / Oil and gas vertical. 2003. N 9 - 10 (http://www.ngv.ru/magazin) .

Prime-TASS. 16.02.2004.

Recommendations of the parliamentary hearings "Oil and gas of the continental shelf: problems of development and rational use" / / Oil and gas vertical. 2002. N 9 (http://www.ngv.ru/magazin ).

Russian Statistical Yearbook (RSE) 2003. Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 2003.

Russia in the Modern World, Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 2002.

Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii [Socio-economic Situation of Russia]. Moscow: Goskomstat RF, 2003, No. 12.

Khodorkovsky M. Interview / / Oil and gas vertical. 2003, N 4 (http://www.ngv.ru/magazin/ ).

Tsymbursky V. L. The Struggle for the "Eurasian Atlantis": Geoeconomics and Geostrategy, Moscow: Institute of Economic Strategies, 2000.

Expert. 2003. N 21, 42, 43; 2004. N 10.

http://www.rusoil.ru/news/29.04.2004.

http://www.rusenergy.com/archives/23.04.2004.

http://www.rusoil.ru/news/ 09. 07. 2003: 11.09.2003.

http://www.rusoil.ru/news/24.09.2003.

http://www.rusoil.ru/news/13.04.2004;29.04.2004.

http://www.rusenergy.com/newssystem/opened/37/18.02.2004.

http://www.rusenergy.com/newssystem/opened/37/01.04.2004.

Kremlin.ru. 27.04.2004.

www.rusoil.ru/news. 01.07.2004.

Permanent link to this publication: