The year 2001 brought major changes to the geopolitical landscape of East and South-East Asia, largely predetermining a new alignment of forces and new trends in the dynamics of political and socio-economic processes in this vast region.

The most important surprise was that the optimistic forecasts about the possibility of forming a new Asian regional community using the "10 plus three" formula (that is, the ASEAN ten plus China, Japan and South Korea) did not materialize. These forecasts were based on the decision reached at the 2000 Singapore summit of the leaders of 13 countries to create a single region-wide free trade area with equal participation of the ASEAN Ten, China, Japan and South Korea. The anti-American nature of such a plan was obvious, and analysts were only speculating about what Washington would do in response to an open challenge to its dominant role in the region.

However, in November 2001, ten ASEAN countries signed an agreement to establish a free trade zone with China over the next ten years. The separate agreement initiated by Beijing actually undermined the Singapore agreements.

A new blow to the idea of East Asian unity was delivered during the recent visit of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the five most developed countries of ASEAN (Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore). He offered the most developed ASEAN countries a path of regional consolidation and creating an alternative to China's common market, demonstrating to Beijing Japan's determination to defend its position in the region. Koizumi refused to even discuss the possibility of Japan joining the China-Asean Treaty, thereby making it easier for him to do so.

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by fundamentally changing the prospects for regional consolidation. They began to look not as the formation of a single economic and, in the long run, political space based on a common East Asian cultural identity, not as the emergence of a relatively unified East Asian center of power, but in a completely different way - as a field of increasingly intense competition and confrontation between Japan and China, which easily transferred their rivalry from Northeast Asia They also showed their willingness to divide the region in order to defend their national interests.

The position of the ASEAN countries on their role in the consolidation process has also become clearer. It turned out that the ASEAN states, weakened by the economic crisis and internal contradictions, are now not so much equal subjects of the consolidation process as objects of the Japanese - Chinese struggle for dominance in the region that is unfolding before our eyes. During the talks with both Chinese Premier Zhu Rongzi and Prime Minister Koizumi, as well as with the leaders of the ASEAN countries, not a single serious initiative was voiced, except for reports about their difficulties and requests for financial and economic assistance that have become routine. One gets the impression that the political elites of the ASEAN countries have quite deliberately taken a wait-and-see attitude in their relations with Japan and China.

Along with Washington's policy, the Sino-Japanese struggle for dominance in the region is now beginning to largely determine the general direction and nature of political and economic processes in Southeast Asia.

CONFRONTATION ALONG THE ENTIRE FRONT

Judging by the agenda of recent diplomatic meetings and contacts between representatives of Japan and the PRC, their confrontation now covers the entire range of issues - from the economy and loans to military and foreign policy issues - such as the targeting of Chinese missiles at Japanese cities, intense competition for dominance in Southeast Asia, and various approaches to the Taiwan problem.

The parties also disagree on the main cultural and historical issues concerning the existence of a common cultural and historical foundation, which Huntington called the Far Eastern Buddhist-Confucian civilization, and the famous Philippine politician Domingo Siason - "the all-conquering spirit of East and Southeast Asia."

Chinese political scientists certainly include Japan in the overall Buddhist-Confucian world, which originates from the enduring values of ancient Chinese civilization. In Japan, this approach is rejected. The country's political and intellectual elite has long been dominated by the belief that there are not one, but two different types of Asian cultures in Northeast and Southeast Asia. According to Kazuo Chiba, a well-known political scientist and former Japanese ambassador to the UK, one of them can be called oceanic, the other continental. According to Tokyo, the differences in the very basis of these cultures determine the deep line of cultural and political division between Japan and China as the main representatives of oceanic and continental cultures, respectively. Moreover, in Japanese political science, the Chinese living in Taiwan and Singapore are associated not with continental, but with oceanic culture, since their level of education, as well as their living standards, international relations, and participation in real government are in sharp contrast to those of mainland China.

The Japanese attitude to the problem of cultural identity can be expressed something like this: "Yes, in the past we borrowed a lot from China, but today it is the twenty-first century, and our perception of the world and way of thinking are very different from the Chinese."

Today's Japanese see themselves more as a strong and culturally unified and self-sufficient nation rather than a part of the East Asian cultural world, which currently has closer cultural ties with the West than with China. Recent social studies in Japan and China have greatly disappointed the proponents of the Buddhist-Confucian cultural area. They did not reveal any deep mutual sympathy between the Japanese and Chinese. But such sympathy is one of the essential features of the common cultural field and acts as a basis for solving practical problems and contradictions in the spirit of peace and compromise. A special survey conducted in 1997 at the initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan showed that less than half of Japanese people are sympathetic or neutral towards the Chinese. In turn, studies conducted in China show that only 10 percent of Chinese people have a positive attitude towards the Japanese, compared to 41 percent who have a negative attitude.

This means that the formation of a single regional community in East Asia on the basis of common cultural values for the peoples of this region has little chance of success, because the peoples themselves, despite the seemingly obvious (especially for Europeans) similarities, refuse to recognize the existence of these common values and, on the contrary, try in every possible way to show deep differences. in the culture. This conclusion is of great importance, transforming the Sino-Japanese rivalry from an intra-civilizational conflict, which means that it is temporary and relatively easy to regulate, to an inter-civilizational conflict, which is long and difficult to regulate.

Recent statements by Japanese and Chinese officials indicate that the long - standing latent confrontation, the origins of which can be found in modern times in the Sino - Japanese war of 1894-1895, is once again gaining dangerous dynamics.

In August 2001, the new Chinese Ambassador to Japan, Wu Dawei, frankly stated that " ... due to the problem of different interpretations of historical events (referring to events during the Japanese occupation of China in 1937-1945), the visit of Taiwanese President Lee Deng

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Hui's visit to Japan, visits by high Japanese officials to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, which is considered a symbol of Japanese militarism, Sino-Japanese relations have now reached the most acute stage since the establishment of diplomatic relations " (in 1972).

The words of the Chinese ambassador about the most acute stage in Japanese-Chinese relations are not an exaggeration. Last year's meeting of the Japanese and Chinese foreign ministers ended without success, however, as most of the Japanese-Chinese negotiations have recently. Neither on the future of Taiwan, nor in the interpretation of recent history, nor on territorial issues, nor on China's military buildup, nor on the continuation of lending to China under the ODA program (non - direct investment from the Japanese budget) and providing Japanese assistance in the development of the poorest 12 provinces of Western China-the agreement of the two sides is not viewed. Beijing is constantly pressuring Tokyo on all these issues, and the Japanese have been making fewer and fewer concessions lately.

Apparently, Tokyo is gradually revising the entire architecture of relations with China. After all, for many years, Japan has been dominated by the view that, despite all mutual contradictions and territorial claims, it is necessary to continue the course that was proclaimed back in 1972 in the Japan-China joint communique and enshrined in the 1978 Treaty of peace and friendship. Proponents of this approach pointed out that over the years of implementing the policy of "compromise and economic assistance", China has become one of Japan's most important trading partners (in 2000, exports to China amounted to 55.3 billion dollars, and imports-30.4 billion; Japanese direct investment over the past 10 years exceeded 38 billion dollars), and, no less It is important that the socio-political situation in China has undergone significant changes. The new social groups that have emerged, due to the country's modernization and high rates of economic growth, are inexorably pushing the ruling regime in China towards deep democratization. And this goal, as Professor Suzuki pointed out in a conversation with me (in the early 90s, he served as an adviser to the Prime Minister in the newly formed Muroyama government), is the basis of Japan's strategy in relations with China. Tokyo believes that in a democracy, China will no longer be an aggressive and expansionist country, if it can maintain itself as a great power at all and not disintegrate.

The idea of weakening China by promoting the democratization of its political system (as happened with the USSR and Eastern Europe) has always been popular in Japanese political circles. It is based on such views that Tokyo, despite the obvious deterioration of relations with Beijing, actively promoted China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and, most likely, will continue, albeit on a smaller scale, to provide economic assistance to the PRC in the future.

Recently, however, a different approach has become increasingly common in Japanese policy towards China. His supporters argue that the policy of compromise and economic assistance" towards China is not beneficial to Japan. With Japanese money, they say, Chinese power is growing at the country's side, with the tacit support of the United States, which in the future can really threaten Japan's security. Therefore, it is necessary to make significant adjustments to the Japanese policy towards China, to present Beijing with a list of conditions without which Japanese aid to China should be sharply reduced or even stopped. These demands include Beijing reducing military spending, improving conditions for Japanese investors, and changing its policy towards Taiwan.

THE ETERNAL PROBLEM-TAIWAN

Taiwan and everything connected with it is a very sensitive issue for most Japanese politicians. Tokyo still unofficially claims that Taiwan was liberated in 1895 during the Sino-Japanese War

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that 80 percent of the island's population is radically different from the mainland Chinese and, together with the Japanese, are carriers of the values of oceanic culture; that Taiwan's prosperity is based on the foundation laid during the years when Taiwan was part of the Empire of Japan.

