The goals of Japan's foreign policy towards the countries of East Asia (by East Asia in this context, we mean the region that includes the PRC, the DPRK and South Korea) demonstrate an enviable constancy. In their essence, they have changed little over time and even with changes in the system of international relations. The entire first half of the twentieth century. Japan sought to create a community of East Asian States under its auspices. Since the second half of the twentieth century, after the defeat in World War II, it has also not abandoned this strategic super-task in principle, but its ruling circles, primarily in foreign policy, had to overcome distrust and alienation on the part of East Asian states, formerly former Japanese colonies. All Tokyo's efforts to speed up this process, however, came up against the intractable historical memory of the peoples of the region about the past brutal colonial policy of the mother country. Moreover, the East Asian states have always been wary of Japan's foreign policy dependence on the United States, whose geopolitical interests in the region, as is well known, were determined by the need to contain China as a new pole of power, as a strategic rival of the United States in the new system of international relations during the Cold War, and especially after it ended.

The peculiarities of Japan's foreign policy towards East Asian countries during the Cold War period were thoroughly studied in the works of domestic Japanese scholars, primarily R. Sh. Aliev, A. D. Bogaturov, V. N. Bunin, I. I. Kovalenko, G. F. Kunadze, L. N. Kutakov, A. P. Markov, M. G. Nosov, V. I. Shishkin, and others. N. Pavlyatenko, D. V. Petrova. This article is an attempt to examine new directions of Japan's foreign policy behavior towards East Asian countries after the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations.

NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THE HISTORICAL FACTOR ON JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES AT THE PRESENT STAGE

This influence is now determined by two factors: first, Japan's past colonial policies in the region, and second, its military alliance with the United States, which has stood the test of time throughout the second half of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, and which Japan seems determined not to abandon.

Japanese diplomacy in its relations with East Asian countries is struggling to overcome the syndrome of the colonial past. As you know, Japan's colonial policy in the pre-war period was limited to making the above-mentioned countries-

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We are completely dependent on the mother country for political, economic, and security issues. Its ruling circles used imperialist methods for this, seeking to create a " Great East Asian Sphere of co-prosperity." Japanese colonial policy was a combination of the interests of its ruling circles, aimed at gaining the status of a great power in the pre - war system of international relations, on the one hand, and gaining access to the natural resources and labor of the countries of the region, on the other. The propaganda cover for this course was the ideology of pan-Asiatism, which assumed the "liberation" of East Asian countries from European colonizers and the creation of a community of "independent" states under the auspices of Japan (Beasley, 1987, p. 245).

After Tokyo officially proclaimed the idea of creating a "Great East Asian Sphere of Co-prosperity" in 1942, which essentially suggested that the countries of the region should replace European colonialism with Japanese, the peoples of China, Korea, and Southeast Asian countries, primarily the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia, experienced the inhumane nature of Japanese colonial policy. To mitigate anti-Japanese sentiments in these countries, the Japanese ruling circles stimulated nationalist sentiments there, translating public indignation in the East Asian states into a fight against Europeans, as well as promoting the idea of a "struggle for independence" from European colonialists [Mendl, 1995, p. 113].

However, despite all the attempts of the occupation authorities to mitigate anti-Japanese sentiments in the East Asian countries, they failed to change the situation: Tokyo's colonial policy left a deep trace of distrust and hostility in the mass consciousness of the peoples of these countries. It is precisely these feelings that have formed the psychological barriers of rejection for many years to come on the path of rapprochement between East Asian countries and Japan in the political, economic, and security fields.

Japan's imperial ambitions not only created a deep sense of antipathy and distrust towards Tokyo's foreign policy on the part of its closest neighbors in the region, but also contributed to the formation of a new balance of power in the regional system of international relations. Japan's defeat in World War II and the expulsion of the Japanese army from China and Korea accelerated the declaration of national independence by these two East Asian States. True, the process of further development of the newly independent states of East Asia was decisively determined by the formation of a bipolar system of international relations with two poles of power - the Soviet Union and the United States of America-after the end of World War II. Each of the East Asian states was backed by either the USSR or the United States, which included them in its sphere of influence.

In fact, these two global superpowers were also regional powers at the same time. Therefore, the process of decolonization of East Asian countries was accompanied by civil confrontation, the division of states that were united in the past into state entities that were warring on ideological principles. In China, the defeat of Japan and the withdrawal of Japanese troops led to a civil war between supporters of the Chinese Communist Party led by Mao Zedong and the Kuomintang Party led by Chiang Kai-shek. This confrontation ended with the CCP's victory in mainland China and the expulsion of the Kuomintang to Taiwan. In October 1949, the People's Republic of China was proclaimed, with Beijing as its capital.

On the Korean Peninsula, Japan's defeat led to an agreement between the superpowers to divide Korea along the 38th parallel into two states. The USSR acted as a guarantor of the development of North Korea - the DPRK, which was officially declared a sovereign state on September 9, 1949, while the United States supported South Korea, which was officially declared independent on August 15, 1948.

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The end of World War II and Japan's withdrawal from the region contributed to the consolidation of the bipolar system here. The strategic confrontation between the superpowers, which began in Europe after the end of the war, has spread to East Asia. It fueled nationalist movements and internal conflicts in the form of civil war. In June 1950, the Korean War began, which resulted from ideological contradictions between two parts of the same state, as well as the breakdown of the forces of the two superpowers in the struggle for spheres of influence in East Asia [Cumings, 1990, p. 2]. At first, the Korean War looked like a clash of the armies of the North and South of the Korean Peninsula, which was supported by the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively. However, already in October 1950, China intervened in the conflict on the Korean Peninsula, acting together with the USSR against the United States. The internal conflict quickly escalated to the scale of a clash between two superpowers and their allies.

