In the second half of the seventh and eighth centuries, an attempt was made in Japan to create a state in no way inferior to the highly centralized state of China (the Tang Empire). To this end, a number of activities were carried out, the most important of which was the creation of a management apparatus. However, a clear functioning of the administrative apparatus is impossible without effective control of the center on the ground. It was the specifics of solving this problem that largely determined the fate of the Japanese state. Among these features, an important place is occupied by the relationship between the center and the periphery in the history of Japan in the VIII century.

Administrative divisions based on the territorial principle, traditionally considered as the most important sign of statehood, arise at the stage of the formation of the early state. However, the remnants of the former administrative division based on family ties continue to play an important role in the life of society and the state for a long time. At the same time, clan ties are strongest at the local level, while the central administration tends to have an extra-clan basis. Rivalry between the central government and the local tribal nobility was the main content of the socio-political life of the early states .1

Japanese statehood, whose origins are usually attributed to the IV-V centuries AD, was formed on the basis of tribal structures, which was usually used for the formation of early states in the East. However, in the second half of the seventh and early eighth centuries, an attempt was made in Japan to create a state that would not be inferior to the centralized state of Tang China (618-907). The creation of such a State was impossible without the establishment of the center's control on the ground. Therefore, the system of local administration of Tang China was borrowed, which had to be adapted to the conditions of society, where the tribal nobility still enjoyed great influence. Approximately similar processes took place during the formation of barbarian states in Western Europe, when the Roman administrative - territorial system and tribal principles of organization interacted. However, on the territory of Western Europe, the Roman administrative division was partially preserved, which significantly accelerated the process of establishing a government based on the territorial principle (the exception was Norway and England, in which Roman influence was extremely weak, and the administrative-territorial administration bodies grew directly out of the decaying tribal system) .2

The study of local governance in eighth-century Japan is important because, on the one hand, it allows us to trace the process of confrontation between the center and the periphery (a problem inherent in all early states, without exception-

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On the other hand, to find out how successful (or unsuccessful) Japan's experience in creating a centralized state turned out to be.

Ritsure State: The Japanese state of the Nara period (710-794) and the beginning of the Heian period (794-1185) is commonly called ritsure: kokka, which literally means a state based on laws. At this time, the Japanese sought to create a centralized state, all aspects of life of which would be regulated in legislative codes. Tang China served as a model for this.

It was during the Tang era that a highly centralized state was created on the territory of China with an effective central government apparatus, local administrative and territorial administration, military and tax systems.

At the head of the state was the Son of Heaven (Emperor). The central bureaucracy consisted of three departments (San Sheng): The State Secretariat, the Imperial Chancellery, and the Cabinet of Ministers. Six ministries were subordinate to the Cabinet: the Ministry of Rank, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Ceremonies, the Ministry of War, the Ministry of Punishments, and the Ministry of Public Works.

The local administration of the Tang Empire consisted of four main parts: the region (kit. Dao, Japanese do:), province (Chinese Zhou, Japanese Koku ), county (Chinese hsien, yap. gong), a village (kit. li, yap. ri). Counties were divided into volosts (kit. syam), consisting of five villages. Local officials up to assistant county governors were appointed from the center. In the first half of the eighth century, there were 15 regions, about 350 provinces, and 1,573 counties .3

Japan used the experience of the Tang Empire very actively: the structure of the central office, the scale of official ranks, basic requirements for officials, a four-tier management structure, and the Chinese experience in compiling legislative codes. It was legislation that was supposed to become the main tool regulating all aspects of society and the state.

The structure of Japanese legislative codes was similar to that of Tang laws. Like Chinese laws, Japanese laws consisted of two main parts: criminal (kit. lü, Japanese ritsu) and the Civil Code (Chinese lin, Japanese re:). But in China, the civil code is almost entirely lost, while the criminal code is completely preserved .4 Scientists explain this by the fact that in China " law was conceived first of all... as a penitentiary system " 5 . In Japan, on the contrary, criminal laws are almost completely lost, while civil laws are preserved (reconstructed from references in later sources). Based on this, some Japanese historians believe that if the organization of the bureaucratic apparatus was really built in accordance with Tang models, then the application of Chinese criminal law was impossible, since customary law continued to operate in Japanese society at that time .6

Although Japanese legislation was created according to Chinese models, upon closer examination, it turns out that the Japanese took into account local peculiarities, and some provisions of Japanese laws differ from Tang or do not have Tang analogues at all:

1. The law did not determine the order of succession to the throne; it was carried out on the basis of customary law;

2. The defining role of Shintoism in the state ideology was consolidated by the creation of the Chamber of Heavenly and Earthly Deities (Jingikan);

3. Unlike in China, Japanese legislation included a special section dedicated to the rules of conduct of Buddhist monks, which indicates a greater role of Buddhism in the state ideology;

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4. The opportunities for non-noble people to hold high-level positions were much lower in Japan; the candidate's background remained the determining factor in taking office .7

5. Unlike Tang China, land plots in Japan were allocated not only to men, but also to women;

6. In contrast to uniform taxation in China, Japanese legislation for many areas specified specific local products (mainly marine fisheries) that were to be delivered directly to the court .8

The differences between Japanese and Chinese laws are due to the socio-historical features of Nara Japan and Tang China, the most important of which were the following::

1. Unlike Japan, the Tang Empire was created on the basis of centuries-old experience in building a centralized bureaucratic state (the Qin and Han empires);

2. In China, the remnants of the tribal system in the state administration system were already outlived, and the state apparatus was replenished at the expense of the bureaucratic stratum, while in Japan the bureaucratic stratum was still being formed and its backbone was made up of the tribal nobility, which tended to isolation and self-reproduction. Therefore, social mobility, which is typical for China, is not widespread in Japan;

3. The state ideology of Japan was based on Shintoism (the emperor was the head of the Shinto cult); the state ideology of China was based on ethical teachings (Confucianism, the doctrine of the "mandate of Heaven").

Time when provinces and counties were created. According to the Nihon Seki, 9 in 646, a reform decree was issued, the second paragraph of which prescribed the creation of a new administrative system10 : capital, metropolitan area (Kinai); provinces (kuni); counties (gong); villages (ri). However, many scholars express doubts about the authenticity of the decree, in particular, because in the document counties are designated by the character "gong", while the data of mokkan 11 prove that in the second half of the VII century counties were designated by the character "koori". Nevertheless, the beginning of the creation of a centralized state on the Chinese model really falls in the second half of the seventh century, and there is an opinion that the decree of 646 was a certain program of reforms that had yet to be implemented.

What were the first steps to create a new local administrative system? Initially, koori miyatsuko's possessions, and for a while koori and the former kuni no Miyatsuko possessions co-existed; later, kunino miyatsuko's possessions were split up and new koori were created on their basis. Apparently, the term "koori" was used until the introduction of the legislative code "Taiho:re: "(701-702). The most recent mention of koori in mokkan dates back to 699,13 Later, Mokkan is referred to as"gong".

