For a decade and a half, the Russian economy has been operating in a highly unstable mode: perestroika, a one-step collapse of the country with the disruption of decades of cooperation and specialization, a series of post-Soviet reforms focusing on market fundamentalism, the default of 1998, and desperate efforts to get out of the prolonged crisis and return to the growth trajectory. During this period, it was impossible to expect the development of a long-term foreign economic strategy and policy.

The initiators of Russian reforms pinned their hopes on the West, its financial and technical support, and the help of experts and consultants. Unfortunately, they focused only on one of the possible paradigms of economic development, which does not take into account the situation of transition from an administrative-distributive to a market model, which is completely new for the world economy. The results are well-known - a prolonged recession, a catastrophic drop in living standards within the country, and in the external sphere - passive adaptation to global processes as a slave. Describing this approach, the 2001 Nobel Laureate in Economics J. Stiglitz writes in his book "Globalization and its discontents": "... in Russia, its results were far from the promises of market economy advocates, and from their hopes " 1 . While the share of raw materials in the exports of 111 developing countries studied by the WTO declined from 90% in 1995 to less than 30% in the late 1990s2, Russia's share by the beginning of the twenty-first century. It turned out to be represented on the world markets almost exclusively by the supply of energy resources, raw materials, and products of the primary stages of processing. In 1990-1991 - 2002, the share of raw materials in Russia's exports increased from 66% to 81%, while goods with a high share of added value decreased from 31.5% to 19%, including machine-building products - from 14.5% to 9.5% 3 . At the same time, Russia's raw material exports are extremely poorly diversified and the degree of their concentration on a narrow group of homogeneous goods is increasing. According to the calculations of A. N. Spartak (VNIKI), three main commodity items-oil, gas and petroleum products - accounted for 41% of Russian exports in 1994 and 52.2% in 2001; five commodity items (the same plus rough diamonds and rough aluminum) accounted for 54.6% and 60.0%, respectively .4 In the medium term, we can expect Russia to consolidate its role as a resource-producing region of the globalizing world economy.

The commodity structure of Russian exports largely determines its concentration in nearby European countries, which accounted for more than 68% of total Russian exports in 2001.5 Due to the narrow geographical scope, the vulnerability of Russia's foreign trade is increasing, which is already extremely high due to the fuel and raw materials specialization of exports. At the same time, when-

The article was prepared with the support of the Russian State Scientific Foundation, project No. 01-02-00137A.

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Russia's presence in the largest markets of South Asia and the Asia - Pacific region-India, China, Japan and other countries-has remained significantly below its foreign trade potential for many years.

Fuel and raw materials specialization of foreign economic activity (FEA) played a role, especially at the initial stage of market transformations, ensuring budget filling in the face of a sharp reduction in domestic demand, maintaining production and employment in a number of industries. But by the beginning of the XXI century, the possibilities of such specialization as a factor for ensuring sustainable economic growth approached their quantitative and qualitative limit. Being effective in certain periods of high prices on the world raw materials markets, the foreign economic activity model based on low-tech fuel and raw materials specialization cannot serve as a long-term strategic guideline in the conditions of a modern innovative economy.

Russia's strategic interests require diversification of the industry structure of exports by increasing its innovative component in accordance with the new conditions and requirements of the world market. In the conditions of our country, this is a complex and lengthy process, the course of which, however, can be accelerated with the parallel initiation of changes in the geographical structure of foreign trade, intensive development of large promising markets that make it possible to effectively use both the spatial resource of Russia and its still remaining competitive advantages in the scientific and technological sphere. If a sound industrial policy is in place, large-scale exports of traditional fuel and raw materials to these markets will help accumulate the financial resources necessary for the transition to export structure diversification, and expanding the export range to products with a higher degree of processing will accelerate the development of industries that form the production base of structural diversification. Thus, we are talking about finding such a correlation of different vectors of foreign economic relations that would optimally meet the long-term national interests of a country that is integrated into the global economy.

The resulting situation is highly controversial. Due to its geographical location, civilizational and historical proximity of Russia to Europe, the latter is considered as the main direction of integration into the world economy. If we add to this our mutual interest in combating international terrorism, drug trafficking and dirty money laundering, and in non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it is difficult to disagree with this approach. Obviously, the European direction will remain the most important in our country's foreign economic activity in the foreseeable future.

The existing geographical structure of Russia's foreign trade, in which the ratio of export flows to the Atlantic region and Asian countries of the Asia-Pacific region is approximately 2, also supports the Western vector of participation in global processes.:1. In addition, major projects are being prepared and/or implemented to increase the supply of energy resources (oil and gas) to Europe, attempts are being made to cooperate in certain high-tech projects (Sea Launch), and to create a modern transport infrastructure on the European continent (three Trans-European transport corridors-No. 9-pass through the territory of Russia, Therefore, the Atlantic region will obviously occupy a dominant position in Russia's foreign trade. It is a supplier of state-of-the-art technologies and financial resources (the EU countries account for more than 60% of foreign direct investment in Russia over the past decade) 6, and the location of the largest TNCs.

However, the markets of the industrial countries of Western Europe and North America have strict restrictions: they do not feel the need to import products

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Table 1

The share of industrially developed countries in Europe and North America and Asian countries of the Asia-Pacific region in Russia's exports, %

2001

2002

Atlantic region

Asia-Pacific Region

Atlantic region

Asia-Pacific Region

Export, total

41.2

11.6

44.5

13.2

Export of machinery and equipment

16.0

15.4

10.0

19.4

Source: calculation according to the State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation. Customs statistics of foreign trade of the Russian Federation. Annual collection 2002.

Russian manufacturing industry and high technologies for two reasons. Firstly, they are already oversupplied, and Russian products are significantly inferior to Western ones in many respects; secondly, in the foreseeable future, there is no possibility of any significant breakthrough of Russian suppliers in this area, with the exception of certain products and high technologies. At the same time, the Asia-Pacific region is ahead of the Atlantic region in terms of imports of finished products and high-tech products from Russia.