In 1951, the United States signed a "security treaty" with Japan, which established the presence of American troops and military bases on its territory. In the Korean Peninsula war, Japan actively helped the United States maintain its position in South Korea. America feared losing a strategically important foothold in East Asia, which would weaken its position in the region as a whole. Similarly, in 1954-1955, the American leadership was forced to send its 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, fearing that China would attempt to annex Taiwan by force, thereby depriving the United States of its second important strategic foothold in the East Asian region. These two crises, instigated by the American leadership and supported by their only ally in East Asia, Japan, have only increased tensions in the regional system of international relations.

The division of East Asia into two strategically opposed camps was cemented by the Soviet Union's signature in February 1950. The Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with the People's Republic of China, and in 1961-a similar treaty with the DPRK [Diplomatic Dictionary, 1985, vol. 2, p. 50, vol. 3, pp. 219-220]. The basis of the Soviet-Chinese and Soviet-North Korean treaties was the parties ' concern about the resurgence of Japanese militarism, which was firmly supported in East Asia by the United States.

The two superpowers and their allies finally sealed the division of East Asia into spheres of influence at the 1954 Geneva Conference. It signed documents on the end of the Korean war and de facto recorded the division of the Korean Peninsula along the 38th parallel into North (DPRK) and South (Republic of Korea). The Geneva Conference completed the integration of East Asian countries into the global and regional bipolar system with the Soviet and American poles of power. The superpowers left the East Asian countries no choice but to become neutral states, offering instead to join either the Soviet or the American sphere of influence in the region [Yahuda, 1996, p. 53-55].

The bipolar system of international relations, which has led East Asian countries along new development paths compared to the pre-war period, has seriously complicated the implementation of a regional policy by Japan's ruling circles, which Tokyo would like to base on the principles of trust and mutual understanding with its neighbors in the region. The countries that were part of the Soviet zone of influence had a rigidly structured political system. However, in the economic sphere, they were very heterogeneous: the more international Soviet model of development came into conflict with the pronounced nationalist model of state development in the PRC. Differences in approaches to the implementation of the socialist model eventually led to a political and economic confrontation between the Soviet Union and China from the late 1950s, which made it very difficult for Japan to maintain stable relations with its East Asian neighbor. Simultaneously isolationism poly-

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Kim Il Sung's tiki in the DPRK, which led to the formation of a unique development model that combined the principles of revolutionary socialism, anti-colonialism, Confucianism and self-reliance (Juche ideology), also did not favor Japan in its attempts to establish good neighborly relations with this country. In addition, all Japan's foreign policy moves were closely monitored by the United States, which, in turn, feared the development of good-neighborly political and economic relations of its strategic ally with its former colonial possessions behind its back.

While Japan established close economic, political, and military relations with its colonies during the period of its domination of East Asian countries, after its defeat in the war, it took the path of isolationism. Having lost all its colonies in East Asia, Japan felt somewhat like an outcast in the community of newly independent states in the region. And although the authorities and public opinion of countries such as Burma, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Taiwan were more or less tolerant of Japan's involvement in regional affairs and its foreign policy, the East Asian countries, regardless of their bloc affiliation, were very distrustful of Japan and its foreign policy behavior, fearing its remilitarization and resuscitation of imperial ambitions. These concerns persist to this day.

It seems that the distrust of East Asian countries regarding Japan's foreign policy behavior is well-founded. It is not only the memory of Japan's colonial past that defines it. The lack of confidence of East Asian countries in Japan is largely based on the behavior of its ruling circles in dealing with decolonization issues. As you know, in accordance with the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, Japan had to pay reparations to its former colonies [Diplomatic Dictionary, 1986, vol. 3, p. 16-17] However, in the conditions of the beginning of the cold war and thanks to the direct patronage of the United States, Japan actually got rid of all obligations under the peace treaty in terms of compensation for damage for its colonial behavior, did not pay reparations and did not even officially apologize for its colonial policy. China, North Korea and South Korea have strongly opposed the position taken by the Japanese authorities on this issue and until now they have distrusted many of Tokyo's foreign policy statements. The East Asian states, primarily affected by the Japanese colonialists, cannot be satisfied with the development of trade, economic, scientific and technical ties with Japan, the conditions for providing them with non-tax loans, technology and know-how. All the" good deeds " of Japan cannot, in their opinion, be the equivalent of the humiliations and numerous sacrifices of the peoples of these countries, who for many years were under its colonial oppression.

Distrust of Japan by East Asian countries is currently based on the deep linking of its foreign policy in the region to US geopolitical interests. Immediately after the surrender in World War II, the foreign policy of the Yoshida Cabinet was oriented towards complete subordination to the interests of the United States in East Asia. In exchange, the latter promised to speed up the process of ending the American occupation, sign a security treaty, and provide economic and financial assistance. Since then, more than half a century later, Japan has remained a staunch ally of the United States in East Asia, which seriously undermines the credibility of its policies on the part of regional powers. Japan normalized its relations with China only in 1972, and the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed only in 1978. At the same time, as a strategic ally of the United States in East Asia, Japan already signed a peace treaty with Taiwan in 1952, which, however, it was forced to cancel in 1972, when the United States restored

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relations with the PRC. Japan also behaved obediently in relation to the DPRK, whose relations were normalized only in 2000, and even then with the permission of Washington.