In Japanese historiography, there are two main points of view on the time of the emergence of koori:

1. Already in the reign of Kotoku (645-654), koori counties were created nationwide (according to Isogai Masayoshi, Sonoda Koyu, Imaizumi Takao, Mori Kimiaki, Kamada Motoichi);

2. The introduction of the koori county system occurred in stages during the reigns of the Kotoku, Tenchi (668-671), and Jito (697-707) emperors (according to Seki Akira, Inoue Mitsusada, Shida Junichi, and Watanabe Ikuko) .14

The first point of view is based on later sources - "Hitachi-Fudoki" (714-718), which states that during the reign of Kotoku Namekata counties were created,

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Kashima, Taka 15 . The Nihon Reiki (785-823) 16 refers to the creation of Oti County in the province of Iyo 17 . In the chronicle Shoku Nihongi (797) 18, the expression occurs: "the clans that have served as county governors since the time of the Naniwa Court (i.e., since the time of Kotoku. - E. C.) " 19 . Since all these sources are late, then, based on them alone, it cannot be considered a conclusively proven position on the introduction of koori throughout the country to the Kotoku rule. Apparently, we can only talk about the beginning of the process of creating a koori under this sovereign.

Previously, Japanese historians equated koori and gong, believing that Kokkan data confirms that the creation of a Chinese-style administrative system began immediately after the decree of 646. According to Inoue Mitsusada, 20 the use of the term "koori" indicates the existence and functioning of the "Asukakiyomiharare" legislative code that has not come down to us, but is mentioned in the sources. 21 Indeed, according to archaeological data, the Gongs created in the early eighth century inherited the Koori tradition. In particular, the architectural complexes of county administrations (gcs) were very often (but not always) built in the same place where the county administrations (koori) were located .22 The continuity between koori and gun is also confirmed by the mokkan data. Thus, in Wakasa Province, koori counties were transformed into Gun 23 counties without changing the boundaries of the territorial unit .

The introduction of the new term, of course, was not accidental. There is an assumption that the character "koori "is Korean in origin, and the character" gong " is Chinese , 24 and, therefore, the introduction of the latter was intended to emphasize the similarity of the Japanese state with the Chinese one. But recently, there has been evidence that the character "gong" was also used in Korean states .25

The following differences can be distinguished between koori and gong::

1. Both military and civil functions were concentrated in the hands of the koori governors, 26 whereas with the introduction of the kuni-gong system, military functions were transferred to the provincial governors, who were subordinate to military-territorial detachments (Taiho: re: 11-70, XVII-14) .27 ;

2. Prior to the introduction of such an important link in the administrative system of the Ritsurei state as the province (kuni), the koori were directly connected to the center. With the introduction of provinces, the relations of counties with the center were mediated by provinces.

The creation of provinces (kuni) is traditionally attributed to the reign of Emperor Temmu (673-686). In 683, he ordered Prince Ise to draw the borders between provinces 28 , and in 685, Prince Ise was again sent to establish the borders between provinces 29 . It is quite obvious that the drawing of borders was directly related to the introduction of provincial government.

There is a view that provinces were created simultaneously (i.e., between 683 and 685) on a national scale (Oomachi Takeshi), and a view that provinces were created gradually (Hayakawa Sehachi, Watanabe Ikuko) .30 The latter point of view seems more reasonable. For example, the names of the provinces of Chikugo and Higo, which were later subordinated to the Dazaifu General Governorship (Kyushu Island), were first mentioned during the reign of Jito in 686-697, so it is unlikely that Kyushu provincial government was introduced earlier than the reign of this sovereign. 31

The completion of the creation of the local administrative - territorial system of kuni-gong is usually attributed to the time of the introduction of the legislative code "Taiho:re: "(701-702). In the first half of the eighth century, the construction of architectural complexes of provincial councils was undertaken throughout the country32 . The construction of the koori (hega) district councils began at the end of the seventh century; the gong (gunga) district councils were built at the beginning of the eighth century. Gunga were often built on the site of hega 33 .

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A network of roads connected the provincial offices to the center, and roads were laid from the provincial offices to the county ones.

Thus, provinces and counties were created in the second half of the seventh and early eighth centuries, while narrative ("Nihon seki"," Fudoki"," Shoku nihongi"," Nihon reiki"), epigraphic (data from mokkan), and archaeological (data from excavations of provincial and county councils) sources indicate that the history of counties is older than that of provinces, and the classic gong county of the Ritsure era: it was created, as a rule, on the basis of the koori county that preceded it.

Evolution of county councils. The county-gun was created on the basis of the previous county-koori, in other words, the state tried to make the existing territorial unit part of the new centralized administrative-territorial system. Let's try to find out how successful this experience turned out to be.

During the eighth century, the policy of the center in relation to the county administration was repeatedly changed. Japanese historiography generally describes these changes as follows. At the beginning of the eighth century, county governors were not officials in the strict sense of the word, and their appointment was within the competence of the provincial governors, not the center. Since the end of the Wado 34 years, the State has sought to incorporate county administrations into the State-wide bureaucratic system. The policy of the Japanese state to strengthen control over counties has been sharply intensified since 735. However, in the second half of the eighth century, the hereditary principle of appointing county governors prevails, which later leads to the loss of control over the counties by the center. The victory of the hereditary principle in the appointment of county governors in the second half of the eighth century is not controversial among Japanese historians, but the role of this principle in the first half of the century is evaluated differently. Imaizumi Takao believes that at the beginning of the eighth century the hereditary principle and the principle of appointment by ability co-existed; Ueda Masaaki, Komeda Yu: suke believe that in the first half of the century, especially since 735, the principle of appointment of county governors by ability prevailed, which is directly related to the emergence of a new service stratum and the inclusion of counties in the national the bureaucratic system 35 .

At the center of these disputes are various interpretations of article 13 of the law on the appointment and Promotion of officials (Taiho:re:, XII-13) and later comments to this article. The article is devoted to the principles of selection for the county administration: "To select people who are intelligent, honest, and suitable for [conducting] current affairs as county supervisors; to appoint [to posts] taire: (senior county manager. - E. S. ) and se:re (junior district administrator. - E. S.)...". At the end of the article there is a postscript: "With the same abilities for the posts of taire: and sho: ryo: it is preferable to take kuni-no miyatsuko." It was around this postscript that the discussion unfolded. There are two main points of contention: which kuni no miyatsuko are we talking about, the old ones or the new ones? And how widespread is the appointment of county governors of Kuni no Miyatsuko?

Imaizumi Takao believes that we are talking about the old kuni no miyatsuko. Thus, in his opinion, the hereditary principle of appointing county governors is already laid down in the " Taiho:ryo: "but, in addition to kuni no miyatsuko, representatives of other clans were also appointed to the post of county governors. He believes that before the reign of Kotoku, there was a number of Kuni (here meaning Kuni headed by Kuni no Miyatsuko, which should not be confused with the Kuni provinces of the Ritsure era:) there were a little over 120 people . Under the Kotoku board, koori are created and the process of splitting up these administrative divisions begins. In the period from 721 to 737, there are approximately 555 counties, in the reign of Kotoku, according to Imaizumi Takao, about 500 koori. Therefore,

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the number of koori far exceeded the number of Kuni no Miyatsuko clans, which led to the promotion of new clans to the post of county governors. Hence the expression: "The clans that have served as county stewards since the days of the Naniwa court." But the hereditary principle was combined with the principle of assignment by ability. In addition, by the beginning of the eighth century, side branches had separated from the clans that had been hereditary county governors. This meant an expansion of the number of applicants for the position of county governors; the selection from among them was the implementation of the principle of appointment according to ability. 37

However, in the commentary of "Ryo-no gige" 38 to the 13th article of the law on " Appointment and promotion of officials "(Taiho:ryo:, XII-13) states: "The Kuni no miyatsuko who are preferred are those Kuni no Miyatsuko who are required by the Shinto Worship Law to be given one horse." 39 The comment links to " Taiho:ryo: "(VI-19), which prescribes that during the celebration of the "great purification" (ooharae) in the provinces, one horse should be given to Kuni no miyatsuko. Thus, according to " Re:- no gige", we are talking about new kuni-no miyatsuko, that is, about kuni-no miyatsuko, who were appointed from the center one to each province. This interpretation means that the practice of appointing Kuni no Miyatsuko was not widely used and cannot be considered a system-forming principle for selecting county governors.

Imaizumi Takao and Inobe Ju: ichiro believe that the commentary "Ryo - no gige" to " Taiho:ryo: "XII-13 is wrong, and it's actually about the old kuni no miyatsuko 40 . But there are no serious reasons to question the data of this source. Taiho Amendment:ryo:, can not be evidence of a large-scale practice of appointing Kuni no Miyatsuko to the post of county administrators, and the article itself implies that the selection for the county administration, at least ideally (that is, according to the Taiho:ryo: code), should have been based on the principles of a bureaucratic state, in other words, on the basis of the most capable officials, regardless of their background, were to be appointed county governors.

But the reality was markedly different from the ideal presented in the legislative code "Taiho:re:". The Tang laws describe the powers of county and village heads in much more detail than the Ritsure laws: 41 , which seems to indicate the weak control of the Japanese state over the lower administrative divisions. The position of county administrator was a life-long one, which in itself makes us doubt whether the state managed to reorganize the county administration bodies into purely official structures. In addition, the appointment of county governors until 735 was the responsibility of the provincial governors. This is confirmed by the decrees of the Sekou nihongi prohibiting provincial governors from being biased in appointing county governors (Sekou nihongi, Mommu 2-3-10, 698; Wado 5-5-13, 712). In 713, a decree was issued prohibiting provincial governors from removing county governors at will (Sekou nihongi, Wado 6-5-7, 713).). These edicts indicate the emergence of friction between the provincial governors sent from the center and the county nobility, and the state makes a concession in favor of the latter.

In 716, it was forbidden to appoint relatives of county governors up to the third generation as heads of military - territorial detachments, and to transfer officials who had already been appointed to other provinces (Shoku nihongi, Reiki 2-5-14, 716). Thus, the state sought to prevent the concentration of military power in the hands of local nobles (i.e., families who occupied the same position). positions of county managers).

Measures to strengthen the centralization of the Japanese state were taken during the reign of Coe:mu (724-749).

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Table 1

Changes in the staff of the county administration by Decree 739

County status

By " Taiho: re:"

By decree from Tempe: 11-5-23

Big

8

5

Upper

6

4

Average

4

3

Lower

3

3

Small

2

2

In 735, the following decree was issued: "Kinai and all the provinces of the seven regions, in addition to candidates for the position of county governors selected by the provincial governors, report to Siquibus: (Ministry of Ceremonies. - E. S. ) name lists of four or five hereditary families that have served as county stewards since the time of the Naniwa court. If there are people who, although they have not served from generation to generation as county governors, but have remarkable abilities, about whose merits there is a public rumor, then report them separately..." (Shoku nihongi, Tempe: 7-5-21, 735).

This decree is interpreted differently from the point of view of the correlation between the hereditary principle of appointing county governors and the principle of appointing them according to their abilities in the first half of the eighth century .42 What is fundamentally new is that the appointment of county governors is transferred to the competence of Shikibuse. This measure was intended to limit the arbitrariness of the provincial authorities and strengthen the control of the center over the counties, but the provincial governors retained the right to nominate candidates for the post of county governors and recommend them to the center. To strengthen the control of the center, it was also intended to nominate people who were capable, but not well-born, for the post of district administrators.

In 739, staff reductions were made at the county level ( Table 1. Shoku nihongi, Tempe: 11-5-23, 739).

As you can see, the reduction in the staff of the county administration was very significant, we will add that it affected the county officials, starting with the assistant manager of the county.

The Japanese state was concerned not only with limiting the arbitrariness of provincial authorities; in the 1930s, restrictions were also imposed on county governors. In 734, the following decree was issued: "It is forbidden to recommend for the post of county administrator those who are more than seventy years old" (Shoku nihongi, Tempe: 6-4-26, 734). The decree of 739 states: "Non-virtuous county administrators cannot hold their post for life" 43 . Thus, although minor, restrictions were imposed on the lifetime service of county administrators. The Decree of 739 is a continuation of the decree of 735 in the sense that it also implies limiting the hereditary principle of appointing county administrators and attracting capable people of non-noble origin to serve in the county administration.

According to the law, the county administration, as well as the metropolitan bureaucracy, had to pass an annual certification (Taiho).:re:, XIV-65, 66). Metropolitan officials were assessed on a nine-point scale (Taiho).:re:, XIV-1), and the county administration-on a four-point scale. Certification of the county administration was handled by the provincial authorities. But the decree of 739 indicates that if the annual certification of county officials was carried out, then its results could not lead to the removal of county managers from office .44

In 742, a new restriction on the limits of competence of provincial authorities is introduced: provincial governors are not allowed to decide on the reco alone.-

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When a candidate for the position of county administrator is recommended to the center, they are instructed to make a decision on the recommendation of candidates only after joint meetings with officials of the respective county administrations (Shoku nihongi, Tempe: 14-5-27,742). This decree should be considered as a concession of the center in favor of the county nobility, who henceforth takes part in the discussion of candidates for the post of county administrators. A number of decrees restricting the arbitrary actions of provincial governors in relation to county governors (Shoku nihongi, Mommu 2-3-10, 698; Wado 5-5-13, 712; Wado 6-5-7, 713; Tempe: 14-5-27,742) indicate that the state was forced to reckon with the county administration in its efforts to strengthen local control. the nobility.

Thus, in the first half of the eighth century, administrative administration at the county level largely did not correspond to the ideal image of a centralized state of the Chinese type, as evidenced by the following. The right to appoint county governors is in the hands of provincial governors; the system of attestation of officials at the level of county governors is ineffective; the position of county governors itself is lifelong and often hereditary; the center is forced to limit the power of provincial governors in favor of the county nobility.

But since the first decade of the eighth century, especially in the 30s and 40s, the state has taken measures to strengthen control over the counties and has sought to bring local administration closer to the model expressed in legislative codes: a ban is introduced on the appointment of relatives of county administrators to the third generation to the post of commanders of military-territorial detachments; restrictions are lifetime term of service of county officials; appointment of county managers is transferred to the jurisdiction of Shikibuse:; reduction of the staff of the county administration is carried out; a course is taken to attract non-native capable people to the civil service.

However, the inertia of the hereditary principle turned out to be too great, which was fully manifested in the late 40s of the VIII century. In 745, Emperor Xie:mu fell seriously ill and abdicated in 749. Illness prevented him from actively participating in public administration, and very soon centrifugal tendencies began to gain strength. In 749, the following decree was issued: "In recent times, the governors of the provinces, reporting to Shikibusa: information about candidates for the position of county administrators, provide data on the abilities and talents of representatives of hereditary clans, on the clan hierarchy, and on the age of representatives of the clan. Based on the results of the Shikibuse exams: decides on the appointment. It happens that, regardless of hereditary genera, candidates are recommended based on their abilities, or it happens that although they value [hereditary] genera, they refuse to recommend them because of their incompetence. Therefore, there is no single order, and hereditary families are divided into many tribes. There were many descendants. Regardless of the degree of kinship, each of them asks to be appointed according to their own wishes and regardless of ritual and duty. The principles of filial piety fall into disrepair and are usually imperceptibly thinned out. We think that this is not consistent with the principles. From now on, in order to correct this, when choosing county governors, hereditary families should be highly valued and direct descendants should be appointed, and representatives of side branches are forbidden to be appointed. And then the source of strife will be removed forever..." (Shoku nihongi, Tempe: 21-2-27, Tempe Ho: ji 1-2-27, 749).

Ueda Masaaki and Komeda Yu: suke believe that the decree was caused by an escalated struggle between the service layer and hereditary childbirth. Imaizumi Takao believes that the competition was not between hereditary genera and the service layer, but between the direct and lateral branches of hereditary genera. Time difference

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The difference in opinion is due to different views on the very beginning of the creation of a Chinese-type state. Ueda and Komeda consider the decree "Kaishin-no te: "to be borrowed from" Asukakiyomiharare: "and attribute the beginning of the formation of the new administrative system to the reign of Empress Deito: (686-697), and it is to her reign that the researchers and the compilation of this code relate. With the introduction of " Taiho:re: "In their opinion, the promotion of a new service layer is beginning. Imaizumi Takao also believes that work on the creation of a new administrative system begins in the reign of Kotoku (645-654) 45 .

In my opinion, this decree confirms Imaizumi Takao's view of the coexistence of the principle of appointment by ability and the hereditary principle in the first half of the eighth century. and about the predominance of the latter in the system of appointing county governors. Since the publication of this decree, the main principle for appointing county governors has been hereditary (the so-called fudai system 46 ) .

In the second half of the eighth century, in contrast to the strengthening of hereditary clans, the system of appointing descendants of hereditary clans with experience in serving in the guard (guarding the palace of emperors) to the post of county managers came into effect .47 This system consisted in the fact that the sons of the heads of the district administration were recruited to serve in the Guard, and subsequently appointments to the post of district administrators were made from among the guards. In 757, it is forbidden to appoint people who do not have a rank to the posts of county administrators and commanders of military-territorial detachments (Shoku nihongi, Tempe: Ho:ji 1-1-5, 757). According to Imaizumi Takao, this measure was aimed at ensuring that the posts of county administrators and military-territorial detachments were occupied by officials who had a rank of experience of service in the center 48 . In 761, a decree was issued prohibiting the appointment of representatives of the side branches to the post of county administrators, but it is specifically stipulated that this does not apply to those who already serve in the guard (Shoku nihongi, Tempe: Ho: ji 5-3-1, 761). Imaizumi Takao, who put forward a provision on the operation of the system descendants of hereditary families - > service in the center (in the guard) - > appointment to the posts of county administrators, believes that its functioning can only be described in relation to the second half of the VIII century. Although in " Taiho:re: "there are articles that indirectly indicate the possibility of obtaining an appointment to the post of district administrator after serving in the Guards 49 , this is not confirmed by any other sources.

The strengthening of the hereditary principle inevitably led to a weakening of the center's control in the field. Taking advantage of this, the county nobility accumulates in their hands an increasing amount of material values, because it was in the counties that the main part of rice barns was located. In 752, a legislative provision was adopted, according to which county managers were dismissed for embezzlement of state property, and their descendants were deprived of the right to hold the position of county chiefs (Shoku nihongi, Tempe: Se: ho: 4-11-7, 752). Apparently, in response to such measures, granary fires become very frequent (Shoku nihongi, Ho: ki 4-6-8, Ho: ki 4-2-6, 773). How widespread was this method of hiding embezzlement of state property, is evidenced by the decree of 773, ordering the dismissal of county managers who burn down state property. However, this decree apparently was not carried out, and in 786, under the Emperor Kammu (781-806), a decree was issued that the heirs of county governors whose rice barns burn down are deprived of the right to hold this post (Shoku nihongi, Enryaku 5-8-8, 786).

During the reign of Emperor Kammu, an attempt was made to restore the center's control over the counties. By decree of 798, it was forbidden to appoint representatives of hereditary families to the post of county stewards, and it was prescribed to appoint people of ability (Ruiju sandai kyaku, St. 7, Enryaku 17-3-21, 798). In 799,

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A decree was issued, according to which the selection of candidates for county governors, the admission of examinations and the appointment of county governors falls within the exclusive competence of Shikibuse: (Ruiju sandai kyaku, St. 7, Enryaku 18 - 5-15, 799). Consequently, by 799, Shikibuse: to some extent lost its authority to appoint county governors. stewards. However, the attempt to restore control over the counties was unsuccessful, and already in 811, a decree was issued ordering the appointment of representatives of hereditary families to the post of county administrators (Ruiju sandai kyaku, St. 7, Konin 2-2-7, 811).

Thus, the actual system of county government was very different from that presented in the legislative code of "Taiho:re: "and although from the first decade of the eighth century until the early 1940s, the state tried to bring the requirements of law and reality into line, this attempt was unsuccessful. In the second half of the eighth century, power at the county level is concentrated in the hands of the local nobility, and all attempts to change the situation are fruitless.

