"Stalinism" has long been an everyday term, and this familiarity has led to the fact that the term has lost its accuracy, turning into a kind of negative label that can be applied to almost any sufficiently repressive regime of the left. Back in 1988, Henry Reichman, one of the few researchers who tried to define "Stalinism" as a phenomenon of world history, wrote on this subject: "What was Stalinism? ...This term has become an almost universally accepted category both in Soviet history and in the history of socialism, but its meaning is surprisingly little discussed" (Reichman, 1988, p.57). The situation has hardly changed much since then.

The most comprehensive definition of Stalinism to date seems to belong to Severin Bayeler, who pointed out seven main features of the system that he himself called "mature Stalinism" or "late Stalinism." According to Bayeler, these traits include: "a system of mass terror; the disappearance of the party as a social movement; the amorphous nature of the macropolitical organization; a mobilization model of economic growth aimed at achieving military power; a heterogeneous system of values that favours economic status and stratification of power, creating extraordinary cultural homogeneity and anchored in extreme nationalism; the end of the revolutionary impulse, social change and a permanent conservative attitude towards existing institutions and the status quo; a system of personal dictatorship "[Bialer, 1980, p. 9].

Most often, the term "Stalinism" is used to describe the system that existed in the USSR during the three decades between the rise of Stalin in the late 1920s and the beginning of Khrushchev's reforms in the mid-1950s. In the mid-1940s, this system was exported to Eastern Europe and North Korea. Mao's China is rarely called "Stalinist", although the parallels between Maoism and Stalinism are quite obvious and were repeatedly recognized by Mao himself. In the USSR, the Stalinist system was dismantled during the so-called Khrushchev reforms of the late 1950s. After these reforms, the Soviet Union did not become a democratic society, but the social climate in the country radically changed.

Even a cursory glance at Bayeler's list of Stalinist traits is enough to show that Kim Il Sung-era North Korea, especially in the period 1961-1986, was a classic example of"advanced Stalinism." Many of its features were even more pronounced in the DPRK than in the Stalinist Soviet Union. The mobilization management style and massive militarization of the economy in North Korea were much more noticeable than in the USSR. The worst excesses of the Soviet " great construction projects "of the 1930s pale in comparison to what happened in North Korean factories and construction sites, with their endless" 100-day battles "and" 200-day battles " (during which workers were not allowed to go home even at night).

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Nationalism during Stalin's" struggle against cosmopolitanism "could take rather tragicomic forms, but at the same time racism still remained alien to the Soviet system, while in North Korea the" racial purity " of Koreans is openly celebrated-and, of course, many of the most important inventions of world history are attributed to the Korean genius. Control over the daily life of the population in North Korea took forms that would have been unthinkable in the Soviet Union even during Stalin's lifetime. In the Stalin-era USSR, only collective farmers did not have the right to freely change their place of residence, and in North Korea, for many decades, the entire population did not have the right to leave their native county without official permission, even for a short time. The intensity of North Korean indoctrination is simply staggering: in the 1970s, every Korean adult was expected to spend two to three hours in meetings every day, listening to editorials from the Nodong Sinmun or Memoirs of Anti-Japanese Guerrillas. Portraits of Stalin were quite common in the USSR, but in North Korea there has been a portrait of Kim Il Sung since the early 1970s. it became mandatory not only in institutions, but also in private homes (in the 1980s, a portrait of Kim Jong Il appeared there), and a complex cult was created around these images and carefully regulated by state and party bodies.

However, the description of North Korea as a "Stalinist state", which is certainly correct for the 1970s and 1980s, does not reflect the profound changes that have taken place in this country over the past 15 years. Some features of Stalinism persist in the DPRK to this day, but in general, the country and society have changed to such an extent that "Stalinism" has become more of a misleading label. In this article, we will try to describe these changes, as well as answer the question of what significance the events of recent years have for assessing "Stalinism" as a phenomenon of world history. The article is based on press publications, interviews of the author with natives of the DPRK and foreign diplomats and other specialists permanently residing there.

END OF THE INFORMATION BLOCKADE

One of the most important changes in recent years is the dramatic increase in North Koreans ' access to uncensored information about the outside world, which they have been denied for decades.

All socialist states tried to limit the flow of information from abroad to the best of their ability, but few of them could compare in this respect with the North Korean regime during the "mature Stalinism" period, that is, in the 1960s and 1990s. I remember a North Korean university official in Pyongyang in 1985 reacting to my report that you could buy a shortwave radio in the USSR and listen to foreign programs. Somewhat surprised by the unbridled liberalism of the Soviet revisionists, the official asked:: "What if the content of radio broadcasts is ideologically harmful?"

In North Korea, such liberalism was impossible. Radios sold in North Korean stores did not have a free setting and could only receive official Pyongyang channels. For many decades, ordinary North Koreans have only had access to normal radios while serving in the military. Some of them used it to listen to South Korean and foreign programs, but they also took a serious risk. Relatively recently, in 1995, screenwriter Jung Sung-san was sentenced to 12 years in prison for listening to South Korean programs during military training (he was lucky: he was eventually able to escape to the South) [Cho-Ho-young, 1999]. In less liberal times, the punishment could have been more severe: in 1988, a soldier was sentenced to 20 years

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Incarceration for listening to broadcasts from Seoul and sharing what he heard with local farmers [Ichaejin and others, 2004, pp. 138-139]. Foreign radios with free tuning were on sale in foreign exchange stores since the 1970s, but after purchasing such a receiver, a citizen of the DPRK was obliged to immediately hand it over to the police, where free tuning of the receiver was blocked in special workshops.

All foreign publications were sent to special departments of libraries, where only those who received special permission had access to them. A similar system (spetskhran) once existed in the libraries of the USSR, but in the Soviet Union, the spetskhran mainly included those foreign publications that either directly criticized Soviet ideology and politics, or dealt with such "subversive topics" as religion and sex. In North Korea, this system was applied to all foreign publications, with the exception of purely technical literature1. Another feature: in the USSR, materials published in other socialist countries were usually uncensored, while in North Korea, publications from other "fraternal" countries were also considered subversive.

Unofficial contacts between North Koreans and foreigners have been restricted in every possible way since the late 1950s, and have become almost impossible since the early 1960s. Those Koreans who had to travel abroad were in no hurry to share their impressions: many people who spoke too openly about the higher standard of living in other countries ended up in the United States. prison 2.

These efforts to establish and maintain an information blockade reflect the special role that the myth of North Korean prosperity plays in the regime's survival. Despite some of its quasi-religious features, Juche remains a rationalistic ideology that explicitly denies the existence of God, and therefore the idea of an afterlife reward. Its claims are based not on any approval from higher powers, but on its alleged ability to ensure that its supporters, or at least their descendants, thrive in this world. This means that (unlike, say, fundamentalist Islam) the Juche ideology cannot promise its faithful followers rewards in the afterlife. Nor can it imagine suffering in this world as some kind of divine test that believers must pass with honor in order to prove the purity and strength of their faith. The virtues of Juche should be quite obvious in this world - and that is why stories of North Korean prosperity, as well as stories of the suffering of oppressed South Koreans, are so important for maintaining political stability in the country.

In other socialist countries, propaganda also tried to play down the economic success of capitalist States. However, in a divided Korea, this propaganda line has a special meaning. In the first case, we were talking about the economic achievements of Western countries, whose prosperity could always be explained in Marxist terms as a product of the imperialist policy of neocolonialism, as a result of the exploitation of the non-Western world and its resources. The situation in North Korea is radically different from that in China or Vietnam: the South's remarkable economic success is the success of the same state, and of the half of it that initially lagged significantly behind the industrial North.

This is why, ever since the rise of the North Korean state, stories about the suffering of South Koreans have played such an important role in Pyongyang's propaganda.

1 Based on data collected by the author while studying at Kim Il Sung University in the mid-1980s.

2 For the story of a Korean man who started complaining to his friends after being repatriated from Japan and ended up in a concentration camp, see [Ichhejin irim, 2004, pp. 140-141]. The author is also personally aware of the case when, in the early 1990s, the father of a North Korean logger who worked in the USSR was arrested after complaining that he had earned less in decades of immaculate service than his son had earned in a couple of years abroad.

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For decades, the South has been portrayed as a land of terror and famine, where poor students sell their blood to pay for textbooks, and sadistic Yankees squish Korean schoolgirls with tanks for fun. In primary school textbooks, children can see an instructive picture: "The principal of a school in South Korea beats and drives out of school a child who could not pay for his education on time" [Kang Chol-hwan, 2001, p.54]. In high school, they learn, " There are currently seven million unemployed people in South Korea. Crowds of people are queuing in front of labor exchanges, but there are no jobs at all. Factories are closed one after another, and in such a situation, even those people who still have a job do not know when they will lose it and their livelihood" [Lee Hye-bum, Choi Hyun-ho, 2000, p.250]. Naturally, all these horrors are pure fiction: primary education in South Korea has been free since the 1950s, and even during the worst times of the economic crisis, there were no "seven million unemployed people". But North Koreans have been forced to listen to such stories for almost six decades - and it seems that in general, for lack of alternative information, they have accepted them on faith.

However, this system could function normally only insofar as North Korea itself remained cut off from the outside world. Changes in recent years have led to the fact that the information blockade began to break down quickly. As is often the case, the proliferation of new technologies has played a major role in the changes. While in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, alternative visions of the world were largely created by "voices" - that is, listening to radio broadcasts-in North Korea, videotapes now play a similar role. Video recorders have been known in the North since about 1990, but for the next decade they remained completely inaccessible to the average resident of the DPRK. In the mid-1990s, the cheapest VCR cost approximately $ 250, while the average monthly income (at the black market rate) was only $ 4-5.

The situation changed dramatically around 2000, when China's Manchuria was flooded with cheap DVD players. Chinese consumers began to switch en masse from videotapes to video discs, and as a result, no one needed the old video recorders. So used video recorders are sold at an almost symbolic price, and then smuggled out to North Korea. In North Korea, they are resold at a high margin, but their price is still about $ 40 - $ 60, which is generally within the acceptable range for a well-off North Korean family.3

Video recorders are now purchased largely to watch and copy South Korean television series, which are a sharp contrast to the ideologized North Korean productions. South Korean "soap operas", along with Chinese and Indian TV series and films, are now forming the basis of video consumption in North Korea. The popularity of this video product is huge. One of the author's acquaintances, a Western businessman who has long and successfully worked in the DPRK, remarked in the spring of 2005: "I used to have to return to the North with packs of American cigarettes. Now I'm taking South Korean videos that all my colleagues are asking for."

South Korean actors and actresses are well-known in the DPRK, and their hairstyles and clothing styles are imitated by Pyongyang's youth, mostly from among the scions of elite and sub-elite families. There are reports in the press that young residents of Pyongyang are trying to reproduce the clothes and manners of the characters of the latest South Korean shows with maximum accuracy.4 South Korean forms of polite communication-

3 For large-scale smuggling of used video recorders, see [Cho Won-ik, 2003, p. 6].

4 For such imitation, see: [Cho Won-ik, 2003, p. 6; Hong In-pyo, 2004, p. 3; Puk kovichhyn..., 2003, p.8]. In 2002-2005, such reports became very frequent.

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These laws are also becoming popular in the North, replacing the previous "socialist" forms of address.5 As in the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s, the" imperialist ideology "(known in the DPRK as the" yellow ideology") primarily affects the more affluent,educated and young segments of the population [Puk kovichhyn..., 2003, p.8].

It is difficult to answer the question to what extent South Korean television series and movies influence the views of Northerners on the world and on their ideas about South Korean society. The series gives a generally correct picture of daily life in Seoul, although it is not clear to what extent this picture is believed by northerners. As you know, North Korean films have always embellished the life of the DPRK, so the Northerners probably suspect that South Korean filmmakers behave in a similar way.6 Perhaps only a few North Korean consumers of Seoul video products seriously think that every South Korean family actually has a car (even if this is quite clear from the TV series). However, there is no doubt that the people of the DPRK are gradually coming to the conclusion that the South is not a "land of hunger and despair." This will certainly have serious political consequences in the more or less distant future, since the myth of "suffering of the people of South Korea" is extremely important for legitimizing the North Korean state.

Face-to-face contact with the outside world, once completely impossible, has also become fairly commonplace, although the "outside world" still includes only China. Beginning in 1996, masses of starving peasants and townspeople from the northern parts of the country began to leave for China through the poorly guarded border in search of food and work. According to a study conducted by South Korean sociologists in China in November 1998-April 1999, there were between 143,000 and 195,000 people in northeast China at that time. North Korean refugees 7. Currently, the number of refugees has noticeably decreased and probably amounts to about 30-50 thousand people.8 Many cross the border regularly, engaging in the smuggling trade or going to China to work (often for a relatively short time, such as a few weeks or months). Therefore, the number of people who have visited China and spent some time there is several times more than the number of people who are currently in China. It can be assumed that at least half a million North Koreans have visited China over the past decade, and the proportion of such people is especially high in the northern regions of the country.

Since computer centers are ubiquitous in Northeastern China, many of the young fugitives are learning the Internet, mainly interested in sites in South Korea that operate in the Korean language they understand.9 Most of them are visited by

5 Oral report by a former student who visited North Korea in August 2004

6 This is an assumption based on the author's personal experience and observations, but some facts seem to indirectly support it. The captain of a North Korean fishing boat who fled to the South in August 2002 said that he often watched South Korean TV programs at sea, but still did not believe that these programs reflect the real standard of living of the country [Kim Eui-gu, 2002, p.22].

7 This study was commissioned by Choheung Pos ("Good Friend"), a major South Korean non-governmental organization that plays a major role in helping refugees. The results of the study were published in 1999 in: [Tumangan..., 1999, p. 27].

8 In November 2004, a professional broker actively involved in illegal emigration to the South estimated the number of refugees in China at 50,000 [see: Chu Son-ha, 2004, p. 8]. At about the same time, in October 2004, a Beijing correspondent for the Korean daily newspaper estimated the number of refugees in China at 50,000. 100,000 people [Hong Ik-pyo, 2004, p. 2]. In August 2004, another newspaper gave the maximum and minimum estimates of this number - 30,000 and 100,000, respectively [Kim Chi-ban, 2004, p. 4].

9 For information on the use of the Internet by North Koreans in China, see Han Chang-hwi, 2004, p. 8; Lee Mi-suk, 2002, p. 2.

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entertainment and erotic sites, but the very possibility of accessing hitherto prohibited information is also important. Fugitives from North Korea usually speak poor Chinese, but they actively communicate with ethnic Koreans, who make up the majority of the population in the border areas, as well as with newcomers from South Korea, whose presence in the border zone is also very noticeable now. From contacts with Southerners and conversations with local Koreans, Northerners will sooner or later learn that South Korea is thriving even compared to China, a country that seems incredibly rich to refugees [Talbuk 25 men..., 2003, p.2]. This does not always mean that they will try to escape to the South (it is difficult and expensive to do so now, and not everyone is ready to take such a drastic step), but when they return home with smuggled goods or with money earned in China, they tell what they have heard, and also bring with them These are videos of South Korean TV series or cassettes of popular Seoul songs.

The proliferation of mobile phones in the border area in the North of the DPRK has also become an important phenomenon. These mobile phones are serviced by Chinese carriers. Until the summer of 2003, signals from Chinese mobile networks could only be received on mountain slopes facing the Chinese border, but in 2003 the network of relay stations on the other side of the border was dramatically expanded, which greatly increased the coverage area of Chinese networks, including on the Korean side of the border.

Mobile phones have spread to the affluent residents of the border areas. These phones use pre-paid phone cards, and access to the network for three months costs approximately 400 yuan ($50). The cards are purchased in China and then shipped to North Korea. Reliable communication is possible, depending on the terrain features, at a distance of 10-15 km from the Korean-Chinese border. It is reported that mobile phones are popular among smugglers who use them to exchange information about the movements and actions of border guards, as well as among "brokers" who specialize in preparing the flight of North Koreans to China and the South. Mobile phones are also used to communicate with relatives abroad, including in the United States. South Korea. Like most other changes in recent years, the rapid growth in the number of mobile phones has occurred without the permission of the authorities, who from time to time try to detect and seize them.10 However, it should be noted: in the spirit of today's liberal times, the discovery of a phone usually ends with its confiscation and a preventive conversation with the violator 11.

Radios officially sold in the DPRK are still being sealed, but in practice this does not matter as cheap transistor radios are smuggled in large quantities across the Chinese border. Access to foreign radio broadcasts has become quite common: a survey conducted in South Korea in 2003 showed that 67% of future defectors listened to foreign and South Korean radio broadcasts even when they lived in the DPRK (Park Yong-seok, 2003). Of course, this sample is hardly representative: it is clear that the willingness to escape abroad itself makes a person more inclined to listen to foreign programs from time to time. Nevertheless, it is clear that foreign radio programs are quite accessible to those who want to listen to them.12

South Korean goods are increasingly popular with North Korean smugglers and market traders. Until the mid-1990s, merchants were usually afraid to own a car.

10 On the widespread use of cell phones in border areas, see [Cell Phones..., 2004; Im So-hwi, 2004. On the role of mobile phones in organizing illegal border crossings, see [Chu Song-ha, 2004, p. 8].

11 In July 2005, a South Korean journalist asked a small-time Chinese entrepreneur who organizes mobile communications for his North Korean partners:"Isn't it dangerous if [the North Korean authorities] seize a mobile phone?" He replied: "If there is no evidence that he talked to South Korea, then it's nothing special" (Han Yong-jin, 2005).

12 Interview with Park Sang Hak (defected from North Korea in 2000). October 25, 2004, Seoul.

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dealing with South Korean goods, as their resale could result in charges of espionage and subversion. In the late 1980s, the first contacts with South Korean goods shocked North Koreans, because the high quality of these products contradicted the official image of the "underdeveloped" and "technologically backward" South.

Journalist Kang Chol-hwan, himself a native of the DPRK, conducted a small study on how and under what circumstances North Koreans first encountered the products of South Korean factories and factories. He wrote about the typical impression that such contacts made on the residents of the DPRK: "People reacted differently, but in most cases their first reaction was shock and fright" [Kang Chol-hwan, 2002(2), p. 55]. Currently, South Korean products are sold almost openly in North Korean markets, and sellers even sometimes try to deceive buyers by passing off Chinese goods as South Korean ones ("South Korean means quality").13.

Of course, the North Korean authorities are not very happy with these changes, which would have been unthinkable a decade ago. Periodically, there are reports of attempts to "restore order" by the old repressive methods, but it seems that these attempts remain fruitless, including because the lower officials and the police apparatus have largely lost their former zeal. According to defectors, it was the young police officers who disrupted the recent campaign against "foreign trends" in clothing and hairstyles and actually refused to detain teenagers for wearing "politically incorrect" trousers or eccentric hairstyles. 14 Several ideological campaigns were also reported against "dangerous" trends, but the results were not impressive [Hong In-phe, 2004, p. 3].

Compared to the old days, North Koreans are now much more open to short-term contacts with foreigners. In the 1970s, even the most innocent question asked by a foreigner on the street could literally put a Korean to flight. a few minutes of conversation on neutral topics was already perceived as something quite acceptable, and now a foreigner can talk to a Korean on the street for quite a long time, although inviting a foreigner home remains an exception and can only be done with the permission of the authorities.15

THE COLLAPSE OF THE STALINIST STATE ECONOMY

Even more important and revealing are the changes in the economy. The events that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union clearly demonstrated that North Korea's loud statements about the country's economic independence were unfounded. Deprived of Soviet subsidies, the North Korean economy entered a long period of decline. Between 1990 and 1999, the DPRK's GNP almost halved16. The situation became disastrous in 1996, when the country suffered a famine the likes of which Korea had not seen in at least a century. According to various estimates, the death toll ranged from 200,000 to 3,000,000 people, but the most likely figure at the moment is in the United States. 600 000 - 900 000 17 dead. There was a lot of famine

13 For this trend, see Kang Chol-hwan, 2002 (1), p. 53; Hong In-pyo, 2004, p. 3.

14 On the reluctance of police officers to participate in this campaign, see [Cho Won-ik, 2003, p. 6].

15 Oral communication from the author's former student, now a Russian official in Pyongyang. Similar comments can often be heard from foreigners who speak Korean, remember Pyongyang in the 1980s, and can compare the current situation with the one that existed 20 or 25 years ago.

16 For detailed reports on the economic situation in North Korea, see the Bank of Korea yearbooks, for example: [2002 gyeongju..., 2003, pp. 1-3].

17 For an overview of existing estimates, as well as the most thorough analysis of available data to date, see [Goodkind and West, 2001, p. 219-238].

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the result of Pyongyang's desire to preserve the old models of collective agriculture at all costs, despite the fact that their inefficiency has long been proven by the experience of other countries.

The end of Soviet subsidies meant the end of the industrialist economy of coal mines and steel mills that Kim Il Sung had created with so much effort and sacrifice. The militarized state economy was quickly replaced by a spontaneous revival of small-scale handicrafts and private trade, with markets as the focus.

In the 1960s, markets in North Korea disappeared almost completely. Retail trade in grain products was officially banned in 1958, and from 1965 to 1970 virtually everything from grain to socks was distributed on cards, with formal prices in gostorgovle being symbolic in character18. Until July 2002, rice in the official trade was only 0.08 won per kilogram, but only the state could decide how much rice and other grains can be claimed by a particular citizen of the DPRK. The norms for issuing food by card depended on a person's place in a complex social hierarchy, as well as on their occupation and place of residence. Occupation determined the size of the ration (from 300 g to 800 g of grain for adult Koreans), while the place of residence determined how much of this ration would be given out in rice, and how much in corn, barley, and other low - value cereals. In this respect, Pyongyang was in a privileged position, where the share of rice in the grain ration at the best of times reached 80%. In any case, for decades, the DPRK was a country where the card system covered literally all types of goods. Perhaps only stationery and books (mostly the works of the Great Leader and Beloved Leader, as well as commentaries on them) were freely sold in the North by the end of the 1980s19.

Unlike the situation in other socialist countries, North Korean peasants had almost no land of their own: the size of an individual land plot in the DPRK was 20-30 square meters. This was barely enough to grow peppers and condiments for family consumption. The lack of homestead plots was the result of a conscious political decision. The North Korean authorities hoped that farmers deprived of their own plots would work better for the state.

Back in the late 1980s, markets were perceived as something ideologically dubious, so in Pyongyang they were moved to the far outskirts. Until the early 1990s, most markets were located in places hidden from view, behind high concrete walls. The markets of those times were small and could be located in small fenced areas. In Pyongyang itself, the main city market was organized under a huge viaduct on the eastern edge of the capital, as far away from the city center as possible.20

The economic crisis of 1991-1995 and the subsequent catastrophic famine changed the situation. Markets began to spread rapidly across the country. In 1995 - 1997, almost all plants and factories stopped working. In the most difficult period-

18 A detailed study of the gradual growth of North Korea's public distribution system is contained in an in-depth and comprehensive article by Choi Bong-dae and Ku Kap-woo [Choi Bong-dae and Ku Kap - woo, 2003, pp. 153-156]. The same study carefully traces the changes in the fate of North Korean markets during the four "Kimirsen" decades, when they were suppressed and were on the periphery of the official economy.

19 For a detailed study of the ration system in the form it took by the end of the 1980s, see: [So Ton-ik, 1995, vol. 2, pp. 211-250]. During a recent conversation with a defector of the same age as the author, we tried to figure out what else you could buy in Pyongyang without cards in 1985-1986. In addition to stationery and books, this list included some types of haberdashery (buttons, pins, combs) - and, perhaps, everything (Interview with Han Yong-jin, August 20, 2005).

20 According to the author's memoirs.

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Before the crisis, in 1997, the average workload of factories was reported to be only 46% of normal [Lee Kyo-hwan, 2001, p. 41].

In the mid-1990s, the population continued to receive cards in most parts of the country, but it was impossible to exchange them for food. Only in Pyongyang and some other politically important areas of the country did the card system continue to function, but even there the norms were sharply reduced, and in the late 1990s the real daily norm was only 150-200 g of grain per person. In this situation, the main guarantee of physical survival was "market skills". According to the witty and cynical remark of a North Korean merchant, the situation in North Korea after the famine is as follows:" Those who could not trade died long ago, and now there are only survivors around - that is, those who could trade " (Shin Seung-gun, 2002).

The Government has also eased restrictions on domestic travel. Since about 1960, every Korean who traveled outside their home county was required to carry a special "travel permit" issued by the local police authorities, and it was almost impossible to circumvent this requirement. Issuing such a permit was subject to numerous bureaucratic restrictions, and the entire procedure took a long time - usually from a week to a month. However, since the mid-1990s, the authorities began to turn a blind eye to travel without such permits (although this relief did not apply to Pyongyang and other major cities). It is not clear whether this was the result of some political decision or simply reflected the impotence of the official bureaucracy and its inability to force the population to comply with the instructions. The bureaucracy was demoralized, and a significant number of ordinary officials were in distress, so a trip permit could be issued for a bribe of several dollars [Kim Mi-yeon, 2001, p. 53]. In any case, the boom in private commerce would not have been possible without a dramatic increase in people's physical mobility.

In the mid-1990s, a wave of small-scale private trade flooded the country, which once came so close to creating a non-monetary economy. With the beginning of the famine, people began to leave their homes. Many went in search of food, while others enthusiastically engaged in barter trade, including the smuggling trade with China. Huge markets appeared in all the cities and towns of the country. There was a semi-static expansion of household plots, as well as the development of inconveniences on mountain slopes by peasants. Finally, the distribution of land to citizens has become commonplace, a kind of North Korean equivalent of Russian "dachas".

Women play a huge role in the new business. Traditionally, the DPRK has not been particularly strong in its feminist tendencies. North Korean women were housewives or held very minor positions, and the campaign to involve women in social production, which was actively pursued in the 1960s, had generally run out of steam by 1980. During the years of crisis, men continued to go to their shut-down factories. They still received symbolic salaries and ration cards, which had long been useless pieces of paper. Nevertheless, this behavior was (or seemed) rational: the majority of North Koreans still perceived the new situation as temporary and therefore were afraid to give up "normal" work in the public sector, which for decades was a necessary condition for a normal existence in society. While the men waited in vain for "normal life" to return, sitting in their idle factories, the women plunged into a frenetic business activity. Soon some of them began to earn sums far in excess of their husbands ' wages.

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DISINTEGRATION OF POLITICAL CONTROL, NEW SOCIAL FORCES

It's not just trading that thrives in the markets. Over the past decade, the private service sector has been revived in the DPRK, which was destroyed in the late 1950s: private canteens, stalls and hotels have appeared in abundance in the vicinity of markets. Prostitution has become commonplace, almost completely disappearing during the years of absolute control. Since official banking institutions cannot, in principle, lend to private commercial transactions, usury has also appeared. The minimum interest rate is currently 10% per month, but in some cases the level can reach up to 30% [Lee Kyo-gwan, 2003; Park Geun-ho, 2004, p. 7]. This is partly due to the high level of inflation, and partly reflects the level of risk that North Korean private creditors have to deal with: loan sharks are vulnerable to both the state and criminals.

None of this is unusual: after all, a similar picture can be seen in almost all "normal" poor Asian countries. But for the DPRK, which has been an extremely unusual society for many decades, all these changes are revolutionary in nature.

The authorities ' control over the market has dramatically weakened. Part of this weakening was the result of the economic crisis and the state's inability to adequately pay officials, which led to the demoralization of the state apparatus and an increase in corruption. It also seems that the new situation was influenced by the moral and ideological fatigue of the elite. In the DPRK, there are no people who are ready to kill and die for the sake of an idea for a long time, and it seems that the North Korean elite is experiencing the same "crisis of faith" in the official ideology that was so clearly visible in the USSR in the 1970s.

The growth of the new "unofficial" economy has also made a significant contribution to undermining the system of everyday control over the life of the population. Gone are the days when North Korean workers and employees spent several hours a day at various meetings and political activities. Now both the intensity of meetings and, most importantly, their attendance have decreased. This also applies to other official rituals. Representatives of the elites and sub-elites still try to observe the old formalities, because they have something to lose, but those who are at the bottom of the official hierarchy no longer care about it. 21

Indeed, the worker of a long-defunct factory knows perfectly well that the authorities are not able to properly reward him for his political zeal, or, on the contrary, to seriously punish him for refusing to participate in official rituals (unless, of course, such refusal takes the form of a simple non-appearance, and is not accompanied by some statements and active actions which can be interpreted as a political protest). Many, if not most, North Koreans outside of Pyongyang rely on small businesses, handicrafts, and homesteads for their livelihoods. An increasingly large part of the country's population does not depend on the official state economy in any way. They no longer care about promotions, bonuses, travel packages, or being deprived of all the benefits described above, which means that at the grassroots level, the authorities have lost extremely important levers of control over people's daily activities.

The growth of the new market-oriented economy also undermined the old North Korean hierarchy, which was based on the principle of "origin," or seongbun. During Kim Il Sung's time, seongbun was defined by the family's background and the associated perceived political credibility. For example, the descendants of Korean War heroes or high-ranking officials had a "good seongbun", while the seongbun of the grandchildren of a Catholic priest or a rich peasant who fled to the South was "bad".

21 Interview with Park Sang-hak (defector to South Korea in 2000), October 25, 2004, Seoul.

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The entire population was formally divided into 51 groups based on their seongbun, with each group having its own rights and restrictions. Seongbun was passed down from his father's side. During Kim Il Sung's time, only people with a good seongbun could get a good job, enroll in prestigious universities, or live in Pyongyang. Families with poor seongbun were usually forced to live in small towns or villages, where they were mainly engaged in manual labor.22 This emphasis on family background is unusual even for Stalinism: in the USSR, having a relative with a "bad background" could block the way to some positions, but the system never reached the level of bureaucratic development that Korea showed, and was generally much milder even in Stalin's time.

However, the importance of the seongbun system, long the cornerstone of North Korea's social structure, has declined dramatically in recent years. Of course, many of those who have grown rich in recent years come from the old nomenclature - a situation that is familiar from the experience of most post-socialist countries. Many representatives of the nomenclature use their official privileges in order to get additional earnings. For example, an official who controls a truck can easily make a fortune transporting goods and playing on the huge differences in price levels between regions. Drivers also earn a considerable income from the transportation of "left" passengers and cargo.23 Managers of state-owned enterprises often sell the products of their factories on the market. Sales staff at all levels also actively use the opportunities of the "black market".

Many social groups that were previously systematically discriminated against were able to consolidate their position during the chaotic and tragic decade that followed Kim Il Sung's death. Access to foreign currency has become particularly important in the new situation, and there are three main groups in North Korea that have had access to initial investment capital: Japanese Koreans, Chinese Koreans, and Korean Chinese.

The first of these groups includes ethnic Koreans who came to the DPRK from Japan in the 1960s, during the then-widespread "homecoming" campaign. The number of repatriates themselves was 93 thousand, and taking into account family members and descendants, the number of this group can currently be estimated at 200-250 thousand people. Most of these people have relatives in Japan, many of whom send them money transfers and valuables from time to time. For decades, Japanese Koreans were treated with great suspicion by the authorities, and many of them ended up in the camps. At the same time, transfers from Japan have long been an important source of convertible currency, so the authorities are often willing to overlook the minor transgressions of Japanese Koreans, who thus represented both a privileged and discriminated group. As the old system of state distribution and the strict ban on private entrepreneurship began to unravel, Japanese Koreans began to invest heavily in semi-legal private businesses. The other group is those Koreans who have relatives in China. China's economic growth in recent years means that these relatives are now able to help their poor relatives in North Korea. In many cases, this support is not a transfer of money per se, but rather an assistance in business and trade. Also, local ethnic Chinese,

22 There are numerous studies of the seongbun system, which has been one of the most important aspects of the DPRK's social organization for decades. Among the English-language works, we can recommend the well-known study by Helen-Louise Hunter, which provides a detailed overview of how the seongbun system functioned in the 1970s and 1980s [Hunter, 1999].

23 North Koreans even say: "Being a driver is better than being a professor", and getting a license is very difficult - to get into driving courses, you need a lot of connections. We are talking about professional drivers, since there are almost no private cars in the country [see: Choi Chae-yeon, Cho Ho-yeon, 2001, p. 4].

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The only ethnic minority in North Korea has also been given a lot of new opportunities. For several decades, they were the only group of people in the country who were allowed to travel abroad privately and more or less at will. Even in the old days, ethnic Chinese used their unique position to earn extra money through small-scale trade. In the 1990s, the scale of their activities increased many times 24.

There is some historical irony in the sudden economic success of these groups. For decades, their ties to foreign countries have made them politically suspect and systematically discriminated against. In the 1990s, however, these same connections became the source of their prosperity and influence.

In any case, in the new conditions, monetary income plays an increasingly important role in determining social status, rather than the seongbun system, political trustworthiness and the associated benevolent attitude of the authorities. The state is no longer able to encourage those who continue to play by the official rules, and Koreans are increasingly aware of this fact. This means undermining one of the most important principles of the Stalinist system, in which the individual's financial position is ideally determined solely by his relationship to the state - or rather, by the State's relationship to it.

Currently, market traders and semi-legal entrepreneurs have fortunes that, in some rather exceptional cases, reach the size of several hundred thousand dollars. This money is an unimaginably large sum by North Korean standards and, in general, by the standards of any Stalinist state.25 At the same time, there is almost no information about the systematic attempts of the North Korean elite to follow the Chinese or post-Soviet model and try to gradually reincarnate as capitalists. There are reports of government-approved enterprises headed by former party leaders or their close relatives, but this seems to be a rare occurrence. At the same time, foreign trade companies operating under the auspices of the army and law enforcement agencies or directly created by these agencies earn quite decent money.26

However, the merging of local bureaucracy and new capital is still taking place. Typical in this regard is the story of a wealthy businesswoman, Ms. Hwang. Born in China to a Han Chinese father and a Korean mother, Ms. Hwang fled to Korea with her mother after her father was killed by Red Guards. Since 1997, it has been actively engaged in trade, using its connections in the PRC and the DPRK. It was Ms. Hwang who handed over 100,000 pairs of socks to the authorities of Ryongcheon County, where her business activities are mainly concentrated, which were then distributed in the county as a "gift from a Favorite Manager". In this way, the authorities scored political points, and Ms. Hwang gained - or rather strengthened-a much-needed "rapport" with the authorities. She herself said about this: "People in the police and state security like good clothes, food, alcohol. Now there are a lot of thieves and bandits in Korea, but if I call the police and state security, they appear immediately... If you are friends with the state security service, you can easily get permits to travel to China; if you are friends with the police, you can easily get rid of thieves; if you are friends with the party apparatus, you can easily trade" [Kwon Chong-hyun, 2005].

24 For the role of these groups in the new North Korean capitalist elite, see [Lee Kyo-gwan, 2003].

25 Judging by the publications of 2003-2005, it seems that a fortune of 100 thousand dollars is perceived as a symbolic boundary separating the "simply rich" from the "fabulously rich" [see: Lee Kyo-gwan, 2003; Park Geun-ho, 2004, p. 7].

26 One of the few known cases is Pinteck in Pyongyang, a computer firm headed by the son of a former WPK Central Committee secretary (Yoon Ho-woo, 2004). In addition, numerous firms belonging to law enforcement and party structures have recently conducted business in such a way that it becomes obvious that the "managers" of these firms increasingly feel like their owners.

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The new capitalists are connected to the bureaucracy, but they are generally quite independent and, unlike the bureaucrats, they are more likely to believe that they can survive the fall of the regime in principle. After all, their well - being is the result of connections not only in the apparatus, but also outside it, including abroad, and the money they have (in foreign currency) will allow them to continue the business even in the event of radical changes. Unlike the traditional nomenclature elite, the new "black market" elite can also take anti-government movements of any kind quite calmly and even expect that radical changes will benefit it.

Political relaxation is also notable. An interesting example of new trends is the story of Lee Yong-guk, Kim Jong-il's former bodyguard. Disillusioned with the North Korean system, he fled to China and attempted to move to South Korea, but was intercepted by North Korean agents and smuggled out to the DPRK. In not-so-distant times, the fate of an unlucky fugitive was easily predictable: torture and execution awaited the person who betrayed the personal trust of a beloved Leader. But in the liberal 1990s, Ri Yong-guk was treated with surprising leniency: he was sent to a prison camp and soon released on Kim Jong-il's special orders. Lee Young-guk used this opportunity to try again, which turned out to be successful: this time he reached Seoul on the 27th.

The hyper-centralized spatial organization of the Stalinist state also underwent radical changes. In North Korea, Pyongyang, the "capital of the revolution," has always been given a special role. On the contrary, the countryside and its inhabitants were in a subordinate position, and they were treated with condescension. There were good reasons for this perception: everything from the standard of issuing food by card to educational opportunities in non-capital cities, and even more so in rural areas, was worse than in Pyongyang. The Far North of the country, areas on the border with China, traditionally served as a place of exile for undesirable persons. The Government obviously wanted to place suspicious individuals as far away from a potential theater of operations as possible, where they could pose a threat. The proximity to the Chinese border did not matter much at that time, because until about 1990-1992, it was possible to be sure that any fugitive to China would eventually be detained by the Chinese police and extradited to the DPRK.

However, the actual opening of the border with China changed the situation, transforming once-discriminated areas into a stronghold of the shadow and" gray " economy. One North Korean defector described the fate of his family as follows: "After our older brother, who was studying in Moscow, fled [to South Korea] in September 1990, our entire family was exiled to Onson County in northern Hamgyong Province. Now the border regions are a place where you can live really well, but then life there was difficult" (Ichjejin irim, 2004, p.201) .28

Finally, the housing trade has become a fundamentally new phenomenon. The exchange of residential space in the DPRK became commonplace in the 1980s, but in the last decade, the exchange often represents a disguised sale of housing (what in the USSR at one time was diplomatically called an "exchange by agreement"). At the beginning of 2005, the price of an apartment with a total area of 75 square meters (large, by the standards of the DPRK) in Chongjin was approximately three thousand dollars [Pukhan "chihapuzha"..., 2005] 29.

27 In principle, the author knows this story from Lee Yong-guk himself, but it is described in detail in his recently published book [Lee Yong-guk, 2004].

28 For a dramatic change in the situation in the border areas, see also [Lee Kyo-gwan, 2003; Kim Mi-yeon, 2001, p. 53].

29 Han Young-jin and Jang Hae-sung, both recent North Korean defectors, explained the mechanics of the sale to the author during interviews in July 2005.

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So, North Korea has changed in many ways and continues to change rapidly: The old hierarchies are collapsing, and the old institutions and institutions that were once created in accordance with classical Stalinist models are being marginalized and faded into oblivion. How do the authorities react to all these changes, which could be described as "de-Stalinization from below"? It seems that until recently, the North Korean government did not try to take the initiative, but simply passively followed the events, while somewhat lagging behind them. The much-publicized "July 2002 reforms" were nothing more than an official recognition of a situation that had already existed for several years.

Can the current North Korean society still be described as "Stalinist"? Most likely, this question should be answered in the negative. The traits identified in the above definition of "Stalinism" are difficult to detect in today's North Korea. The centrally planned economy has ceased to exist, private entrepreneurship is growing rapidly, government control over the population is seriously undermined, even uncontrolled (although mostly formally illegal) movement across the border has become possible, indoctrination is carried out with relatively low intensity, the scope of repression has sharply decreased, and even the party has partially faded into the background as a result of politics "priority of the army". Of course, there are remnants of Stalinism in the country, which exist mainly due to bureaucratic inertia and the unwillingness of the government to take the initiative and launch truly radical reforms (this reluctance probably reflects the well-founded political concerns of Kim Jong Il and his entourage). But classic Stalinism has also disappeared in the DPRK, a country that has long been its embodiment and last stronghold.

The North Korean departure from Stalinism is remarkable in one respect. Changes in the DPRK demonstrate that the Stalinist system can be dismantled not only from above, as happened in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the late 1950s or in China in the late 1970s. This system can also disintegrate under the pressure of its own inefficiency.

In the USSR and China, Stalinism and Maoism (in fact, "Stalinism with Chinese characteristics") were dismantled from above, as a result of a series of deliberate reforms that were planned and implemented by the government. In the DPRK, on the contrary, the changes occurred because the system began to fall apart from below, despite weak and ineffective attempts by the authorities to keep it in working order. In China, the transition to a market economy was made possible by a set of reforms undertaken by Deng Xiaoping's government after Mao's death in 1978-1985. In North Korea, the much-publicized "July 2002 reforms" simply recognized the existence of existing markets and reluctantly gave them official retroactive sanctions. In China, the government initiated reforms and tried to lead society in the direction that the government itself considered right. In North Korea, society began to change itself, forcing the state to adapt to these changes and belatedly giving official sanction to what had already happened against its will and desire.

North Korea also shows trends similar to those once seen in the Soviet Union and China. The Stalinist utopia proved unviable in the long run, and sooner or later this system began to disintegrate everywhere. There were some features of North Korea that made Stalinism last an unusually long time: the small size of the country, the population that combined a relatively high level of education with a traditional view of the world, and the historical experience of colonialism. Kim Il Sung's personality and ability to eliminate competitors also seemed to play a significant role

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and create an effective system of individual power, as well as draw conclusions from the experience of other socialist countries that allowed him to maintain this system intact for a long time. In the end, however, Stalinism could not avoid collapse there either.

Can the North Korean regime survive the changes that are unfolding?

It is generally assumed that such survival is not only desirable, but also quite possible - after all, the Chinese political system has successfully survived such a transition and continues to function without much trouble. But there is an important difference between China and Korea: There was no booming, rich, and democratic "other China" in the neighborhood of the PRC (Taiwan is too small to have any impact on the PRC comparable to the potential influence of South Korea on North Korea). In the Korean case, the people of the North will probably think that unification with the South is an obvious way to easily and quickly solve their various problems. So far, the lack of information about Seoul's prosperity, as well as the fear of a powerful repressive apparatus, prevents them from following the example of the East Germans. But what can save the ex-Stalinist monarchy if this fear disappears or weakens, and information from abroad continues to flow into the country at the current, very high rate? The prospect of collapse does not inspire the slightest enthusiasm among all of North Korea's neighbors, especially South Korea, but it seems that such a collapse is more likely than those who are currently making decisions in Seoul are willing to admit.

But even if the North Korean regime manages to survive and survive for a long time, its actions will become more manageable and predictable, and it will become more susceptible to external influences and pressures, less repressive, in a word-more "normal". This is a natural process that is already underway, but the wise, calm and restrained policies of other countries can contribute a lot to it.

list of literature

2002 gyeongjae seongjang-kyul chujong kelgwa (Results of the North Korean Economic Growth Assessment for 2002 "). Seoul: Bank of Korea, 2003.

Im So-hwi. Pap poda to chunghan ingwon odi issna? (Where should human rights be more important than food?) Hangere October 21, 14, 2004.

Ichjejin irim (Forgotten Names). Seoul: Side Jongsin Publ., 2004.

Kang Chol-hwan. Pukhan kyogwaso seok-eui Namhan (South Korea in North Korean textbooks) / / Choson ilbo .7.12.2001.

Kang Chol-hwan. Pukhan changmadan-yeso Namhan sanphum pulthi nanda (The brilliance of South Korean goods in the North Korean market) / / Choson ilbo. 17.04.2002(1).

Kang Chol-hwan. Namhan sanphum-eui chos gyeongkhom (The first meeting with South Korean goods) / / Chosun ilbo. 24.04.2002(2).

Kwon Jong-hyung. Kim Jung-il sung-il nal yangmal 10 man kolle pachhessta (Gave 100 thousand pairs of socks on Kim Jung-il's birthday) / / Daily NK. 27.04.2005.

Kim Mi-yeon. Kukkyeon toshidyl " Pyongyang-i an puropta "(Border towns "don't envy Pyongyang") / / Chosun ilbo. 7.09.2001.

Kim Chi-bang. Talbukja jeongchaek kynbon pyeonghwa sigyphada (A serious review of the policy regarding defectors is required) / / Kukmin ilbo. 18.08.2004.

Kim Eui-goo. Pukhan-yesodo Namhan TV sichon ([I] watched South Korean television in North Korea) / / Kukmin ilbo. 23.08.2002.

Lee Young-guk. Na-neung Kim Jong Il gyeonghowon yeossta (I was Kim Jong Il's bodyguard). Seoul: Side cheongxin Publ., 2004.

Lee Kyo-gwan. Sanopol kadongyul 77% - ro khyge hyangsan (A noticeable increase in industrial equipment utilization to [the level of] 77%) / / Chosun ilbo. 9.04.2001.

Lee Kyo-gwan. Pukhang-eui sinheung kwon-ryeokja-dyl (New influential forces in North Korea) / / Chu-gang joseon. 19.07.2003.

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Lee Mi-sook. Kasimi ullin talbukzha e-meil" (Emotional e-mail from a defector) / / Munkhva ilbo. 28.05.2002.

Lee Hye-bum, Choi Hyun-ho. Pukhan kegwaso-ryl thonkhan cheongseongyong kachhigwan yong-gu: Kodyn chunhak-kyo "Konsangzhuy todok" 3,4 haknen chunsim-yro. (Studying the system of values of youth in North Korean textbooks: based on textbooks on "Communist Morality" for the 3rd and 4th grades of high school) / / Pukhan yong-gu hakhvebo. Seoul, 2000. N 2.

Park Yeon-seok. Talbukja 67% "Puk-ye sal tte namhan pan son tyrossta" (67% of defectors "listened to South Korean radio when they lived in North Korea") / / Chosun ilbo. 28.02.2003.

Park Geun-ho. Puk: sarinjok inpheulle, pinbu kekcha simhwa (North: The growing gap between rich and poor and killer inflation) / / Segye ilbo. 22.11.2004.

Puk kovichhyn sinsede ' nam pyesen chohsypnida '(Among the children of the North Korean elite "South [Korean] fashion is cool") / / Segye ilbo. 16.09.2003.

Pukhan "chihapuzha" chepop nyrane (A noticeable increase in the number of "underground rich people" in North Korea) / / Daily NK. 22.04.2005.

Shin Seung-gong. Pookhan, mocha salman hayetta (North Korea: Is it enough just to eat to live)? // Hangere 21. N 404. 10.04.2002.

So Ton-ik. Inmin-y sanyn mosyp (How the masses live). Vol. 2. Seoul: Charewon, 1995. Tumangan-y connon saramdyl (People who crossed Tumangan). Seoul: Jeongdo chulphan, 1999. Talbuk 25 myeong-seul tochak (Arrival of 25 defectors in Seoul) / / Segye ilbo. 19.03.2003.

Han Yong-jin. Puk-gwa handi-phon thonkhwa, pam poda nych-i yuri (It is better to talk to the North on a mobile phone not at night, but during the day) / / Daily NK. 1.08.2005.

Han Chang-hwi. "Puk silsan allyrie ..." Talbukja homphi kaechul (Tell about the real situation in the North... Defector's home page) / / Kukmin ilbo. 6.07.2004.

Hong Ik-pyo. Chepho talbukja Hanguk hyeong himdul thousand (Sending arrested North Korean refugees to South Korea seems difficult) / / Gyeonghyang sinmun. 28.10.2004.

Hong In-pyo. "Nam Joseon sanphum chohae", Pukhan-ye phunun 'Namphun' ("South Korean goods are cool": South Korean mania in North Korea) / / Gyeonghyang sinmun. 17.03.2004.

Jo Won-ik. Nam taejun munhwa yelphun (High popularity of South Korean mass culture [in North Korea]) / / Segye ilbo. 8.12.2003.

Cho Ho-yeon. Talbukja sahwe chogun yesoe kode nomoya (Five initiation rituals in the social adaptation of defectors from the North). // Gyeonghyang sinmun. 17.03.1999.

Chu Seong-ha. 300 man won names, chayu Taehan phum-ye ... unmyeon kon tobak (If you have 3 million won -you are in a Free Korea: Playing with fate) / / Tonya ilbo. 20.11.2004.

Choi Bong-dae, Koo Kap-woo. Pukhang toshi "nonmin sichang" hyeongseong kwajong-yi and hyeongrongjok hamy: 1950-1980 nendae Sinuiju, Cheongjin, Hyesan-yi sare-ryl chunsim-euro (Study of the dynamics of the formation of "peasant markets" in a North Korean city: based on the example of the cities of Sinuiju, Cheongjin and Hyesan in the 1950s-1980s) / / Hyundai pukhan yong-gu. 2003. N 2.

Choi Chae-yeon, Jo Ho-yeon. Chhvegyn ttynyn yinjikop-pusuip ssolssol unjonsa (A job that is popular recently-a driver with an easy additional income) / / Gyeonghyang sinmun. 28.05.2001.

Yoon Ho-woo. Pukhan pyeonghwa imgyejom toriphaessta (Changes in North Korea have passed a critical point) / / Newsmaker. 3.07.2004.

Bialer S. Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

Cell Phones Spark 'Communication Revolution' in N. K. / / Digital Choson, December 2, 2004. Получено с http://en-glish.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200412/200412020030.html.

Goodkind D., West L. The North Korean Famine and Its Demographic Impact // Population and Development Review. 2001. N 2. (June).

Hunter H. -L. Kim Il-song's North Korea. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1999. Reichman H. Reconsidering "Stalinism" // Theory and Society. 1988. N 1.

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