Thus, Japan's colonial past, its foreign policy and military dependence on the United States seriously complicated the formation of equal, trusting and mutually beneficial relations with the countries of East Asia during all the years of the Cold War. Throughout this period, Japan has been isolated from the regional community, unable to atone to the countries of the region for its colonial past. After the end of the Cold war, Japanese politicians are trying to find new forms and methods of "returning" the country to the regional community of countries as its full member.

CHINA AS THE MAIN OBJECT OF JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS IN EAST ASIA AFTER THE COLD WAR

At the beginning of the Cold War, Japan, as a military ally of the United States, could not maintain official relations with the People's Republic of China, either in political, economic, or even in the field of security. At the same time, such a situation did not meet the Japanese national interests, and Tokyo was ready to establish a bilateral dialogue with Beijing. The basis of Japanese interests in the Chinese direction has always been a solid civilizational foundation, i.e. a common culture, a hieroglyphic script, a system of values - all that is called "dobun-doshu" in the Japanese understanding (the same characters mean the same race). In addition, Japan has never forgotten about the huge Chinese sales market, which is vital for the development of the national economy, as well as the presence of rich sources of energy and industrial raw materials on the territory of the PRC. Finally, Japan was interested in modernizing Chinese society, economy, and political system, believing that relations with this great country and its neighbor in East Asia would strengthen Japan's own international position and power potential.

That is why there have always been influential forces in Japan's ruling circles, the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and the Japanese business community that have advocated the development of broad relations with China in various fields. These forces used every opportunity for political and economic maneuvering within the framework of the bipolar system of international relations and the system of the Japan-US security treaty in order to get closer to China. Of course, there were also opponents of this policy in the Japanese establishment. The latter feared a direct threat from China to Japan's national security interests and therefore actively supported the US policy of strategic and economic containment of China and the development of broad ties with Taiwan. The bifurcation of the ruling elite in the assessment of the Chinese factor during the Cold War led to the fact that Tokyo pursued a policy of "double standards" in relations with Beijing, when, on the one hand, official relations were frozen, largely under pressure from the United States, and on the other hand, they continued to develop at an unofficial level. This is the model of Sino-Japanese relations until the normalization of bilateral relations in 1972. it was called "seikei bunri", i.e. the separation of "politics from economics", when political ties were frozen, and trade ties developed.

Immediately after the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, Japan significantly intensified its policy towards China, meeting with full understanding and support from Beijing. It has significantly increased the level of interdependence in trade and economic relations between the two countries. In the new international conditions after the collapse of the USSR and the breakdown of the bipolar system of the world, the Japanese authorities are trying to-

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We sought to integrate China as deeply as possible into regional and international economic and political organizations, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the WTO. Japan hoped to "soften" China in this way, to make it more obedient and dependent. At the same time, however, it continued to participate in the American policy of strategic deterrence of China, strengthening national defense in the Chinese direction.

Sino-Japanese relations gained significant dynamism during the cabinet of Morihiro Hosokawa (1993-1994), who tried to pursue a more independent and independent policy in East Asia from the United States. Hosokawa became the first Prime Minister of post-war Japan who was not a member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to pay an official visit to China in March 1994. He held confidential talks with the Chinese leadership on a wide range of bilateral relations, and also touched upon regional security issues, including the issue of North Korea's nuclear missile programs. Hosokawa, for the first time on behalf of the Japanese government, apologized to the Chinese people for his country's armed aggression in China during World War II and distanced himself from the American understanding of human rights, relying primarily on the norms of Asian civilization in these matters. Hosokawa emphasized the relativity of American legal criteria and criticized the US position on imposing uniform standards on this issue [Hidenori, 1996, p. 87].

However, in the second half of the 1990s, tensions and disagreements between Japan and China increased, which negatively affected the overall climate of bilateral relations. This was partly the fault of the United States, which was not interested in strengthening Sino-Japanese economic, political and military cooperation. Washington does not want to put up with the fact that China is rapidly becoming an economic and military superpower in East Asia, and Japan is helping it in this. In turn, Chinese leaders have a negative view of the United States ' transformation into a global and regional gendarme, fearing that Washington may push Taiwan to declare independence and abandon all its previous obligations to the PRC not to do so. Beijing came to this conclusion based on an analysis of American policy in the Chinese direction, characterized, on the one hand, by efforts to integrate China into the world market, and on the other, by continuing the course of its strategic containment in East Asia.

Tensions in Sino-Japanese relations also increased in the second half of the 1990s due to the accelerated transformation of Japan itself into a regional political, economic and military superpower, which contributes to the formation of a new balance of power in East Asia between the United States, China and Japan, increasing tensions in their relations [Funabashi, 1998, p.47]. The new alignment of forces emerging in East Asia after the Cold War is clearly asymmetric, because the power capabilities of the parties to this triangle are far from equal: Japan has huge economic and financial potential, but it does not have an independent foreign and military policy, which is limited by the framework of a Security Treaty with the United States. In turn, the United States is positioned in East Asia as a powerful economic and military global superpower. China is a rapidly growing economic and military regional power pole. Such a balance of power cannot contribute to stability in a region where each player sees the other's behavior as a potential threat to their national interests.