As can be seen from Table 1, the share of Asian countries of the Asia-Pacific region in Russian exports of machinery and equipment is significantly higher than their share in total exports of Russia, while the opposite picture is observed in trade with Western countries. Exports of machinery products to Asian countries in the Asia-Pacific region are growing faster than Russia's total exports to these countries. If in 2002 its exports to Asian countries of the Asia-Pacific region increased by 14.8% compared to 2001, then exports to these countries of machinery and equipment increased by 19.5%. Russia's exports to Western countries in 2002 increased by 11.2% compared to 2001, while exports of machinery and equipment decreased by 40.9%. In recent years, the share of machinery and equipment in Russian exports to Asian countries of the Asia-Pacific region has shown a growing trend and amounted to 12.5% in 2001 and 13.1% in 2002. In Russia's exports to Western countries, this share is much lower -3.6% in 2001 and 1.95% in 2002, and in 2002 the Asian countries of the Asia-Pacific region were 1.9 times ahead of the countries of the Atlantic region in terms of the absolute volume of machinery imports from Russia. The accession of new members to the EU in April 2004 will somewhat improve the situation, but it will not fundamentally change it. In 2002. The share of machinery and equipment in Russia's exports to the EU within its borders in 2004 (15 current member states and 10 future ones) was 2.6% 7 . Taking into account the ambitious goal set by the Russian government to bring the volume of finished product exports to $ 100 billion by 2010 without reducing the volume of raw material exports8, the development of Asian markets in the Asia-Pacific region is becoming an extremely important strategic task.

The above considerations allow us to state that the foreign economic strategy (and policy!) aimed at finding the optimal balance of economic interaction with the Asian countries of the Asia-Pacific region and the Atlantic region is more in line with Russian interests. Solving such a complex geo-economic problem will require quite a long time, concentration of business efforts, clearly defined goals by the state and its close interaction with business, including by creating conditions for encouraging the activities of economic entities in both areas, implementing partial redistribution of income between resource-producing and processing industries, creating the necessary production and transport infrastructure, first of all, by creating total on the eastern and southern borders of Russia.

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The rapid growth of economic relations with the Asia-Pacific region compared to the Atlantic region in the current geopolitical and geo-economic situation is an imperative for Russia for a number of reasons. First of all, the increase in trade with Western Europe and North America is hindered by objective constraints on the Russian side - the size of natural resources reserves. If Russia's proven natural gas reserves at the current level of production will last for 83 years (for the Middle East - for 245 years), then oil reserves will last only for 19.1 years (for the Middle East - for 86.8 years) 9 . In connection with the projects currently under discussion to organize massive oil supplies abroad on a long-term basis (add to this an increase in domestic consumption as part of the task of accelerating economic growth until at least Portugal's indicators are reached) 10 doubts arise as to whether all obligations can be fulfilled. The current level of geological exploration, given the length of the cycle from discovering reserves to making them reliable and developing deposits, is such that it is unlikely to keep pace with growing domestic and external demand. Therefore, it is suggested that these projects were built with the expectation that Russian companies would participate in the development of deposits in Iraq or in the CIS countries. Supplies from these fields would close the gap between the planned massive supply commitments and the level of production on Russian territory prior to the development of new oil and gas fields here. Such a game is extremely risky in any scenario.

One of the reasons why, at least in the next 10-15 years, the Atlantic region cannot be considered as a promising market for Russian exports of sophisticated manufacturing products and high technologies is the fierce competition of suppliers from other regions in this market. The intensity of this competition can be judged at least by the fact that the share of manufacturing products in Russia's exports in recent years does not exceed 25%, while the corresponding aggregate figure for developing countries is 27%, and for such giants as India and China, already in the early 1990s. reached 75-80% 11 . In the total volume of Russian exports, only 1-2% can be attributed to high technologies; therefore, the share of our country in world trade in them is simply minuscule - 0.3% 12 . As early as in the late 1990s, high-tech products accounted for 6% of China's exports, and the information boom of 2002 was accompanied by an increase in exports of information technology products - computers, computer peripherals, entertainment electronics, and other products-to $ 92 billion, or 28% of the total export volume .13 Chinese manufacturers of high-tech products, mainly represented by companies with foreign participation, have captured a significant niche in the markets of the Atlantic region over the past decade or are preparing to attack these markets. For example, Huawei, which ranked fourth in the world in network equipment production in 2002, actively distributes its products in Germany. Chinese chip companies, which until recently occupied a modest position in the global market, having sharply increased production since 2002 and teaming up with Taiwanese partners, can, according to American estimates, overtake North American manufacturers in six years and occupy 40% of the market14 . India, which has become one of the world's information technology centers over the past 10 to 15 years as a result of the state's policy of supporting the export-oriented high-tech sector, exported $ 4.5 billion worth of software products in 2000 (more than 10% of total exports), $ 8 billion in 2002, and $ 7 billion in 2008. G. expects to receive $ 50 billion from their exports. 15 and in the production of these products to reach the level of the world leader-the United States.

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Russia's position in the markets of the Atlantic region is complicated not only by a less efficient supply structure than that of other exporters, but also by the fact that the bulk of its industrial products are competitive only in the domestic market and in the CIS countries. In the OECD markets, the competitiveness index ranges from 3 to 5%.

The need to boost economic activity in the Asia-Pacific Region also stems from the strategic task of stopping the drift of Eastern Siberia and the Far East from the European part of Russia. It can be stopped only as a result of a comprehensive revival of the economy of these regions with a purposeful orientation towards integration in three directions: to the West - with the European part of the country, to the South and East - with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. If this does not happen and it is not possible to expand the direction of Russian internal migration by 180 %, then economically weak depopulating regions will inevitably either "float away" to foreign lands, or become the object of active foreign economic expansion.

Finally, avoiding an excessive focus on one Atlantic region will strengthen Russia's position in the growing global competition by expanding its maneuverability in the event of crisis situations. This point of view is shared by a well-known Russian expert on the problems of Northeast Asia, V. Mikheev, who notes that conditions are beginning to develop."..for the formation of a single economic space here, capable of cooperating and competing on equal terms with existing groupings like the EU." To achieve economic recovery, Russia "should use the integration situation near its Far Eastern borders no less than the opportunities for integration with Europe" 16 . He supports this conclusion with three considerations: the combined GDP of China, South Korea and Japan already exceeds $ 6 trillion, all of them are pursuing a course of active interaction with the outside world, and Russia, with the right foreign economic strategy and policy, has real opportunities to join the integration processes in Northeast Asia.

So far, Russia has managed to gain a foothold in trade with Asian countries in the Asia-Pacific region in two areas: the export of energy resources, which may increase significantly after the implementation of the planned projects, and military equipment. The energy market of the Asian countries of the Asia-Pacific region, whose share in global energy consumption may increase from the current 20% to 33% in 2020, is extremely promising. According to expert estimates, a significant part of this increase will be provided by natural gas, the share of which in the energy balance will reach 20% (currently 11%). Under favorable conditions, Russian energy supplies, especially natural gas from Eastern Siberia and the Far East, could meet a significant part of the growing needs of Asian countries in the Asia-Pacific region. In a few years, if at least some of the large-scale projects currently being worked out are implemented, China may become the largest buyer of Russian energy resources in the Asia-Pacific region. China is interested in diversifying its energy supply sources and improving their reliability by providing a significant part of its energy consumption through imports, which is the third largest in the world.

A partial replacement for the import of Middle Eastern oil delivered by tankers may be deliveries from Russia via the Angarsk-Daqing pipeline planned for construction with a length of 2500 km (plus the 1000 km Daqing-Dalian route to the final consumption point). The pipeline is expected to be built in 2005. The agreement signed in May 2003 between the Chinese oil company CNPC and Russia's YUKOS provides for the supply of 700 million tons of Russian oil over 25 years - 20 million tons in 2005-2010 and then 30 million tons per year. In addition, over the next three years, YUKOS will deliver another 6 million tons of oil to China by rail.

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After the pipeline construction is completed, Russian oil will occupy 10% of the Chinese market17. (In 2002, CNPC purchased 1,050 thousand tons of oil from Russia - less than 1.5% of the total volume of its imports by China) 18 . The importance that China attaches to this project is shown by the fact that it is included in the current five-year plan of the country, and a feasibility study for the construction of the pipeline has already been prepared. The cost of construction of the Russian section of the pipeline is estimated at $ 2 billion. and the sources of its funding have not yet been determined. The Chinese side is considering the possibility of early repayment to Russia of a loan of $ 658 million that it previously provided for the construction of the Tianwan NPP. so that these funds can be used for laying the Russian section of the pipeline 19 .

China is also considering projects related to the purchase of Russian natural gas. So far, however, only the least significant of them has been implemented: the 500-kilometer Barnaul - Biysk-Gorno-Altaisk gas pipeline - the border with China, which will supply natural gas from Siberia, is being laid. Agreements in principle on cooperation in two large-scale projects involving the supply of natural gas to China from the largest Kovykta gas condensate field in the Irkutsk region (reserves of 1.8 trillion cubic meters) and from Yakutia have not yet entered the practical stage. Back in 1999, an agreement was reached on China's annual purchases of Kovykta gas in the amount of 20 billion cubic meters. m for 30 years, which was joined in 2000 by South Korea, which intends to purchase 10 billion cubic meters. m per year. The development of the field and the construction of a pipeline with a length of more than 4 thousand km require investments of almost $ 20 billion. 20 The project feasibility study is completed. The main obstacle to its implementation is serious discrepancies between the supplier and consumers on the price of gas supplied.

Similar contradictions prevent reaching a final agreement between CNPC and the Yakut company Sakhaneftegaz on gas purchases from the Chayandinskoye field in Yakutia (recoverable natural gas reserves of more than 1.2 trillion cubic meters). In 2002, Beijing approved a preliminary feasibility study for the development of the field and the construction of a gas pipeline to China with a length of 3.5 thousand km and a capacity of at least 20 billion cubic meters. cube. m per year 21 . However, the route of the pipeline has not yet been determined, as the option proposed by the Yakut company significantly increases the price of gas. The start of major gas projects may be delayed, as China is not inclined to concede on the issue of prices. Not so long ago, it began to intensively develop its own very significant gas resources, which in the not-so-distant future may seriously reduce its interest in importing this energy carrier.

Cooperation with China in major gas projects is also hindered by the Russian side's lack of a real strategy for developing the gas industry that combines the interests of the state and business, the country as a whole and individual regions, and the lack of coordination between Russian oil and gas companies, which Beijing skillfully plays on .22

Japan increases imports of Russian energy carriers. Mitsui and Mitsubishi are shareholders of Sakhalin Energy (25% and 20%, respectively), the operator of the Sakhalin-2 project, which is developing the Piltun-Astokhskoye and Lunskoye fields on the Sakhalin shelf of the Sea of Okhotsk under PSA conditions. Oil reserves here are estimated at 185 million tons, natural gas-700 billion cubic meters. m. Investments in the project will amount to $ 10 billion. In 1999, commercial production of oil exported by tankers to China and South Korea began. In 2003, Sakhalin Energy signed a contract with a consortium of two Russian and two Japanese companies for the construction of a liquefied natural gas plant

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(LNG), which will be the largest enterprise of its kind in the world. It will have two production lines with an annual capacity of 4.8 million tons each. One of the lines will supply liquefied natural gas to Japan, the second-to China, South Korea, and the west coast of the United States23 . An agreement has already been reached with a Japanese company to supply 1.2 million tons of LNG annually for approximately 22 years, starting in 2007.24

Japanese companies actively supported the alternative route Angarsk-Daqing project of an oil pipeline to the Pacific coast - Angarsk-Nakhodka (3,500 km long), from where oil would be delivered by tankers to Japan, South Korea, China and other countries of the Asia-Pacific region. The Japanese National Oil Corporation has announced its readiness to invest about $ 6 billion in the construction of an oil pipeline and an oil loading port in Primorye. 25 The Russian government has so far accepted the Angarsk-Nakhodka compromise with a branch to Daqing. However, if the Angarsk-Daqing pipeline is provided with oil and its construction can be started in the coming years, the Angarsk-Nakhodka route does not yet have sufficient resource support. Only by 2015-2020 will large - scale development of the oil-bearing regions of Eastern Siberia and the Far East make it possible to pump such volumes of oil through it annually (50 million tons at the initial stages, 80 million tons later), at which the project becomes profitable. These terms, however, may be significantly reduced if Japanese investors who are actively involved in Sakhalin projects (or companies from other Asia-Pacific countries) extend their activities to fuel and energy projects in other regions of Eastern Siberia and the Far East. The fact that such assumptions are not groundless is evidenced by the entry of the Indian oil company ONGC (20% participation) into the Sakhalin-1 project for the development of oil and gas fields in the north-eastern part of the Sakhalin shelf, which is carried out under a PSA.

Within the framework of cross-border cooperation, electricity supplies are being expanded, mainly to the north-eastern provinces of China. In 1996-2000. China received 367 million kWh from Russia, 390 million in 2001-2002, and 250 million kWh of electricity is expected to be delivered in 2003.26 Development of a project for the construction of a power transmission line from the Amur Region to the border Chinese province of Heilongjiang has begun.