Evolution of provincial administrations. With the introduction of the new administrative system, the provinces become the main link connecting the center and the periphery. According to the laws of ritsurei, the governor of a province also concentrated in his hands those functions that, according to Tang laws, were distributed between the rulers of counties and village heads. This is particularly evident in the process of compiling counting records 50 and household lists 51 . In China, the county and village administrations took part in the compilation of accounts and household lists, while in Japan, the provincial and metropolitan administrations (Taiho) were responsible for their compilation.:re: VIII-19, 18; IX-23) 52 . Although in reality the county administrators were more involved in the compilation of accounting records and household lists than was prescribed by law 53, there is a clear desire of the state to create an "artificial" administrative link (province), making it the main means of local control.

The thesis that only metropolitan officials were appointed to leadership positions in the provinces in the eighth century is a common place in the research of Japanese historians. At first glance, the Shoku Nihongi data fully confirm this position ( Table 2).

As can be seen from Table 2, the overwhelming number of positions were held by representatives of the highest metropolitan nobility: of the 14 most frequently appointed families, eight were represented in Giseikan; 14 families accounted for more than half of all appointments to the posts of provincial governors and their deputies in the period from 697 to 757 (Table 3).

However, Table 3 shows that during the Jito rule, provincial governors were appointed in 17 provinces, during the Genmei rule (707-715) - in 34, and during the Gensho rule:

(715-724) - in 16. The total number of provinces was 68,55. This, of course, does not mean that during the reigns of these three sovereigns, provincial governors were appointed to less than half of the provinces. It should be borne in mind that it was the highest metropolitan nobility that got on the pages of Shoku Nihongi in the first place. Apparently, appointments to the posts of governors and deputy governors of provinces were recorded mainly in cases when an official was appointed who had a high social status, sufficient to get on the pages of the chronicle. The fact that appointments to leadership positions in the provinces cover such a small number of provinces is probably due to the fact that representatives of local nobility were appointed to the remaining provinces, who did not make it to the pages of the chronicle, because they did not have sufficient social status for this.

The most consistent attempts to strengthen the control of the center over the provinces during the VIII century were made three times: during the reign of Emperor Xie:mu, during the reign of Emperor Xie.

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Table 2

A list of genera who have been appointed as provincial governors and deputies five or more times. 697-757 (based on "Shoku nihongi")

N

Childbirth

Number of appointments

Participation in Giseikan *

1

Ootomo no Sukune

23

+

2

Tajihi no Mahito

14

+

3

Imperial family

14

+

4

Kudara no Konokishi

13

-

5

Fujiwara no Asomi

12

+

6

Saeki no Sukune

11

-

7

Abe no Asomi

11

+

8

Ishikawa no Asomi

9

+

9

Kose no Asomi

7

+

10

Ki no Asomi

7

+

11

Haguri no Sukune

6

-

12

Kamitsuke no Asomi

6

-

13

Hiketa no Asomi

5

-

14

Casa no Asomi

5

-

Total appointments for 14 births

132

-

Total appointments for births that were assigned less than five times (72 genera in total)

125

-

Total number of appointments

257

-

-------

* Plus marks are given to those families whose representatives were part of the Giseikan (the highest advisory body within the Dajo).:kana [State Council]) 54 .

Table 3

Number of provinces and appointments of provincial governors and their deputies

Number

Years

Mommu (697-707)

Gammay (707-715)

Gense: (715-724)

Ce:mu (724-749)

Koken (749-758)

Junning(758-764)

Se:toku (764-770)

Co:Ning (770-781)

781-791

Provinces

17

34

16

43

40

60

66

64

60

Destinations

26

53

18

97

66

201

224

328

348

Source: Shoku nihongi, Jingi 4-2-21, 727

Fujiwara Nakamaro (Fujiwara Nakamaro's influence peaked during the reign of Emperor Junning, 758-764), and during the reign of Emperor Kammu (57). As can be seen from Table 3, it is from the time of the Council of Europe:mu, the number of provinces for which appointments of provincial governors are recorded in Sekou Nihongi is increasing.

During the reign of Emperor Xie:mu conducted an inspection of seven regions in 727, the relative effectiveness of which is evidenced by the fact that it resulted in the removal from office and exile of the governor of the province of Tango Hanebayashi no Muraji Emaro, and the secretary of the same province was stripped of his rank (Shoku nihongi, Jingi 4-12-20, 727) .58

In 733, a decree was issued to strengthen the responsibility of provincial governors: "Many provincial governors go to the capital without waiting for the arrival of the official appointed to replace them, or, after serving their term, do not bother to transfer their affairs to the newcomer. In the third year of Tempe: (731 CE) the annual envoys to the court had already been ordered to report this. But because the provincial governors are connived at, they openly do not follow [our demands]. Really

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Table 4

Number of combined positions

Post

Years

Moimmu (697-707)

Gammay (707-715)

Gense: (715-724)

Ce:mu (724-749)

Ko-ken (749-758)

Junn-in (758-764)

Се: току (764-770)

Co:Ning (770-781)

781-791

Provincial Governor

0

0

0

2

1

14

25

52

52

Assistant Manager

0

0

0

0

0

2

13

18

22

Total

0

0

0

2

1

16

38

70

74

2.06 *

1.51 *

7.96 *

16.96 *

21.34 *

21.26 *

-------

* Share of combined positions in the total number of appointments. Source: Shoku nihongi, Tempe: Ho: ji 3-7-3, 3-5- 16, 3-11-5, 759.

is it appropriate to spend days and months in idleness? Therefore, [such officials] are prohibited from holding other positions after completing their service, and they can also be considered sanvi (officials who hold rank but do not hold office. - E. S.). All the provinces were delighted to learn that the new governor of the province would have to hand over his affairs and report them to Dajo:kan. So be it from now on and forever "(Shoku nihongi, Tempe: 5-4-5, 733). This measure shows that there are serious problems in the area of accountability of provincial authorities to the center.

The centralization of the Japanese state was especially active under Fujiwara Nakamaro. Under him, in 757, a new legislative code "E:rore:" was put into effect, compiled in 718 under his grandfather Fujiwara no Fujito. In the following year, 758, the term of service of provincial governors was extended from four to six years (Shoku nihongi, Tempe: Ho: ji 2-10-25, 758), while inspections in provinces were provided for every three years .59 And " Taiho:re " and "E: rore:" established a six-year term of service for provincial governors, but in 706 the term of service of provincial governors was reduced to four years (Sekou nihongi, Keyun 3-2-16, 706). Thus, only in 758 the term of service of provincial governors was brought into compliance with the law.