The emergence of a new balance of power in East Asia after the Cold War creates additional incentives and obstacles for Japan to move forward with its economic development.-

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relations with China. On the one hand, Japan, as a strategic ally of the United States and a regional partner of China, has gained additional opportunities to play a more active mediating role in US-Chinese relations, which are rife with contradictions in the economic and military fields. However, on the other hand, relations in the US-China-Japan triangle create for the latter many new problems that require extraordinary solutions. For example, Japan is afraid of being left out of the struggle between the two poles of power in the regional system of international relations - the United States and China - for spheres of influence in the East Asian region. US President Clinton's statement during his visit to China in June 1998, when he praised the actions of the Chinese leadership in East Asia and even hinted that China could count on the position of a strategic partner of the United States in the region, most seriously puzzled the ruling circles of Japan. Tokyo then did not understand what place the United States assigned to a nuclear-free Japan. At the same time, the Japanese side does not know how it should behave towards China in the event of a power conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan. Japan would like to avoid engaging in such a conflict against its will and to the detriment of its national interests, since it is not ready to participate in it either politically or militarily. Japan is not interested in a military confrontation with China. Its national interests are primarily served by the policy of integrating China into global economic and political processes, and not by participating in the policy of its strategic deterrence and, even more so, confrontation with it. At the same time, the relentless growth of China's economic and military potential after the Cold War, as well as the strengthening of strategic partnership relations with the United States, are pushing Japan to coordinate its actions in the Chinese direction in line with American interests.

Japan's current policy on China is characterized by subtle and careful maneuvering between the United States and China. Tokyo has redoubled its efforts to draw the PRC into the processes of political and economic globalization and continues to provide serious financial support to China through development assistance. Japan supported the latter during its accession to the WTO and lobbies for Chinese interests in the leadership of this international organization. However, the Chinese leadership's resistance to the West's growing attempts to tie China more closely to itself in the economic and political fields, on the one hand, and the inability to stop the dynamic growth of its economy and military potential, on the other, are increasingly pushing Tokyo to move closer to Washington in the Chinese direction of its policy.

In this policy, Japan pays special attention to curbing the growth of China's power potential. Following the United States, it willingly joins in criticizing the Chinese authorities in connection with the closure of China's military budget, the increase in its purchases of the latest types of weapons, the modernization of its nuclear potential, and the active military activities of the Chinese Navy in the South China Sea. Deep concern in Japan's ruling circles was caused, for example, by the fact that China openly interfered in the March 1996 election campaign in Taiwan.At that time, Beijing tried to exert psychological pressure on the Taiwanese electorate, as well as on Taipei's strategic allies, and defiantly organized large-scale naval exercises in the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese leadership has made it clear that it can use force if Taiwan declares its independence from China.

Since the Cold War, Japan's ruling circles have been very sensitive to any show of force from China. Back during Prime Minister Hosokawa's official visit to China in 1994. Tokyo showed its concern about its nuclear tests and temporarily suspended the provision of financial assistance to Beijing through "development assistance". Disappointment

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Japanese politicians ' relentless attempts by China to demonstrate its military power in the region leads to a regrouping of forces in Japan's ruling elite, weakening the position of those who have traditionally lobbied for Chinese interests in its ruling establishment. Despite the fact that pro-Chinese elements in the LDP and the Japanese Foreign Ministry retain their influence, the restructuring of the Japanese political system in 1955 and the weakening of the LDP's leadership role, as well as the strengthening of the pro-Taiwan lobby in political circles as political life in Taiwan democratizes, all together contribute to a certain weakening of the interest of the ruling elite Japan has been actively expanding ties with China since the late 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century [Asian Survey, vol. 38, N 11, 1998]. At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, Japan's policy towards China underwent a noticeable shift in emphasis. In negotiations with Beijing, Tokyo began to take an increasingly tough position. This was first demonstrated by the Japanese side during the talks between Prime Minister Obuchi and Chinese President Jiang Zemin in December 1998 in Tokyo and in July 1999 in Beijing. Then the Japanese leader refused to meet the Chinese leadership halfway and did not condemn the Japanese colonial past in China, so as not to give the Chinese side additional political trump cards to put pressure on Japan in resolving controversial issues of bilateral relations. The Japanese leadership, ignoring criticism from Beijing, defiantly regularly visits the Yasukuni Shinto Shrine, where the ashes of Japanese war criminals are buried, thereby sending a signal to China about its commitment to a hard line in its behavior in the Chinese direction.

JAPAN'S POLICY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Tokyo's post-Cold War policy toward the two Koreas was shaped primarily by two factors: a sense of guilt over its colonial past, when Korea was a vassal state dependent on Japan from 1910 to 1945, and Tokyo's obligations to Washington under the Security Treaty.

The more than 30-year period of Japan's brutal colonial rule in Korea has left generations of the Korean people with a deep sense of hostility and hatred towards the colonizers, and all Koreans living in both the North and South of the peninsula. In the post-war period, this hostility was the basis of Korean nationalism, which shaped the mass consciousness of many generations of Koreans on both sides of the 38th parallel in an anti-Japanese spirit, despite the entry of the DPRK and South Korea into the opposing blocks of the bipolar system of international relations. In addition, the public and the North Korean authorities felt a sense of rejection and wariness towards Japan as a strategic ally of the United States, whose policies they also did not forget since the Korean War in the early 1950s. Although Japanese soldiers did not directly participate in that war, Japan made a significant contribution to the United States ' war under the UN flag on the peninsula and to consolidating the division of a formerly unified state into two opposing states. In the following years, Japan participated in the strategic deterrence of the DPRK, cooperated with the American authorities and the ruling circles of South Korea in attempts to replace the social system and leadership in the DPRK with American-loyal authorities. Tokyo's anti-North Korean course could not contribute to the formation of normal relations between the two countries during all the years of the Cold War. As for the policy in the South Korean direction, here Japan acted within the framework of allied obligations to the United States, strengthened political, economic and partly military ties with Seoul. It did this, on the one hand, for the sake of strengthening the US strategic position on the Korean peninsula, and on the other, for the sake of deterrence

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North Korea's military potential, reducing the threat of a strike from its side on American military bases on Japanese territory, as well as to prevent the unification of the two Korean states.

Guided by different interests in relation to both Korean states, the ruling circles of Japan accordingly built their relations with them. At the same time, the common denominator of Japan's policy in the Korean direction during the Cold War was the interest in establishing normal, good-neighborly relations with the two Korean states, but preventing their unification. In relations with the DPRK, Tokyo was interested in easing the pressure on Pyongyang, which was produced by the United States. In its policy toward South Korea, Tokyo sought to distance itself from its colonial past and instead offer Seoul assistance in economic and technological development. The rules of the game in the bipolar system of international relations, as well as Japan's commitment to its Security Treaty obligations with the United States, have encouraged Japanese politicians, diplomats, and business circles to fully support a strong authoritarian government in Seoul. Businessmen saw great benefits from the penetration of Japanese capital into the South Korean market and strengthening their positions there. The desire of Tokyo-both politicians and business circles - to at least somewhat atone to the South Koreans for the colonial past was a stimulating factor in the development of stable relations with Seoul during all the years of the Cold War.

The commitment to the creation of an East Asian community of states under the auspices of Japan and the interest of its business circles in entering the capacious market of the DPRK were a strong incentive for developing relations with Pyongyang. In addition, in its relations with the North, Tokyo also felt guilty about its colonial past. Politicians from the LDP, the Social Democratic Party of Japan, as well as the leadership of the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry of Japan, and the country's leading corporations showed great interest in building new relations with the DPRK. Many in Japan saw the benefits of normalizing relations with Pyongyang for national interests and maintaining equidistant relations with both North and South Korea. However, Japan's objective interest in cooperation with the Korean states could not overcome the deep-rooted feelings of distrust and hostility towards it on the part of Korean society. And it's not just that Japan was a military ally of the United States in East Asia. The fact is that Koreans on both sides of the 38th parallel could not forgive her numerous crimes during her colonial rule on the Korean peninsula.

The objective difficulties that Japan experienced during the Cold War, when trying to restore stable relations with both Korean states after the end of the Cold War, pushed Tokyo to maintain the existing model of relations with the North and South of Korea. Therefore, in the 1990s. Japan continued its policy of cooperation with the United States to contain the DPRK, and, like the United States, was interested in changing the communist regime in Pyongyang to a pro-American one. At the same time, Tokyo actively developed ties with South Korea.

The collapse of the bipolar system of international relations and the beginning process of changes in the balance of power in East Asia created favorable conditions for improving Japan's relations with South and North Korea. In September 1990, the Soviet Union normalized relations with Seoul, and in August 1992, China established diplomatic relations with South Korea. In December 1991, a joint agreement was signed between North and South Korea on the restoration of relations, on mutual non-aggression and cooperation. In September 1991, both Korean states were simultaneously admitted to the UN. This solved the old, deferred issue.

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the issue of recognizing the legal rights of both Korean States to membership in this international organization.

After the Cold War, Japan placed a special emphasis on the "North Korean factor"in its policy. The fact is that the DPRK leadership was extremely concerned about the possible political and economic isolation of Pyongyang after the collapse of the USSR and the end of the East-West confrontation period. It sent signals to Tokyo that it was ready to sit down at the negotiating table with Japan and discuss the normalization of Japanese-North Korean relations. Between January 1991 and November 1992, Japan and the DPRK held eight rounds of negotiations. However, the negotiations turned out to be unproductive, since by that time many contradictions and unresolved problems had accumulated in relations between the two countries, which required their preliminary settlement. At the same time, the Japanese authorities were afraid of a negative reaction from Seoul to separate negotiations between Tokyo and Pyongyang. Roh Dae-woo's government was not interested in Japan normalizing relations with the North before South Korea itself did. In addition, Seoul's concerns were also related to the possibility that the Japanese side would provide Pyongyang with more favorable conditions for compensation for the colonial period than South Korea once received from it under the terms of the 1965 Treaty on Normalization of Relations. The South Korean authorities preferred to avoid a situation where Japanese diplomacy, using economic levers, could split the inter-Korean dialogue that had begun. In turn, the nuclear-free South Korea was seriously concerned about the acceleration of work on nuclear and missile programs in the DPRK and was not interested in Pyongyang securing international recognition of the DPRK's right to implement them under the supervision of the IAEA.

In post-Cold War relations with the two Koreas, the Japanese authorities continued to prioritize developing relations with South Korea, keeping in mind the interests of national security and stability on the Korean peninsula, as well as taking into account the interests of the United States in the region as a whole. Therefore, Tokyo hastened to reassure South Korean President Roh Dae-woo and Kim Yong-sang, who succeeded him, that Tokyo will continue to coordinate its actions in the North Korean direction with Seoul. The Japanese Foreign Ministry and the LDP leadership stressed that Tokyo will not normalize relations with Pyongyang, provide it with economic assistance and monetary compensation without taking into account progress in inter-Korean relations, especially given the unresolved issue of continuing the DPRK's nuclear programs. At that time, the Japanese Foreign Ministry introduced the term "renkei" in relation to North Korean policy, i.e. the principle of linking the development of Japanese-North Korean relations with the success of inter-Korean dialogue. At the same time, the leadership of the Japanese Foreign Ministry made it clear to Seoul that Tokyo intends to continue the course of political and economic rapprochement between North Korea and the West, if such a course meets the interests of the latter. Nevertheless, in practice, Tokyo failed to synchronize the progress of Japan's normalization of relations with the DPRK and steps to defuse tensions in inter-Korean relations, which is why its policy towards Pyongyang suffered in the first place.

Japan's attempts to coordinate more closely North and South Korean policies on the DPRK's nuclear program serve as a good incentive for strengthening Japan-South Korea relations in the political and security fields. In negotiations on the normalization of Japanese-North Korean relations, Tokyo regularly raises the issue of allowing IAEA inspectors to visit North Korea's nuclear reactors at the request of Seoul. Japan actively supports South Korea's attempts to" return " North Korea to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (North Korea withdrew from the NPT in January 2003.)

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It is necessary, because the DPRK's demonstrative expulsion of IAEA inspectors in mid-1994 could become a kind of detonator for a new war in Korea after the end of the cold war. Then the crisis was resolved through direct negotiations between the DPRK and the United States and the signing of a framework agreement between the two countries in October 1994. According to this document, the DPRK authorities froze all work on the nuclear program, while the American side promised, in turn, to create an international consortium with the participation of Japan and South Korea for the supply and installation in North Korea two light water reactors by 2003 at a total cost of $ 5 billion. At the same time, the United States and Japan promised Pyongyang to lift economic sanctions.

Japan understands that the well-known radicalism of the North Korean leadership's foreign policy is a direct result of the US policy of international isolation of North Korea, its policy of political, economic and military containment of the DPRK, which the US pursued throughout the entire period of the Cold War and after its end. In 1995, such a course brought the DPRK to the brink of physical survival when a massive famine broke out in the country. Therefore, Japan and South Korea prefer to change their policy in relations with Pyongyang, flexibly combining the strategy of forceful deterrence and integration of the DPRK into economic and political relations with the West. As part of maintaining the DPRK's policy of deterrence, Japan and South Korea are increasing their military preparations on the borders with North Korea. At the same time, they are noticeably intensifying dialogue with the North Korean leadership in various areas, making attempts to bring it out of international isolation by providing economic assistance, providing food supplies, and developing cooperation within the framework of the KEDO project, an Organization for the Development of Energy on the Korean Peninsula. Japan has already allocated more than $ 1 billion for this project. In addition, since December 1997, quadrilateral negotiations have resumed with the participation of South and North Korea, China and the United States on the issue of replacing the Armistice Agreement between the parties with a full-fledged peace treaty between the two Korean states.

The post-Cold War Japanese-South Korean cooperation has provided a solid foundation for their political relations. However, two factors still complicate relations between Tokyo and Seoul: the unresolved territorial dispute over the Takeshima Islands, the issue of material compensation for the so-called comfort women who served Japanese soldiers during the occupation of Korea. The Japanese and South Korean sides are making considerable efforts to resolve the problems left over from the colonial past that complicate bilateral relations, although Tokyo still denies its responsibility for the need for material compensation for Korean women, referring to the settlement of this issue during the normalization of bilateral relations in 1965. 10 billion rubles. yen to compensate Korean and Southeast Asian women to a non-governmental organization-the International Foundation for Women of Asia (Peace Foundation for the Women of Asia).

Japanese Prime Ministers Hosokawa and Murayama have issued official apologies to the people of South Korea for the conduct of Japanese soldiers during the occupation of Korea. Research groups were set up in both countries to objectively study the behavior of Japanese soldiers during the occupation of East and South-East Asian countries and cover this issue in the media of both countries in order to restore the historical truth. In the 1990s, a Japanese boom began in South Korea through the efforts of the Japanese side: the construction of Japanese food restaurants became widespread, Japanese films were widely shown in cinemas, Japanese songs were often played on the stage, and bookstores sold Japanese food at low prices.-

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Popular Japanese manga magazines were published [Bridges, 1993, p. 136-139]. The joint organization of the 2002 FIFA World Cup by the Governments of Japan and South Korea contributed to the rapprochement of the peoples of both countries, which made it possible, at least for a while, to put aside the controversial problems of bilateral relations and look for new areas of cooperation.

The development of Japan-South Korea relations reached its highest point during the tenure of President Kim Dae-jung, who was elected to this post in 1998. This was due to the interest of the ruling circles of South Korea to involve Japan as deeply as possible in cooperation on the implementation of the "Sunshine"program of economic assistance to the DPRK. In addition, the South Korean leadership counted on substantial financial assistance from Japan after the severe financial crisis of 1997, which hurt the country's economy. The election of Kim Dae-jung to the post of president was seen in Japan as a sign indicating, on the one hand, the readiness of the South Korean political elite to develop comprehensive relations with Japan, and on the other, as a signal demonstrating Seoul's readiness for reforms and transition to democratic forms of government. Official visit of the South Korean leader to Japan in October 1998 It ended with the signing of a bilateral declaration, which gave a special place to cooperation between the two countries in solving the problem of strengthening security in East Asia, and in particular in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the curtailment of the DPRK's nuclear programs. In addition, the declaration stressed the interest of Japan and South Korea in jointly solving the economic problems of the region by providing Japanese banks with preferential non-tax loans and technologies to South Korean corporations in exchange for Seoul's active cooperation in strengthening stability and security on the Korean peninsula and in the region as a whole. The parties expressed their readiness to coordinate efforts in the work of the WTO, the OECD,and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.

Japan's relations with North Korea are developing differently. The Japanese authorities have always been realistic about the situation on the Korean Peninsula after World War II, in particular the very fact of the formation of the DPRK, whose political and economic system turned out to be quite viable despite all the talk about its historical doom. Pursuing its geopolitical interests in East Asia, Japan has sought to engage North Korea in economic and political dialogue at the regional level. In the interests of increasing security and stability on the Korean Peninsula, Tokyo was interested in easing the anti-Japanese sentiments of Koreans as much as possible, not only in the South, but also in the North of Korea, and if possible to erase negative memories of the colonial past from the mass consciousness of North Koreans.

At the same time, it is obvious that Japan's policy in the North Korean direction has its own objective constraints, which are absent in its relations with South Korea. This primarily applies to Tokyo's obligations under the Japan-US security Treaty and, as a result, to the formation of relations with the DPRK as a strategic partner of China. This circumstance seriously complicated the Japanese leadership to establish a direct dialogue with Pyongyang both during the Cold War and after it ended. Under the current circumstances, Tokyo cannot count on the full normalization of relations with the DPRK, and it has no choice but to take a wait-and-see position on this issue, waiting for the natural development of events and a change in the position of the United States towards the DPRK.

After the Cold War, Japan is particularly sensitive to the threat of a potential missile attack by the DPRK on American military bases on its territory.-

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rii. Tokyo always reacts painfully to Pyongyang's official statements about the successful implementation of North Korean missile programs, as well as the continuation of the development of nuclear programs for uranium enrichment. Under these circumstances, the Japanese authorities have no choice but, on the one hand, to support the US policy of forceful deterrence of the DPRK, and on the other, to continue to develop trade and economic relations with it, provide humanitarian and financial assistance, and try to actively integrate North Korea into the regional community of East Asian states.

If after the Cold War Japan reached a new level in its relations with Seoul, then at the same time the Japanese authorities are interested in improving their relations with North Korea. The process of normalizing Japanese-North Korean relations was initiated by the efforts of the ruling LDP and the Social Democratic Party, when their representatives made an official visit to Pyongyang as part of a joint delegation in September 1990. Then, during the talks, a joint statement was signed, according to which the crew members of the Japanese trawler Fujisan Maru-18 were released, and a trilateral declaration was signed on behalf of the leadership of the LDP, the Social Democratic Party of Japan and the Workers ' Party of Korea on bilateral relations. The Declaration called on the Governments of both countries to take concrete steps towards normalizing bilateral relations. At the same time, Pyongyang offered Tokyo not only to apologize and compensate for the damage caused to the Korean people during the period of colonial rule, but also to compensate for the damage that the people of North Korea suffered through the fault of the Japanese government during the Cold War.

Official negotiations between Japan and the DPRK on the normalization of bilateral relations began in 1991 after they were completed at an informal level. The differences between the parties were revealed from the very beginning. The DPRK delegation insisted that the Japanese Government strictly follow the spirit and letter of the Joint Japan-North Korea Declaration of September 1990 and compensate the damage caused to the Korean people during the colonial period - from 1910 to 1945, as well as during the period of non - recognition of the DPRK-from 1945 to 1990, in the amount of $ 10 billion. However, the Japanese Foreign Ministry stated that, firstly, the Joint Declaration signed by the three political parties is not a binding document for the Government of Japan, as it is of a recommendatory nature; secondly, Tokyo does not intend to compensate for material damage over such a long period of time, and, thirdly, Tokyo does not intend to compensate for material damage for such a long period of time. It is ready to reimburse only half of the amount requested by the DPRK, i.e. $ 5 billion in the form of "economic development assistance".

Japanese-North Korean negotiations were continued in 1992, but they also progressed with great difficulties. The main differences in the positions of the parties concerned the amount of compensation, Pyongyang's refusal to issue exit visas to Japanese citizens of the DPRK (nihondzuma) to visit their relatives in Japan, Tokyo's demands for the North Korean side to return the abducted Japanese citizens to their homeland (ratti jiken) and thoroughly investigate each case of such abduction, as well as demands for Pyongyang to allow IAEA specialists to inspect nuclear installations on the territory of the DPRK.

The 1992 Japan-North Korea talks ended in failure. The parties failed to reach consensus when discussing controversial issues. The DPRK authorities continued to implement their nuclear and missile programs. Japan has driven itself into a dead end on the issue of normalizing relations with the DPRK, following the erroneous logic of linking its policy in the North Korean direction with the position of South Korea and the United States in relations with North Korea. Japan's dependent foreign policy does not allow it to realize its national interests in the North Korean direction. Failure of perego-

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Vorov 1992 seriously set Japan back in its relations with North Korea. In August 1997. Pyongyang took the initiative and made an offer to Tokyo to participate in the quadrilateral nuclear talks scheduled for December 1997, sending a signal to the Japanese authorities about its readiness to return to the negotiating table on normalization of bilateral relations. By this time, the Japanese government had already allocated a $ 27 million food aid package to the DPRK, and the DPRK authorities, in turn, allowed Japanese women who married Koreans to visit their relatives in Japan in November 1997. In January 1998, Pyongyang promised to investigate all cases of abductees of Japanese citizens on the territory of the DPRK and inform the Japanese side about this. In response to the signal sent by Pyongyang, Tokyo sent a party delegation to the DPRK in November 1997 consisting of representatives of the LDP, the Socialist Party and the Sakigake Party, who upon their return confirmed the readiness and interest of the North Korean authorities to continue negotiations with Japan on the normalization of bilateral relations.

