On December 18, 2001, a very remarkable event occurred in the South China Sea, indicating a radical shift in Japanese national consciousness over the past 50 years. For the first time since Japan's surrender in World War II, the country's navy was again ordered to open fire on a foreign ship that invaded its territorial waters. The order was carried out - the foreign ship was attacked and sank, and its crew was killed [Asahi Shimbun, 12/20/2001]. Such behavior of the Japanese military seamen and officials who gave them such an order was impossible to imagine a decade ago, because it would certainly have caused an explosion of indignation of the Japanese public, mass protests against the violation of the Constitution, etc. However, this time the Japanese not only did not strongly condemn the use of armed force by Japanese military personnel, but also tacitly they supported their actions, thus demonstrating a rapid surge of patriotic feelings, and in fact demanding that violators be punished at all costs.

A similar rise in nationalist sentiment in the country was recorded in October 2002, after the DPRK authorities officially announced the presence in North Korea of several nuclear warheads and launch vehicles capable of reaching the territory of the Japanese Islands [Yomiuri Shimbun, 23.10.2002]. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimates that the DPRK does indeed have six nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles [Washington Post, 9.06.2005]. Then the Minister of National Defense of Japan, Shigeru Ishiba, for the first time in the country's recent history, issued an official warning to the leadership of the DPRK that Japan, if necessary, would launch a series of pre-emptive strikes on the territory of North Korea [Asahi Shimbun, 15.02.2003]. The Japanese side officially repeated a similar militant statement in London on September 15, 2003, when the head of the National Defense Department of Japan stressed that the country's Constitution allows preemptive strikes on the territory of a potential enemy in self-defense and that Tokyo will not allow North Korean missiles to reach Japanese territory first [Asahi Shimbun, 16.09.2003]. Subsequent official speeches by a number of prominent members of the Cabinet of Ministers confirmed the words of the Minister of Defense that Japan is ready to defend itself by all means available to it, not excluding, if necessary, nuclear weapons [Foreign Affairs, 2003, p. 75].

During the Cold War, only representatives of ultra-right nationalist forces, not members of the government, could make such militaristic statements. Today, however, after the end of the period of global confrontation and the transition to the formation of a new system of international relations, the national-

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onalistic terminology is firmly included in the political vocabulary of the official Japanese authorities. And if the attention of the US leaders after their victory in the Cold war with the USSR is focused on the fight against international terrorism, then the leaders of Japan, being at this moment, as if aloof from the attention of the world community, focused their efforts on reviving the policy and practice of Japanese militant nationalism, on unwinding a new nationalist wave in the country.

But what is Japanese nationalism today? Perhaps this phenomenon is not as dangerous as the old, traditional nationalism, based on the ideology of which the ruling circles of Japan have unleashed conflicts with China, Russia and the United States of America in the past? This article is devoted to the analysis of the real manifestations and goals of the state nationalism policy in Japan.

1. HISTORICAL STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE NATIONALISM

In theory, there is a distinction between state and ethnic nationalism. State nationalism refers to the ideology and policies of the ruling circles of a multinational or mono-national state, which primarily serve the interests of the authorities. In a multinational State, this policy is aimed at inciting national hostility under the slogan of protecting the national interests and national superiority of the titular nation, which has a numerical superiority over national minorities. The nationalist ideology of power in a multinational state presupposes the subordination of other nations to the titular nation, it promotes the exclusivity and superiority of this nation; its representatives form the national elite. State nationalism is aimed at justifying the legitimacy of all state actions in pursuing a policy of external expansion, in subordinating other sovereign states to their influence.

The concept of patriotism is close to state nationalism. The state willingly uses official symbols and ideological institutions (school education, social sciences, mass media) to foster patriotism in order to assert the loyalty of the entire society to the policy of the authorities. State nationalism or patriotism acquires a special scope and extreme forms of manifestation in the form of chauvinism or expansionism in the period of preparation for wars, as well as to prevent internal social explosions and violent regime change. After the Cold War, the rise of state nationalism was observed both in the countries that won this war, i.e. in the United States, European countries and Japan, and in the countries that lost the Cold War, for example in Russia, due to the loss of its superpower status, the loss of allies, and the unstable position of power within the country.

In contrast to the state, ethnic nationalism is the ideology and political practice of the behavior of national minorities in a multinational state. It is based on the understanding of a nation as the highest form of ethnic community based on its historical values and traditions, a community that has an exclusive right to its statehood, including its institutions of power, resources, and cultural and civilizational values. In other words, ethno-nationalism is a phenomenon generated, in essence, by the ineffective national policy of the authorities of a multi-ethnic state, especially in relation to non-dominant ethnic groups. Hans Kohn, a well-known researcher on nationalism, wrote in his book Nationalism: Its Meaning and History that "ethnic nationalism is a state of mind that is convinced that the highest value of the individual should be the creation of an independent national state" (Kohn, 1955, p.3). Ethnic nationalism is thus the answer-

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It is a direct reaction to the titular nation's attempts to impose, including by force, its political system of governance, the system of values of the dominant nation, and to forcibly assimilate national minorities. As a rule, such ethnic nationalism carries negative stereotypes in relation to other peoples and anti-etatist, i.e. anti-state, attitudes towards the state of the titular nation. The extremist form of ethnic nationalism, namely terrorism, is a serious threat to the national security of both the multinational State itself and international stability in general.

The Japanese, as representatives of a mono-ethnic state, interpret nationalism as both state and ethnic at the same time, without making great distinctions between them, but often showing false feelings of national superiority and national isolation in relation to other nations. Japanese nationalism is characterized by a high level of patriotism, love for the Motherland and for everything Japanese. Through this prism, it is easier for the Japanese to look at the world and not notice their inferiority complex, which, alas, has been suffered by more than one generation of Japanese people. The ideology of nationalism in Japan seems to neutralize this complex, artificially instilling in the mass consciousness a sense of racial superiority of the Japanese nation over the peoples of East and Southeast Asia, as well as over the Russians inhabiting the Far East. The latter were called yabanjin by the Japanese from time immemorial, which means "savage, barbarian". The Japanese justified their national "choice" by the isolated geographical position of the country in East Asia, ethnic homogeneity with a single language of communication, a common Shinto religion, strongly developed soil feelings, as well as the special status of the emperor, which for the Japanese always meant both God and the state and was a symbol of patriotic unity of the nation. It is very significant that after the restoration of the Meiji Emperor in 1868, when the authorities needed a new national ideology of modernization, a new national idea to rally the Japanese to carry out unpopular reforms based on models borrowed from outside, the Japanese ruling elite developed the nationalist ideology of "the state as one family" - the ideology of "kokutai", which contributed to the mobilization of the Japanese. not only for the shock reforms of the modernization period, but also for expansionist policies in East Asia.

Traditional nationalist ideology in Japan during the period of modernization and active foreign policy in East Asia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries served specific political interests of the authorities. This ideology had its own obvious pros and cons.

First, it was designed to consolidate Japanese society after centuries of feudal fragmentation and civil strife. This need was objective, because it was determined by the external threat to Japan's national interests from the great world powers, who sought to subordinate it to their influence and turn it into a colony in East Asia. The Japanese authorities actively used the patriotic, nationalistic idea in order to mobilize public consciousness to search for the enemy, to protect themselves from external threats, as well as to engage in external seizures. Nationalist rhetoric was demanded by new political forces for the sole purpose of modernizing the Japanese economy in a short historical period, creating a modern army and navy, and building a strong island state - Fukoku Kyohei. The consolidation of Japanese society after the Meiji Restoration took place against the backdrop of a rapid rise in nationalism and patriotism, which were implanted in the mass consciousness of ordinary Japanese, primarily through the school and higher education system. Every Japanese was aware of the importance of achieving the national goals announced by the new Japanese authorities, and perceived them as their own personal goals.-

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dachas. (During the period of modernization of the country, as well as throughout the pre-war period of the first half of the twentieth century, the ideology of nationalism was implemented in Japan in two main forms: in the form of state nationalism (kokkasyugi), which assumed complete submission of all citizens to any directives of the supreme power and complete loyalty to the state, and in the form of ethnic nationalism (minzokushyugi), japanese cultural tradition, national history, Shinto religion, and folk customs.)

Secondly, the ideology of nationalism in Japanese society has always met the objectives of strengthening the power vertical of management. The Imperial Constitution of Japan of 1889 ordered all citizens of the country to follow the principle that the first duty of behavior of every Japanese person is to maintain loyalty to the state and the emperor. The Imperial Decree on Education, issued immediately after the Constitution was published in 1890, emphasized this sacred duty of every Japanese. The authorities allocated huge amounts of money from the state budget for organizing mass events, for holding Shinto festivals and national holidays that glorify the emperor and the supreme state authority. School textbooks were filled with nationalistic texts. Since childhood, the Japanese were brought up in an atmosphere of loyalty to the emperor and the motherland. The state nationalist ideology was especially actively indoctrinated into the mass consciousness of Japanese people as capitalism and the market economy developed in the country, under which the process of individualization and isolation of private and corporate interests to the detriment of state and national interests objectively increases in any society. The Japanese authorities were afraid of the undesirable consequences for the national interests of the country of the process of spreading a capitalist, individualistic system of values and made great efforts to promote nationalist ideology1 .

State nationalism in Japan in the 1920s and 1930s actively exploited ultranationalist dogmas as the military's role in the country's political life increased on the eve of World War II. In 1937, the Code of the Japanese Nationalist was published, known as Kokutai no Hongi, which means "Basic Principles of the national essence of the Japanese". In particular, it emphasized that the life of every Japanese citizen belongs to the state and is one inseparable whole with it [Kokutai-no hongi, 1993, p. 820]. Officially, the nationalist indoctrination of the mass consciousness of the Japanese was stopped by the country's authorities only after the surrender of Japan in 1945.