Like Emperor Se:mu, Fujiwara Nakamaro was concerned with the issue of reporting to provincial governors. Since 758, the governor of the province, at the end of his term of service in the province, was required to submit a report to Dajo:kan (Shoku nihongi, Tempe: Ho:ji 2-9-8, 758) within 120 days.

Since 759, metropolitan officials have been appointed to the posts of assistant provincial governors (Table 4).

From the table. 4 It is clear that during the Junnin reign (under which Emperor Fujiwara Nakamaro was most influential), the mass appointment of metropolitan officials to the post of assistant provincial governors begins, while at the same time the number of appointments to the post of provincial governors increases markedly. Apparently, Fujiwara Nakamaro tried to strengthen the control of the center in the provinces in the simplest and most effective way, appointing metropolitan nobles to senior positions in them. This is also confirmed by the fact that under Junning, stewards and assistant stewards were appointed to 60 provinces (see Table 3), i.e. capital officials were appointed to almost all provinces of the Japanese state.

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However, as a result of this course, there was an increase in the number of combined positions, when the main position for an official was in the capital, while he held a part-time position in the province.

If under Sho: mu, Koken, and Junnin, the share of combined positions was small (2.06, 1.51, and 7.96%, respectively), then under Empress Sho:it is already 16.96% for the current, and at the same time:nina - 21.34%. This means that not all officials appointed in the provinces left the capital and went to serve in the field.

The last emperor of the eighth century to try to strengthen the control of the center over the periphery was Kammu. It introduces restrictions on raising novi, as well as strict penalties for embezzlement of state property (Shoku nihongi, Enryaku 1-12-4, 782, Enryaku 4-5-24, 4-7-24, 785, Enryaku 5-6- 1,5-8-8, 786). In 784, a decree was issued ordering the confiscation of crops and fields of developed land. In 785, a collective responsibility for embezzlement was introduced for provincial officials who were guilty of seizing the fields of the common population, as well as to dismiss them from office (Shoku nihongi,Enryaku 3-11-3, 784). In 785, collective responsibility for embezzlement was introduced for provincial officials: "If there is even one official in the provincial government who is guilty of embezzling Xie:jei 60 , the other officials must be held equally responsible for the crime. All of them are subject to dismissal and are permanently deprived of the right to hold official positions" (Shoku nihongi, Enryaku 4-7-24, 785).

Economic support of provincial officials. For the study of local governance in the eighth century, the changes that took place in the economic support of provincial officials are very important.

According to " Taiho:re: "(IX-4, XV-10), the economic support of provincial and county officials consisted of salaries and income from official allotments.

The salary was paid twice a year (in the second and eighth months) and allocated directly to the center from the received tax revenues. Obviously, such a system was economically unprofitable, since it required excessive material costs for delivering taxes to the center, and then back - for delivering salaries to the provinces. In 728, officials who had an external fifth rank and below were ordered to receive salaries not in the capital, but at the place of service (Shoku Nihongi, Dzingi 5-4-15, 728). On the one hand, this was economically feasible, on the other, it meant weakening the economic control of the center in the field.

Another source of income for local officials was interest on loans. In 734, a decree was issued granting provincial administrations the right to make loans (sakutai) state-owned rice and setting the amount of rice allowed for loan depending on the size of the provinces (Shoku nihongi, Tempe: 6-1-15, 734): large provinces - 140 thousand sheaves, upper - 120 thousand, middle - 100 thousand, lower - 80 thousand. Initially, shakutai were interest-free and given out to the needy and those in distress. However, in the 1930s, loans became one of the components of the material well-being of provincial officials, as evidenced by the decree of 736: "The governors of all provinces are not allowed to take anything with them except the income from official allotments, personal servants and income from shakutai" (Shoku nihongi, Tempe: 8-5-17, 736).

In 745, the kugeto: system was introduced, in which all provinces were allowed to lend part of the rice from the se:zei fund, while the size of loans was set: for large provinces - 400 thousand sheaves, for upper - 300 thousand, for medium-200 thousand, for lower-100 thousand; exceeding the established size Borrowing was considered an official offense (Shoku nihongi, Tempe: 17-11-27, 745). According to Hayakawa Sho: hachi, the main purpose of introducing kugeto: was to replenish local rice supplies 61 . However, very soon kugeto: becomes primarily a means of heating-

page 34

local officials ' offices. In 757, the following decree was issued: "Recently, on the day of the change of the governor of the province, officials, forgetting to observe the hierarchy and losing the spirit of justice, vied with each other to seek kugeto:. This is not consistent with the principles. Therefore, from now on, the following order is established. The governor of the province, after calculating the total amount of kugeto: received during the year, must first make up for government arrears, then allocate part of the kugeto: to replenish the province's reserves, and only last of all must he distribute the remainder among the officials, depending on the hierarchy. Officials of the first category should be given six parts, officials of the second category-four parts, officials of the third category-three parts, officials of the fourth category-two parts, scribes-one part... "(Shoku nihongi, Tempe: Ho: ji 1-10-11, 757).

Thus, in the second half of the eighth century, the basis of the material well-being of provincial officials became kugeto:, i.e., income from loans. The amount of government rice used to represent loans tended to increase (it is enough to compare the decrees of 734 and 745). In fact, the redistribution of surplus product moves from the center to the places.

Another way to enrich the local bureaucracy was to raise Novi. In 743, a decree was issued introducing the principle of "perpetual private ownership of developed virgin land" 62, and also transferring the issuance of land development permits to provincial governors (previously such permission was issued by central government agencies). Simple peasant farming was not able to develop virgin land, but the nobility was able to take full advantage of the situation. The creation of private farms meant the beginning of the collapse of the foundations of the ritsure state: - the allotment system (handen). Realizing this, the state sought to suspend the process of forming private farms. In 765, it was forbidden to expand the possessions of the developed Novi (Sekou nihongi, Tempe: Dzingo 1-3-5, 765). But already in 772, this prohibition was lifted (Sekou nihongi, Ho: ki 3-10-14, 772); apparently, it was no longer possible to stop the process of forming private possessions.

Thus, the main trend of economic development in the second half of the eighth century was the strengthening of provincial autonomy: the redistribution of surplus product (rice) was in the hands of provincial officials, provincial officials (as well as county officials) were able to create private farms.