Asian countries of the Asia-Pacific Region are Russia's main partners in military-technical cooperation. In 2002, Russia exported $ 4.5 billion worth of weapons, which is expected to increase to $ 5.6 billion in 2003. 27 Approximately 70% of Russia's arms exports go to China and India, and some Southeast Asian countries and South Korea are major buyers. The range of this cooperation is very wide - from more or less large one-time deals, often separated from each other by significant periods of time (this is, for example, the contract for the purchase of four Su-30KI multi-role fighters and two Mi-35 transport and combat helicopters, concluded in April 2003 with Indonesia, whose military-technical cooperation with An agreement with South Korea in June 2003 to supply the Omsk Transmash plant to pay off part of the debt of the former USSR with a batch of T-80U tanks , which had a large-scale nature in the 1960s, was frozen during the reign of General Suharto, and attempts to re-establish it in the late 1990s were unsuccessful. This plant was already supplied to South Korea in 1995-1997 under similar conditions), to a multilateral developed military-technical cooperation system implemented on a long-term basis (with China) or even within the framework of a ten-year program (with India).

Supplies of Russian military equipment play an important role in modernizing the Chinese Air Force and Navy. China has already purchased 48 Su-27 fighter jets and two Project 956E multi-purpose destroyers equipped with an anti-ship missile system.

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"Moskit". An order of $ 2 billion is being implemented. for the production and supply of 38 Su30MKK2 multi-role fighters to China, billion-dollar contracts have been prepared for the supply of eight diesel-electric submarines equipped with the Club system, and S-300PMU2 anti-aircraft missile systems .28 China shows interest in purchasing many other types of weapons and military equipment, as well as in organizing their licensed production.

For more than 40 years of military-technical cooperation with India, first the USSR and then Russia supplied this country with military equipment worth $ 30 billion .29 80% of the Indian Air Force, 75% of the Navy, and 40% of the ground forces are equipped with Soviet and Russian weapons. The program of military-technical cooperation until 2010 provides for the supply of all types of weapons. At the end of 2002, more than 350 contracts were under consideration by the Indian side30 . In 2002, Russian military supplies to India amounted to approximately $ 1 billion, but this is only a quarter of the total volume of purchases by the Ministry of Defense of India .31 Russian companies face growing competition in the Indian market from Western firms that are significantly ahead of them in terms of their ability to establish direct links with business structures.

In recent years, India has radically changed its military-industrial strategy, moving from large-scale purchases of weapons to organizing their joint development and production, obtaining the technologies necessary to establish its own production. Thus, the Ufa Motor-Building Production Association granted India licenses for the production of engines for MiG-21 and MiG-27 fighters; under the Russian license, 146 MiG-27M (Bahadur) fighters were produced at the enterprises of the Indian corporation "HAL". The largest recent deal ($3 billion) is a contract for HAL Corporation to organize licensed production of 140 Su-30MKI multi-role fighters. The license is valid for 17 years (without the right of re-export). Since 2004. India will assemble these aircraft from Russian components, and from 2007 will start producing them independently. According to the contract with the Irkutsk Aviation Production Association (IAPO), the Indian side is allowed to use Russian technology to create its own aviation industry. At the same time, the IAPO sells India 40 SU-30MKM fighter jets, the onboard electronic equipment of which is manufactured in cooperation with Indian, French and Israeli firms .32 India is interested in cooperating with Russia in designing and manufacturing a fifth-generation fighter jet. In 2001, a contract worth $ 800 million was signed. for the supply of 124 T-90S main battle tanks and licensed production in India of another 186 such tanks from Russian components 33 . The first joint project for the production of high-tech weapons with a partial focus on export to third countries is the development by a Russian-Indian joint venture of the Brahmos anti-ship missile based on the Russian Yakhont missile (NPO Mashinostroeniya, Reutov). In 2003, its serial production begins, with approximately equal distribution of work among Indian and Russian contractors. The majority stake in the joint venture is held by the Indians.

In China, the tendency to replace or supplement supply contracts with licensed ones and organize its own production is also quite clear. It has acquired a license for the production of Su-27 fighter jets, is considering the possibility of organizing its own production of diesel submarines purchased in Russia; the Haifei production association, in agreement with Kamov LLC, plans to start assembling aviation equipment at one of the enterprises in Harbin from Russian components.

Thus, the prospects for arms exports to the Asia-Pacific countries are largely related to the ability of Russian defense enterprises to establish long-term cooperation in the region.-

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long-term and mutually beneficial research and production cooperation with their foreign partners, which are making such cooperation more and more stringent requirements.

But even successful progress in the two above-mentioned areas-the export of energy and military equipment-will not solve the problem of Russia's effective development of the large markets of the Asia-Pacific countries. It seems that here we need to focus not so much on further expansion of exports in their current structural parameters, but rather on the promotion of civil engineering products, high technologies, information support and know-how, including those suitable for use in small and medium-sized enterprises. The high unemployment rate in many Asian countries forces them to make extensive use of the format of such enterprises to create as many new jobs as possible. Therefore, the export of technologies, equipment and know-how for small and medium-sized firms that provide acceptable profitability by the standards of the importing country would help to increase the efficiency of Russia's trade with the Asia-Pacific countries (by the way, such technologies and equipment are also necessary for the Russian economy, so they can count on a fairly high demand both in the external domestic market). Unfortunately, in reality, relationships even with priority partners are not always built in accordance with this optimal scheme. If in 1994 the share of machinery and equipment in Russian exports to China was 77 times higher than the share of energy carriers (23.1% and 0.3%, respectively), then in 2002 the share of machinery and equipment in Russian exports to China was 77 times higher than that of energy carriers (23.1% and 0.3%, respectively). they are almost equal (13.7% and 11.6%, respectively) 34 .

The export of high technologies to the Asian countries of the Asia-Pacific region faces specific problems for each of them. Cooperation with Malaysia , Russia's most promising partner among the ASEAN countries for high-tech cooperation, is constrained primarily by the wary attitude of Malaysian entrepreneurs, who are accustomed to technologies from the United States, Japan, and Western Europe, to new suppliers. The Russia - ASEAN Foundation and the Malaysian state organization SIRIM, which is responsible for implementing technologies, are working on creating a mechanism to establish effective scientific and technical cooperation in 30 basic areas based on the recommendations of APEC and ASEAN. In 2001, Russian organizations, under agreements with Malaysian firms, worked on projects to create an optical production center and a gas turbine unit.