Third, the promotion of nationalism in Japan served the purpose of maintaining a high level of public morals, which can not but be assessed as a positive phenomenon. The task of maintaining a high moral standard in society was solved in the Russian Academy of Education.-

¹ Updated in comparison with the period of modernization and Meiji reforms, the main nationalist doctrines of the period of World War I and the preparation for World War II emphasized the introduction of myths about social harmony under capitalism, about the exclusivity and uniqueness of the Japanese nation, and about the need for external conquests in East Asia to ensure the welfare and security of the Japanese people. The development of official nationalist doctrines of loyalty to the state and expansionist policies was the responsibility of the country's top military and political figures, such as Tanaka Giichi, General, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, chairman of the Rikken Seiyukai Party, an active participant in the Russo-Japanese War [Tanaka Giichi, 1993, p. 1523], as well as nationalist representatives a well-known right-wing ideologue in the period 1920-1945, author of the well-known Japanese book "Japan and the Special Way of the Japanese", published in 1926 and withstood 46 reprints, theorist of Japanese fascism and the inevitability of conflict between the West and the East, a war criminal convicted by the Tokyo Military Tribunal [Okawa Shumei, 1993, p. 1138].

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kach of the ideology of ethnic nationalism. It was based on the nationalist doctrine of 1887 "Nihon dotoku ron", which means "Morale of the Japanese". Its ideologist was Nishimura Shigeki, a well-known Japanese moralist of the early Meiji period, author of more than 130 books and 200 articles devoted not so much to the praise of Japanese statehood as to the formation of a special Japanese spirit and Japanese morality [Nishimura Shigeki, 1993, p. 1100].

However, in general, Japanese ideologists of ethnic nationalism were united by the idea of pan-Asiatism and the exclusivity of the Japanese nation "Nihonsugi". They organized such influential radical nationalist organizations as Genesya (Istoki), the Amur River Society or the Black Dragon Society (Kokuryukai), and preached a much more aggressive foreign policy than the authorities could afford within the framework of the ideology of state nationalism [Amur River Society..., 1993, p. 35]. At the same time, it should be noted that the spread of the ideology of ethnic nationalism helped the Japanese authorities not only to win the war with China in 1894-1895, but also to win the Russo - Japanese war over a strong opponent, such as tsarist Russia. Then, for the first time in Japanese history, nationalists celebrated not only a victory on the battlefield, but, perhaps, to a greater extent, a victory to overcome the inferiority complex and eternal fear of the Japanese before the power of the great European and Asian powers, which far surpass Japan itself in military power.

Left-wing Japanese ethno-nationalists, including such prominent figures as Socialist leader Kotoku Shusui, who was executed in 1911 for attempting to organize a plot to overthrow the Meiji Emperor, felt the most loyal feelings towards the Japanese people, and were in fierce opposition to the ruling regime for its aggressive foreign policy, for unleashing the Sino-Japanese and Japanese-Russian wars. wars [Kotoku Shusui, 1993, p. 834].

If for ideologists of state nationalism in Japan, the emperor has always been the highest representative of statehood, the guarantor of the constitution and independence of the country, then ethno-nationalists worshiped the emperor as the highest Shinto dignitary, as an intermediary in communication between society and God [Shinto..., 2002, pp. 261-384]. National unity in the 1930s and first half of the 1940s under nationalist slogans was facilitated by the crucial fact that the authorities indoctrinated the myth that every Japanese person is part of a sacred chain: God-Emperor-ordinary Japanese. The pamphlet "Fundamentals of Kokutai", prepared by the Ministry of Education in 1937, explicitly emphasized that "Japan is one big family and the emperor, as the messenger of God on earth, is the head of this family and the core of the nation's existence" [The Meiji Japan..., 1969, p. 282]. Japanese soldiers went to the "death for the emperor", believing that they were part of and at the same time an extension of this sacred chain, and not at all a driving belt of the state machine, whose interests they needed to protect and pay for it with their own lives [Benedict, 1974, p.33].

After the victory over Japan in World War II, the US authorities attached particular importance to destroying the foundations of the ideology and policy of Japanese nationalism, which was associated with militarism. The solution of this problem began immediately after the signing of the act of unconditional surrender of Japan with the adoption by the headquarters of the occupation forces under the command of General D. MacArthur of a number of important documents. On October 4, 1945, the headquarters Directive "On the abolition of restrictions on political, civil and religious freedoms" was adopted, directly aimed at eliminating the state ideology of Shinto. Following this directive, on December 15, 1945, another one was issued- "On the abolition of state patronage, preservation, management and dissemination of state Shinto" [Japanese Education Since...,

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1994, p. 70]. The main point of these two most important documents to destroy the foundations of Japanese state nationalism was to prohibit the propaganda and dissemination of ultranationalist, militaristic ideology, which was expressed in the doctrines, practices, rituals and ceremonies of Shinto.

In addition to uprooting the nationalist ideology of Shinto, the American occupation authorities also attacked the pre-war nationalist doctrines of Kokutai, which was the conceptual justification for the conduct of the "Great East Asian War" (Daitoa Senso), and the doctrine of "eight corners under one roof" (Hakko ichiu), which justified external seizures on the continent. The American authorities forced the Japanese to rewrite history textbooks, and nationalist myths were allowed to be studied only as literary monuments.