But this time, too, artificial obstacles stood in the way of normalizing Japanese-North Korean relations. In early 1998, Japanese authorities withheld food aid promised to North Korea. In June 1998, the DPRK authorities, in turn, officially announced that they had found no trace of Japanese citizens allegedly forcibly abducted from Japanese territory, and suspended the issuance of exit visas for Nihondzum to meet with his relatives in Japan. Bilateral relations became even more complicated after North Korea conducted a missile test over Japanese airspace in August 1998 with flooding in one of the regions of the Pacific Ocean. Officially, Pyongyang announced that these were launches of rockets to put satellites into orbit, but Japanese experts identified the class of Taihodong-1 missiles as medium-range missiles that pose an immediate threat to Japan's security. Reacting painfully to these North Korean missile launches, the Japanese government withdrew its signature on the agreement on financing KEDO activities and imposed restrictions on trade and economic ties with the DPRK. Subsequently, however, under pressure from the United States and South Korea, Tokyo resumed financing the KEDO project in 1999. At the same time, Japan announced its readiness to return to negotiations on normalizing relations with the DPRK, stipulating that it must fulfill the preliminary conditions, namely: refraining from further testing of medium-range missiles, resuming the practice of issuing exit visas to Japanese citizens who find themselves on the territory of the DPRK to visit their relatives in Japan, and continuing to search for abductees Japanese citizens.

However, the North Korean authorities ignored the signals sent from Tokyo, which were also stipulated by the preliminary conditions. Pyongyang was primarily interested in holding direct talks with the United States. In September 1999, a bilateral US-North Korean agreement on streamlining relations was signed: the US side lifted a number of sanctions on trade with the DPRK in exchange for the North Korean side suspending missile tests until the end of 1999.

The unexpected warming of US-North Korean relations in late 1999 created a very delicate situation for Japan: on the one hand, its relations with the DPRK remained somewhat tense, and on the other, before its eyes, the United States and South Korea were laying the foundation of their own relations with Pyongyang, in which Japan seemed to have no place left. Unwilling to accept the position of an outsider in relations with the DPRK, in December 1999 Tokyo has sent a party delegation to Pyongyang consisting of representatives of the country's leading political forces, led by former Socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama. In the same month in negotiations for the ruler-

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At the international level, Tokyo confirmed its readiness to lift all sanctions in relations with the DPRK, provide a large package of humanitarian and food aid, and return to negotiations on the normalization of bilateral relations in early 2000 without preconditions. In turn, the DPRK promised to study the issue of "abducted Japanese".

The North Korean leadership is interested in improving relations with Japan and receiving substantial Japanese economic assistance in the amount of $ 5 billion, which is so necessary for Pyongyang to modernize its economy, including the military-industrial complex. However, the DPRK understands that it is primarily in the national interest to improve relations with the United States and only secondarily with Japan. At the same time, the US and Japanese authorities have repeatedly been convinced that they do not always manage to effectively manage economic levers in their relations with the DPRK, to ensure the proper level of political dependence of its leadership on ties with the West. In this sense, South Korea is much more sensitive to the provision of Western loans and technologies than North Korea. With this behavior of the North Korean leadership, which has well mastered the tactics of playing the "American" and "Japanese" cards, Tokyo has no choice but to increase its assistance through the KEDO project and use it as a political lever of pressure on the North Korean leadership.

It can be stated that since the Cold War, Japan's relations with both Koreas have remained at a different level: Tokyo has significantly strengthened its relations with the South, while it has not been able to form a solid foundation in its relations with the North. Japan remains limited in its leverage over the North Korean leadership. The Japanese authorities have repeatedly resorted to "quiet diplomacy" in relations with the DPRK, using promises of economic assistance and maintaining inter-party ties. However, Japan has not managed to stabilize relations with its former colony and strategically important neighbor in East Asia. North Korea remains the only State in the system of international relations in East Asia with which Japan has not established diplomatic relations. At the same time, it is obvious that Japan is interested in expanding dialogue with Pyongyang and therefore, in the short term, will refrain from the policy of forceful deterrence of North Korea and use economic and political levers to integrate the DPRK into the East Asian community of states to a much greater extent.

(To be continued)

list of literature

Diplomatic Dictionary, Moscow, 1985-1986.

Asian Survey. Vol 38. N 11, 1998.

Beasley W. G. Japanese Imperialism 1894 - 1945. Oxford: Claredon Press, 1987.

Bridges B. Japan and Korea in the 1990's: From Antagonism to Adjustment. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1993.

Cumings B. Origins of the Korean War. Vol. 2, 1990, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

Funabashi Yoichi. Thinking trilaterally // China-Japan-US: Managing the Trilateral Relationship / M. Abramowitz, Y. Funabashi and J. Wang (eds.). Tokyo: JCIE, 1998.

Hidenori J. Sino-Japanese controversy since 1972 // China and Japan: History. Trends and Prospects. Christopher Howe (ed.). Oxford: Claredon Press, 1996.

Hughes C. Japan s Economic Power and Security: Japan and North Korea. L.: Routledge, 1999.

Mendl W. Japan's Asia Policy: Regional Security and Global Interests. L.: Routledge, 1995.

Yahuda M. The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945 - 1995. L.: Routledge, 1996.

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