In China, the use of Russian scientific and technical resources is playing an increasingly important role in modernizing national enterprises and developing high-tech industries. Efforts to find suitable Russian technologies are underway at all levels, especially in the border province of Hei-Longjiang. The Heilongjiang Sino-Russian Center for Scientific and Technical Cooperation, established at Harbin Polytechnic University, has invited several hundred high-tech specialists from Russia and other CIS countries since 2001. They help the Chinese side complete research on 300 technologies originating from the CIS and bring 50 developments to the commercial readiness stage .35 Construction of a center that will commercialize the developments of Russian scientists has begun near Harbin. Russian technologies acquired by China often turn out to be under-developed, including for objective reasons, and the main obstacle to expanding this activity is China's limited ability to finance the completion of research and their commercialization. The Russian side also often loses out when selling it its intellectual product, since an increasing part of it is purchased not through the official line, but directly from Russian research institutes and laboratories.-

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Table 2

Share of the USSR/Russia's share in the export and import of NEA countries, %

Export

Import

1985

1990

1995

2001

1985

1990

1995

2001

China

3.8

3.3

1.1

0.6

2.4

4.2

2.9

2.4

Japan

1.6

0.9

0.3

0.2

1.4

1.3

1.4

1.0

NORTH Korea

79.7

82.6

13.7

...

25.7

40.0

4.3

...

South Korea

0.2

0.8

1.1

0.6

0.2

0.5

1.1

1.4

Source: Financial News. 8.03.1997; Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF. Wash. June 2002. P. 82, 148, 154.

thorium, even individual scientists. This not only reduces prices, but also avoids the issue of intellectual property, which buyers often try to transfer to themselves. The Russian side has not yet been able to make extensive use of China's advantage in terms of cheap labor to organize joint production of high-tech products, although there are certain prospects in this area, in particular, in the joint use of Chinese integrated circuit production facilities.

The current quantitative and structural parameters of mutual trade, it seems, can be considered as the first stage of interaction with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, largely forced due to the decline in the Russian engineering industries and applied science that occurred during the Russian reforms. In our opinion, the transition to the next stage will take at least two decades, because it involves solving a number of complex internal problems, as well as implementing major infrastructure projects in the Asia-Pacific region with the participation of several countries. The main requirement for cooperation in the second stage will be to ensure stability, mutual benefit and the ability to sustainably grow not only trade, but also cooperation, cross-country investment, the creation of joint ventures, and the development of projects involving two or more countries.

What are the starting conditions for the transition to the second stage in Russia and its partners in the Asia-Pacific region?

During the Soviet period, the most developed relations in the Asian region were with the countries of North-East and South Asia. For many of these countries, the Soviet Union was one of the main or even the main trading partners. Thus, in 1990, the share of the USSR in India's foreign trade turnover exceeded 10% 36 . But in general, by the time of the collapse of the USSR, its position in the foreign trade of the Asia-Pacific countries was rather modest, and in the 1990s it worsened even more. The importance of the Russian market for the export of the Asia-Pacific countries has decreased especially noticeably. Imports from Russia play a more important, but also not very significant role. In 1995, its share in Asia-Pacific exports was only 0.4%, and in imports-0.8%. This trend is well illustrated by data on Russia's trade with NEA countries, without which it is difficult for Russia to gain a foothold in other Asian sub-regions (Table 2).

Thus, it can be stated that Russia's starting positions in the Asian countries of the Asia-Pacific region were unfavorable. They look very shaky for the transition to large-scale interaction with this rapidly developing region. It would be wrong, however, to lose hope of a turn for the better and to recognize the Atlantic direction as the only one worthy of attention, while agreeing with Z. Brzezinski that " ... Russia has no choice but to turn to the West and become part of it." 37

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First, in 2002, Russia's exports to Asian countries in the Asia-Pacific region more than doubled its imports from there ($13.6 billion and $ 5.99 billion respectively). respectively) 38 . At least a partial mitigation of such a significant asymmetry would contribute to a significant increase in mutual trade, its stabilization and strengthening of Russia's position in the Asia-Pacific region.

Secondly, global processes stimulate the exchange of goods between Europe and Asia, as well as the creation of new transport corridors in the North-South and East-West directions. The middle position of Russia becomes extremely advantageous, as it allows you to significantly reduce the time of cargo delivery and increase its profitability. Transportation of containers from Asia-Pacific countries to Europe via the Trans-Siberian Railway is 50% cheaper and 30% faster compared to the sea route around South Asia via the Suez Canal 39 . The development of the Trans-Siberian Railway is in harmony with large-scale projects to form a unified transport infrastructure in Asia, implemented under the auspices of UNESCAP-the Trans-Asian Railway and the Asian Highway. In 1995. The Trans-Siberian Railway was included in the ESCAP program as the northern beam of the Trans-Asian Railway. So far, the Trans-Siberian Railway has not overcome the consequences of the crisis it experienced in the 1990s. However, its potential is still significant and can be significantly increased as it is upgraded. The Trans-Siberian Railway's technical capabilities allow it to transport up to 100 million tons of cargo per year, although in fact the volume of traffic is almost two times lower (55 million tons in 2002) .40

The prospects of the Trans-Siberian Railway are largely related to the implementation of the idea of turning it into a reliable "container bridge" between the Asia-Pacific countries and Europe, which was popular in the mid-1990s. The project has a very real basis. However, shippers are constrained by the lack of guarantees for many transit parameters, excessive complexity of customs procedures, frequent changes in customs regulations, imperfection of the newly created system of forwarding services, the level of railway tariffs and various fees in Russian Far Eastern ports and their lack of competitiveness in comparison with the port infrastructure of the Asia-Pacific countries, etc. Currently, the Trans-Siberian Railway accounts for less than 1% of the total volume of container traffic between the extreme points of the Eurasian route - the ports of the Asia-Pacific Region and Northern Europe 41. If the infrastructure is upgraded, transportation management problems are solved, and the tariff rate is reduced to a cross - cutting version, this share can be increased to 5-6% in the medium term - the level that took place during the heyday of the Trans-Siberian Railway (late 1970s - early 1980s). These problems are already being partially solved: almost a third of them are already being solved. container terminals have been re-equipped for processing 40-foot containers, fiber-optic communication lines are being developed, the capacity of the container port in St. Petersburg is being increased, the Far Eastern ports of Vanino, Vostochny, and Vladivostok are being modernized, road and regional traffic control centers are being formed, measures are being taken to monitor transit cargo flows and optimize the tariff component of the Russian section International transport corridor "East-West", etc.