After the war, the US authorities tried to prevent the revival of Japanese nationalism and militarism at all costs. This task was clearly spelled out in the 1947 Constitution they drew up for the Japanese.In addition, the Americans forced Emperor Showa to renounce his divine origin. In a New Year's address to the nation on January 1, 1946, known as the "Declaration on Human Nature" ("Ningen Sengen"), the emperor officially announced that he was changing his nationalist status as a "descendant of the gods" to that of an ordinary person, but "first among equals" (Isamu Kanaji, 1989, p. 11). As the English historians Sterling and Pegi Seagrave emphasize in their interesting study "The Yamato Dynasty", Emperor Hirohito, as a true Japanese nationalist, did not even apologize to his people for the defeat in the war, which meant that Japan did not lose the war under his leadership [Seagrave C, Seagrave P., 2005, p. 468].

In the early post-war years, the United States saw the foundations of Japanese pre-war nationalism and militarism seriously undermined. However, as the main ideology of the nation's survival, it has not completely disappeared. The Americans only managed to tone it down a little, but nationalism was once again in demand by the Japanese authorities in the new difficult historical conditions of the late XX-early XXI centuries. The fact is that after the defeat in World War II, the Japanese authorities themselves were not interested in stimulating nationalist sentiment in society. To a large extent, such a policy during the post-war decades was explained by the fears of the Japanese ruling circles that the "genie of state nationalism" could break out of the bottle with destructive consequences unpredictable for national interests, and then it would be extremely difficult to drive it back. In addition, the complex capitulation of the nation, as well as the need to quickly restore the destroyed economy in the context of expanding international trade and economic ties and internationalization, only strengthened the determination of the Japanese authorities to temporarily refrain from unwinding the nationalist spiral. At the same time, in the conditions of the capitulation and subsequent American occupation of the country, the ideology of ethnic nationalism remained important, which was expressed in the propaganda of love for the Motherland, patriotism, loyalty to national history and traditions by the authorities. After the war, ethno-nationalism was in demand in Japan in this form against the background of the country's transformation into a largely dependent power on the United States.

The fears of the Japanese authorities for the uncontrolled growth of state nationalism in the country after the war were twofold. First, they were based on the uncertainty of Japan's leaders in the behavior of Japanese security forces if they were given the opportunity to play an important role in the country's political life. And secondly, these concerns were related to the fact that the Japanese public, humiliated by the terms of surrender and the American occupation, could easily support revanchist sentiments and bless the Japanese military for usko-

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acceleration of the militarization process. Tokyo's abstinence from spinning a nationalist spiral in the 1950s and 1980s had a concrete expression in the fact that all sectors of society, including the ruling elite, opposed any changes to the country's Constitution, and above all Article 9, which proclaimed the rejection of war [Documents. Constitution of Japan, 1973, p. 758]. Indoctrination of public opinion was then carried out by the country's authorities in a pacifist manner. Thus, in January 1968, the then Prime Minister of Japan, Sato Eisaku, officially announced that his Government would continue to strictly adhere to the three non-nuclear principles - not to produce, import or store nuclear weapons. However, he refused at the time to enshrine these principles in the form of a law or any international obligation.

Undoubtedly, in all the actions of the Japanese authorities during the Cold War, there was an interest in self-restraint in promoting state nationalism, a desire to pursue a passive foreign policy, to restrain the process of militarization and the transformation of the country into a strong military power in East Asia. American political scientist Christopher Calder accurately described this stage in the development of Japanese nationalism as a mirror image of the essence of the country's foreign policy, which was a special mixture of indecision combined with pragmatism [Calder, 1988, p.518]. Despite the accumulated solid economic and technical potential, the Japanese authorities did not come up with significant foreign policy initiatives at that time, and did not rely on nationalist ideology in their foreign policy behavior. The constructivism of this model of foreign policy behavior consisted in forming friendly relations with the leading world powers in order to obtain guaranteed access to the main world markets for finished products and raw materials. The policy of unwinding the nationalist spiral in those historical conditions simply did not meet the interests of the country's ruling circles.

2. FEATURES OF THE STATE NATIONALISM POLICY AT THE PRESENT STAGE

Radical changes in the balance of power in the international arena after the Cold War and the need to strengthen power positions in these conditions, the emergence of new threats to national security, including the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment in East Asian countries , and, finally, the need to consolidate society to carry out unpopular reforms-all this, taken together, stimulated the Japanese authorities to step up the policy of state nationalism, so necessary to mobilize the Japanese to solve the complex problems of the nation's survival in the new historical conditions.

The policy of state nationalism in Japan at the present stage has acquired a number of specific outlines.