Provincial government in the eighth century certainly requires more careful study. In the meantime, we can draw the following conclusions:

1. Provinces created artificially, as opposed to counties, according to the creators of the Ritsurei state, were supposed to become the main lever of control of the center on the ground (provincial governors in Japan had broader powers than in Tang China);

2. The thesis that metropolitan officials were appointed to leadership positions in the provinces is true only with certain reservations. Appointments of metropolitan officials to almost all provinces of the Japanese state were recorded not earlier than the Junnin rule (758-764), when metropolitan officials began to be appointed to the posts of assistant provincial governors.;

3. However, since the reign of Empress Xie:the number of combined positions is increasing. This means that not all officials appointed in the province actually served locally;

4. The main trend of economic development at the provincial level in the second half of the eighth century was their transformation into autonomous and economically independent units.

page 35

* * *

So, in the second half of the seventh and early eighth centuries, a new administrative system was created in Japan, borrowed from Tang China. However, there were very significant differences between the systems of local government in Tang China and Nar Japan:

1. In China, metropolitan officials were sent to serve not only in provinces, but also in counties (Xian) 63 . In Japan, however, representatives of local clans were appointed to the post of county stewards.;

2. The position of county governors in Japan was lifelong and tended to be hereditary. Thus, the county governors were not officials in the full sense of the word;

3. In China, the governors of provinces and counties were appointed from the center (Li-bu 64 was responsible for the appointment). In Japan, only provincial governors were appointed from the center; the appointment of county governors until 735 was the responsibility of provincial governors.

In general, the experience of creating a centralized state in the eighth century was unsuccessful. Although an attempt was made in Japan to create a four-tier administrative system similar to the Tang one (region - province - county - village), the regions did not really become an independent administrative unit (there was no permanent staff of officials at the regional level; the provinces already in the second half of the century began to turn into autonomous, independent from the center of education; the power of the most of the counties, despite the best efforts of the center, remained in the hands of the local nobility.

Apparently, in the eighth century in Japan there were no objective prerequisites for the creation of a centralized state. As you know, the decision of the Japanese rulers to create a centralized state of the Chinese type was largely influenced by the fact of the military defeat of Japan in 663, when the Japanese fleet was defeated by the joint forces of Tang China and the Korean state of Silla. 65 However, with Japan's withdrawal from Korea, the country was practically not threatened by a military invasion from outside; by the end of the eighth century, it became obvious that there was no need for a strong centralized army - conscription was facilitated, and later eliminated. Thus, one of the leading factors in the creation of a centralized state - the military-was absent in Japan. There was also no economic necessity for the unification of the country, as evidenced, in particular, by the unsuccessful attempt to introduce monetary circulation in the eighth century, as well as the tendency to turn provinces into economically autonomous units.

notes

Kochakova N. B. 1 Reflections on the early state / / Early forms of political organization, Moscow, 1995, pp. 160-161.

Korsunsky A. R. 2 Obrazovanie rannefeudalnogo gosudarstva v Zapadnoy Evrope [Formation of the Early Feudal State in Western Europe]. Moscow, 1963, p. 139.

Batmanin A. 3 outline of the history of state institutions of the Chinese Empire // Fenomen Oriental despotism: structure and control. M., 1993. S. 300-301.

Hayakawa Sehachi. 4 Nihon no rekishi 4. Ritsure: kokka (History of Japan 4. Ritsure State:). Tokyo, 1974. pp. 127-134.

Coachman S. 5 Some thoughts on law and legal thought in ancient China // Society and state in China. 25th Scientific Conference, Moscow, 1994, p. 10.

Hayakawa Sehachi. 6 Edict, Op. pp. 129-131.

7 The most striking example is the differences in the system of "shadow ranks", in which the descendant of an official could, upon reaching the age of majority (21 years), receive a rank and the corresponding post. In Japan-

page 36

In Japan, the shadow institute was used to concentrate the most important state posts in the hands of the Kinai aristocracy (the aristocratic families of the central Kinai region; in the VIII century, the Kinai region included five provinces-Kawachi, Setsu, Yamato, Yamashiro, Izumi). For more information, see: Grachev M. V. Formation of Ancient Japanese officialdom in the 7th-early 8th centuries. Kand. dis. Moscow, 1998, p. 158.

8 History of Japan, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1998, pp. 103-104.

9 Chronicle and mythological code compiled in 720. The story begins with mythological times and extends to 697. See: Nihon seki (Annals of Japan). Trans., preface and comments by L. M. Ermakova and A. N. Meshcheryakov, vol. 1-2, St. Petersburg, 1997, p. 148.

10 The former administrative system was based on blood relations; the local authority of the center was represented by the heads of local influential families, who received confirmation of their authority from the center.

11 Wooden tablets with hieroglyphic inscriptions made in ink. The earliest mokkan dates back to the second quarter of the seventh century.

Kuni no miyatsuko- 12 the title given to influential local families by the Yamato State authorities (the name of Japan before the eighth century), gave formal confirmation of the rights to manage the territory. Since the position of kuni no miyatsuko existed in the eighth century, to avoid confusion in Japanese historiography, it is customary to divide kuni no miyatsuko into old (the title of the local ruling family before the reforms) and new (the name of the position in the ritsure state: when one kuni no miyatsuko was appointed to each province, performing ritual functions serving the national Shinto cult).

Watanabe Ikuko. Gunshi sei-no seipu (Formation of the system of county councils). Tokyo, 1989. p. 17.

14 Ibid., p. 18.

15 Ancient fudoki. Translated, preface and commentary by K. A. Popov, Moscow, 1969, pp. 39, 47, 59.

16 Collection of Buddhist legends, compiled at the turn of the VIII-IX centuries.

17 Nihon reiki. Japanese legends of miracles. Translated, preface and commentary by A. N. Meshcheryakov, St. Petersburg, 1995, St. 1, 17.

18 One of the main sources on the history of the VIII century; the weather chronicle "Shoku nihongi" covers 697-791, its compilation was completed in 797. See: Shoku nihongi (Continuation of the Annals of Japan). Ser. "Shin Nihon koten bungaku taikei". Vol. 1-5. Tokyo, 1989-1996.

19 This expression is first found in Shoku nihongi, Tempe: 7-5-21, 735.

Kucu Tocuo. 20 Ritsure: taisei moto no gozoku to nomin (Local nobility and rural population within the ritsure system:) / / Nihon reksi 3. Kodai 3 (History of Japan 3. Antiquity 3). Tokyo, 1962. p. 89.

21 There are references in the sources to two pieces of legislation that have not come down to us: "About: the World: "(its compilation dates back to 668, the 7th year of the Tenchi reign, 668-671) and " Asukakiyomiharare:", which, according to the Nihon Seki (720), was introduced during the reign of Empress Jito (686-697). The existence of both vaults is questionable, but most scholars believe that the Kiyomiharare: Vault actually existed.

Yamanaka Toshiji. 22 Kokuga gunga no kozo to hansen (Architecture of provincial and county councils and its evolution) / / Nihon rekishi koza 2. Kodai 2. (Lectures on the History of Japan 2. Antiquity 2). Tokyo, 1984. p. 87.

Imaizumi Takao. 23 Hasseiki gunre-no ninye to syutsuji (The origin of county governors and the method of their appointment in the VIII century) / / Shigaku dzassi (Historical Journal), vol. 81, 1972, No. 12, p. 5.

Kucu Tocuo. 24 Edict. op., p. 89.

Watanabe Ikuko. 25 Edict. op., p. 7.