The implementation of a project to connect the railway networks of North and South Korea with access to the Trans-Siberian Railway would help to revive the work of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The new land route for cargo delivery to Europe from South Korea in transit through Russia is almost one and a half times shorter than the sea route and almost twice as fast. It could increase the loading capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway by 20-30 thousand containers. However, the current political situation on the Korean Peninsula puts the implementation of the project in doubt, as the chances of creating an international consortium that was supposed to provide the necessary investment in the project are significantly reduced.

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The transit potential of the Trans-Siberian Railway may be in high demand after 2010, when, according to ESCAP estimates, the growth of production in Southeast Asian countries will lead to such an increase in their exports that it will be necessary to use all possible channels to deliver these export products to markets. The volume of cargo transported via the Trans-Siberian Railway will continue to increase as the current imbalance in Russia's trade with the Asia-Pacific countries evens out, leading to a significant mileage of empty containers in the eastern direction.

Recently, more and more attention has been paid to the development of the North-South international transport corridor, designed to provide multimodal cargo transportation from the Persian Gulf states, India, Pakistan, and Iran to the countries of Central Europe and Scandinavia via Russia .42

On the territory of Russia, the North-South corridor runs from the borders with Finland to ports on the Caspian Sea (Astrakhan, Olya) with branches to Minsk and Kiev, and then through the Caspian Sea and railways of other countries to Iranian ports in the Persian Gulf and then by sea to India. In the north - eastern direction of the corridor, which faces the Urals and Western Siberia, the capacity of the recently reconstructed Kazakh port of Aktau can be used, which now has 12 modern berths, a ferry crossing, a grain terminal for 13.5 thousand tons. The length of the route is reduced by 400 km compared to the route to Astrakhan 43 . In many sections, this corridor has overlapping road, rail and river tracks, which allows optimizing the logistics schemes used. The first experience of container transportation on this route has already shown that it is significantly faster and 30-40% cheaper than the traditional route through the Suez Canal .44 The bottleneck of the corridor is the port hub in the Astrakhan region. The existing capacities here are almost exhausted, and 52 km of railway should be built to the port of Olya under construction, which requires $ 40 million. 45 At the second meeting of the coordination committee of the countries participating in the intergovernmental agreement on the North-South transport corridor in April 2003, the Russian side made a proposal to form a consortium of transport companies and cargo owners in order to attract the necessary investments for the development of the corridor. Despite the absence of such an important link as the railway line to the port of Olya, the volume of traffic along this route, especially container traffic, is growing. In 2001, 5.4 million tons of cargo passed through Russian ports in the Caspian Sea, in 2002 -7 million tons, and in 2005, the volume of transit cargo in this direction is expected to reach 20 million tons. During the period 2003 - 2007, the volume of container traffic is expected to triple compared to the level of 2002. 46

Transit through Russia in the latitudinal and meridian directions has recently increased by 10-15% per year, which makes it possible not only to preserve, but also to modernize many transport infrastructure facilities and attract new investments. According to the calculations of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, in the future only container transportation of transit cargo can bring Russia up to 5-6 billion dollars a year, and with an increase in additional transport services-up to 8.5-9.5 billion dollars. 47

In the context of globalization, the most effective use of Russia's transit potential seems to be associated with the formation of a unified transport system of the CIS countries, coupled with the international transport corridors N 2 and N 9, the North-South corridor and the Trans-Siberian Railway passing through its territory. Such a route, which passes through the Kaliningrad and Leningrad regions, the Black Sea and Caspian ports of Russia, Belarus, and connects Germany and the Scandinavian countries with China, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Turkey, could take on a significant part of the transit cargo going around Russia today, without entering into a tough confrontation with TRACECA projects and

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ALTID, and developing in parallel with them on the basis of healthy competition. However, this option, which requires huge investments in the development of all parts of the transport infrastructure in Russia and other CIS countries, may be only a very distant future. Nevertheless, some steps in this direction are already being taken, as evidenced, in particular, by the upcoming agreement of the EurAsEC countries on the creation of the Kazakhstan (Druzhba) - Russia (Yekaterinburg) - Belarus transport corridor.

In the long run, the Baikal-Amur Railway (BAM) deserves special attention. Its reanimation will help revive the economy of the Far East and Eastern Siberia, develop their richest natural and mineral resources, increase exports to the Asia-Pacific countries, and stop the outflow of population. Export earnings will enable the creation of new capacities in the manufacturing industry, in agriculture, as well as new jobs in sparsely populated areas of the Far East.

Asian countries of the Asia-Pacific region feel an acute need for fuel, energy and raw materials resources, which allows Russia to count on attracting foreign direct investment to the Far Eastern region, provided that the transport and production infrastructure meets modern requirements here on the basis of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the BAM, the 2,165-kilometer Moscow-Vladivostok highway, the completion of the construction of the last link ofKhabarovsk) is planned for 2004, as well as improvement of Russian legislation in the foreign economic sphere, corporate structure, and regulation of property relations. Thus, Japan, which has invested more than $ 1 billion in the Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 oil and gas projects alone, 48 expresses its intention to develop cooperation in the reconstruction of Far Eastern thermal power plants in order to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, in the development of forest resources, in the field of information technology, etc. Japanese businessmen are particularly interested in investment projects in the Khabarovsk Territory, Irkutsk Region, and Buryatia.

The following data indicate the reality of the formation of export - oriented territorial production complexes in the regions under consideration (Table 3).

Already, joint projects are being implemented jointly with some Asia - Pacific countries and/or their companies to study and develop domestic and foreign markets for gas, oil, and petroleum products consumption (the Siberia - Pacific Ocean program), promising oil and gas pipeline routes, and the creation of special economic zones and technology parks.

