V. TEREKHOV, Candidate of Technical Sciences

The view that the center of world politics, which has been located in Europe for the past few centuries, is shifting to the Asia-Pacific region (APR)is becoming increasingly widespread¹. Quite often, therefore, the coming century is called the "century of Asia". The Asia-Pacific region is home to almost all the world's leading powers (the United States, China, Japan, and Russia). It is also home to two-thirds of the world's population. According to analysts ' forecasts, by 2025, China will take the ^second place in the list of leading economic powers2. Japan, from the current second, will move to third place.

The complex complex of relations between the United States and China is becoming a kind of "axis" of regional and global politics. At the same time, Japan is increasingly influencing the development of US-China relations, as it has taken a course to increase its importance in regional and world politics. Although the country's economy continues to be the main tool for implementing this policy, in recent years considerable attention has been paid to the "power component" as an important component of the country's total national power. This is evidenced, in particular, by the rapidly developing process of adapting the national armed forces to operations outside the country's territory.

JAPAN'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY POSITIONING

The process of Japan's new positioning in the international arena has recently been defined by the term "normalization". Somewhat earlier, it was used in relation to Germany-an ally of Japan in World War II, the defeat in which became the starting point of the subsequent fifty-year period of the" abnormal " state of both states. Its main feature is the establishment of control over the process of restoring statehood in general and over the format of military construction of the defeated country, in particular, on the part of the victors.

There is a widespread view in Japan that its impressive economic success is largely due to the fact that the inevitable costs associated with solving the problem of ensuring national security in the post-war years were mainly borne by the United States. Japan, which was defeated in the war, could not independently determine its post-war policy, but the political course dictated to it turned out to be very successful for the process of reconstruction and development.

In the opinion of one of the first post-war Prime Ministers, S. Yoshida, the main condition for further successful development of the country was to preserve the 9th "anti-war" article of the 1947 Constitution, as well as expand trade relations with the PRC. The former provided an opportunity to avoid the huge unproductive costs of military needs, and the latter provided an extensive market for the products of the rapidly growing Japanese economy.

However, since the early 1990s, the relative passivity of the Japanese leadership in matters of national and international security has come under increasing criticism both at home and abroad. It was pointed out, in particular, that Japan can no longer remain a "third-party observer" of new processes on the world stage.

Published in 2007, the book "Japan Rising: Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose" by the well-known American expert on Asian issues, K. B. Pyle, attracted attention with its title, since so far the term"rise" has always been used only in relation to the PRC. The main conclusion that the author makes is that in the near future, Japan will have no less influence on the development of events in the Asia-Pacific region than China.³

In the general discussion about the need for Japan's participation in the construction of a new world order, the motive of "forceful" provision of the economy's needs for the necessary raw materials (most of which are absent in the country) and the reliability of transportation of Japanese goods by sea is increasingly emerging. In Japan, they believe that the necessary actions on the world stage (including military ones) are best carried out jointly with the United States (even if they are on the sidelines). Firstly, because the Asia-Pacific region retains a negative historical memory of Japan during the Second World War, and secondly, because in the near future, the Japanese military potential will not reach a sufficiently high level. One of the main tasks that the current leadership of Japan intends to solve is to overcome the "negative reputation" of the country due to the above-mentioned historical memory of the peoples of Asia. For this purpose, Japan insistently and at the same time unobtrusively presents itself as a state with "sufficient, but not at all dangerous military power"⁴.

As P. M. Cronin, director of research programs at the London-based Institute for International Strategic Studies, noted in June 2006, after almost six years of the Koizumi cabinet, the country is ready to formally abandon the euphemisms "Japanese Self-Defense Forces" and "National Defense Administration" (YASS and UNO), which still refer to "very real armed forces and the Ministry of Defense". Defense of Japan"⁵. The reason for such a statement of the British expert was the bill submitted to the Japanese Parliament on renaming the UNO to the Ministry of Defense.⁶

At an expert meeting in May 2007 to assess Japan's ability to fulfill its duty as an ally without changing the constitution, then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe described the security situation as "dramatically tightening" ^.7 At the same time, both houses of the Japanese Parliament voted to hold a national referendum before 2010 on the need to amend article 9 of the national Constitution.⁸ The so-called "Group of 13" formed by the Prime Minister is currently studying the possibility of Japan exercising the right to collective defense without "modifying" the constitution. The Group is tasked with answering the following questions::

- what should be the actions of Japanese warships in the event of an attack on the US Navy?

- should the Japanese missile defense system participate in repelling a missile strike on the territory of the United States?

- can YASS units in Iraq return fire?

- can YASS provide transportation services and provide logistical support to the US and other countries ' armed Forces?

The very fact of forming a "Group of 13" and the nature of the questions put to it (which actually determines the answer) They indicate the desire of the ruling circles of Japan to get the right to collective defense (together with the United States) so far without amending the constitution, but only by a new interpretation of its 9th article.

In recent years, contacts between high-ranking representatives of Japan and the Alliance have become more active. A significant event in Japanese foreign policy was the visit of former Foreign Minister Taehyung. Aso to the NATO Council Headquarters in Brussels ⁱⁿ May 2006.9 Japanese Minister and NATO Secretary General Ya.de Hoop-Scheffer, who visited Japan a year earlier, expressed readiness to develop and deepen cooperation between the parties.

The apogee of the two-year mutual probing of positions was the first visit of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the alliance's headquarters in Brussels in ^January 2007.10 In his speech, he noted the common goals pursued by Japan and NATO in the world political arena, supported all the international actions of the bloc (in particular, the Alliance's actions). in Afghanistan) and stressed his country's willingness to expand its partnership with it11. Thus, Japan declared itself as an " eastern partner of NATO."

The further development of the so-called "Quadrilateral Initiative", which provides for expanding cooperation between the United States, Japan, Australia and India in various fields of activity, can seriously affect the situation in the Asia-Pacific region. It was first announced in early 2007 by Shinzo Abe. It was immediately supported by US Vice President D. Cheney, and on May 25, 2007, a meeting of representatives of all four participants in this "Initiative"was held in Manila.¹² This meeting was preceded by a trilateral (Japanese-American-Indian) naval exercise timed to coincide with the visit of three ships of the Indian Navy to Japan. In early September 2007, the Initiative's participants, as well as Singapore, conducted unprecedented joint naval maneuvers in the Bay of Bengal.

Apparently, the participants of the "Initiative" disagree on its format and actual content. Nevertheless, it seems that the United States has the most serious hopes for it. So, the former adviser to the President, J. R. R. Tolkien.Speaking about US-Indian cooperation, R. Blackville emphasizes the need to "increasingly link it to the close cooperation of the United States with Japan and our European allies." ¹³

Japan advertises its participation in this "Initiative" as "a struggle for democracy, humanism and the rule of law." According to Abe, his country stands for strengthening the Asian "arc of freedom and prosperity", which is formed primarily by Australia, India, the United States and Japan. Naturally, it is not by chance that this " arc " completely coincides with the main routes of hydrocarbon supplies to Japan. As a columnist for the Economist magazine noted with some irony, Abe's trip to the Persian Gulf countries in the summer of 2007 (when the concept of the mentioned "arc" was formulated) is "a clear illustration of the pragmatism of Japanese politics masked by statements about the spread of democracy"¹⁴.

The "arc of freedom and prosperity" is also mentioned in the Japan-India Defense and Security Cooperation Agreement signed on August 22, 2007 during Abe's visit to India. Among the various measures provided for in this agreement, special attention is paid to ensuring the protection of sea lines of communications "from transnational criminals" and "preventing the spread of WMD".

THE CHINA FACTOR

Political analysts believe that the main reason pushing Japan to revive its military power is the fears associated with the transformation of China into a regional, and in the future, a global superpower. As you know, the problem of confrontation between Japan and China (as well as Japan and Korea) has deep historical roots.¹⁵

Tensions in Japanese-Chinese relations, which were in a state of "deep freeze" almost during the entire period of the Koizumi cabinet, represent one of the main challenges to stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, it is probably no accident that the next Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, made his first foreign visit

it is in the PRC. The return visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to Tokyo in April 2007, and the subsequent meeting of the defense ministers of both countries, created a certain basis for "unfreezing" bilateral relations.

However, there are factors that hinder the development of this positive process. First of all, these include serious disagreements about the future of Taiwan and Korea. As for China, it demonstrates its willingness to build constructive relations with Japan. At the same time, given the complex history of these relations, Chinese experts say that there is a "lack of clarity" about the real intentions of the partner.¹⁶

According to Yang Bojiang, a professor at the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations, the prospects for the development of Japanese-Chinese relations "in the post-Koizumi period" largely depend on whether the Japanese people will agree to the possibility of using YASS units outside their national borders. In fact, Yang Bojiang expressed the main concerns of the PRC about Japan, due to the likelihood of its complete rejection of the post-war "pacifist traditions" ¹⁷, which, according to the former director General of UNO F. The Nukagi prevented Japanese combat units from supporting the United States during the 1991 Gulf War.

NEW TRENDS IN JAPANESE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

In fact, the process that has already begun of moving the YASS sphere of responsibility far beyond national borders requires a radical revision of the structure of these forces and the nature of their equipment. The fact that these requirements are already being taken into account is indicated by new trends in the policy of purchasing weapons by all three branches of the Japanese armed forces. So, it was decided that the Ground Forces will now mainly acquire lightweight combat vehicles suitable for rapid airlift over long distances. The Air Force will receive military transport aircraft and "air tankers" for refueling aircraft in the air. The Navy will receive logistics support vessels for "overseas operations" and warships capable of providing air defense, missile defense, and PLO for both the sea group and the Land Forces. Accordingly, it is planned to decommission or reduce the number of heavy artillery and tanks that do not meet the objectives of the new Japanese defense policy.

These changes in the procurement policy have already been reflected in the military budgets of the 2004 and 2005 financial years.* It was during these years that the practical implementation of the new strategy for military construction of the country began, outlined in the concept documents published at the end of 2004. The structure of these budgets was aimed at increasing the mobility of nuclear weapons and, accordingly, reducing the number of heavy weapons. The launch in August 2007 of the Hyuga helicopter carrier with a displacement of 13.5 thousand tons (the first in a series of 4 vessels) was, according to experts, " evidence of Japan's ambitious plans to increase its naval potential and expand participation in operations of international coalitions." According to the Deputy director of the Okazaki Institute (Tokyo), retired Rear Admiral S. Kawamura, "Hyuga was an important step in demonstrating Japanese capabilities to create full-fledged aircraft carriers in the future." ¹⁸

Shortly before his resignation from the post of Minister of Defense of Japan, Fr. In an interview with the weekly Defense News, Kuma outlined the main directions for re-equipping the YASS, taking into account the new tasks set for them.¹⁹ First, he pointed out the need to increase the level of "transportability" of these forces, since they are supposed to be used more often in international military actions." Secondly, F. Kuma drew attention to the rapid equipping of the Chinese Air Force with fourth-generation fighters, and therefore, in his opinion, the Japanese Air Force should also be armed with fighters of at least the 4+ generation, not excluding the possibility of acquiring fifth-generation fighters.

Referring to the possible lifting of the "voluntary embargo" on the sale of Japanese defense products (which is the main reason for its high cost), F. Kyuma noted that the solution of this problem will be carried out gradually, as certain reasons arise. The first such reason, as is known, was the joint US-Japanese development of the SM-3 anti-missile system, including for Japanese ships equipped with the Aegis air defense system. Since the final assembly of these missiles is carried out in the United States, an appropriate "exception"was made in the embargo law for sending components made in Japan abroad.

In a concentrated form, the views of the Japanese leadership on the country's defense problem are set out in the annually published "White Paper" on the defense of Japan. The last one (Defense of Japan 2007)²⁰ reflects the main trends in the country's defense policy of recent years that were noted earlier. They consist in extending the scope of responsibility of the YASS beyond national borders and strengthening military and political ties with the United States and its closest allies in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as with India.

WORKS IN THE FIELD OF MISSILE DEFENSE

Perhaps none of the aspects of Japan's military construction is under such close attention of experts as its work (in cooperation with the United States) in the field of missile defense. This is quite understandable, since the situation in this particular area, firstly, affects the highest, strategic levels of relations between both states and, secondly, is a good indicator of their state and directions of development. It should be noted that among more than a dozen military-applied R & Ds21, in which US-Japanese cooperation is established to varying degrees, work in the field of missile defense systems occupies a special place, which, according to the Japanese leadership, "contributes to the strengthening of the Japanese-American Security Treaty"22.

According to the recommendations of the Security Council of Japan, the government of the country in 1999 decided to join the part of the American research in the field of missile defense systems called " Expanded defense of the naval theater of military Operations "( Navy Theater Wide Defense, NTWD).

* At the end of 2004, the basic government documents were also adopted, which outlined a new state defense policy, which, in turn, were based on the conclusions of the so-called "Commission X" specially formed by the government. Araki", which ran from April to October of the same year.

Then a memorandum of understanding was signed between the UNO and the US Department of Defense, according to which Japan joined the development of several basic elements of the three-stage SM-3 interceptor missile, designed to be launched from ships equipped with the Aegis system. The future Japanese missile defense system should include sea and land-based systems. The former are designed to intercept ballistic missiles in the active and middle sections of the flight path, the latter - at the end.

Expanding the scope of US-Japanese missile defense cooperation was the main topic of negotiations held at the end of March 2006 between the delegations of the US Department of Defense and the then UNO of Japan. American experts tended to view this event in the context of the formation of a new strategic configuration in Northeast Asia (NEA), which will have a significant impact on the military and political situation in the world as a whole.²³ The transition of the multi-year US-Japanese program for creating regional missile defense systems to the deployment stage, according to the same experts,"...increases the ability of both countries to protect their military groups from Chinese missiles during a conflict."

It is possible that US-Japanese cooperation in the field of missile defense may reach a fundamentally new, higher level. This will happen if Japan joins many years of American work on the development of a powerful airborne laser (Airborne Laser-ABL). Speaking in the summer of 2007 at a conference of the American Air Force Association, which was attended by representatives of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, the director of the ABL program implemented by Boeing, G. Hislop, said that such a possibility is very real24.

FIGHTER AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

The F-X fighter modernization program illustrates the transformation of U.S.-Japanese relations, as well as the political situation in the Northeast Asian sub-region. As part of this program, a tender should be announced to replace the fleet of outdated F-4E fighters. Until recently, it was expected that the United States could exhibit the F/A-18E/F "Super Hornet" fighter, France - "Rafale", the united trans - European company" Eurofighter " - the Typhoon fighter.

Outwardly, a rather ordinary event in the process of rearming the YASSO gave political intrigue to the Japanese probing of the US position regarding the possibility of putting the most modern (and expensive) F-22 fighter (5th generation) in the world for tender by the American side. A positive solution to the issue is hindered by both the legally established ban on the export of the F-22 ²⁵ fighter, and the lack of consensus in the United States on the feasibility of introducing amendments to the existing law that would allow it to be circumvented "in exceptional cases". The main supporters of the idea of selling the F-22 to Japan are the US Department of Defense and the aircraft manufacturer Lockheed Martin.

Representatives of the US Department of Defense point to " Japan's needs for F-22 fighter jets due to the strengthening of China and the difficult situation on the Korean Peninsula." As for Lockheed Martin, its lobbying is caused by the fact that if the Air Force cannot convince Congress to double the total number of fighter aircraft ordered, then after 2011 the company's production lines will be closed.

After a series of missile tests conducted by the DPRK in the early summer of 2006, the issue has taken on a new context. The previously mentioned deputy director of the Tokyo Okazaki Institute, S. Kawamura, recently stated that, given the aggravation of the situation to the west of Japan, the F-22 will be the most suitable model for replacing the country's Air Force fighter fleet.

This remark reflects one of the most important tasks that the F-22 (or any other aircraft adopted under the F-X program) should solve, which is to provide missile defense at the stage when missiles are intended to attack Japanese territory."..they haven't left the launchers yet." The purchase of four B-767 air tankers will also help solve this problem.

In June 2007 The US Congressional Research Service distributed a document entitled "The possibility of exporting the F-22 fighter to Japan", which expressed its readiness to re-consider this issue and gave arguments for and against lifting the ban on the sale of this fighter. The former included "potential benefits of American industry, contributions to the defense of Japan and the [surrounding] region, and ensuring US-Japanese military interoperability (opportunities for interaction between different software and hardware vendors)," while the latter included "concerns about the consequences of the spread of [the latest] technologies." technologies and the possibility of undermining regional stability " ²⁶.

