E. V. UKHANOVA

Saint Petersburg State University

Keywords: militarization of space, military satellite, space forces, Japan's Self-Defense Forces, missile defense

Japan's space program, launched with the assistance of the United States in the 1950s, was of a non-military nature and was aimed at strengthening the country's scientific, technical and economic potential. By the early 1990s. Japan has created its own technological base, which has contributed to the reorientation of the program and defense needs. The difficult regional situation has prompted Tokyo to develop a new strategy for the development of space activities, which is based on the country's national security interests.

Japan's military space program began to develop actively only in the late 1990s, and by 2014, the country's military space program was fully developed. Tokyo already had a network of surveillance and tracking satellites. On August 2, 2014, it was decided to create a special military unit for monitoring near-Earth space by 2019. The tasks of the new unit, which is planned to be formed from employees of the Air Self-Defense Forces*, will include protecting orbital equipment from collisions and external attacks, tracking the movement of potentially dangerous space bodies and "space debris" in the immediate vicinity of Earth1.

At the same time, it can be assumed that in reality this initiative, as well as Japan's military space program in general, is aimed at improving space intelligence, especially in view of periodic tensions in relations with China and North Korea.

Tokyo is concerned about the activity of the Chinese navy in the Senkaku Islands, which have been the object of territorial claims by Japan, China and Taiwan since the late 1960s. ² The situation around the disputed territories remains unstable: periodic outbreaks of anti-Japanese sentiment in China are often accompanied by Chinese ships entering the Senkaku waters and landing on the islands, which Tokyo considers an encroachment on territorial sovereignty of Japan.

On March 27-28, 2014, the first Japanese-American naval exercises were held using tracking satellites to practice transmitting data about warships and suspicious vessels to each other. ³ Bilateral cooperation between Japan and the United States is aimed at improving space surveillance capabilities, especially in the East and South China Seas.

Tokyo is seriously concerned about North Korea's missile program, which is developing against the backdrop of unfavorable relations between the two countries (abductions of Japanese citizens by the DPRK special services, in particular, in the 1970s and 1980s, and the lack of practical results of the six-party talks** on the North Korean nuclear program).⁴. So, from May 2013 to July 2014. Pyongyang has fired at least 7 short-and medium-range ballistic missiles, all of them into the Sea of Japan.⁵ In this regard, special attention is paid to the problems of intelligence and missile defense in Japan.

North Korea began testing its missiles in 1993. After the launch of a North Korean ballistic missile towards the Japanese islands in August 1998, Japan and the United States issued a statement on cooperation in the development of missile defense systems.⁶ In the same year, Japan decided to create its own satellites. On August 16, 1999, Japan and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the study of technical aspects of the deployment of missile defense systems in the naval theater of Operations (Theater of Operations).7

Largely influenced by the North Korean problem, Tokyo decided in 2003 to deploy a national missile defense system (ABM) and develop its own military satellites.

* Self-Defense Forces - the armed forces of Japan after World War II (author's note).

** The six-party talks are attended by: Russia, China, the United States, Japan, North Korea and South Korea (author's note).

To better understand aspects of Japan's military space program, it is necessary to refer to its conceptual framework and consider the development process.

JAPAN'S APPROACH TO USING SPACE FOR MILITARY PURPOSES

The use of outer space was regulated by a decision of the Japanese Parliament of May 9, 1969, according to which it was permitted exclusively for peaceful purposes.⁸ In the interpretation of Tokyo 1985, the term "peaceful" meant "non-military". This precluded the use by the Self - Defense Forces of satellites that are not used for their intended purpose-commercial or scientific.⁹ This situation corresponded to the principles of Japan's defense policy of the post-war period: the space program was mainly aimed at implementing the achievements of scientific and technological progress.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the Government began funding research on satellite technologies for military applications. But the situation began to change significantly only since 1998-after the flight of a North Korean missile over Japan on August 31.

Tokyo has announced its intention to begin" information gathering " development of a network of domestically produced satellites that will be used by the Defense Directorate* and the Self-Defense Forces to protect Japan from new threats.¹⁰ In fact, they were talking about military satellites, but the Government used the terms "intelligence" or "military" instead of the terms"information gathering satellites"and" multi-purpose satellites".

