On the rise of the nationalist wave, the Japanese authorities are solving the legally difficult task of creating a modern army in the country, equipped with new types of weapons. Thanks to the policy of state nationalism in Japan, the times when members of the self-defense forces were uncomfortable to appear in their uniforms on the streets of Japanese cities are rapidly disappearing. The military was not liked by the population, who insulted them, considered them parasites who squandered public funds. Today, however, the Japanese military is once again on horseback, they are held in high esteem and even give advice to members of the Japanese Parliament on how best to review the Constitution in terms of the content of Article 9 of the Basic Law. They demand, in particular, the creation of a full-fledged army that exists in any "normal country", granting it the right to participate in collective military operations outside Japan, expanding the tasks of the armed forces and improving their equipment.

The increasing role of the military in the country's political life has already led to the fact that in Japan, the ban on statements by government representatives on accelerating militarization and even nuclear weapons of the country has actually been lifted. For example, Gen Nakatani, a former Japanese defense minister in the cabinet of Yoshiro Mori, in April 2001 openly called on the authorities to radically revise the defense concept, granting the army and security forces "emergency powers" in case of an external threat. Nakatani insisted on the speedy revision of Article 9 of the Constitution, on strengthening the country's power potential, on ensuring the readiness of the self-defense forces to repel any armed aggression on its territory, using all types of modern weapons [Asahi Shimbun, 29.04.2001]. In mid-2002, Japanese Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda officially stated that the 1947 Constitution of Japan does not prevent the possession of nuclear weapons [Asahi Shimbun, 15.02.2002]. Fukuda's statement was immediately echoed by Tokyo Mayor Shintaro Ishihara, a recognized leader of Japan's nationalist forces and an ideologue of state nationalism. Ichiro Ozawa, leader of the Liberal Party of Japan, also expressed support for Ishihara, emphasizing that the country could face a direct threat from China or North Korea and therefore should be armed with at least 3 to 4 thousand nuclear warheads. The presence of such a large number of nuclear warheads, in his opinion, will really ensure the interests of Japan in the field of national security from any potential enemy [Foreign Affairs, 2003, p. 76].

On the growing wave of nationalism, without encountering serious resistance from the Japanese public to plans to strengthen the power potential of Japan, its authorities began to actively implement military construction programs. In 2004 alone, the cost of deploying the country's new air defense system amounted to $ 1.2 billion, which was 9 times more than the total cost for these purposes in the period 1999-2003. Become

Ending. For the beginning, see: Vostok (Oriens), 2006, No. 1, pp. 79-91.

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It is possible to ignore the restrictions imposed on the militarization process by Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution. This process, in fact, began in 1987, since since 1970 the share of the country's military budget was limited to 1% of GDP (in 1955, the share of military expenditures in Japan's GDP was 1.78%, in 1960-1.23%, in 1965 - 1.07%). Since then, Japanese lawmakers have taken various measures to circumvent the restrictions imposed by Article 9 of the Constitution on military preparations in the country.

After the Cold War, the authorities paid special attention to the processing of public opinion in the direction of its departure from the ideology of pacifism to the recognition of the need to quickly strengthen the country's power potential. As a result, today the majority of Japanese people sincerely believe in the existence of an external threat to national security, and share the authorities ' concern about the problems of creating a full-fledged modern army. So, if in 2000 41% of Japanese people supported changing Article 9 of the Constitution, then in 2001 this share increased to 47%. This figure exceeded half of the country's population after the events related to the attack on a North Korean ship in 2001, as well as terrorist attacks in Indonesia and the Philippines in 2003-2004."

Nationalist sentiment, which had been dormant in Japanese society during the Cold War, quickly revived after the end of the Cold War. Today, it is considered a sign of good taste to conduct patriotic conversations, be known as a statesman, and talk about external threats to national security. Patriotism with a nationalistic tinge has spread widely both among politicians and in the circles of the scientific community. In late 2002, Shingo Nishimura, a prominent right-wing member of the ruling LDP, publicly insulted North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, comparing him to Hitler. He criticized the Japanese government for making a serious mistake in trying to appease and appease the North Korean leader. Nishimura bluntly said that Tokyo's policy on North Korea was making mistakes comparable to those of Neville Chamberlain's government in England in the late 1930s, when the latter was appeasing Nazi Germany and agreed to the signing of the Munich Agreement in 1938. Japan, according to Nishimura, should act more decisively and aggressively in the North Korean direction [Asahi Shimbun, 20.12.2002].

Commenting on such a harsh speech by Nishimura, which is not typical of traditional Japanese diplomacy, the English "Times" of February 22, 2003 wrote that a few months ago Nishimura was considered an odious person in the West against the background of Japanese politicians, and all his arguments on the topic of Japan's nuclear weapons or calls to "punish" Pyongyang were not taken seriously. However, in the context of growing nationalism, such statements do not seem so harmless in today's Japan, and many representatives of the ruling establishment, academic circles and the highest bureaucracy consider it a rule to speak in this spirit [see: Times, 22.02.2003].

After the Cold War, Japan's foreign and defense policy increasingly showed signs of growing power ambitions to create an "Asian co-prosperity zone." This was most clearly demonstrated at the February 2005 Japanese-American meeting on the so-called "2 + 2" formula [Asahi Shimbun, 10.02.2005]. At that time, the foreign and military ministers of the two countries actively discussed the new concept of strategic cooperation in the East Asian region, planning joint operations in the Chinese and Korean directions, as well as common strategic interests in the Pacific Ocean [Asahi Shimbun, 10.02.2005]. The Japanese, in particular, obtained the consent of the United States to assign them a share of responsibility for controlling the situation in the Taiwan Strait. This is a problem that the Japanese have been discussing with the United States over the past few years.

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10 years old. The fact is that, having finally achieved the consent of the American side to this, Japan "received the go-ahead" for its Navy, in violation of the 1947 Constitution, to operate far beyond the country's borders and solve strategic tasks that are very remotely related to Japan's self-defense.

At the February 2005 Japan-US meeting, it was agreed that Tokyo and Washington would continue to work together to put pressure on China to make its military policy more transparent and accessible to international monitoring. At the same time, Japan also stated that it intends to work together with the United States to solve the Taiwan problem. Following the meeting, Japan's position towards the DPRK also looked no less powerfully ambitious. So, she suggested that Pyongyang" without putting forward any preconditions " return to the negotiating table of the "six" to discuss the agenda prepared in advance for it in Washington and Tokyo, namely, North Korea's rejection of its nuclear and missile programs - complete, final and verifiable. Of course, neither Japan nor the United States even talked about any security guarantees for the DPRK.

In Japan, the popularity of politicians who do not hide their openly nationalistic beliefs is rapidly growing. So, in recent years, the rating of Tokyo Mayor Ishihara Shintaro, a well-known ideologist of state nationalism, has sharply increased. His popularity in society today is so great that the leadership of the ruling LDP considered it possible not to distance themselves from him during the election campaign for mayor of Tokyo, but, on the contrary, to support his candidacy in the April 2003 elections, although he ran as an independent candidate. Ishihara then won 70% of the popular vote, which turned out to be a record figure for candidates supported by the LDP. Already in September 2003, based on the successful election experience with the nationalist candidate for mayor of Tokyo, Prime Minister Koizumi called on the public to start discussions on changing Article 9 of the Constitution.

Rising nationalist sentiment in Japan amid the country's accelerated militarization does not go unnoticed in European capitals. In the summer of 2002, Greenpeace International and its European Unit called on EU member states to break all bilateral trade agreements with Japan in response to its government's policy of turning the country into a military and nuclear power, which costs more than $ 45 billion for this purpose., and the military budget is the second largest in the world after the United States [An International comparison..., 2004, p. 32]. Greenpeace drew the attention of the world community to the fact that Japan is rapidly increasing its weapons-grade plutonium reserves. The country already has 38 tons of radioactive materials and intends to increase them to 145 tons by 2020. Since only 5 kg of weapons-grade plutonium is needed to create a single nuclear charge, by this time Japan will be able to produce at least 30 thousand nuclear warheads. At the same time, the Greenpeace leadership is concerned that the Land of the Rising Sun has made great strides in space exploration and is working closely with the United States in deploying space-based theater missile defense components. This means that it can soon claim the status of a space power, which also has modern nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

Japanese nationalists today are so confident in their abilities that they allow themselves not to resort to populist demagoguery, but together with the government to advocate structural reforms in the economy that are so unpopular and so painful for the Japanese, which result in an increase in unemployment, the rejection of the lifetime employment system, a decrease in living standards and economic stagnation. Many nationalist-minded representatives of big capital are particularly eager to support the American model of economic management, which is fundamentally different from that of the United States.

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traditional paternalistic style of Japanese corporations. They are convinced that the old Japanese economic system no longer works and that its preservation threatens the nation's survival as a great Power. From their point of view, unpopular structural reforms will provide a solid foundation for Japan for many years to come in the twenty-first century, and without radical changes in the economy, the nation is doomed to decline and slide to the level of third-rate countries.

Japanese nationalists today openly oppose the strengthening of state regulation and effective control over the activities of large national corporations. They argue that in such modern high-tech areas as telecommunications, government regulation is holding back technological progress in the production of new types of products, which forces Japanese manufacturers to fall back, give way to Chinese and South Korean companies in the world market, although in the past Japanese firms in this industry sector were dominant. Japanese nationalists believe that national corporations can only succeed by strengthening international and domestic competition.