First, it is the unequivocal attempts of the Japanese authorities not to recognize the guilt of the former leaders of the country to the peoples of East Asia for pursuing aggressive imperialist policies in the past, as well as not to recognize Japan's defeat in World War II. This is precisely the meaning of regular and persistent visits by top Japanese officials to the Yasukuni Shinto Shrine, where the ashes of Class A war criminals convicted by the Tokyo International Military Tribunal are buried, despite mass public protests in East Asian countries. Official Tokyo defiantly ignores these protests, saying that the Yasukuni Shrine is only the Japanese equivalent of the Arlington National Cemetery in the United States, since in addition to burying the ashes of war criminals, the ashes of national heroes of Japan have been buried there for centuries.

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its centuries-old history, and therefore it is difficult for the Japanese authorities to ignore this fact of national pride. In addition, the country's authorities say in their defense, the Japanese public is tired of the fact that Japan has to constantly justify itself and listen to the opinions of other countries, in order to please them, apologize for the country's behavior on the eve and during World War II.

Second, the official propaganda of state nationalism in Japan after the Cold War has reached such a high level that today many ordinary Japanese really believe that their country repented of its criminal imperialist policies 60 years ago. In the XXI century. Japanese people want to finally feel like citizens of a "normal" country, like Germany or Italy, and stop apologizing for the past actions of their leaders.

However, what arguments do modern Japanese politicians find to justify the need to regularly visit the Yasukuni Shinto Shrine and worship the ashes of World War II war criminals? In 1999, the general secretary of the Cabinet of Ministers in the government of Keizo Obuchi, Hiromi Nonaka, justifying official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by top state officials, officially stated that "class A war criminals responsible for unleashing the war in the Pacific are really buried in the temple, but it is extremely difficult to decide on their reburial, given the national traditions of the Japanese" [Yomiuri Shimbun, 15.06.2005].

He explained that in this case, the Japanese would have to violate the principles of the nationalist Shinto doctrine, according to which the reburial of the buried is strictly prohibited for the following reasons: first, the names of dead war criminals and ordinary Japanese soldiers and civilians are forever recorded in general lists, entries in which are made in special Indian ink on traditional Japanese paper vasi, which excludes making any amendments and changes to the documents. Secondly, burial in a Shinto shrine involves the procedure of calling out to the souls of the dead, who are already in another world, which does not suffer any shocks. Finally, third, the lists of the dead are kept forever in the main building of the temple, access to which is prohibited, so as not to" wake up " the souls of the deceased. Priests of the Yasukuni Shrine categorically refuse to exhume the ashes of war criminals, since, according to the traditions of Shinto temples, it is impossible to violate the general lists of the dead and enter the room where they are buried together, because it is impossible to violate the mass burial of a large group of dead people who have already "found peace" in this particular temple. The Shinto religion allows only one reburial procedure: if it applies to the joint reburial of all 2.5 million people, including war criminals, in another temple. However, even this, according to the authorities, will not fundamentally change the procedure for worshipping the ashes of the dead, since instead of the Yasukuni Shrine, officials of the country will be forced to make similar visits to another temple, where the ashes of Class A war criminals and more than two million Japanese people who died during World War II will be transferred.

In addition, the Japanese authorities always emphasize that they have no right to exert any pressure on the priests of the Yasukuni Shrine, as in this case they will immediately be accused of violating Article 20 of the Constitution, according to which the church is separated from the state and the latter does not have the right to dictate what it should do.

Thus, the demonstrative continuation of visits by top officials of the state to the Yasukuni Shrine, in fact, means that the Japanese authorities do not recognize the guilt of the former leaders of the country for unleashing the war in the Pacific, for crimes against humanity.

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peace and humanity recognized by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Military Tribunal).

The desire to rehabilitate war criminals was formed in the ruling circles of Japan immediately after the entry into force of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, i.e. after the formal end of the period of American occupation. Then the Japanese authorities organized a mass movement of the public for the restoration of the rights of all those convicted at the Tokyo trial. It is very significant that the appeal to the authorities with this request was signed by more than 40 million people. the Japanese. In 1953, the lower and upper houses of the Japanese Parliament approved a resolution calling on the Government to rehabilitate war criminals. In the same year, the law on state assistance to the families of dead and wounded soldiers and officers of the Japanese army was revised in favor of war criminals and supplemented with provisions on equating their families with the families of ordinary soldiers in the issue of receiving equal military pensions and benefits. In 1954, the Law on State Pensions was revised to significantly improve the financial situation of surviving war criminals and their families. However, the most significant fact, in our opinion, is that the government already qualified death sentences for war criminals in the category of "death of military personnel in the performance of their official duty"! At the same time, the country's authorities did not introduce provisions that would deprive Class A war criminals of the opportunity to get a job in the civil service.

At the same time, the attempts of the Japanese ruling circles to rehabilitate war criminals already in the 1950s were clearly contrary to paragraph 11 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which stated that Japan should recognize the sentences handed down by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East both inside and outside Japan. In fact, the Japanese authorities even then ignored this provision, and the American side turned a blind eye to the violation of the letter and spirit of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, despite the fact that its provisions strictly required Japan to carry out judicial sentences for war criminals after the end of the period of occupation of ^the country2 .