The Department of Defense could not depend solely on intelligence received from the United States, since there was a risk of erroneous interception of missiles aimed at non-Japanese territories. In this case, Japan's actions would contradict its interpretation of the right to collective self-defense, which prohibits the use of force to defend other countries, which is tantamount to violating the Constitution. In addition, due to the increased participation of the Self-Defense Forces in international operations outside Japan (UN peacekeeping missions, US military campaigns, the fight against maritime piracy), there was a need for their own sources of information and communication. The Japanese solved these problems by launching their first satellites into orbit in March 2003.

On May 28, 2008, the Parliament approved the draft law, and on August 27, the "Basic Law on Space" entered into force. Among other things, the law concerned the military sphere, namely, the use of outer space for national security purposes. It is the first time that the term "safety" is mentioned in an official document in relation to space exploration. Accordingly, the defense establishment was given the right to participate in the development, procurement and management of space systems. It was supposed to expand the range of tasks performed, including military use.

Thus, one of the main goals of this law was to remove bans on the use of space technologies for military purposes. A Strategic Development Headquarters was established in the Cabinet of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister. The "Basic Law on Outer Space" actually changed the interpretation of the concept of "peaceful purposes" from "non-military" to "non-aggressive", i.e. "non-offensive, defensive", which corresponded to world practice.

Article 2 of the Law established that Japan will conduct space research in accordance with the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, and in accordance with the principles and spirit of the Constitution of Japan.¹¹ The document emphasizes the need for Japan to continue active space exploration in order to ensure national security and the security of the international community, and the right of the Japanese Government to take appropriate measures.¹²

In other words, the law authorized the use of space-based systems specifically for national security purposes, as well as the further development of a network of intelligence satellites. The law does not prohibit the Self-Defense Forces from producing and using their own satellites to support military operations, including operating missile defense systems: developing high-resolution spy satellites, satellites for tracking ballistic missile launches, and early detection and warning satellites.

Based on the" Basic Law on Space", the" Basic Plan of Space Policy " was published on June 2, 2009 - the first comprehensive national strategy of Japan in this area: development of networks of meteorological, communication, navigation satellites, as well as tracking and surveillance satellites. At the same time, the Government pledged to pursue an exclusively defensive policy "in accordance with the pacifist principles of the Japanese Constitution"^.13

On January 25, 2013, the updated "Basic Plan" was approved - it justified the priority of ensuring national security. Space technologies have become one of the most important means of monitoring the sea and air space of Japan and the surrounding territories. To the Ministry of Education and Science-

* Department of Defense - a public administration body in the field of defense in Japan, which received the status of a ministry in 2007 (author's note).

rona was required to improve satellite surveillance and intelligence facilities, in particular, the construction of a new communication satellite for the Self-Defense Forces ^during FY201514.

A serious obstacle in the development of outer space is "space debris". A large number of such objects ended up in low-Earth orbit after China's experimental destruction of its artificial satellite in January 2007 and as a result of the collision of American and Russian satellites in February 2009.

According to NASA, there are currently more than 500,000 objects of various sizes in Earth orbit related to "garbage" ¹⁵. It is expected that their number will increase, so this problem requires appropriate attention. For this formal reason, Japan decided to create the above-mentioned special military unit.

The Ministry of Defense cooperates with the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency to improve domestic satellite technologies for military applications. One example is the plan included in the Defense Ministry's draft budget for FY2015 for the joint development of satellite-mounted infrared sensors designed to detect incoming ballistic missiles. The plan runs until 2024, and the stated cost of the project is more than $40 million.¹⁶

To date, the main problem of the Japanese military space industry is the lack of necessary resources, primarily budget ones. Established in 1976, the military budget limit of 1% of GDP obliges the Ministry of Defense to limit spending on space development. This problem is partly solved with the help of dual-use technologies, i.e. the achievements of the civilian space industry are used for military purposes. For example, early detection systems can detect both ballistic missile launches and forest fire sources ¹⁷.

The military space program in Japan is becoming increasingly important, private development companies are being attracted, and cooperation with the United States continues. It is no exaggeration to say that the strategy for space exploration and use is based on national security interests.

JAPANESE MILITARY SATELLITES IN EARTH ORBIT

The Defense Department, without having its own satellites, acquired satellite data from the United States and France until 2003. Since 1985, in cooperation with NASA, Japan has provided data from the Landsat satellite, and since 1987-from the Spot satellite of the French National Center for Space Research18. Due to the lack of accuracy of the images obtained (the resolution of the American and French satellites was 30 and 10 m, respectively), the Government of Japan in 1998 began funding research in the field of remote sensing technologies, including satellite ones.