26 Nihon seki, Saimei 4-7-4, 658; Saimei 5-3-17, 659; Temmu 1-6-22, 672; Temmu 1-6-24, 672; Temmu 14-11-1-4, 685; Jito 3-8-10, 688 For more information, see Mori Kimiaki. Hyo: sei moto no kuni no miyatsuko ni kansuru ikko-satsu (About kuni no miyatsuko in the framework of the existence of the Koori system) / / Nihon rekishi (Japanese History). 1986, N 460.

27 Taiho:re: - code of laws, introduced in 701-702: Code of Laws " Taiho: re:". 702-718 Translated and commented by K. A. Popov, Vol. 1-2, Moscow, 1985.

28 Nihon seki, Temmu 12-12-13, 683

29 Ibid., Temmu 14-10-3, 685.

Watanabe Ikuko. 30 Edict. op., p. 59.

31 Ibid., pp. 62-63.

Yamanaka Toshiji. 32 Edict. op., p. 89.

page 37

33 Ibid., pp. 86-89.

34 Wado is the motto of the reign of Empress Gammei (708-715).

Nakada Yokichi. 35 Ritsure: chihotesei no henka to sono igi (Evolution of the Local Governance System of the Ritsure State:) / / Nihon rekishi. 1980, N 386. P. 19; Komeda Yu:suke. Gongshi kenkyu:- no mondaiten (Debatable issues in studies of county management) / / Nihon rekishi. 1975, N 324.

36 This figure is based on a comparison of the Chinese chronicles and the Kuni no Miyatsuko Hongi ("Basic Records of the Kuni no Miyatsuko Clans") compiled at the beginning of the Heian Era. The Song Shu says that there are 121 kunis in the country of Wa (Japan), and 120 in the Sui Shu. Kuni no miyatsuko Hongi records 126 births of Kuni no miyatsuko. On this basis, Imaizumi believes that before Kotoku, there were approximately 120 Kuni headed by Kuni no miyatsuko.

Imaizumi Takao. 37 Decree. op. p. 19.

38 In the ninth century, commentaries and clarifications to the legislative codes Re:-no Gyge (compiled in 833) and Re:-no shu:ge (compiled at the end of the tenth century) appeared, giving an idea of the changes made to the laws during the eighth century.

Ryo: But gige. 39 Episode "Kokushi taikei". Tokyo, 1996. pp. 139-140.

Imaizumi Takao. 40 Edict. op. p. 9; Inobe Ju: ichiro. Gunshisei no zo:shi-ni tsuite-no oboegaki (Remarks on the emergence of the system of county councils) / / Nihon rekishi. 1964, N 189, P. 19.

Inouchi Seiji. 41 Ritsure:seiteki kokugunsei no saikento: (Once again to the question of studying the provincial and county system in the era of ritsure) / / Ritsure: kokka no tycho: shihai (Local Government of ritsure State). Ed. Torao Toshiya. Tokyo, 1995; Sasaki Keisuke. Ritsure: risei-no tokushitsu-ni tsuite (On the peculiarities of village administration in the Ritsure era:) / / Shigaku zassi. 1986, N 2.

42 Ueda Masaaki, Komeda Yusuke and Naoki Kojiro believe that this decree indicates the emergence of a new service layer. Imaizumi Takao believes that the decree lays down both the principles of appointing a county administration - by ability and hereditary. Decree. op. p. 19.

43 Ruiju: Sandai kyaku, Tempe: 11-7-15, 739 "Ruiju: Sandai Kyaku" - a collection of edicts during three epochs - Konin (810-823), Teikan (859-866), Enryaku (901-922) (Konin, Tekan, Enryaku-mottos of government, starting from the middle of the VII century., Japanese emperors at the accession of on the throne they took one or another motto of government, consisting of favorable hieroglyphs; according to the mottos of the government, this or that period of time received its name). The monument was composed in the Heian period (794-1185), but it also includes decrees from the Nara era.

44 According to article XIV-65 " Taiho:re: "if an official is certified according to the lowest indicator, he is subject to immediate dismissal.

Imaizumi Takao. 45 Edict. op. p. 4, 14.

Fudai 46 can literally be translated as "succession / succession of generations"; a system in which the position of county governors was replaced by representatives of families who held this post for several generations.

Imaizumi Takao. 47 Edict. op. p. 30.

48 Ibid.

49 Taiho:re:, XVII-37, XVII-38.

50 had to be compiled annually and consisted of household and tax lists.

51 had to be drawn up once every 6 years, since the law provided for land redistribution every 6 years.

Inouchi Seiji. 52 Edict. op. p. 72-73.

53 Ibid., pp. 74-78.

54 Data on the composition of Giseikan are presented in the article: Grachev M. V. On the composition of the ancient Japanese court officials in the first half of the VIII century (in press).

55 Between 712 and 718, six new provinces were created: Deva Province in 712, Mimasaka, Tango, and Oosumi Provinces in 713, and Noto and Awa Provinces in 718. Thus, by 712, there were 62 provinces.

56 Fujiwara Nakamaro (706-764) became the most influential political figure in the court shortly after the abdication of Emperor Shō-mu in 749. For more information about the genus Fujiwara, see: Meshcheryakov A. N. The rise of the genus Fujiwara. Chinese education, political system, and official ideology in Japan in the seventh and eighth centuries. (in print).

57 The reign of Emperor Kammu (781-806). The chronicle "Shoku nihongi" brings the story to 791.

page 38

58 By way of comparison, a similar inspection conducted in 699-700 under Mommu's rule resulted in only rank promotions, as well as grants to feed yards. See: Sun nihongi, Mommu 4-8-22, 700.

59 Already in the following year, 759, inspectors were appointed to seven regions (Shoku nihongi, Tempe: Ho: ji 3-8-1, 759).

60 Sho: zei or oozei - part of the land tax paid to warehouses in the province and to county granaries. Sho: zei was used in emergencies, as well as to cover the financial expenses of the province. See: Nihon kodaishi jiten (Dictionary of Ancient Japanese History). Tokyo, 1974. p. 311.

Hayakawa Sho: hachi. 61 Kugeto: seido no seiritsu (Formation of the kugeto system:) / / Shigaku zassi. 1960. T. 69, N 3. P. 7.

62 Prior to this decree, a person who has mastered virgin land received the right to own it for life, if, while cultivating the land, he used the old irrigation system, or to own it for three generations (in the case of creating a new irrigation system). Shoku nihongi, Tempe: 15-5-27, 743

63 Cambridge History of China. V. 3. Cambridge, 1979. P. 352-353.

64 can roughly be translated as the Office of Civil Affairs.

65 The ancient Korean state, located in the south of the Korean Peninsula, emerged in the II-III centuries AD; in 668, Korea was united under the auspices of Silla. The Silla state lasted until 935.

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