Official Tokyo did not adhere to the decisions of the International Military Tribunal, and as a result, all Class A, B and C war criminals were released between 1956 and 1958. Notably, among Class A war criminals, Mamoru Shigemipu was even appointed Deputy Prime Minister as well as Foreign Minister in the cabinet of Ichiro Hatoyama; Okinori Kaya was appointed Minister of Justice in the cabinet of Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda; and Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, who was a Class A war criminal, was also rehabilitated.

Moreover, according to the diaries of Yoshihiro Tokugawa, the chief steward and treasurer of the Showa Emperor, Kazuo Aoki, a former minister for the Greater East Asian Sphere of Co-prosperity during World War II, argued in 1978 at a general meeting of Shinto supporters in Tokyo that if the ashes of Class A war criminals were not buried in the Yasukuni Shrine, this will be equivalent to

² Thus, according to paragraph 1 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, any decision based on the proposal of the Japanese side to pardon or release Class A war criminals prematurely, as well as to reduce their sentences, presupposed the consent of the majority of countries that sent their representatives to the Tokyo Military Tribunal, and could not be taken unilaterally by the Japanese authorities. After the entry into force of the San Francisco Treaty in 1952, the Japanese Government formally requested the countries that participated in the Tokyo Military Tribunal to commute the sentences of all Class A, B, and C war criminals, but received no support for this.

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recognition of the decisions of the Tokyo Military Tribunal as just, which the patriots of Japan will never accept [Yomiuri Shimbun, 15.06.2005].

Characteristically, at the height of anti-Japanese protests in China and South Korea in April 2005, 80 members of the Japanese Parliament defiantly visited the Yasukuni Shrine. Of these, 78 parliamentarians represented members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP); two were members of the opposition Democratic Party. Among this solid official delegation of Japanese lawmakers was former LDP General Secretary Makoto Koga and former Trade Minister Takeo Hiranuma. Takeo Fuji, a member of parliament from the Liberal Democratic Party, then bluntly stated that " visiting the Yasukuni Shrine is quite a normal event, since the victims of World War II are buried here and we must respect this historical fact, never forgetting them. I would like to ask Prime Minister Koizumi to never refuse to visit the Yasukuni Shrine" [Asahi Shimbun, 23.04.2005]. The Japanese parliamentarian's remark was in response to a call from Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Quin Chang that Beijing hopes Koizumi will stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine.

The Japanese authorities are not even bothered by the fact that Japanese officials ' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine directly lead to a serious aggravation of relations with China and South Korea. So, in May 2005, Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Wu Yi refused from the previously planned talks with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi and, unexpectedly for the Japanese side, interrupted his official visit to Japan and flew home. Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura strongly condemned this" unfriendly " move by the Chinese representative and expressed hope that in the future China will act in accordance with international diplomatic standards and rules of international etiquette. The reason for Wu Yi's refusal to negotiate with Prime Minister Koizumi was that Japanese officials visited the Yasukuni Shrine and worshipped the ashes of war criminals [Asahi Shimbun, 24.05.2005].

However, the greatest outrage in East Asian countries was caused by a statement made by Masahiro Morioka, a well-known member of the LDP leadership, a member of the lower house of parliament, in May 2005 at a conference of Japanese lawyers in Tokyo. Then Morioka officially stressed that Japanese war criminals were unfairly found guilty by the Tokyo Tribunal [Asahi Shimbun, 23.06.2005]. "The Japanese should openly declare to the world," Morioka said,"that the Tokyo military Tribunal was nothing more than a political farce." Participants of the conference of Japanese nationalist lawyers then demanded that the authorities maintain a respectful attitude to Japanese history and traditions and always "tell subsequent generations the truth about Japan's policy during World War II." The conference was chaired by Takeo Hiranuma, former Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan, and a resolution was unanimously approved calling on Prime Minister Koizumi to continue to make official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and to worship all Japanese buried there [Asahi Shimbun, 23.06.2005].

The Japanese authorities, however, were quick to pretend that they were distancing themselves from Morioka's statements. Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda denied that Morioka made this statement as a member of the government, adding that official Tokyo at one time recognized the results of the International Military Tribunal. At the same time, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, in turn, noted that he personally does not consider visiting the Yasukuni Shrine an event that other countries should spoil relations with Japan. "I have no intention of stopping my visits to the Yasukuni Shinto Shrine in the future. I do not believe that Japan should comply with all the demands coming from China or South Korea. These countries are

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We should only think about how to improve our relations with Japan, and not complicate them. Japanese people should remain realistic in their assessment of their own history " [Asahi Shimbun, 23.06.2005]. It is difficult to express the position of the Japanese authorities on the implementation of the policy of state nationalism more clearly than the country's Prime Minister himself did, fending off attacks on Japan from its neighbors in the region.

The Japanese ruling circles assign an important place in the promotion of nationalism to the formation of school curricula and the compilation of textbooks on national history. It is natural, therefore, that their content is not only the object of sharp criticism from the leaders and public of the countries of East and South-East Asia, but also every time adds fuel to the fire of anti-Japanese sentiments and provokes a serious aggravation of Japan's bilateral relations with these countries. In the wake of the nationalist spiral, the Japanese government has made it so that today even ordinary Japanese do not recognize fair criticism from abroad against the compilers of school history textbooks, although many East Asian countries, former victims of Japanese aggression, continue to accuse Tokyo of deliberately distorting the role of Japan and biased coverage of atrocities Japanese soldiers in the occupied territories.