At the initial stage of the program, it was planned to launch four high-resolution satellites with a total cost of more than $1.7 billion. manufactured by Mitsubishi Electric Corporation: two optical and two radar cameras equipped with equipment with a resolution of 1-3 m ¹⁹.

On March 28, 2003, Japan successfully launched its first military satellites. Two tracking satellites were delivered into orbit by a Japanese H-PA launch vehicle from the Tanegashima Island launch center. Another , on November 29, 2003, was unsuccessful due to problems with the launch vehicle. The next pair of satellites were put into orbit in September 2006 and ^February 2007.20 The orbital grouping made it possible to determine the models of aircraft, missiles, ships and even armored vehicles day and night in conditions of continuous cloud cover.

Japanese satellites are also used for scientific purposes, but the Japanese do not hide the fact that their main tasks are related to national security. Its own satellites provide Japan with the ability to receive data on the territories of interest to it and track missile launches, primarily by North Korea.

It is known that the Japanese conducted observations of North Korean facilities, including the Yongbyon nuclear complex, and missile launchers in Musudanri. It was also reported that satellites were photographing Russian, Chinese and Middle Eastern military installations ²¹.

A new generation of Japanese satellites was launched in November 2009, September and December 2011, and January 2013. ²²

The implementation of Japan's military space program began with the help of the United States. However, the Japanese preferred not to buy entire satellites, limiting themselves to importing components. Since 1999, on the basis of intergovernmental agreements, American development companies have supplied auxiliary systems and components to the Japanese. In March 1999, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation received a contract to develop the first satellites and still maintains a leading position in the Japanese space technology market.

The high rate of development of the Japanese military space industry can be explained by the presence of the technological potential of the civilian space program and the use of key dual-use elements.

As noted above, direct

Funding for the military segment of Japan's space program began only in 1998. Prior to this, budget funds were allocated for the civil and military components with a total amount not exceeding $2 billion. The situation gradually leveled off, the amount of deductions for the development of the military component in the period from 2000 to 2003. they averaged about $570 million a year. In recent years, this amount has been kept in the range of $500-600 million per year23, i.e., it has reached approximately 1% of Japan's defense budget.

The main item of expenditure is research and development. Efforts are being made to improve technologies: increase image clarity, increase compactness and maneuverability, and reduce the mass of satellites. In the coming years, it is expected to produce a new generation of satellites with improved characteristics, with a resolution of up to 0.4 m instead of 0.6.

The Ministry of Defense of Japan included in the draft budget for FY2015 about $3 billion in missile defense-related expenditures, of which $2.6 billion is expected to be spent on the development of the space component (for comparison, the Defense Ministry's spending on missile defense in FY2014 amounted to $590 million, and on space research - $531 million) ²⁴.

Formally linking the development of satellite technologies with research on improving missile defense allows Tokyo to avoid strict restrictions, since missile defense systems are not subject to a ban on the transfer of military technologies.

In December 2004, when announcing the adoption of a new National Defense Program, the Japanese Government stated that the 1976 principles prohibiting arms exports do not apply to missile defense projects. Moreover, Tokyo reserved the right to make such a decision on issues other than missile defense: "Decisions will be made on the basis of individual consideration of each case in accordance with the basic principles of Japan, which is a peaceful country that avoids international conflicts." ²⁵

The research entered an active phase after reports of North Korea resuming its nuclear program in October 2002. By June 2003, it became known that Pyongyang had solved the problem of practical use of nuclear weapons (creating a smaller warhead)26. This meant that the Nodong-1 missile, tested in 1993, could be used as a means of delivering a warhead to the territory of Japan, since its flight range is 1000-1300 km27.

On December 19, 2003, the Secretary of the Cabinet of Ministers of Japan issued a government statement "On the deployment of missile defense systems and other measures", which emphasized that missile defense is an exclusively defensive measure that complies with the principles of Japan's defense policy and cannot negatively affect stability in the region. In addition, Japan will make decisions on an independent basis and will not use missile defense systems for the defense of other States, which excludes the possibility of violating its ban on collective self-defense.²⁸

In order to avoid criticism of the opposition, as well as accusations of violating this ban by potentially using Japan's missile defense systems to protect American territories, the Cabinet Legislative Bureau prepared an expanded interpretation, according to which intercepting a missile that is "highly likely aimed at Japan would be justified from the point of view of the right to self-defense"²⁹. The interpretation of the right to self-defense concerned the exchange of operational information with the United States. According to a statement from the Legislative Bureau, " the exchange of intelligence between our countries is necessary to ensure Japan's security. This does not mean gathering information to support U.S. military operations. " ³⁰