This point of view is officially almost invisible, but in practice the Japanese stubbornly follow it. They, for example, have resolutely refused to join the "three no's" policy initiated by Beijing towards Taiwan and supported by the United States. This policy was voiced by Henry Kissinger. She implied that the United States does not seek the formation of two Chinas, the implementation of the "one China - one Taiwan" formula, and an independent Taiwan. Moreover, the Japanese have recently prepared a list of requirements for Beijing to facilitate foreign investment, and at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the two countries, they declared Japan's unconditional ownership of the disputed Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu) and warned of the upcoming reduction in lending under the price investment program from the Japanese budget.

It is not surprising that after such steps, the tone of Chinese statements regarding Japanese policy became even more harsh. The aforementioned Chinese Ambassador to Japan, Wu Dawei, recently stated that "...If the Japanese government continues to insult the feelings of the Chinese people on issues related to Taiwan's history, then Sino-Japanese relations and international relations throughout East Asia will face great difficulties."

This statement draws attention to the fact that the threats of the Chinese official representative about the appearance of all sorts of difficulties in the event of Japanese intransigence apply not only to Sino-Japanese relations, but also to international relations in East Asia. The meaning of his words can be interpreted in such a way that in the event of a more serious confrontation, Beijing can seriously damage Japanese interests in the ASEAN area (in China, as in Japan, it is customary to call the region that includes these two countries, the Korean Peninsula and Southeast Asia, East Asia).

Chinese threats are not a bluff, because in recent years Beijing has consistently increased its economic and political ties with the countries of the region, taking active steps to become one of the main trade, economic and political partners of the ASEAN countries. China-ASEAN bilateral trade has grown from $ 13 billion in 1994 to $ 23.5 billion in 1998 and to $ 40 billion in 2000. The key points of Beijing's new policy towards Southeast Asia were the proclamation of the so - called "go abroad policy" - that is, a policy that allows Chinese companies to invest capital outside of China, using both state loans and guarantees of insurance of these investments from the Chinese government.

Beijing hopes that China's active financial and economic expansion, transition to the role of the main investor and trading partner, coupled with the enormous influence of ethnic Chinese in the region, will open the way to future political dominance.

As for the Japanese, during Koizumi's visit, they demonstrated that they are ready to both protect their economic and political interests in the region and offer the ASEAN elites a project to create a common market alternative to the Chinese one. The extent of Japanese interests can be judged at least from the following data: in 1996, for example, the total volume of Japanese trade with the ASEAN countries was $ 109 billion, Japan accumulated 21 percent of all ASEAN countries ' foreign trade, and ASEAN, in turn, accumulated about 15 percent of all Japan's foreign trade and more than 10 percent of all japanese direct investment abroad.

Koizumi spoke about a new model for the development of Japan's relations with the ASEAN countries, which provides for strengthening ties not only in the traditional areas of trade and investment, but also in the field of science, information technology and education. At the same time, the Japanese prime Minister stressed that this model should be implemented not within the framework of the "Greater China economic community", but within the framework of a new regional community, which will include Japan and the ASEAN countries. Unlike the Chinese project, which was simultaneously signed by all its participants - China and the ASEAN countries-the new Japan-Asean common market will be built by consistently concluding bilateral agreements between partners, following the example of the already signed free trade agreement between Japan and Singapore.

It is difficult to say why the Japanese place such hopes on the attractiveness of this agreement for the ASEAN countries. According to it, tariffs will be removed from 94 percent of Singapore's total exports to Japan, but the main products of agricultural production and fishing for the export of most Southeast Asian countries are excluded from the free zone. For industrialised Singapore, this is not as significant as for Burma, Laos, Cambodia, and even Vietnam. In the Chinese project, for example, there are no restrictions on trade in agricultural and fishing products.

Just by comparing these two competing proposals, one can assume the possibility of a dangerous split in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the more developed countries (Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore) are likely to join the bloc with Japan, while the least developed countries - such as Burma, Laos, and Cambodia - will have no choice but to enter a free economic zone with China.

It is difficult to say how Vietnam and Indonesia will behave, but it is obvious that the consolidation of the situation of internal division in the long term and the transition of Sino-Japanese contradictions, in the language of modern conflictology, from the non-actualized to the actualized phase, can once again turn Southeast Asia into a sphere of confrontation between the great Asian powers with all the negative consequences that

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