At the same time, the Japanese authorities deny criticism and say that the compilers of textbooks do not glorify the role of Japanese militarists during World War II, but simply avoid too detailed, detailed descriptions of the behavior of Japanese soldiers in the countries of the region, considering it superfluous and uninteresting for the younger generation of Japanese in the XXI century. In fact, the country's authorities consistently and persistently teach the Japanese public, especially Japanese youth, to think that during the Second World War, Japan behaved in the occupied territories in the countries of East and Southeast Asia exactly as all other participants in this global conflict behaved, that Japan was great It was a Pacific power and, like all other great Powers, had its own interests in expanding the sphere of influence on the continent. As for the brutal treatment of Japanese soldiers with prisoners of war and civilians in the occupied territories, it was characteristic not only of Japanese military personnel, but also of the armies of other countries and was dictated by the harsh necessity of wartime.

While avoiding fair criticism from the East and Southeast Asian countries affected by Japanese aggression regarding the content of school history textbooks, the Japanese government, in turn, focuses on the fact that other countries, including the Soviet Union, the United States, China, and South Korea, also behaved unfairly towards the United States. Japan, taking away its ancestral lands, which the Japanese will never accept [Yomiuri Shimbun, 8.05.2005]. In addition, official Tokyo prefers to say in its own defense in connection with the biased coverage of history in school textbooks that these textbooks are compiled not by the Ministry of Education of Japan, but by private publishing companies, which bear full responsibility for their content. Moreover, local prefectural authorities in Japan decide for themselves which school textbooks should be recommended to teachers and which should not, and the Center cannot put pressure on local authorities in this matter.

For the sake of objectivity, it should be noted that the Japanese authorities try to avoid holding international conferences of historians on the problems of Japan's imperialist policy in East Asia during World War II. This, by the way, was rightly pointed out by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of South Korea, Ban Ki-moon, at a meeting with his Japanese counterpart, Foreign Minister Nobutaka Matimura in June 2005 in Tokyo [Yomiuri Shimbun, 8.05.2005]. The same one

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The idea was voiced at a meeting between President Roh Hyun and a delegation of Japanese parliamentarians in Seoul in May 2005. In a conversation with LDP Secretary Tsutomu Takebe and Komeito Party Secretary Tetsuzo Fuyushiba, the South Korean leader stressed :" We do not demand a formal apology from the Japanese authorities for the past, but we know that today there are nationalist forces in the leadership of Japan that not only do not recognize the guilt for the actions of the Japanese military in the occupied territories, but also hinder the They are trying to establish the truth and hide the truth about those events from the Japanese public. This situation cannot be considered normal" [Yomiuri Shimbun, 8.05.2005].

The external manifestation of the revival of the policy of state nationalism in Japan is the active popularization of Shinto ideology, and not so much as "the need of the Japanese to acquire spiritual strength to resist everyday difficulties", as V. N. Eremin claimed [Eremin, 2002, p. 361], but primarily as the state religion of Japanese militarism, under the banner of which The Japanese committed war crimes in China, Korea, and other countries they occupied during World War II in East and Southeast Asia and Oceania. In 1999, a law on state symbols was adopted in Japan

- the national anthem - Kimigai (Long live the Emperor) and the national flag

- Hinomaru (Sun Disk), which was first used as a symbol of national unity of the Japanese during the Mongol invasion of Japan in 1274-1281, and during the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603 - 1867), it was raised on all Japanese ships; since 1870, by order of the Meiji government, it was already used on Japanese warships. Hinomaru differs from the flag of the Japanese Navy during the war and post-war period, known as the "Rising Sun" flag and representing a solar circle with 16 rays radiating from it [National Flag..., 1993, p. 1055, 1057-1058]. In October 2003, the Tokyo City Board of Education issued a special instruction requiring schools to perform Hinomaru raising ceremonies and Kimigae singing [www.agnuz.info. 15.06.2005]. Today, not a single school event is complete without organizing these ceremonies. Failure to perform the national anthem or raise the Hinomaru in schools entails the most severe administrative sanctions against the school administration. At the same time, the forcible introduction of the Hinomaru raising ceremony and the singing of the Kimigae anthem in schools contradicts the constitutional principles of freedom of conscience and religion (Article 20 of the 1947 Constitution of Japan), as well as the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by Japan in 1994 [Catholic News Service..., 2005].

What are the main goals pursued by the policy of state nationalism in Japan today, and why do the country's authorities show increased interest in whipping up nationalist sentiments in society?