The decision to cooperate in the development of missile defense systems, including satellite ones, was supported by the Japanese defense industry. Members of the Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) urged the government that restrictions on arms exports and technology exchanges should be lifted so that the Japanese military-industrial complex could have access to the latest developments in this area, i.e. open up new markets for Japanese business, including dual-use technologies.³¹ Under the licensing agreements, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries developed the nose cones of rockets, Ishi-kawajima-Harima Heavy Industries-rocket engines, and Fuji Heavy Industries-infrared radars. Kinetic warheads and radars were manufactured in ^the United States32. Thus, Japanese-American military-technical cooperation extended to missile defense and satellite systems.

RESULTS AND PROSPECTS

The active phase of Japan's military space program is relatively short, starting in 1998.

The development of military technologies in North Korea, the crown of which is the nuclear missile potential, is considered the most serious security threat in Japan. On April 1, 2013, the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK adopted the "Law on Space Exploration" and approved a resolution establishing a responsible agency. Thus, according to experts of the National Institute of Defense Studies of Japan, a legal framework was drawn up that allows continuing the development of military technologies under the pretext of mastering

outer space ³³. They draw attention to the fact that North Korea's success in developing long-range missiles contributes to the improvement of short-and medium-range missiles, which poses a direct threat to Japan.

When evaluating China's space activities, it should be taken into account that many active satellites are used for military purposes. Back in 2008, experts from various countries claimed that Chinese intelligence satellites function under the guise of civilian satellites - mobile communications and telecommunications. In addition, there is a possibility that the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) operates navigation systems and a network of 4 optical and 4 radar reconnaissance satellites launched in 2006-2010. Presumably, China uses the data obtained with their help to position cruise missiles that have already entered service with the PLA ³⁴.

Of course, the active development of Japan's military space activities is hindered by problems based on legal restrictions that affect the real budget figures. This is partly solved by the possibility of dual use of space technologies, which also avoids public protests by the Japanese public, which is sensitive to military issues.

Japan, like other major countries in the region, is focused on creating modern mobile armed forces that are capable of solving regional and global problems. This contributes to the development of the military component of its space activities.

¹ Boei-sho, hatsu no uchu kanshi butai sosetsu e 5-nen-go medo, joho wa Amerika ni teikyo (The Ministry of Defense will create the first space forces in 5 years, information will be transmitted to the United States) / / Kyodo Tsushin. 03.08.2014 - http://www.47news.jp/CN/201408/ CN2014080201001617.html

^{Kireeva A. A.} 2 The Japanese-Chinese dispute: Senkaku or Diaoyu? // Asia and Africa today. 2013, N 10, pp. 2-9; N 11, pp. 18-26. (Kireeva A. A. Yapono-kitayskiy spor: Senkaku ili Dyaoyuidao? // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. 2013. N 10, 11) (in Russian)

³ Nichibei, kaiyo kanshi de hatsu no kijo enhu Chugoku no Senkaku katsudo haikei eisei joho kyoyu e (Japan and the United States conducted the first naval exercises to test satellite data transmission against the background of Chinese activity near the Senkaku Islands) / / Kyodo Tsushin. 27.03.2014 - http://www.47news.jp/47topics/e/251874.php

^{4. Grinyuk V. A.} 4 Japan-North Korea: a painful point of relations / / Asia and Africa today. 2012, N 9, с. 35 - 39; N 10, с. 41 - 44. (Grinyuk V.A. Yaponiya-KNDR: bolevaya tochka otnosheniy // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. 2012. N 9. 10) (in Russian)

⁵ Chronology of North Korean missile launches. Dossier / / ITAR-TASS. 03.07.2014 - http://itar-tass.com/info/1296095

⁶ U.S., Japan Agree to Study Missile Defense // Washington Times. 21 September 1998.

⁷ U.S., Japan To Ink Missile-Defense Deal // Defense Week. 26 July 1999.

⁸ Resolution concerning the fundamentals of space development and exploitation by Japan. House of Representatives, 9 May 1969 // Defense of Japan 1987. Tokyo: Defense Agency, 1987. Appendix 22.

⁹ The utilization of satellites for "peaceful purposes" by Self-Defense Forces, as defined by Diet resolution. Budget Committee of the House of Representatives, 6 February 1985 // Defense of Japan 1987... Appendix 23.