The last reservation was made not by chance, because the prospect of Japan acquiring the F-22 caused a sharply negative reaction in the Republic of Korea (ROK). In the commentary of the American weekly Defense News, in particular, it is noted: "The zeal shown by Washington in militarizing Japan does not help to call it [the policy] extremely honest."²⁷. Expressing the opinion of a certain part of the American establishment, which is watching this process with concern, the author of the article emphasizes that in

* Such a law was adopted in 1997 to prevent secret information about technological innovations used in the F-22 fighter jet from leaking to the PRC and Russia.

As a result, the security of Japan itself may suffer first of all due to the inevitable countermeasures of its neighbors.

In April 2007, South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yang-soo publicly expressed concerns about Japan's possible acquisition of F-22 fighter jets, pointing out that his country was ready to take "appropriate measures" ^.28 At the same time, a representative of the press service of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Korea made a statement that Seoul "cannot afford to quietly observe watch Japan increase its air dominance potential in the region."

At the same time, leaked information, according to which Japan is developing its own fighter of the new generation ²⁹. Judging by the photos of the model of the future aircraft published in the Japanese press, it looks like an F-22, but it will probably be smaller in size. Its first flight is expected in 2011.

US ATTITUDE TO JAPAN'S "NORMALIZATION" PROCESS

In the United States, there is still no consensus on how far the process of "normalization" of Japan can go, and what consequences it threatens American interests in the Asia-Pacific region. For example, there is a widespread view that the Japanese-Chinese strategic rivalry is coming out on top in the regional balance of power, which is gradually replacing the US-Chinese confrontation. Washington is already considering adapting the US ' own strategic course in the Asia-Pacific region, taking into account the growing competition between China and Japan for regional leadership.

In recent years, two rather contradictory approaches to the problem of ensuring security and protecting American interests in the Asia-Pacific region have spread among the American political elite.³¹ Experts from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, K. M. Campbell and D. Chelit, argue that there are two main groups in the American establishment, for which they use the term "cliques" ^.32 In their opinion, without taking into account the existence of these groups (consolidated on the basis of mutual loyalty of their members), it is impossible to understand the nature of the recent evolution in US foreign policy.

The essence of the first approach, which is associated with the name of former Deputy Secretary of State R. Zelik*, is to assert that priority should be given to establishing constructive relations with China and gradually involving it in global political and economic processes. At the same time, R. Zelik does not deny the importance of Japan as one of the main allies of the United States in the region and in the world as a whole.

According to a different approach, which is supported by R. Zelik's predecessor as Deputy Secretary of State R. Armitage and Harvard University Professor J. R. R. Tolkien. However, it is Japan that is assigned the most important role in ensuring the national security and interests of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, and the PRC is rather ranked among the potential sources of challenges to these interests**.

Both approaches were successfully combined in the "US National Security Strategy" published in 2006. The document reads in part: "Our main task is to help China make the right strategic choice in the interests of its own people. At the same time, we intend to insure ourselves against other possible scenarios." According to American experts, one of the negative consequences of Washington's lack of a clear political course towards China is the decline in the importance of the United States in East Asian affairs and the awareness of its closest allies (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) of the need to take their own measures (including in the field of defense) to ensure their interests and security in the region^..

The key question facing the American elite today is: "What will China become in 20 years? Friend or foe of the United States?"³⁴ In Washington, it is assumed that as a result of its rapid development, China will eventually take a geopolitical "place in the sun", becoming a leading participant in world politics.³⁵ At the same time, one part of American politicians expresses fears that the PRC may direct its huge resources "to military development to the detriment of the country's social and economic priorities." However, another believes that Beijing "has learned from the experience of the Soviet Union's exhaustion due to its militarization, and therefore China is not eager to directly challenge American military power." ³⁶

In these circumstances, the question of whether further stay in Japan (and South Korea)is appropriate becomes relevant American troops, as well as what consequences their complete withdrawal and relocation to the United States may entail. A number of American experts (especially military ones) believe that at this stage it is especially important to help mitigate interstate conflicts among the leading NEA states in every possible way.

At the same time, there is direct and indirect evidence that most countries in the region, including China, are positive about maintaining (at least in the near future) the military presence of the United States as a guarantor of maintaining stability. For example, Beijing does not discount the fact that the United States is actually curbing Japan's ambitions for Taiwan, which was under its jurisdiction for more than 50 years in 2006. However, Japan's other neighbors are also more likely to welcome the continuation of close US-Japanese ties, seeing this as a lesser evil compared to the prospect of once again finding themselves face-to-face with Japan, which would finally have a completely free hand. No one in Southeast Asia has forgotten the "trouble" that their island neighbor caused them 70 years ago.³⁷

On the eve of D. Koizumi's resignation from the post of Prime Minister in October 2006, the American political-

* Retired in July 2006 and was appointed Director of the World Bank at the end of May 2007.

** In 2000, in a report intended for a team of Democrats led by A. Gore, R. Armitage, and J. R. R. Tolkien. Nai proposed their thesis of "Japan-centricity" as the main direction in American policy towards the Asia-Pacific region. Later, the thesis was adopted by the Republicans who won the presidential election at that time, led by George Bush. The mentioned recommendation was fully accepted by the then Japanese Cabinet of Ministers D. Koizumi.

Table

Major groups in the Japanese establishment

In some quarters, the debate over Japan's future course has intensified. During the last visit of this rank to Washington, D. Koizumi thanked the American people for their "tender love", quoting one of the songs of the revered E. Presley. At the same time, the United States asked the question: will the "love" between the two countries continue, or will Japan, having restored its economic power (with direct and indirect help from Washington), no longer need the United States?³⁸.

American experts do not give a clear and unambiguous answer to this question. As a rule, they limit themselves to banal statements that much will depend on what the new political course of Japan becomes, as well as on the development of the situation in the region and in the world as a whole. At the same time, it is emphasized that much, if not all, will depend on the development of three trends designed to have a primary impact on the course of world politics. First, the relative decline in the role of the United States in world affairs; second, the rapid transformation of the PRC into a second superpower; and third, Japan's claim to the status of a great geopolitical power.³⁹

Currently, the Japanese establishment has different assessments of both the situation in the external world and what place Japan itself should take in it. The director of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Professor R. J. Samuels, analyzing the existing differences, identifies four main groups that are represented in all political parties, and their difference from each other lies in the fact that they all give different answers to two key questions^.:

- How close should US-Japanese relations be in the future?

- what can be the scale and nature of the use of JASS abroad?

For greater clarity, R. J. Samuels has compiled these groupings into a table based on the answers to the above questions (see Table).

American political circles treat the process of Japanese "normalization" as a given, which is weak or not at all affected by external influence. At the same time, they tend to encourage "normal nationalists", since their views guarantee the continued US military presence in Japan. At the same time, outside the official framework, political scientists express concerns that in the course of the new foreign policy course, the views of those Japanese politicians who are expressed by "neo-autonomists"may prevail.

At the same time, Washington believes that S. Abe, who was less than a year in the post of Prime Minister of Japan, who publicly positioned himself as an even greater nationalist than his predecessor D. Koizumi, in practice showed himself more like a pragmatist.⁴¹ Just like D. Koizumi, he advocated the transformation of his country into one of the leading regional and global players. There were, for example, attempts by Shinzo Abe to restore dialogue with China and South Korea, which was actually interrupted in the last years of D. Koizumi's rule. At the same time, he continued the latter's policy of strengthening security ties with the United States, while at the same time seeking a more independent role for Tokyo in foreign policy affairs.

In general, the United States is inclined to believe that Japan is creating modern armed forces to conduct power projection operations anywhere in the world. At the same time, according to American experts, "if there are any significant changes in Japanese defense policy in the next decade, they will be caused more by external threats related, for example, to the situation on the Korean Peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait, and not by constitutional amendments."⁴² At the same time, they point out that Japan is showing less and less inclination to continue to fully entrust the United States with conducting offensive operations abroad.⁴³

And yet, the U.S.-Japan military-political alliance still looks solid. One of the indications of this strength is the nature of the distribution of the financial burden to ensure the conditions for the stay of American military personnel who are part of the group stationed in Japan. The Japanese side assumed more than 70% of the corresponding costs. Approximately in the same ratio is the distribution of costs for the process initiated by the 2006 bilateral agreement for the partial withdrawal (until 2014) of the Marine Corps expeditionary group from Okinawa to the Guam archipelago, which will amount to $ 10.27 billion. In general, the total cost of implementing all the measures provided for in the mentioned agreement may amount to 26 billion rubles. USD ⁴⁴

* * *

In conclusion, we note once again that although the emerging political game in the Asia-Pacific region (and possibly in the world as a whole) continues to be centered on a complex set of US-China relations, it is still very important to note that the US-China relations are still being played out.-

The transformation of Japan into a fairly independent world-class player with its own interests is having an increasing impact on the processes taking place there. It is also important that these interests do not always and at least not completely coincide with the interests of its current political "patron", that is, the United States. Japan, for example, will not be satisfied with Washington's hypothetical "surrender" of Taiwan to China, which is considered by some American politicians as a completely acceptable "price" for normalizing US-Chinese relations.

In this regard, there is a certain transformation of the functional role of the US-Japan Security Treaty, which until recently "served" primarily the US strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Today, it is beginning to serve Japan more and more, acting as a tool to enhance its role in the affairs of the region.

Japan's claims to a more active role are supported by a "new interpretation" of the national Constitution (and the likely complete rejection of its 9th "pacifist" article in the future), as well as the gradual withdrawal of the scope of activities of the Japanese Armed Forces outside the country.

The opinions expressed today about how far the process of Japanese "normalization" will go are still limited only to the assumption that Japan, although it is moving away from its position as a "political marginal", will nevertheless not return to its former world status in the mid-30s of the last century.

At the same time, according to some analysts, the course of the Japanese leadership to increase its role in regional and world affairs (including by reforming its Armed Forces), as well as the desire of some of the American elite to build constructive relations with the PRC, makes it very likely that the Japanese-Chinese strategic rivalry will gradually come out on top in the Asia-Pacific region which may well replace the current US-China standoff.

In these circumstances, Russia is faced with the task of working out the optimal course in relation to the process of Japan's foreign policy "normalization". There is an opinion that Russia's main interest in the strategic game unfolding in the Asia-Pacific region is to prevent its transition to the phase of uncontrolled conflict, the reasons for which (and the places where it can break out) in the region are quite sufficient.

Only political stability in the Asia-Pacific region will allow the Russian Federation to implement its own long-term socio-economic development programs in Siberia and the Far East, as well as maintain mutually beneficial economic ties with all countries in the region.

¹ In Russian publications, this thesis is reflected in one form or another, for example: Mironov S. Expanding cooperation with the Asia - Pacific countries is a conscious choice of Rossini // Asia and Africa Today, 2007, No. 8, pp. 2-4; Mosyakov D. USA-China: Asia and Africa, 2007, No. 7, pp. 30-33; Shirkov A.V. The crisis of "open Regionalism" in APEC and the formation of a new concept of integration in the Asia-Pacific region in the late 1990s.Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Ser. 8. History. 2007, No. 5, pp. 57-68.

^{Drezner Daniel W.} 2 The New World Order // Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2007, p. 34.

^{Green Michel J.} 3 Japan Is Back: Why Tokyo's New Assertiveness Is Good for Washington // Foreign Affairs. March/April, 2007, p. 142 - 147.

^{Midford Paul.} 4 The Logic of Reassurance and Japan's Grand Strategy // Security Studies. V. 11. Spring, 2002, N 3, p. 1 - 43.

^{Cronin P. M.} 5 Japan: Ready for a Real Army // International Herald Tribune, 2006, June 15.

^{Herman S.} 6 Japan to Upgrade Defense Agency to Ministry [Электронный ресурс] //Voice of America, the Official Site, 2006, June - http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006 - 06/2006 - 06 - 09-voa4.cfm

⁷ AT Press Time. Japan Studies Security // Defense News, 2007, May 21, p. 4.

⁸ For more information, see: Anisimtsev N. Japan. Is the referendum law a step towards revising the Constitution? // Asia and Africa Today, 2007, N 10, 3-8.

^{Fiorenza N.} 9 NATO and Japan Seek to Deepen Relations // Jane's Defence Weekly, 2006, May 17, p. 7.

¹⁰ Visit to NATO by Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan [Электронный ресурс] // North Atlantic Treaaty Organization: News, the Official Site, 2007, January 12 - http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2007/01-January/e0112a.html

^{Abe S.} 11 Speech at the North Atlantic Council "Japan and NATO: Toward Further Collaboration" [Электронный ресурс] // The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2007, January 12 - http://www.infojapan.org/region/europe/pmv0701/nato.html

^{Bedi Rahul.} 12 India Eyes Major Players Status // Jane's Defence Weekly, 2007, July, 22.

^{Blackwill Robert D.} 13 A Friend Indeed // The National Interest, 2007, May/June, p. 16 - 19.

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 56.

^{Cronin P. M.} 15 Japan: Ready for a Real Army...

^{Bojiang Yang.} 16 Redefining Sino-Japanese Relations after Koizumi // The Washington Quarterly. 2006. Autumn, p. 129 - 149.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 148.

^{Minnik Wendell.} 18 Japans New Ship: Destroyer or Carrier? // Defense News, 2007, September 3, p. 20.

¹⁹ Interview of F. Kyum to the weekly "Defense News", 14.05.2007, p. 38.

²⁰ Defense of Japan 2007 (Tentative Translation) [Electronic resource] - http://www.mod.go.Jp/e/publ/w-paper/index/html

²¹ For a list of these developments, see: 2002: Defense of Japan, p. 197.

²² Ibid., p. 198.

^{Bordonaro F.} 23 Money Meets Missiles // Asia Times Online, 29.03.2006.

^{Ahearu Dave.} 24 Japanese May Contribute Technology to ABL. Purchase Might Be Considered // Defense Daily. 26.09.2007, p. 1, 2.

^{Minnick W.} 25 Japan Seeks F-22's Despite Tech-Transfer Hurdles // Defense News, 17.07.2006, p. 1, 8.

^{Grevatt John.} 26 US reveals concerns over transfer of F-22 Raptor technology to Japan //Jane's Defence Industry, 2007, August, p. 12.

²⁷ Japan, the F-22 and History // Defense News, 7.05.2007, p. 44.

^{Bennetjohn T., Sung-Ki Yung.} 28 Seoule Sounds Alarm as Tokyo Seeks F-22// Defense News. 7.05.2007, p. 1, 8.

^{Bennetjohn, Minnick Wendell.} 29 Japan Looks Beyond F-22 for Next Fight // Defense News. 30.07.2007, p. 28.

^{Perret Bradley.} 30 ATD - Advances // Aviation Week & Space Technology, 17.12.2007, p. 35.

^{Przystup J. J., Sanders C.} 31 Vision Order: Japan and China in U.S. Strategy // Strategic Forum, 2006, June. N 220, p. 6.

^{Campbell Kurt M., Chollet D.} 32 The New Tribalism: Cliques and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy // The Washington Quarterly. Winter 2006 - 2007, p. 193 - 203.

^{Minnick W.} 33 China Rising // Defense News. 19.03.2007, p. 11, 12.

^{Carter Ashton B., Perry William J.} 34 China on the March // The National Interest. 2007. March-April, p. 116.

^{Art Robert J.} 35 Agreeing to Agree (and Disagree) // The National Interest. 2007, May/June, p. 33.

^{Erickson Andrew, Goldstein Lyle.} 36 Hoping for the Best, Preparing for the Worst: China's Response to US Hegemony // The Journal of Strategic Studies. 2006, December. Vol. 29, N 6, p. 955 - 986.

^{Katz Richard, Ennis Peter.} 37 How Able Is Abe? // Foreign Affairs. 2007 March/April, p. 75 - 91.

^{Green Michael J.} 38 U.S. - Japanese Relations after Koizumi: Convergence or Cooling? // The Washington Quarterly, 2006, Autumn, p. 101 - 127.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 120.

^{Samuels Richard J.} 40 Japan's Goldilocks Strategy // The Washington Quarterly. 2006. Autumn, p. 111 - 127.

^{Katz Richard, Ennis Peter.} 41 How Able Is Abe? //Foreign Affairs, 2007, March/April, p. 75 - 91.

^{Minnick W.} 42 Japan's "Group 13" Seeks Article 9 Loopholes // Defense News, 28.05.2007, p. 18.

^{Fulghum D. A.} 43 New Defense // Aviation Week and Space Technology, 3.11.2007, p. 59.

^{Yoda Tatsuro.} 44 Japan's Host Nation Support Program for the U.S. -Japan Security Alliance // Asia Survey, 2006, p. 937 - 961.

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