The dynamic economic growth and strengthened geopolitical position of the PRC have caused lively discussions in the world about the place and role of intra-Chinese nationalism, as well as the development trends of the multi-million-strong Chinese diaspora. According to the leading Russian expert A. Moskalev, China's official approach to this problem today looks like a rejection of Sun Yat-sen's concept of the nationalism of the Han ethnic majority (according to the latest version of the creator and ideologist of the Kuomintang, which also takes into account the aspirations of national minorities). At the same time, the current line also means new priorities of the post-Maozedong and post-Deng leadership in the field of national ideology and politics: nationalism is no longer considered as a "harmful manifestation" of human psychology, as it was considered for several decades of the PRC's history. Today, nationalism is legalized, but its right to exist is associated with a certain common Chinese complex, common Chinese aspirations.

The problems of Chinese nationalism and transnationalism are actively discussed in the world media, and in recent years, special attention has been paid to them in academic circles. For example, the Open Society Institute is organizing a course on this topic for the first time since 2001 as part of the traditional summer university at the Central European University (Budapest). A notable feature of this course was the expanded international representation of students (usually only citizens of the former USSR or countries with PSI branches/offices were allowed to participate in such events), which reflects the diversification and expansion of the profile of CEU programs, traditionally focused only on post-socialist issues localized in Europe and the former USSR. Data

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The innovations, while interesting in themselves, reflect at the same time the process of improving the model/forms of the Soros megaproject, including CEU, which has largely approached the status of a viable Western (European or North American) higher educational and scientific institution. A group of Chinese students was also selected to participate in the course "Chinese Nationalism and Trans-nationalism", which gave the classes more discussion and brought them closer to the object under study.

The well-coordinated efforts of a multinational (Asians, Europeans, Russians, and Americans) team of internationally renowned lecturers reproduced the latest scientific and theoretical constructions on the problems of the emergence and development of Chinese statehood, China's relations with its neighbors and the world community, and, most importantly, the main models of Chinese nationalism - domestic (in China and Taiwan) and foreign (in the context of the diaspora) sample. Lecturing skills and theoretical depth were demonstrated by scientists of the European school: Director of the Institute of China at the University of London, F. A. Yushchenko. Dikotter, senior researcher at the University of Oxford, director of this course P. Niri (P. Niri is a Hungarian who received his education and academic degree in Russia, he also studied at the American University, perfectly speaks Russian, English and Chinese), as well as Americans-Professor at the University of California (Berkeley) Iva Ong and Professor at the University of Hawaii (Honolulu) Drew Gladney. Gladney is an expert and scholar of a unique range with solid business connections, including in the PRC and even Xinjiang, which is not easily accessible to others, an undisputed world leader in the study of Chinese minorities (Turkic-Muslim groups) and their diasporas in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkey, etc.), a brilliant speaker and polemicist. It is likely that he will direct the next similar course of the summer university in Budapest - assignments of this kind D. Gladney repeatedly had to perform in the United States and Asia.

The originality and high level of professional skills of the Russian lecturer A. V. Lomanov (Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences) are indisputable.

The seminar attempted to combine the innovative approaches of both invited lecturers and other reputable sinologists and ethnologists with the realities of today's China and the Chinese diaspora, and the effectiveness of such a connection was to be demonstrated by the final presentations/defenses of scientific projects of the students themselves.

Both the course of classes and the final discussions demonstrated an eclectic understanding of the phenomenon of Chinese nationalism and transnationalism: even highly respected professors and lecturers sometimes think in terms of the actual material of their own research and individual experience, and the audience, as a rule, is very qualified specialists - Sinologists, international experts, ethnologists, political scientists, and historians. The problems of peripheral nationalism in China, Islamic, Turkic and some other factors are not sufficiently understood, and there is no clear picture of what is happening in Xinjiang. A very different position was taken by Chinese students on a number of issues, who sometimes reacted extremely painfully to maxims about the "yellow threat", national contradictions in Chinese society, etc. In their reaction, there was an ideological background, and sometimes a great-power approach, the perception of their country and nation as a global factor. At the same time, the Chinese participants repeatedly stressed the deep-rooted traditions of Russian-Chinese cultural, political and other interaction, openly demonstrated a friendly attitude and readiness to cooperate with their Russian colleagues.

The problems of the Chinese diaspora and its individual communities - economic, intellectual and others-received a high status at the seminar. The role of this phenomenon is a generally recognized fact of real life and science. The counterarguments put forward by the Russian side were that the Chinese diaspora should be a controlled and law-abiding foreign community, capable of transforming into a local (including Russian) ethnic group. The consequences of mass Chinese immigration to neighboring countries, as well as the foreign economic strategy and approaches of Chinese decision-making structures in matters of migration/demographic policy should also be predictable.

In connection with the prospects of Russian-Chinese interregional economic cooperation within the Greater Altai (including its possible migration consequences-

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D. Gladney noted that the Chinese side will always consider Russia as the main partner, and therefore the vector of Chinese activity will be more focused on Siberia, and not on Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries. But he also added that the true geopolitical and other intentions of the Chinese will be important for the pace and concrete plans of such cooperation, and that the West, in particular the United States, does not hinder Russian-Chinese cooperation in the co-distributed Central Asian regions (Altai Krai - SU AR). At the same time, D. Gladney's scientific and expert activity, his scrupulous study of the attitudes of the Uighur population of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, etc., and the implementation of a number of special and essentially closed projects on Xinjiang by a carefully selected small team of American experts, including D. Gladney himself, suggest that the ethno-religious factor (primarily its Xinjiang dimension It will play a significant role in the development of China's domestic and foreign economic policy, relations between China and the West, as well as between China and Russia. However, serious Western analysts, especially those who have established working relations with the Chinese side at the Beijing level, emphasize that the situation in the center and on the ground does not show signs of conflict. The Chinese "cadets" of the summer university in Budapest also talked about the same thing. Regarding the situation of national minorities, they even cited the facts of Han people mimicking national minorities in order to obtain certain social benefits. Lecturers emphasized that, for example, groups professing Islam (collectively known as Hui) are dispersed throughout China and therefore cannot form a homogeneous opposition element. But the specialized literature and media do not reduce the alarmism and speculation about the "Islamic explosion", Uighur separatism in China.

Considering this issue, it cannot be ruled out that the whipping up of rumors about the situation in Xinjiang and other regions/regions where national minorities live, the situation of information and other closeness of these areas for the majority of foreigners, including Russians, is created deliberately-to increase the degree of uncertainty of Chinese domestic and foreign policy and create additional difficulties for analytical/predictive work practical activities of regional and other participants in international relations focused on China.

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