¹⁰ Cabinet Approves Plan to Launch Spy Satellites // Kyodo News Agency, 22 December 1998.

¹¹ Uchu kihon-ho (Heisei 20-nen 5 tsuki 28-nichi horitsudai yonjusan-go) (Basic Law on Space, May 28, 2008, N 43). Article 2 / / Shugiin (House of Representatives of the Parliament of Japan)- http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_housei.nsf/html/housei/kaijil6 9_l.htm

¹² Ibid. Articles 3 and 4.

¹³ Basic Plan for Space Policy: Wisdom of Japan Moves Space. Tokyo: Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy. 2 June 2009, p. 2.

¹⁴ Basic Plan for Space Policy... 25 January 2013, p. 7 - 8.

¹⁵ Space Debris and Human Spacecraft // NASA. September 27, 2013 - http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_ debris.html

¹⁶ Eisei tosai-gata 2 hacho sekigaisen sensa no kenkyu. Heisei 26-nendo jizen no jigyo hyoka (Research of two-wavelength infrared sensors for satellites. Project assessment for the period after FY2014) / / Boei-sho (Ministry of Defense of Japan) http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/hyouka/seisaku/results/26/pdf/jizen _16 honbun. pdf

¹⁷ Basic Plan for Space Policy... 2009, p. 37.

^Taoka 18 5. Japan's Turning Point Toward Spy Satellites and Information Independence. Decision Made To Launch Satellites in Four Years// Aera. 11 January 1999, p. 46 - 50.

^{Radcliffe W.W.} 19 Origins and Current State of Japan's Reconnaissance Satellite Program (U) // Studies in Intelligence. 2010. Vol. 54, No. 3.

²⁰ Japanese rocket puts spy spacecraft into orbit // Spaceflight Now.

24 February 2007 - http://www.spaceflightnow.com/news/n0702/ 24h2aigs/; Japan Launches Its 4th Spy Satellite // The New York Times.

25 February 2007 - http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/25/world/ asia/25japan.html?_r=0

²¹ Japan's 'Spy' Satellites Start 'Full-Fledged' Photo Surveillance Over DPRK // Asahi Shimbun. 6 September 2003.

²² Government to build backup intelligence satellite // The Daily Yomiuri. 10 October 2010; Japan launches spy satellite under veil of secrecy // Spaceflight Now. 28 November 2009.

^{Hulsroj P., Pagkratis S., Baranes B.} 23 Yearbook on Space Policy 2010/2011: The Forward Look. Vienna: Springer Science & Business Media. 2013, p. 69.

²⁴ Defense Programs and Budget of Japan. Overview of FY 2015 Budget Request. Tokyo: Ministry of Defense of Japan. 2014, p. 12, 14.

²⁵ Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, 10 December 2004 // The Official Website of the Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet -http://japan.kantei.go.jp/tyokan/2004/1210statement_e.html

²⁶ U.S. told Japan that North Korea has several nuclear warheads // Agence France Presse. 21 June 2003.

²⁷ Center for Nonproliferation Studies Special Report on North Korean Ballistic Missile Capabilities. 22 March 2006, p. 10.

²⁸ Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, 19 December 2003 // The Official Website of the Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet -http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2003/1219danwa_e.html

²⁹ Ishiba: Japan to "counterattack" if N.Korea prepares to attack // Yomiuri Shimbun. 25 January 2003.

³⁰ Successful missile defense requires close U.S. support // Yomiuri Shimbun. 29 March 2004.

³¹ Kongo no boei-ryoku seibi no arikata ni tsuite - boei seisan gijutsu kiban no kyoka ni mukete (On Defense technologies in the future: towards strengthening the defense industry and technological base). Tokyo: Nippon Keizai Dantai Rengokai. 20 July 2004 / / Nihonkeizaidantairengokai (Japan Business Federation) https://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2004/063.html Wagakuni no kihonmondai o kangaeru-korekara no Nihon o tenbo shite (Reflecting on Japan's Major Problems: Japan's Future Prospects)... 18 January 2005 // Nihonkeizaidantairengokai... http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2005/002/

³² Aviation week and space technology. 2 December 2004. P. 10; Asahi Shimbun. 17 July 2005; Sankei Shimbun, 20 July 2005.

³³ East Asian Strategic Review 2014. Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies. 2014, p. 78.

³⁴ East Asian Strategic Review 2008... 2008, p. 24.

Permanent link to this publication: