I. P. LEBEDEVA

Doctor of Economics, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

Keywords: Japan, society, middle class, non-standard social groups, social inequality

Until the early 1990s, among highly developed countries, Japan was characterized by a fairly uniform distribution of the fruits of economic development among various segments of the population. Thanks to the high rates of economic growth in the 1950s-1960s and the very successful development in the 1970s-1980s, not only did the standard of living of the population rapidly increase, but conditions were also created that provided access to the benefits of modern civilization for the vast majority of the country's citizens.

According to public opinion polls, since the late 1960s, more than 90% of Japanese consider themselves to be middle class in terms of consumption (7% - to the lower strata, about 1% - to the upper)¹. These subjective assessments by citizens of the country of their situation are also statistically confirmed. In order to reliably assess how much differentiation there is in society in terms of current income, economics uses the Gini coefficient, which shows the degree to which the actual distribution of income among different segments of the population deviates from the theoretically absolutely equal distribution (the higher it is, the higher the degree of stratification). In Japan, this ratio was not only one of the lowest among developed countries, but also remained almost stable (1965 - 0,300, 1975 - 0,300, 1980 -0,273, 1985 - 0,292, 1990 - 0,305, 1995 - 0,311, 2000 - 0,313)².

BUILDING A WELFARE STATE

It should be emphasized that this situation is to a considerable extent

This was the result of a deliberate policy of the Japanese Liberal Democrats, who have been in power for more than half a century. Back in the mid-1950s, in the first program documents, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) declared its goal to be "building a welfare state" and consistently pursued its implementation, using a wide variety of economic policy tools. Without being able to elaborate on this topic, here are just a few examples.

Thus, in order to redistribute national income in favor of the less affluent segments of the population, a progressive system of taxation of personal income was introduced, and very high inheritance tax rates were established. Personal income tax rates have been 10% for the lowest income earners and 37% for the highest income earners (since 2007). they became 5% and 40%, respectively). At the same time, various discounts and deductions from the tax base were applied for dependents, disabled people, etc. As for the inheritance tax system, it is designed in such a way that the recipients of the largest fortunes (their lower limits are determined separately for each type of inheritance) must pay the state up to 50% of the value of inherited property.³

State support for certain sectors and sectors of the national economy also played an important role in ensuring access to the fruits of economic prosperity for the general population. The most striking example in this area is support for domestic agriculture. Thanks to the system of guaranteed purchase prices (which for a long time were set at the level of costs of the least efficient producers), protectionist policies, as well as a number of other measures (starting with preferential financing of farms and ending with assistance in mastering new production technologies), it became possible not only to preserve domestic agriculture as a branch of the economy, but also increasing the income of the Japanese peasantry, and as a result-erasing the differences in the standard of living between urban and rural populations.

The Government's policy towards small businesses also served the purpose of more equitable distribution of the fruits of economic development. Realizing how important the role of this sector is in the development of entrepreneurship and maintaining socio-political stability, as well as taking into account the fact that in terms of access to financial resources, provision of qualified personnel, opportunities for scientific and technological development, etc., small enterprises are much inferior to large companies, from the first years of their stay in power, the Liberal Democrats began to provide comprehensive support to small businesses ⁴.

Without going into details, we will only note that thanks to this policy, thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises, which in the conditions of fierce market competition, most likely, would have ceased to exist, were able to stay "afloat", rationalize their business or switch to a new field of activity, and, consequently, get their share "pie".

A significant part of measures within the framework of the system of administrative and legal regulations, a form of state regulation that was very widely used in Japan, was also aimed at limiting the elements of the market, protecting the weak from its destructive forces. Here is just one example from this area. By administratively limiting the opening hours of large restaurants (for example, until 22.00 or 23.00), customers who want to continue their vacation were "redirected" to other establishments of the restaurant business (cafes, bars, karaoke clubs, etc.) so that the owners of the latter could also take advantage of the willingness of the growing population to spend more and more money on leisure activities outside the house.

It is obvious that a fairly uniform distribution of the fruits of economic prosperity among different segments of the population has become the material basis for the formation of a middle-class society in the country. But no less important was the fact that in parallel there was a gradual erasure of horizontal partitions separating different strata of society in terms of social status.

This was made possible by ensuring access of the general population to quality education (including university education), the high position of labor (including heavy physical labor) in the Japanese value system, the purposeful efforts of Japanese management to improve the status of ordinary employees of companies (within the framework of the so-called lifetime hiring system ⁵), etc. the Japanese nation has an egalitarian consciousness that does not encourage the display of wealth, the display of personal achievements, the emphasis on a higher position in society, etc.

Thus, in the late 1980s. Japan was almost a model of a "middle-class society": the absolute majority of citizens were quite satisfied with their financial situation and social status and had a fairly confident view of the future. At the same time, unlike other highly developed countries, Japan did not know many acute social problems, such as unemployment or homelessness. The unemployment rate in the country was about 1-1.5% (i.e., it was within the statistical margin of error), and there was practically no such phenomenon as homelessness.

ECONOMIC DEPRESSION AND CHANGES IN THE LABOR MARKET

However, with the entry into the 1990s, the situation began to change. The fact is that the 1990s and 2000s were a very difficult period for Japan. The collapse of the "soap bubble" economy (a specific mechanism of growth-

the crisis based on speculation in land, real estate and securities), which occurred in late 1990, plunged the country into a deep depression that lasted for almost two decades. At the same time, under the pressure of internal and external circumstances, quite radical reforms were carried out in the country, which significantly changed the Japanese economic system, making it more competitive and open, but at the same time more rigid.

The sharp slowdown in economic growth and the restructuring of the country's economic system have affected various aspects of Japanese society, giving rise to a number of rather painful, previously unknown social phenomena.

First of all, it should be noted that the country's unemployment rate has increased markedly - from 2.1% in 1990, it rose to 4.9% in 2000 and 5.1% in 2010 (in recent years it has slightly decreased - to 4.3 - 4.6%). At the same time, the young population of the labor force, for which there was previously an increased demand in the labor market, was particularly affected. For example, the share of unemployed men aged 15 to 24 years rose from 4.5% in 1990 to 10.2% in 2000 and 10.4% in 2010, and among men aged 25 to 34 years - from 1.8% to 5% and 6.6%, respectively. In absolute terms, the number of unemployed in Japan in the last decade was about 2.8-3.3 million people.⁶

In the 1990s and 2000s, the situation of small and medium-sized businesses in the country noticeably worsened. In addition to the sluggish economic environment, the situation was aggravated by such a phenomenon as kudoka, which in Japanese means "devastation", "emasculation". This term in Japan refers to the export of production of various types of industrial products abroad, especially increased during the depression years. The leaders of Kudok are large mechanical engineering companies (primarily automotive and electrical engineering).

Thus, in recent years, foreign enterprises of Japanese companies have already produced about 40% of automotive products (in terms of cost), about 2/3 of electronics products, 75-80% of household electrical engineering products, etc. ⁷ Since more than half of all small and medium-sized enterprises in the Japanese manufacturing industry were subcontractors of large companies, the narrowing of the base of subcontracting works in the country, due to the export of production abroad, the number of small and medium - sized industrial firms significantly decreased-from 426.5 thousand in 1991 to 213.2 thousand in 2012, i.e. by half.⁸ In the economy as a whole, the number of individual entrepreneurs and owners of small and medium-sized enterprises decreased from 8.78 million in 1990 ^{to 7.31 million in 2000 and 5.59 million in 2012.9}

Another consequence of the prolonged depression was changes in the demand for labor in the Japanese labor market, which led to a sharp decline in the share of full-time employees in the structure of employment, and, accordingly, to an increase in the share of non-permanent employees (temporary workers, part-time employees, contract workers, etc.). If in 1990 the share of the first category in the total number of self - employed people was about 80%, and the second - about 20%, then in 2012-62% and 38%, respectively. At the same time, from the point of view of social consequences, it was not only and not so much a significant increase in the number of non-permanent workers (from 8.825 million in 1990 to 21.153 million in ^2012.10) that was of fundamental importance, but a qualitative change in the composition of this category.

Previously, high school students, students, and housewives were mostly employed in non-permanent jobs, i.e., people who did not have this job as their main occupation or main source of livelihood. However, since the beginning of the 1990s, the composition of this category has gradually changed, and now its backbone consists of young people who have completed their education but have not found a permanent job, women who have raised children and want to return to full-fledged work, employees who were dismissed due to age or in connection with the reorganization of the company, etc. And for the vast majority of them, working on a non-permanent basis is both the main type of employment and the main source of income.

As you know, in all developed countries there are permanent and non-permanent forms of employment. This is due to the increasing servisization of their economies (in particular, with the rapid development of the individual services market), which objectively expands the need for various types of flexible forms of employment, with the appearance in different industries of types of work that do not require high qualifications, but only follow instructions (for which temporary workers are quite suitable).), with increased attention of governments and the public in developed countries to ensuring a balance of interests between work and family responsibilities for both women and men, etc.

However, in Japan, the situation in this area is very specific. First, the share of non-permanent employees in the total number of employees is significantly higher here than in other countries. So, if in Japan it is more than 38%, then in most European countries it is from 15 to 20%¹¹. Second, in no other country is there such a deep divide between the status of permanent and non-permanent workers as in Japan. This applies to remuneration, opportunities for professional development and, consequently, promotion, the scope of social guarantees, and the social status of the employee as a whole.

As for wages, the national average for non-permanent employees is about 60% of the salary of permanent employees, and in large companies-a little more than half ¹². It is characteristic that the wage gap between these two categories

The number of employees still exists, despite the fact that the Law on Non-Permanent Employment was adopted in 2007, which prohibited discrimination in the remuneration of non-permanent employees, based on the principle of "equal pay for equal work".

The fact is that when determining an employee's salary, Japanese companies take into account not only the results of labor, but also the labor process itself, the quality of which depends on the employee's experience, professional knowledge, creative abilities, discipline, responsibility, etc. Obviously, in this approach, the difference in pay between permanent and non-permanent employees can always be explained by differences in the quality of their work, and in a broader sense - in their potential.

Equally important is the deep divide between these two categories of employees in terms of professional development opportunities. In addition to guarantees of long - term employment (until they reach the so-called age limit, which in most companies is now 60 years old) and salary increases (previously almost annual), permanent employees of Japanese companies are also guaranteed access to the professional development system based on in-house training.

The amount of skills and knowledge that an employee acquires in the course of internal training depends on both the speed of their career advancement and the steepness of the salary increase scale. However, for non-permanent employees, this system is not available, because their very position in the company - fragile, short-term-makes it pointless to train them, which also requires huge financial costs. Since, unlike other developed countries, Japan has virtually no professional development system outside of in-house training, non-permanent employees are essentially deprived of professional development opportunities and are forced to settle for low-profile, low-paying jobs.

However, almost the main dividing line between permanent and non-permanent workers in Japan is the difference in their social status. The system of lifelong employment mentioned above has become not only a model of labor management in Japanese companies, but also has had a strong impact on the value system and lifestyle of several post-war generations of Japanese people.

The status of a permanent employee, with its guarantees of long-term employment, promotion and salary increases, has become particularly valuable. It was associated with the idea of a safe, predictable life for both employees and their families, and allowed them to make plans for many years to come and consistently implement them. It is clear that the status of a non-permanent employee, with unstable employment and low wages, was incomparably lower.

Thus, the rise in unemployment, the impoverishment of thousands of small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, and the dramatic expansion of non-permanent employment over the past two decades have significantly transformed the previously fairly flat landscape of Japanese society, drawing very deep lines of social stratification. But at the same time, there was a significant change in the overall socio-psychological atmosphere in the country: even in those strata of society whose situation remained quite prosperous, feelings of stability and confidence in the future were replaced by very pessimistic moods, a sense of instability and uncertainty.

UNUSUAL YOUTH

One of the manifestations of the change in the general socio-psychological atmosphere was the emergence of all sorts of non-standard, unusual for Japan, groups of the population, whose lifestyle and value orientations sharply contrast with generally accepted norms and ideas. This is especially true for Japanese youth.

The changes that have taken place in the country have affected, first of all, the situation of young people. This is due to a number of features of the Japanese labor market, which were formed during the period of high growth rates, but still remain important today.

One of the distinctive features of the lifetime hiring system is that Japanese companies have always preferred to hire only "fresh" (i.e., those who have no experience in other firms) graduates of schools and universities (the first - in blue - collar positions, the second-in white-collar positions) for permanent employees. Until the economic turmoil of the 1990s and 2000s, the system worked almost smoothly, and every year on April 1 (which marks the beginning of the fiscal year in Japan), tens of thousands of young people were hired permanently by private companies and government agencies. Although small and medium-sized firms did not have such a comprehensive system of lifelong employment as large ones, the status of a permanent employee also allowed us to count on a quiet, prosperous life.

It should be particularly noted that under the influence of the lifetime employment system, Japanese youth have developed stable ideas about what life success and a successful career are. The standard of success in life was the career of a sarariman (from the English salary man) - a permanent employee of a large company or government institution. To become a sarariman, one had to graduate from one of the most prestigious universities, and in order to successfully pass through the "examination hell" and enter it, one had to show diligence and perseverance in their studies, using the opportunities not only for school, but also for various types of extracurricular education.

It is noteworthy that in practice this model turned out to be up to-

it is useful for a very wide range of young people. Thus, among young men who graduated from school in 1976-1985, more than 30% were able to become Sararimans at the end of the university, and among graduates of 1986-1995 - 40%. In addition, in both cases, about a quarter of young people were able to realize this "Japanese dream" to some extent by getting white-collar jobs in medium-sized and small firms. ¹³ Finally, blue - collar employees of large companies, and even some ordinary employees of small ones, could count on a career similar to sarariman's. small and medium-sized companies.

However, with the introduction of the 1990s, the situation in the field of permanent employment of graduates of secondary and higher educational institutions began to change. If in 1990 the number of employed graduates of secondary and higher-level schools (age group-15-19 years) If the number of graduates of colleges and universities (aged 20-24 years) was 678 thousand, and the number of graduates of colleges and universities (aged 20-24 years) was about 530 thousand, then by 2012 these figures decreased, respectively, to 182 thousand and 476 thousand people. In other words, 550,000 fewer young people were able to find permanent employment in 2012 than in 1990,14 In recent years, the share of non-permanent employment among young people aged 15-24 who completed their education was already about 1/3 15.

In Japan, failure to get a permanent job immediately after graduation has far-reaching consequences, because due to the above-mentioned features of the hiring practice of Japanese companies (i.e., their preference for "fresh" graduates), the chances of getting a permanent job for those who have already failed once are extremely low. As a result, at the very beginning of life, Japanese youth are divided into two categories:: the lucky ones who were able to get a full-time job and have the right to expect a calm, predictable and prosperous life, and the losers who are forced to settle for various forms of non-permanent employment. Moreover, as you get older, the differences in the position of these two categories of young people will become more and more noticeable. This applies to the level of income, social status, lifestyle, and life plans.

The consequences of such a sharp division are especially painful for young men. After all, until now in Japan, the status of a permanent employee, not to mention the status of a sarariman, is associated with ideas not only about life success, but also about a real male character. It is considered that the holder of this status is purposeful, determined, persistent in overcoming difficulties, has a developed sense of duty towards the family and society. Fickle employment in relation to young men is still perceived as a kind of deviation from the norm, from the generally accepted way of life, and they themselves are not persistent enough, immature and irresponsible. Such a public perception of this category of young people has become one of the reasons for the noticeable decline in the number of marriages concluded in the country in recent years, as Japanese girls do not want to connect their lives with such unreliable and unpromising men.

According to Japanese statistics, in 2012, out of 15.5 million young people of both sexes aged 15 to 34 who were employed, 10.6 million (68%) were permanent employees, and 4.9 million (32%) were non - permanent employees ^.16

To refer to the second category of young people in Japan, a special word was even invented - Freeters (Freeters is a combination of English Free and German Arbeiter). Freeters are young people of both sexes between the ages of 15 and 34 who are not students or students of educational institutions or housewives (in the case of married women) and work on a non-permanent basis.¹⁷

The composition of fritters is extremely diverse, and, of course, not all of them are burdened by their position. A certain part of them is represented by those who tried to find a permanent job immediately after graduation, but failed and are forced to settle for a non-permanent job. Among the freeters, there are also young people who do not want to entangle their lives with the restrictions and obligations imposed by full-time work, and, while being content with temporary work, expect to fully realize their potential in such areas as art, theater, animation, computer games, etc.

But there is also a special group of freeters - the so-called parasaito singuru, or parasite singles. This term was coined in the late 1990s by the well-known Japanese sociologist Masahiro Yamada to refer to a new category of young people in Japan, namely: working only occasionally (in order to obtain funds for entertainment and pocket expenses), living together with their parents and completely depending on them to meet their daily needs. needs. And these are the majority of freeters.

Of course, it would be an oversimplification to assume that freeters appeared in Japan only as a result of changes in the labor market. Among the reasons for the rapid increase in their number, we can also mention the growing welfare of Japanese families, the increasing diversification of life styles and preferences of Japanese people, and the increasing influence of Western culture and Western values on the behavioral attitudes of young people, etc., but, in our opinion, economic factors still played a decisive role.

An even more unusual group of young people in Japan that emerged in the 1990s and 2000s was the so-called nitto, or NEETs (Not in Education, Employment or Training).

According to the definition of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare of Japan, nitto are young people between the ages of 15 and 34 who are not engaged in anything - neither study, nor work, nor professional retraining (in other words, idlers). In the last ten years

the number of this group ranged from 600 to 640 thousand people, and the scale of this phenomenon increases with increasing age.

So, according to data for 2011, out of 600 thousand nitto 90 thousand. they belonged to the age group of 15-19 years, 150 thousand-to the category of 20-24 years, and 180 thousand each - to the categories of 25-29 years and 30-34 years. However, according to the same ministry, there are also older nitto: among Japanese people of both sexes aged 35 to 39, there are about 200 thousand such people.¹⁸ At the same time, the social composition of nitto gradually changed: if in the early 1990s, when the impact of the depression was not yet fully manifested, the main part of this group consisted of people from well-off families who relied on the financial resources of their parents, then in subsequent years children from poor families who dropped out of school but did not they started working because they couldn't find a job with good earnings.

Together with the parasitic loners, Nitto make up the bulk of consumers of the Japanese "dream industry" products-anime¹⁹, computer games, etc., which allows them to realize their dreams in the virtual world. In this environment, a special group of young people has also formed that causes the greatest concern among Japanese sociologists - the so-called Hikikomori, which means recluses in Japanese.

Hikikomori are young people who, for various reasons, avoid participating in society (whether it is studying, working, including temporary work, volunteering, socializing outside the family, etc.). They prefer to spend time at home (mostly in their room), and even if they occasionally leave their shelter (for example, to make some purchases in the nearest conbini-a small shop that works around the clock), they try not to come into contact with anyone. The following figures speak eloquently about the scale of this problem. According to the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, there are about 260 thousand families in Japan with children who lead a Hikikomori^.20

Thus, under the influence of the difficult economic situation of the 1990s-2000s and the growing public pessimism about the future of the country, a kind of polarization occurred among Japanese youth. At one extreme are young people who have managed to get a permanent job and who, like their parents, can expect a prosperous, peaceful life for many years to come.

At the other extreme are those who, for various reasons, have found themselves outside the sphere of permanent employment, and, consequently, beyond the limits of a calm, prosperous life. The number of this category is about 5.5 million people (4.9 million - freeters, 600 thousand-nitto), i.e. it is very significant. As mentioned above, it is in this environment that groups of young people are formed, whose lifestyle and value system sharply contrast with the ideas of a normal life, a successful career, etc. that are ingrained in the public consciousness.

The existence of these groups of "non-standard" young people not only causes many problems for their parents, but also represents a serious social problem, especially in the light of the rapid aging of the country's population, the decline in the number of people of working age, the decline in the birth rate, the reduction in the number of marriages, etc.

"NON-STANDARD" ADULTS

However, the Japanese, whose lifestyle does not correspond to the generally accepted ideas, can be found in other age cohorts. Of course, the most odious group is the homeless, who stand out especially sharply against the background of ordinary Japanese - fit, well-dressed, neatly combed hair.

Compared to other countries, there are not many homeless people in Japan - about 25 thousand people, but they are concentrated in large cities, so it is impossible not to notice them. This group consists mainly of middle-aged men (aged 50-60 years), among whom there are ruined entrepreneurs, losers who came to the city from the provinces, but never managed to realize themselves, and unemployed, and just sick people. In 2002, Japan passed a law providing assistance to these people from local social security agencies (providing them with housing, food, clothing, employment assistance, etc.), but so far this phenomenon has not been eradicated. ²¹

But a much more serious social problem is presented by another group of the adult population - the so-called unemployed singles (koritsuh muge). The term was coined by the Japanese sociologist Yuji Genda, who published a book of the same name in 2013. According to Y. Gand's definition, single people who are not working are people between the ages of 20 and 60 (with the exception of students), who are not working, are not married and have never been married before, live alone or in a family, but do not have close people outside the family. ²²

It is clear that this category is close to the Hikikomori group, i.e. recluses aged 15 to 34 years (in both cases, one of the defining features is the lack of social communication). On the other hand, lack of work is a trait that unites this group with nitto, i.e. with young people of the same age groups who do not have any employment. In this regard, it can be assumed that the ranks of non-working singles of older age groups are replenished, first of all, at the expense of growing up hikikomori and nitto.

Since the" non-standard "Japanese youth has already been mentioned above, let's turn to the question of what" non-standard " Japanese adults are. According to Y. Gend's calculations, the number of koritsumuge (or unemployed singles aged 35 to 60 years) for the period from 1996 to 2011.

it increased from 262 thousand people to 794 thousand, or 3 times.

Two points should be noted. First, not all unemployed and unmarried Japanese women and men can be counted in this group. So, in the age group from 35 to 40 years, about 62% of Japanese people of both sexes belong to cinnamon muge, from 40 to 50 years - about 69%, in the group from 50 to 60 years -62% ²³. Second, there are fundamental differences between unemployed and cinnamon mugu. If the unemployed are people who are actively looking for work and are ready to start it as soon as such an opportunity arises, then cinnamon muge can be described as mature nitto, i.e., as people who do not have a job and are not particularly eager to get it.

In his research, Yu Genda tried to find out what life circumstances contribute to the inclusion of people in the category of cinnamon mugu. It turned out that quite a strong influence on the fate of these people had various events that happened to them in childhood. For example, among them, there are noticeably more than in the social group close to them - unmarried and non-working Japanese-those who were subjected to various kinds of ijime, i.e. bullying by their peers, during their school years.

There are also significantly more korinsu muges among those who had no or almost no friends in childhood, and vice versa, fewer of those who had many friends and companions. Finally, during their school years, many of them did not have the opportunity to share their experiences with adults whom they could trust and whose opinion would be important to them24.

The social composition of koritsumuge is quite diverse - here you can meet both those who dropped out of high school, and holders of university diplomas, and even people who have completed postgraduate studies. At the same time, the level of education does not directly affect the probability of getting into this group. For example, among unmarried and unemployed Japanese people with incomplete secondary education, the share of koritsu muge is 68.6%, among those who have completed secondary school - 62.5%, among graduates of technical colleges and short-term (three-year) universities-52.7%, and among those who have received university education and completed postgraduate studies - 69.3%.

The probability of getting into this group is also practically independent of the level of material well-being of the families in which the future cinnamon muges grew up and were brought up. Thus, in the same social group, the share of koritsumuge in families with the lowest incomes (less than 3 million yen per year) is 63.8%, and in families with the highest incomes (more than 9 million yen per year) - 59.7% ²⁵.

Regardless of whether Koritsuh Mugu live separately or in a family, they are united by what sociologists call social exclusion, i.e. the severance of all types of social ties. This phenomenon is also found in other developed countries, but in Japan it has a special social sound. Since labor (including hard physical labor) is one of the first places in the Japanese value system, the existence of a fairly large group of people of working age who are not engaged in anything and lead a parasitic lifestyle looks like a clear deviation from the norm.

These feelings are further reinforced by the complete exclusion of koritsu muge from all types of social connections and all forms of social life, since, as is well known, one of the main sociopsychological characteristics of the Japanese nation is the orientation towards group values and group interests (whether it is a family, company or state).

The economic aspects of this phenomenon should also be taken into account. Since the country's laws guarantee that every citizen is supported by the State to ensure a minimum standard of living, the growing number of recipients of social benefits among Koritsu Muge (primarily those living alone) is becoming an additional burden for the social security system and public finances, burdened by the huge amount of public debt. In addition, the withdrawal of this group from economic life further exacerbates the problem of labor shortages associated with the rapid aging of the population and the decline in the number of people of working age.

In the context of considering the stratification of Japanese society, it is impossible not to touch upon another problem - the situation of older Japanese people.

Overall, the situation of this population group (it includes people over 65 years of age) it can be described as quite successful. Most elderly Japanese people live in their own homes or apartments, have very solid savings, receive pensions, the level of which allows them to lead a completely decent and interesting life. In addition, this category has benefits for paying for medical services, as well as various social benefits. It should also be borne in mind that the Japanese are one of the longest-lived and healthiest nations in the world, so many of them lead a very active lifestyle even after retirement-they play sports, attend various interest groups, participate in the volunteer movement, travel, etc.

However, in the generally fairly well-off category of senior citizens of the country, there is a subgroup whose situation is not so rosy. These are single elderly people. In the past, when the typical Japanese household consisted of three generations living under one roof, the phenomenon of old people being left unattended was almost nonexistent. Taking care of elderly parents was the direct responsibility of either daughters or daughters-in-law, and placing them in a nursing home was considered inappropriate, as a violation of the daughter's (filial) duty to parents.

Now, as you know, the main form of the family in Japan is nuclear, and in most cases it is considered to be the most common type of family.-

* 1 yen is approximately $0.0084.

In most cases, elderly parents live separately from their children. Thus, according to data for 2012, out of 20.930 million families with elderly people, 23.3% (4.87 million) consisted of one person, 30.3% (6.332 million) - of an elderly married couple, 19.6% (4.11 million) - of unmarried / unmarried daughters or sons and elderly parents, 15.3% (3,199 million) - from three generations ²⁶. Thus, more than 11 million rubles. Japanese households consist only of elderly people, including about 4.9 million elderly single people.

Of course, not all single elderly Japanese people need government assistance or guardianship. Moreover, there are quite a few very well-off people among them who can use the services of private companies that offer a variety of types of assistance (accompanying them on walks or trips, dining together in restaurants, cleaning an apartment, providing sanitary services, etc.). However, in recent years, Japanese media outlets have published reports about the situation in Japan. There is more and more information about fraud cases of various kinds, which victims are single elderly people, as well as the difficulties they face in their daily lives.

In other words, in the beautiful, prosperous, safe country that Japan is for the majority of its citizens, there is a fairly large group of people who are much less protected and often helpless. A clear manifestation of the severity of the problem of lonely old age in Japan has been the increase in cases of "lonely death" in recent years, when the death of a single person is found out by chance, and sometimes after a few days. In 2013, 2,733 elderly Japanese people died alone in Tokyo alone.²⁷

* * *

Thus, over the past two decades, Japanese society has undergone significant changes. Equality in income, approximately equal level of well-being of different segments of the population, orientation of the absolute majority of families to a certain lifestyle (the husband earned money, and the wife was engaged in housekeeping and raised 2-3 children) and a certain system of values (respect for work, high status of a permanent employee, recognition of the value of education, support for elderly parents, priority group interests, etc.) have been replaced by a fairly noticeable stratification in terms of current income and social status, as well as an increasing variety of life styles and life preferences of the country's population.

As a result, social groups were formed, primarily among young people, whose lifestyle and value system represent a clear deviation from generally accepted norms and ideas. Since individuals belonging to these "non-standard" social groups are characterized mainly by a parasitic lifestyle, their existence is not only a social, but also an economic problem. After all, in their face, the country is losing not only the labor force, whose number is decreasing due to the rapid aging of the population, but also potential consumers, the availability of which is also very important for maintaining economic growth.

^{Woronoff J.} 1 An Economic Crisis in Japan. L., 1996. p. 195 - 196.

² Toukei de mini Nihon (Japan through the prism of statistics). T., 2008, p. 63.

³ Comprehensive Handbook of Japanese Taxes. Tokvo, 2006, p. 27, 135.

⁴ See: Lebedeva I. P. Yaponiya: Promyshlennost i predprinimatelstvo (vtoraya polovina XX - nachalo XXI vv. M., 2007) Japan: Industry and Entrepreneurship (the second half of the XX - beginning of the XXI centuries) (in Russian)

⁵ See: Lebedeva I. P. 2014. Sudby pozhiznennogo naima: sotsialnye aspecty // Yaponskoe obshchestvo: izmenyayushcheesya i neizmennoe. M.) (in Russian)

⁶ Japanese Working Life Profile 2013/2014. Tokyo, 2014, p. 20. 42.

⁷ www.jama-english/statistics www.jieta.or.jp www.JEMA-net.or.jp

⁸ Japan Almanac. Т., 1994, p. 142; Japan Statistical Yearbook 2015. Chapter 8, Table 8 - 5 - http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/1431 - 08.htm

⁹ Japanese Working Life Profile.., p. 20.

¹⁰ Labour Economic Indicators - www.stat.go.jp/

¹¹ International Monetary Fund, Selected Issues. Japan. July 12, 2013, n. 36 - 37.

¹² Summary Report of Basic Survey on Wage Structure (Nationwide) 2012 // Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare -www.whlw/go.jp/toukei/

^{David Chiavacci.} 13 From Class Struggle to General Middle-Class Society to Divided Society: Societal Model of Inequality in Postwar Japan // Social Science Japan Journal, 2008. Vol. 11, No 1, p. 16 - 17.

¹⁴ Labor Economic Indicators // Japan Institute of Labor -www.jil.go.jp/

¹⁵ White Paper on Children and Young People 2012, Chapter 2 //

Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. June 2012 - www.cao.go.jp/

¹⁶ Ibid., Figure 5; Basic Survey on Employment Structure 2012, Figure 1 - 8 // Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare - www.stat.go.jp/

^{Cook E.E.} 17 Expectations of Failure: Maturity and Masculinity for Freeters in Cotemporary Japan // Social Science Japan Journal. Vol. 16. No 1,2013, p. 29.

¹⁸ White Paper on Children and Young People 2012... Figure 8.

¹⁹ See subr. Katasonova E. L. articles in the magazine "Asia and Africa today": Mass culture-Japanese reading, 2007, N 7, 8; In search of self-expression-Japanese youth in the world of mass culture, 2008, N 1: Japan: aesthetic metamorphoses, 2009, N 6, 7; Otaku: pros and cons. New generation of people of the computer age, 2010, N 12 and 2011, N 1; Japan and problems of cyberculture, 2010, N 2. (Katasonova E. L. v zhurnale "Aziya i Africa segodnya": Massovaya kultura - yaponskoe prochtenie, 2007, N 7, 8; V poiskakh samovyrazheniya - yaponskaya molodezh v mire mass-kultury, 2008, N 1; Yaponiya: esteticheskie metamorfozy, 2009, N 6, 7; Otaku: za i protiv. Novaya generatsiya lyudey kompyuternoiy epokhi, 2010, N 12 i 2011, N 1; Yaponiya i problemy kiberkultury, 2010, N 2) (in Russian)

^{Genda Yuuji.} 20 Koritsu Mugyou (Non-working singles). T., 2013, p. 38.

^{Markaryan S. B.} 21 Yaponskaya zhilishchnaya sistema kak katalizator i indikator sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh izmeneniy [Japanese housing system as a catalyst and indicator of socio-economic changes].

^{Genda Yuuji.} 22 Op. cit., p. 22.

²³ Ibid., p. 40.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 157 - 160.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 52.

²⁶ Koureika-no joukyou oyobi koureishyakai taisaku-nojitti joukyou (The Aging Society and Policies for the Aging Society), vol., 2013, p. 9.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 33.

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