But the most surprising thing about the economic program of the Japanese nationalists is their outspoken lobbying for the policy of abandoning the traditional Japanese management system, that is, the lifetime hiring system (nenko dzeretsu), and supporting the transition of the Japanese management system to the American contract system of hiring labor. As you know, the traditional Japanese management system assumed that the position of an employee, the amount of his salary and the level of qualification were based on such seemingly unshakable criteria as the duration of work in a given company or in a public institution. Salary growth and promotion were strictly regulated by the employee's loyalty to the company and the length of service in it. Today, however, thanks in no small part to the efforts of nationalists in the upper echelons of power, many leading Japanese corporations have begun to abandon the system of lifetime employment and switch to the American contract system, which will primarily result in mass layoffs and rising unemployment. In addition, nationalists oppose Japan's traditional state support for leading corporations, which in the past provided them with a strong competitive position in the global market. Nationalists are convinced that the state no longer needs to support those sectors of the economy that are not highly competitive and profitable today.

What is very unusual in the behavior and logic of Japanese nationalists is that they push the government to actively attract cheap foreign labor to Japanese enterprises to replace the rapidly aging local labor force. The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare estimates that over - 65s will account for 26% of the country's total population in the next 10 years, and this proportion will rise to 36% in 2050. And if today there are four active workers per Japanese pensioner, then in 2050 there will be only 1.5 of them, which, in fact, can lead the national economy to collapse. That is why the nationalists insist on increasing the influx of migrants to compensate for the lack of labor. Ishihara Shintaro, for example, openly calls on the government to increase the flow of able-bodied migrants from other countries to Japan, regardless of how its indigenous people feel about it, because, in his opinion, this is extremely necessary for the survival of the nation in the twenty-first century.

The manifestation of nationalism can also be seen in the issues of Japan's territorial claims to neighboring countries. Tokyo's claims to Russia are becoming particularly persistent. In propaganda terms, its ruling circles do not miss a single opportunity to introduce into the mass consciousness of the Japanese the idea that, despite

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Despite the vague position of the Russian side on this issue, Tokyo itself will firmly and completely seek the return of the four islands of the South Kuril Ridge-Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan and Habomai [Latyshev, 2005, p.128-154]. To enhance the propaganda effect, Japanese officials periodically make visits to the Southern Kuril Islands. The last such visit took place on May 30, 2005, when Hokkaido Governor Takahashi Harumi made an "inspection trip" to the Southern Kuril Islands and conducted an "audit" of the disputed territories as part of a visa-free exchange [Asahi Shimbun, 2.05.2005]. Takahashi said at the time that "we, the Japanese, insist on the need for negotiations through diplomatic channels for the return of the four northern islands, and I want to see for myself what kind of territories we are demanding." In other words, she publicly stated that she visits the Russian islands not as a tourist, but as an auditor and wants to check the state of these territories, which, in her opinion, are legally part of the Hokkaido Prefecture and only because of the stubbornness of the Russians, have not yet been returned to Japan.

To increase the propaganda effect, the Governor of Hokkaido, with the permission of the Kunashir authorities, held "meetings-dialogues" with local residents to exchange views on what tasks for improving the territory should be envisaged when the problem of returning the islands to Japan is finally solved. Similar meetings and conversations of the Governor of Hokkaido regarding the return of the islands of Japan took place on Iturup.

In the territorial dispute with Russia, the Japanese authorities are not concerned with the historical truth. Official Tokyo is primarily interested in the nationalist component of this problem. After all, with the acquisition of the South Kuril Islands, Japan receives considerable political and economic benefits to the detriment of Russia's interests. Japan needs the South Kuril Islands in order to establish itself in a new role in the system of international relations after the Cold War. It is interested in controlling as much territory as possible, which is also rich in natural resources. After all, according to international legal norms, together with the islands, Japan receives as a 200-mile economic zone a significant area of the seas washing the shores of the Southern Kuril Islands, rich in fish and seafood. In addition, there are significant oil and gas reserves in this area, which Japan is also not averse to getting. Economic interests are also at the heart of Japan's disputes with China over the oil-rich Senkaku Islands and with South Korea over the Dokdo Islands, whose coastal waters are rich in seafood.

Thus, the current stage in the development of Japanese nationalism is distinguished by its offensive nature and the ambitious nature of new tasks that the authorities intend to solve based on its ideology.

But how dangerous is the new Japanese nationalism?

Like any other nationalism, Japanese nationalism is dangerous primarily for its ability to penetrate deeply into the political fabric of the state and modify its political culture, radicalize the process of making important foreign policy decisions by the authorities. It often distorts the understanding of national interests and leads to attempts to implement them at any cost, without taking into account the interests of other members of the international community. Nationalism is dangerous because it mobilizes the masses to support aggressive, offensive actions of the ruling circles in domestic and foreign policy, destabilizes the situation and makes its development difficult to predict, which, in turn, can push another country to take preventive, proactive measures that can eventually lead to an interstate conflict.

Japanese nationalism has penetrated deeply into the consciousness of the upper echelons of power. The main carriers of nationalist ideology in Japan today are Shi-

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a close circle of professional politicians, senior officials, heads of the military department. This circle also includes representatives of big capital who want to see Japan as a strong economic and military power in the world and intend to actively influence political decision-making to achieve this goal. Japanese nationalists today are those who would like to finally consolidate Japan's status as a victorious country in the Cold War, ensure its proper place on the UN Security Council and guarantee the role of one of the leading players on the world stage.

Japanese nationalists are professionals in their field. They have a good education and work experience in the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. Many of them are not ultra-radicals, but they are very sensitive to any threats, real or imaginary, to national interests and support the idea of Japan launching preemptive strikes against a potential enemy.

The most typical representatives of Japanese neo-nationalists, in our opinion, include Tokyo Mayor Ishihara Shintaro. At the age of 23, he was awarded Japan's highest literary prize, the equivalent of the Booker Prize, for his nationalist works. In 1989, as a member of Parliament, he became the author of a highly acclaimed book in Japan and abroad, "Japan that Can Say No", containing nationalistic views on the country's future foreign policy [Ishihara Shintaro, 1989]. This book Ishihara wrote together with his like-minded friend, the founder of one of the world's largest electronic corporations "Sony" - Akio Morita. This work has sold over 1 million copies in Japan. It became a kind of Manifesto for Japanese neo-nationalism. Ishihara argued in his work that the United States needs Japan's strategic support more than the latter needs American security guarantees. While remaining an independent MP, Ishihara formally disqualified himself from becoming the elected prime Minister, but he did much to promote and spread the ideas of neo-nationalism.

Ishihara's popularity in Japan is not based solely on his nationalist beliefs. He became widely known for being a charismatic personality. Many Japanese view him as a new generation politician who, even on the surface, compares favorably with the representatives of the old ruling elite from the LDP. Japanese people believe Ishihara's statements when he says that he wants to see Japan as one of the world's leading leaders and that it will certainly be reborn as a leading world power. Characteristically, when Ishihara met with Hollywood legend, actor and director Clint Eastwood in Tokyo in April 2005 and discussed the project to shoot a new film, Flags of Our Fathers: Heroes of Iwo Jima, many in Japan were waiting with bated breath for the negotiations to end. The project was approved, and the film will be released in 2006. The fact is that at the end of World War II, there were bloody battles on this island and more than 20 thousand Japanese were killed by American soldiers. Despite the fact that the island of Iwo Jima is located at a distance of 1,120 km from Tokyo, the mayor of the Japanese capital, Ishihara, personally ordered it to be transferred to the jurisdiction of Tokyo, as he considers the island as a sacred land for every Japanese [http://j-mus.narod.ru]. And a lot of people in Japan liked it.

The LDP leadership believes that if Ishihara Shintaro became a member of the ruling party, the latter would quickly increase its rating among the electorate, because nationalist-oriented politicians are particularly popular in modern Japan. In an effort to demonstrate his patriotism and at the same time seem to imitate Ishihara, Prime Minister Koizumi unexpectedly made a series of harsh statements in Tokyo in mid-June 2005 against the French authorities regarding their illegal, in his opinion, claims to build on their territory.

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the world's first controlled fusion reactor under the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) program. Koizumi reproached the French for depriving Japan of the legal right to build it, which, as the main donor of the joint Japanese-French project, has already invested $ 13 billion in it. and I would like to see it implemented on Japanese territory. Koizumi categorically opposed any plans of Paris to build a reactor on its territory and stressed that Japan will make every effort to defend the project for itself and build a reactor in the city of Rokkase in Aomori Prefecture, even though the French authorities intend to prevent this [Asahi Shimbun, 14.06.2005]. Such a tone in diplomatic negotiations was unusual for Japanese leaders before, but today it is becoming the norm for nationalist-minded Japanese politicians.

Nationalism is also spreading rapidly in academic circles. Thus, in May 2003, two professors at Kyoto University, Terumasa Nakanishi and Kazuo Fukuda, from the pages of the Sankei Shimbun newspaper, which is considered a tribune of nationalist circles in Japan, with a daily circulation of more than 2 million copies, officially appealed to the Prime Minister of Japan, Koizumi, with a request to convey to the general world community the idea that the only way to Japan's national security is protected by its possession of nuclear weapons and that the country must soon become a new nuclear power, otherwise it will easily become the target of nuclear blackmail by China and North Korea [Sankei Shimbun. 3.05.2003]. At the same time, it is characteristic that in Japanese nationalist circles today, voices of condemnation of the North Korean leadership's policy of implementing nuclear and missile weapons programs are becoming less frequent. Japanese nationalists are now more critical of the US leaders for failing to take effective measures to disarm the DPRK and thereby deflect the threat of nuclear blackmail from Japan.

Judging by the latest public opinion polls, the Japanese authorities, who have been purposefully pursuing a policy of state nationalism over the past few years, eventually managed to convince the country's population of the need to revise its basic law in order to turn Japan into a "normal" power with a strong army and sovereign ambitions. Today, between 60 and 65% of the total Japanese population would like to see such a variant of the country's development [Yomiuri Shimbun, 17.04.2005]. Among the supporters of the ruling LDP, 64% of respondents approve of this option for its future development, while 40% of supporters of the opposition Communist Party of Japan also support the revision of the Constitution. More than half of the respondents support sending Japanese military personnel abroad as peacekeepers [Yomiuri Shimbun, 17.04.2005].

Data from public opinion polls conducted over the past two years clearly indicate that thanks to purposeful nationalist propaganda, whipping up fear of potential external threats, many Japanese today really advocate turning the country into a strong military power with a modern army and navy. At the same time, it is also obvious that the Japanese do not want to be drawn into international conflicts on the side of the United States and protect American geopolitical interests at the cost of the lives of their compatriots. As the Asahi newspaper wrote on this occasion, "the Japanese agree to have a strong army, but at the same time they agree with the spirit of Article 9 of the Constitution, which, in fact, excludes the possibility of drawing Japan into a war for other people's interests" (Takafumi Yoshida, 2005).

The danger of a resurgence of state nationalism in Japan also lies in the fact that its domestic and foreign policies are becoming less predictable, less effective, and less effective.

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transparent. In the wake of nationalist sentiment in 1992, the Japanese Parliament approved a law on sending units of the self-Defense forces abroad to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, thereby preparing the legal ground for sending Japanese soldiers to Iraq to participate in the anti-Iraqi coalition forces. The adoption of this law was regarded by a number of Japanese scientists and politicians as a dangerous symptom of the far-reaching process of militarization of the country. As Watanabe Oguchi, a professor at the University of Tokyo, pointed out, after the adoption of the 1992 law on the participation of self-defense forces in UN peacekeeping activities abroad, the Japanese authorities clearly outlined their foreign policy priorities for pursuing a neo-imperialist policy and strengthening the military alliance with the United States [Watanabe Oguchi, 1996]. Shinichi Kitaoka, a law professor at the University of Tokyo, also openly admitted in a public speech in early 2003 that a process of remilitarization has begun in Japan, which is still being held back by the existing constitutional framework. However, these restrictions will soon be lifted and Japan's transformation into a strong military power will be given the green light [Asahi Shimbun, 4.02.2003].

The policy of state nationalism helps prepare public opinion for the possibility of Japan becoming a nuclear power. The possession of nuclear weapons will make it easier for its ruling circles in the new historical conditions to implement plans to strengthen national security in the East Asian region, and to participate more effectively in the policy of strategic deterrence of China and the DPRK. It is clear, however, that Japan's possession of nuclear weapons will make the overall situation in East Asia even more unstable, fraught with increased tension and serious conflict. An unprecedented arms race could begin in the region. China will not hesitate to respond to the creation of Japan's nuclear potential by increasing the production of its own nuclear weapons and will primarily focus on the production of nuclear submarines. As a result, the number of nuclear powers in Asia will increase: China, India, Pakistan and Japan. The threshold powers-Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea-will also be able to quickly start producing their own nuclear weapons, which will disrupt the strategic balance of power and bring closer the danger of a destructive conflict in the region that will be difficult to extinguish.

The US reaction to Japan's transformation into a strong military power in East Asia has not yet been officially announced, and therefore it is not known whether America is interested in maintaining its usual "little brother" status with a nuclear-free status, or whether the US is ready to deal with a full-fledged military power in this region, whose strategic interests will not necessarily coincide with the In the near future, everything should be put in its place. However, it is already clear that there are strong strategic ties between the US and Japan, and if Beijing suspects America of encouraging Japan's remilitarization, tensions in US-China relations will quickly increase.

However, it cannot be ruled out that in the wake of a rising nationalist wave, a militarily strong Japan may agree to conclude a "Security Treaty" with China, while pursuing the sole goal of preventing an escalation of the arms race in East Asia that is unprofitable for it. Obviously, the US reaction to such a Sino-Japanese "Security Treaty" will be sharply negative. At the same time, there are signs that the Chinese authorities are making efforts to mitigate historical contradictions with Japan, which, however, does not prevent Beijing from periodically organizing large-scale anti-Japanese campaigns, similar to those that were staged in all major cities of China in the spring of 2005. An example of an attempt by the Chinese authorities to establish a strategic dialogue with Tokyo is the meeting in September

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2003-Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan meets with Shigeru Ishiba, Head of the National Defense Department of Japan. This was the first such meeting in many years. Then it was announced that Japan, for the first time since 1949, agreed to accept Chinese warships into its docks for repairs. In turn, the Chinese side announced its readiness to receive a squadron of Japanese warships on a friendship visit at any time convenient for the parties [Yomiuri Shimbun, 4.09.2003]. Such a thing could not have been imagined a few years ago.

It is obvious that Japanese nationalists intend military cooperation with China to weaken Japan's strategic dependence on the United States, but indirectly it can also lead to a weakening of their influence in East Asia, for which America itself is not yet ready. By playing the "Chinese card" in relations with the United States, Japanese nationalists expect to encourage Americans to deepen bilateral relations in the military field. Indeed, amid the first steps to develop a Sino-Japanese dialogue on strategic issues, the Pentagon hastened to implement plans to invite Japanese military personnel to military bases in the United States to practice joint combat operations in "hot spots". The leadership of the US military department has become noticeably more active in advocating the reduction of US military bases in Japan and, to the great satisfaction of Japanese nationalists, listen more to the opinion of its leading politicians and representatives of the military community on issues of bilateral cooperation in the strategic field.

Japan's nationalist-oriented foreign policy makes it difficult for analysts to determine its future priorities. So, usually the Japanese prime minister does not officially criticize the US hegemonic policy in the world, does not condemn the American war against Iraq. However, in reality, Koizumi and his inner circle believe that the behavior of Americans in the system of international relations does not always meet the interests of Japan's national security. The same opinion is shared by many prominent Japanese nationalists, including the aforementioned Tokyo Mayor Ishihara Shintaro, Governor of the Prefect. Akita Sukeshiro Terata, Governor of pref. Tochigi Akio Fukuda, former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and many others. Recently, this group of influential politicians has been particularly critical of the US authorities for their complete inaction with regard to the leadership of the DPRK, whose policy, in their opinion, poses the most real danger to Japan, and they do not approve of the authorities for the helplessness of Japanese diplomacy in the Russian direction, its inability to use the collapse of the USSR and the victory of the West in the "cold war" final resolution of a territorial dispute in favor of Japan, etc.

The rise of the nationalist wave in Japan will increase anti-American sentiment. The reason for this, in particular, may be Washington's position on Japan's inclusion in the permanent membership of the UN Security Council. America is really not inclined to assist Japan in accepting it as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. June 16, 2005 will probably go down in the history of post-war Japanese-American relations as the blackest day for Japan. At that time, the United States destroyed Tokyo's hopes of finally becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council 60 years after the end of the war [Takashi Oda, 2005]. The Americans, in effect, rejected the UN Security Council reform project developed by a group of four countries consisting of Japan, Brazil, Germany and India, which proposed to increase the number of members of the UN Security Council by adding six new permanent members and four new non-permanent members to the current 15, bringing the total number to 25. USA, ignoring the proposals of Japan, officially stated that America agrees to increase the total number of members of the UN Security Council to only 19 countries, and the number of permanent ones

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members of the UN Security Council - only two seats. Thus, Washington crossed out Tokyo's hopes to claim this place, since in addition to America, China also categorically opposes Japan's admission to permanent members of the UN Security Council. It will be almost impossible for Tokyo to overcome the obvious resistance of the two permanent members of the UN Security Council with the right of veto. The Japanese did not expect such an unfriendly step from their strategic ally. This fact seriously fueled the anti-American sentiments of Japanese nationalists.

The danger of further spreading the policy of state nationalism in Japan is related to the fact that Tokyo, in turn, shows disregard for the protests of the public in East Asian countries against the growth of Japanese militarism and the strengthening of power ambitions. At the same time, the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment in the countries of the region seriously destabilizes the situation, provokes outbreaks of violent actions against Japanese missions and retaliatory actions of Japanese nationalists in Japan. The country's authorities are well aware of the sharp rejection of visiting the Yasukuni Shinto Shrine by Japanese officials in East Asian countries. Nevertheless, visits to this temple continue. At a meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun on June 20, 2005, this issue was raised again. The meeting was dedicated to an important date in the history of bilateral relations - the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Seoul and Tokyo. In a conversation with Prime Minister Koizumi, the South Korean leader tried to encourage the latter to abandon visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, emphasizing that "the people of South Korea categorically oppose these visits, which cause them great pain" [Asahi Shimbun, 21.06.2005]. However, the Japanese prime minister turned a deaf ear to these statements and did not promise any changes in this issue. The Japanese leader also ignored the request of the South Korean president to correct the content of school history textbooks and avoided discussing the territorial dispute between Japan and South Korea over the ownership of the Dokdo (Takeshima) Islands [Asahi Shimbun, 21.06.2005].

The protest movement against the policy of Japanese nationalism covers not only the public in China and South Korea. In June 2005, a group of Taiwanese people in Tokyo attempted to" remove " the ashes of their compatriots who were forcibly conscripted into the Japanese army and died during World War II from the Yasukuni Shrine. Such an attempt was made on June 15, 2005, in protest against the fact that Taiwanese people are buried with the ashes of Japanese war criminals [Asahi Shimbun, 15.06.2005]. As the Taiwanese approached Yasukuni Shrine, they were attacked by a group of Japanese far-right nationalists, who, in turn, "protected" the Shinto shrine from abuse by Taiwanese and did not allow them to visit their shrines. Police sided with Japanese nationalists, beating and driving Taiwanese people away from the Yasukuni Shrine. All this is fraught with the threat of an explosive situation.

The leader of the Taiwanese group, a member of the Taiwanese Parliament, Kao Shin Sumei, officially told Japanese journalists at the time that despite the fact that his compatriots had failed to "free the souls of their ancestors from the Yasukuni Shrine," they would certainly return there and stay at the shrine until they achieved their goal [Asahi Shimbun, 15.06.2005]. The Taiwanese insisted that the leaders of the Yasukuni Shrine delete from the general lists the names of Chinese people who died on the fronts of World War II due to the fault of Japanese militarists. Taiwanese demonstrators have appealed to the Osaka District Court to condemn Prime Minister Koizumi's official visits to Yasukuni as grossly violating the Japanese Constitution [Asahi Shimbun, 15.06.2005].

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In recent years, anti-Japanese protests were most widespread in China in the spring of 2005. These demonstrations were the largest since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1972. Only in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen in Guangdong Province, and Chengju in Sichuan Province, more than 100 thousand people took part in them. Demonstrators protested in front of the Japanese embassy in the Chinese capital, and also threw stones, molotov cocktails, eggs, tomatoes at the windows of offices of Japanese representative offices, companies and restaurants. There were cases of beatings of Japanese citizens. The demonstrators carried slogans such as" Death to the Japanese "and"The war with Japan continues." Anti-Japanese actions invariably ended with the burning of the Japanese national flag. It is significant that the Chinese police did not interfere in the riots, and the authorities were inactive [Asahi Shimbun, 12.04.2005].

In fact, all the demands of the Chinese demonstrators were directed against the rise of Japanese nationalism, which has recently taken a variety of forms, ranging from regular visits by the country's leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine and ending with the adoption of laws authorizing the sending of Japanese military personnel to "hot spots" on the planet. However, judging by the slogans carried by participants in anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, the Chinese not only protested about the events of the historical past, but also expressed disagreement with Japan's current policy on the world stage, in particular with its attempts to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council in the year when the entire world community celebrates its 60th anniversary defeats of imperialist Japan in World War II.

The Chinese authorities would like to remind Japan more often who was the winner and who was defeated in World War II. Therefore, at the meeting of the Japanese and Chinese foreign ministers held in Beijing in April 2005, the Chinese minister firmly stated that China will not apologize for the damage caused to the Japanese side during the anti-Japanese speeches of the Chinese public, because Japan itself provokes them with its nationalist policy [Asahi Shimbun, 19.04.2005]. The Chinese side, according to the Chinese Foreign Minister, is outraged not only by the visits of Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine, but also by the release of a new edition of the school textbook on the history of Japan, which completely lacks episodes that testify to the atrocities and cruelty of Japanese soldiers towards the Chinese civilian population during World War II. China also strongly opposes the issuance of official permits by the Japanese authorities for the exploration of oil and gas fields in the East China Sea, ignoring the fact that the territorial dispute over the legal ownership of this area has not yet been resolved. China, according to the Chinese Foreign Minister, considers such steps by Tokyo as an "anti-Chinese provocation" and demands to stop whipping up nationalist hysteria.

Adding fuel to the anti-Japanese campaign in China was the decision of the Supreme Court of Japan on April 19, 2005, refusing to pay compensation to Chinese citizens for damage caused by the Japanese army as a result of the use of biological weapons during World War II. The highest court of Japan has confirmed the decision of the Tokyo District Court that foreign citizens cannot expect compensation payments for the events of World War II directly from the Japanese government. The Supreme Court of the country explained its verdict by saying that all compensation issues were settled within the framework of post-war agreements between Japan and other countries [Asahi Shimbun, 20.04.2005].

A lawsuit against the Japanese government demanding an apology and compensation for damage caused as a result of the use of biological weapons on the eve and during World War II was filed back in 1997 by a group of 180 citizens.-

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given by the PRC. The plaintiffs argued that official Tokyo should pay compensation to the families of 2,100 Chinese people who died as a result of various diseases caused by the use of biological weapons. The Tokyo District Court decided on 27 August 2002 to dismiss this claim, after which the Chinese citizens appealed to the Supreme Court of Japan [Yomiuri Shimbun, 20.04.2005].

The summer of 2005 was a time of large-scale anti-Japanese protests in China in connection with the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the victory over imperialist Japan in World War II. All the leading media outlets in China were involved in covering this historic event. The Chinese Government used various levers of political pressure on Tokyo to get the Japanese authorities to abandon their great-power policy and embark on a path of broad regional cooperation that takes into account the interests of all East Asian countries.