Finally, an analysis of the activities of enterprises built in Soviet times as part of economic assistance and technical assistance could play a certain role in the growth of mutual cooperation. Many of them have shifted their focus to other partners due to the lack of continuity in Russian economic policy, but all is not lost here. Russia is not yet in a position to make large investments in foreign projects, but in some cases, combining the efforts of both sides will allow for the resumption of ties, modernization and joint production. Special attention should be paid to two areas. First, to the Asian countries of the CIS and Mongolia, whose industries were created with the active participation of Russian (Soviet) enterprises and which, because of this, are technologically compatible with the latter and still support (although significantly weakened)the Russian economy. cooperative relations. Secondly, the development of economic cooperation with China and India is very promising outside the former COMECON: the markets of these countries are represented by more than two billion consumers, and the parties have accumulated experience not only in trade,

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Table 3

Proposed TPC in the BAM zone

TPC name

Administrative districts

Planned industries for development

Verkhne-Lensky district

Irkutsk region: Ust-Kutsky, Kazachinsko-Lensky, Kirensky, Katanga (southern part)

Forestry, wood processing, pulp and paper industry, in the future-oil and gas industry (Verkhne-Chonskoye and other deposits of the Nepa arch), production of potash mineral fertilizers (Nepa-Gazhinsky basin)

Mamsko-Chuysky

Irkutsk region: Mamsko-Chuysky and Bodaibinsky districts

Non-ferrous metallurgy (Lensky gold-bearing district), mica industry (Mamsko-Chuysky district) , extraction of non-ferrous stones (charoite deposit "Lilac stone")

North-Baikal Territory

Buryatia: North-Baikal, Bauntovsky and Kurumkansky regions

Non-ferrous metallurgy (lead and zinc from Kholodninsky and molybdenum from Orekitkan deposits, alumina production from nepheline syenites and synnyrites), building materials industry (Molodezhnoye chrysotile-asbestos deposit), potash mineral fertilizer production (from synnyrites)

Udokan

Chita region: Kalarsky and northern parts of Tungokochensky and Tungiro-Olekminsky districts

Non-ferrous metallurgy (Udokan copper, rare metals and uranium of the Katuginsky deposits), ferrous metallurgy (iron ores of the Charsky deposit), coal industry (coking and power coals of the Apsat deposit)

Yuzhno-Yakutsk

Yakutia: Aldan and Olekminsky (southern part)

Coal industry (coking and power coals of the South Yakutsk basin), ferrous metallurgy (iron ores of the South Aldan and Charo-Tokka districts), non-ferrous metallurgy (gold of the Aldan district), mica industry (phlogopite of the Aldan district), production of phosphorous mineral fertilizers (apatites of the Seligdar deposit), extraction of non-ferrous stones (charoite deposit Yakutskoe Lake)

Zeysko-Selemdzhinsky district

Amur region: Tyndinsky, Zeysky, Madanovsky, Selemdzhinsky

Forestry and timber processing industry, non-ferrous metallurgy, gold mining and coal industry (power coals of the Gerbikano-Ogodzhinsky and Tygdinsky deposits, ferrous metallurgy (iron ores of the Garinsky deposit), power engineering (Zeyskaya HPP)

Urgalo-Komsomolsky District

Khabarovsk Territory: Verkhnebureinsky, Komsomolsky, Amur, Polina Osipenko, Ulchsky, Nikolaevsky, Nanai, Vaninsky, Sovgavansky, Tuguro-Chumikansky

Mechanical engineering, shipbuilding, forestry, wood processing and pulp and paper industry; non-ferrous metallurgy (tin of Komsomolsk, and later Badzhalsky districts), coal industry (energy coals of the Bureinsky basin and Liansky field), petrochemical industry, power engineering (Bureinskaya hydroelectric power station), ferrous metallurgy (peredelny plant), port operations.

Source: Promyshlennye vedomosti. No. 11-13, September 2002.

but also industrial and technological cooperation, the implementation of a number of major projects. In relation to these countries, Russia is able to act as a supplier not only of resources, but also of machine-building products (in Russia's exports to India, the share of machine - building products was about 36% in 2001, 30% in 2002; exports of machine - building products to China increased 1.6 times in 2001-2002, while the share of machine-building products in India share in total Russian exports to China - from 10.4% to 13.7%) 49, as well as some modern technologies. It seems to us that in relation to these two "heavyweights", it is advisable (if they are interested) to define the following terms:-

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We will discuss some basic areas of trade, investment and technological cooperation in the format of a memorandum on coordination of efforts to solve problems of mutual interest, joint projects of business communities, and, under favorable conditions, bilateral and multilateral programs.

The realization of the vast potential of the Far East should be considered as one of the most important strategic tasks of a reforming Russia. At least two generations of Russians will have to deal with its solution. But now it is necessary to define the main goals and (taking into account the financial and technological capabilities) the sequence of their achievement. Obviously, it is advisable to start with the restoration of geological exploration structures in the Far East and Siberia, so that in negotiations with future investors to operate not only the already known reserves of recoverable resources, but also the possible introduction of newly discovered deposits into circulation. It is important to legislate on the mandatory use of part of the rent levied on extractive industries to expand existing competitive capacities in the manufacturing industry (unfortunately, there are very few of them) and create new ones. If steps are not taken in a timely manner to transfer part of the foreign exchange earnings of raw materials and fuel enterprises to the "upper" floors of industrial processing and knowledge-intensive production, the structure of the country's economy will further weigh down, vulnerability to price fluctuations on world markets will increase, and growth rates will slow down. At the same time, we should not allow the emergence of a kind of "flux" of the Far Eastern region due to the unilateral orientation of its economy to the foreign market: the development of resources should take into account the needs of the domestic market, national interests, including the country's security.

Obviously, in the current decade, energy resources and military equipment will retain their leading positions in Russian exports to the Asia-Pacific countries. A significant expansion of exports of machinery and equipment, other finished products and modern technologies can be expected after the formation of a clear structural and industrial policy in Russia aimed at restoring promising existing production capacities and, most importantly, creating new ones with the target setting of saturating the domestic market and meeting the needs of specific potential importers, taking into account natural production, technological and intellectual resources of Siberia and the Far East.

Such a policy, as world experience shows, can be successful if there is a domestic market (or a closely related economic space) with a capacity of at least 300 million consumers. Within its framework, it is possible to implement an endogenous model of economic growth based mainly on one's own resources, while simultaneously activating relations with the outside world. The presence of a large internal market makes it possible to modernize the economy using a three-sector model (R & D - intermediate products - final products) without excessive dependence on the external environment. The expediency of applying Russia's model of economic growth with endogenous technological progress is explained by the fact that models of "catch-up development" with a dominant focus on external investment and technology in relation to large countries, as a rule, did not bring the expected results.

In the era of globalization, large economic structures (the EU, the United States, NAFTA, China, India, ASEAN, Mercosur, and before the collapse of the Soviet Union) proved to be the most viable. Obviously, Russia will have to search for the optimal market that will allow it to enter the path of economic growth with a consistent increase in interaction with other subjects of the world economy.

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The specifics of Russia due to its vast territory and the presence of two flanks - European and Asian - will require the formation of two submodels, the structure of which will be different. As already noted, resource extraction companies, producers of ferrous and non - ferrous metals, fertilizers, etc. will be the main players in the European-Atlantic direction, while on the Asian flank there are prospects for increasing the role of civil engineering, dual-use products, along with several major projects in the fuel and energy sector and transport infrastructure. It seems that the state should also participate in the formation of a new model with two multidirectional vectors, in order to prevent the emergence of two foci of development focused on foreign markets, but poorly connected with each other. The advantage of the two-vector endogenous model is that the Asian part of Russia will somewhat catch up with the European one as a result of creating new capacities in the manufacturing industry and developing technologies that are tied to local conditions and the needs of potential importers outside the country. It also requires the participation of the state not only as a partner of private business, but also as a regulator of the flow of financial and material resources in favor of the eastern regions in line with a clearly defined regional policy.

In our opinion, the primary tasks in forming a balanced system of economic interaction between Russia and the outside world are::

1. progress in the organization of the CIS economic space, which would lead to the emergence of a large market that meets the criteria of globalization. Perhaps it will be the format of the EurAsEC or the "four" (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) with the prospect of joining several more countries, as well as the CIS free trade zone.;

2. Development of transport infrastructure that provides efficient service to the growing cargo turnover between Europe and Asia, including new export flows from Russia and counter-imports.

notes

Stiglitz Joseph. 1 Globalization and its Descontents. The Penguin Press, England. 2002. P. 133.

2 BICS. 11.02.2003.

3 Customs statistics of the State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation for the corresponding years

4 BICS. 11.02.2003.

5 SCC of the Russian Federation. Customs statistics of foreign trade of the Russian Federation. Annual collection 2001. Moscow, 2002. pp. 7, 10, 12, 13.

6 NG-Diplomatic Courier. N 5. 24.03.2003.

7 Calculated from: Customs statistics of foreign trade of the Russian Federation. Annual collection 2002.

8 News time. 26.06.2003.

9 BIKI. 11.02.2003.

10 The recently prepared Energy Strategy of Russia until 2020 in its optimistic scenario (with an oil price of $ 22-23).Oil production is expected to increase to 490 million tons in 2010 from the current 380 million tons, but these figures are hardly reliable. Production growth has been outpacing the growth of proven reserves for many years. Only in 2002 did the increase in reserves exceed the increase in production for the first time, but it is too early to judge the sustainability of this trend. The resource potential of the new districts - Timan-Pechora, Eastern Siberia, and the Far East - is lower than that of the old ones, and requires the development of a mechanism for state investment incentives, which, however, is not included in this strategy (Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 23.05.2003).

Melyantsev V. A. 11 "East Asian model" of economic growth: the most important components, advantages and disadvantages. Moscow, 1998, p. 7.

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12 Economy of Russia: XXI century, May 2002. p. 12; July 2002. P. 18-19; Pravda. 10.12.2002; BIKI. 1.08, 3.08.2002.

Salitsky A. I. 13 Vzaimodeystvie PRC s mirovoy khozyaistvom [Interaction of the PRC with the world economy]. Moscow, 2001, p. 156; Korinth, 2003, No. 16, p. 24, No. 24, p. 4.

14 Corinth, 2003, No. 22, p. 13.

15 BIKI. 11.03.2003, 5.04.2001.

16 Business People. January-February 2003. N 142-143. From 15-16.

17 Izvestia. 29.05.2003; News time. 29.05.2003.

18 News time. 29.05.2003; NG-Diplomatic Courier. N 5. 24.03.2003.

19 Izvestiya. 29.05.2003; Nezavisimaya gazeta. 17.03.2003.

20 NG-Political Economy. N 17. 5.12.2000.

21 News time. 16.01.2003.

22 So, on the eve of the completion of the feasibility study for Kovykta, the SNPC delegation got acquainted with the progress of work on the Sakhalin shelf and announced the possibility of purchasing liquefied natural gas ( the Sakhalin-2 project) in the amount of up to three million tons per year. The price of Sakhalin LNG is significantly lower than the price of network gas in Eastern Siberia, so this action by SNPC significantly weakened the position of the Russian company in negotiations with China on the Kovykta project.

23 Senator. November-December 2002. pp. 165-166; Vremya novostei. 10.06.2003.

24 News time. 20.05.2003.

25 Top secret. Version N 17. 12 - 18.05.2003.

26 BIKI. 30.01.2003.

27 News time. 26.06.2003.

28 Traps of liberalization (China and WTO), Moscow, Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2001, p. 154; Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 31.05, 4.09, 1.11,5.11.2002.

29 BIKI. 2.04.2001.

30 Nezavisimaya gazeta. 3.12.2002.

31 Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 16.01, 4.02.2003.

32 BIKI. 5.04.2002; Nezavisimaya gazeta. 24.06.2002; News time. 15.01.2003.

33 Izvestia. 7.08.2002.

34 Customs statistics of the Russian Federation. Annual collection 1995. Moscow, 1996. pp. 492-494; Annual collection 2002. Moscow, 2003. pp. 480-181.

35 Nezavisimaya gazeta. 29.01.2003.

36 BIKI. 5.04.2001

37 NG-Diplomatic Courier. 4.12.2002.

38 Customs statistics of the Russian Federation. Annual collection 2002. Moscow, 2003. p. I, 8, 9.

39 Nezavisimaya gazeta. 9.06.2001.

40 News time. 28.02.2002.

41 News time. 18.06.2002.

42 The Intergovernmental Agreement on the Development of Transport in the North-South Transport Corridor was signed in September 2000 by Russia, India and Iran. Currently, Kazakhstan and Belarus are completing legal procedures for joining the agreement, Tajikistan and Oman have expressed their intention to join the agreement, and Syria, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Bulgaria have sent notes of their fundamental desire to participate in it.

43 Kazakhstanskaya pravda. 6.06.2002; Rossiyskaya biznes-gazeta. 16.04.2002.

44 Financial news. 18.07.2002.

45 News time. 6.05.2003.

46 News time. 18.06.2002; Izvestiya. 18.03.2003.

47 Rossiyskaya gazeta. 15.09.2000.

48 BIKI. 4.03.2003.

49 Customs statistics of the Russian Federation. Annual Collection 2002. Moscow, 2003. pp. 475, 476, 480, 481.

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