It seems that in the wake of nationalism, the ruling circles are trying to make it easier for themselves to solve at least two main tasks: revising the current Constitution of 1947 and turning Japan into a "normal state" with a strong army and an active foreign policy, as well as carrying out unpopular reforms and preventing a social explosion. It is obvious that without public opinion prepared in advance by nationalist propaganda, it would be difficult for the ruling circles, for example, to enlist public support for the adoption of a law on sending Japanese self-defense forces far beyond Japan, or to justify a new distribution of roles between the US military and self-defense forces in East Asia, etc. Japanese leaders always emphasize that after the Cold War, the United States entered into a long historical transition to the Soviet Union.-

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This will lead to a new period of redivision of the world with the use of military means, which will inevitably affect East Asia, where Japan has its own strategic interests. And if Japan continues to be enclosed in its current "pacifist cocoon", it risks being left with a broken trough. Therefore, it urgently needs to join American military campaigns and expeditions. And not out of love for the Americans, but in order not to be left out. And for this, Japan needs a new nationalist idea that would justify in the eyes of the public the need to revise the Constitution, increase military spending, and abandon the passive diplomacy of the Cold War era with a transition to modern rigid forms of behavior on the world stage.

An important step in the preparation of constitutional revision measures was taken in mid-April 2005, when the Constitutional Commission headed by MP Taro Nakayama submitted a 683-page report to the Speaker of the Lower House of Parliament, Yohei Kono, on the results of its five-year work to amend the Constitution. It is noteworthy that the overwhelming majority of members of the commission spoke in favor of revising the basic law of the country. The preamble of the report justified the need to change the Constitution. In particular, it was emphasized that over the long years of its existence since 1947, a significant gap has formed between the provisions of the Basic Law and real life, which has gone far ahead. Thus, according to the members of the commission, Article 9, which prohibited Japan from having a modern army and denied it the right to participate in collective defense, is clearly outdated [Documents. Constitution of Japan, 1973, p. 770]. According to the head of the Constitutional Commission, such restrictions seriously undermine the confidence of Japanese people in the Constitution, since the Basic Law should exist for the benefit of the people and in the name of their interests.

The Commission proposed to the Parliament to make a number of specific changes to the text of the Constitution, first of all concerning Article 9. In particular, it was proposed to keep the first paragraph of this article, which states that the country refuses to go to war, but add a provision stating that Japan can use military force for defense purposes, while clarifying the scope of the use of force and the new role of the Japanese army in the system of international relations. In this regard, the commission members were unanimous, but their views differed on the question of the implementation of Japan's right to participate in collective defense: two-thirds of the commission members agreed that such a right should be enshrined in the new text of Article 9, while one-third opposed the changes. On the issue of Japan's participation in the United Nations multinational peacekeeping force and other collective forms of security, the Constitutional commission's report noted that the country should participate in UN peacekeeping activities without limiting itself to participating in operations without the use of weapons.

As for changing the articles on the system of imperial power, the majority of the commission members were in favor of preserving the emperor as a symbol of the nation. At the same time, the new version of the Constitution allows the transfer of the throne through the female line and the appointment of a regent, i.e. a return to the traditional forms of imperial government in Japan, while maintaining the imperial system as such.

As a very characteristic conclusion made by the authors of the report, we can consider recommendations to the government and Parliament to carry out the procedure of legitimation of the revised Constitution of the country as soon as possible and start living under the new Basic Law [Yomiuri Shimbun, 17.04.2005].

(The ending follows)

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list of literature

Asahi shimbun.

Documents. Constitution of Japan / / Modern Japan, Moscow, 1973.

Eremin V. N. Shinto in our days. The Way of the Japanese Gods. St. Petersburg: Hyperion Publ., 2002.

The Yomiuri shimbun.

Shinto. The Way of the Japanese Gods. St. Petersburg: Hyperion Publ., 2002.

Seagrave S, Seagrave P. The Yamato Dynasty. Moscow: Lux Publ., 2005.

Amur River Society // Japan. An Illustrated Encyclopedia. Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993.

Benedict R. The Chrysanthemum and the Sword. Tokyo, 1974.

Calder K. Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State // World Politics, 40. 1988. N4.

Catholic News Service. Christians in Japan refuse to recognize the national flag and anthem // www.agnuz.info. 15.06.2005.

Foreign Affairs. Vol. 82. N 6. November/December 2003.

Isamu Kanaji. Hirohito. Japan's Compassaionate Emperor. Tokyo, 1989.

Japanese Education Since 1945. A Documentary Study. N.Y., 1994. http//j-mus.narod.ru

Kohn H. Nationalism: Its Meaning and History. N.Y., 1955.

Kokutai-no hongi // Japan. An Illustrated Encyclopedia. Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993.

Kotoku Shusui // Japan. An Illustrated Encyclopedia. Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993.

The Meiji Japan Trough Contemporary Sources. Vol. II. Tokyo, 1969.

National Flag. National anthem // Japan. An Illustrated Encyclopedia. Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993.

Nishimura Shigeki // Japan. An Illustrated Encyclopedia. Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993.

Okawa Shumei // Japan. An Illustrated Encyclopedia. Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993.

Tanaka Giichi // Japan. An Illustrated Encyclopedia. Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993.

Washington Post. 9.06.2005.

www.agnuz.info. 15.06.2005.

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