Not counting on Tokyo to abandon its policy of state nationalism, the Chinese authorities, in turn, launched a patriotic campaign with anti-Japanese overtones in the country. Beijing has stepped up patriotic education of schoolchildren and students. In the summer of 2005, this campaign took place against the backdrop of such significant dates as the anniversary of the formation of the CCP on July 1, the Marco Polo Bridge incident that marked the beginning of the Japanese aggression against China on July 7, 1937, as well as the formation of the PLA on August 1, and, finally, the surrender of Japan on August 15. The CCP leadership organized a celebration of all these important dates in Chinese history under the slogan of the great victory of the Chinese people over militaristic Japan.

In connection with this date, the Chinese leadership especially noted the decisive contribution that ordinary Chinese soldiers made to the victory over Japan. The country's authorities expressed special gratitude and appreciation to the surviving veterans of the war with Japan, as well as to the relatives and friends of those who died on the fronts of the struggle against the Japanese invaders, and presented valuable gifts. Since June 16, 2005, Chinese television has shown daily special programs and series dedicated to the victory of the Chinese people over the Japanese invaders. All the central newspapers published advertisements inviting Chinese people who had been involved in the resistance to the Japanese invaders in the past, living participants of those historical events, to share their memories in front of Chinese youth, to take part in the celebration of the victory of the Chinese people [Yomiuri Shimbun, 20.06.2005].

The anti-Japanese protests that swept through East Asian countries in 2005 made a strong impression on the ruling circles of Japan. For the first time in the country's post-war history, Prime Minister Koizumi, speaking at the Afro-Asian Conference in Jakarta in April 2005, which became known as the modern version of the Bandung Conference of 1955, was forced to officially formulate a Japanese vision of post-war history and formally distance himself from the policy of Japanese militarism. In Jakarta, Koizumi, in particular, said that he " expresses deep regret and sincerely apologizes for the Japanese aggression and the facts of unfriendly behavior of the Japanese army in the occupied territories during World War II." The Japanese Prime Minister emphasized that Japan does not intend to turn into a military superpower. It will expand economic assistance for the recovery of national economies in Asia and Africa, with the intention of doubling the amount of such assistance in the next three years. In his speech, he also noted that "Japan in the past, as a colonial power, brought great suffering to the peoples of East and Southeast Asia. The Japanese do not refuse to accept these facts of history. However, the Japanese people will not allow anyone to dictate to them how to live and what to do" [Asahi Shimbun, 24.04.2005].

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The political leaders of the East Asian countries do not so much believe the words and promises of the Japanese leaders, as they evaluate them according to the real policy, which, unfortunately, appears in practice as a purely nationalistic and great-power policy: Japanese officials do not refuse to visit the Yasukuni Shrine and equate war criminals buried there with national heroes, its ruling circles do not want to release school textbooks with objective coverage of the country's role in World War II, Japan continues to put forward territorial claims to its neighbors in the region. It is revising the peace Constitution and sending soldiers many thousands of kilometers away from national borders to mark its military presence there. Japan is ramping up military spending and developing a national missile defense system. It is preparing to become a nuclear power and is strengthening its military and political alliance with the only superpower - the United States of America - that claims world hegemony.

In conclusion, I would like to say the following. Japanese nationalism has deep and lasting roots. Historians trace its traces back to the feudal society of the Tokugawa period, but only after the Meiji restoration did the policy of state nationalism take on dangerous forms in Japan, as an ideology with elements of fascism at its core, capable of seriously destabilizing the situation not only at the regional, but also at the global level. The world community does not forget, as in the 1920s. Humiliated by the unfavorable results of the First World War, forcibly disarmed by the great Powers and economically weakened by the global crisis, Japan became one of the militant nationalist centers in the system of international relations, along with Germany and Italy. Many countries of the world then paid a high price for the consequences of the implementation by the Japanese authorities of the policy of state nationalism.

80 years after those historic events, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the danger of a resurgence of Japanese nationalism is even more threatening, even compared to the period between the two world wars of the twentieth century. This is due to the chaos in the system of international relations after the destruction of the bipolar world and the formation of a unipolar world order led by the United States, as well as Japan's attempts to become a great military power, capable of sending its troops many thousands of kilometers from the Japanese islands and preparing to become a nuclear power. Japanese nationalism is growing stronger in the context of growing general instability in the world in general and in East Asia in particular, i.e. in a region where anti-Japanese sentiment is rapidly growing and the process of nuclear weapons proliferation is developing.

Of course, it would be possible to direct the rise of the patriotic movement in Japan in a constructive direction, that is, to support the desire of nationalist-minded political and business circles in Japan to revive the country as a world economic and high-tech superpower. Such a scenario would be possible if the two superpowers - the United States of America and China-were to act in concert. However, its implementation is hardly feasible today, as relations between the two leading players in the modern system of international relations have not yet reached the level of strategic partnership and genuine mutual understanding. Meanwhile, it is now becoming clear to many countries that efforts must be made to prevent Japanese nationalists from trying to turn the country into a nuclear power, because in this case it will be very difficult to avoid a serious destabilization of the situation in the East Asian region.

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