Washington went to great lengths to portray the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a "humane act" that saved millions of lives. Most Americans still believe that the destruction of Japanese cities by nuclear fire was inevitable and justified. Surprisingly, 20% of modern Japanese agree with this. "Two atomic bombs were dropped and the war ended," many say.

At the same time, the participation of the Soviet Union in the defeat of Japanese militarism is either not mentioned at all, or it is denounced as "a treacherous act in violation of the neutrality pact." This brings us back to the events of the summer of 1945 in the Far East.

Moreover, the opposite assessments of these events in Russia and Japan have a direct impact on modern relations between the two countries and complicate the process of final reconciliation. In addition, since the Tokyo Tribunal convicted Japanese war criminals 60 years ago, many secrets have been revealed, which in some cases allow us to take a different look at the policies and strategies of the main participants in the global conflict.

WASHINGTON'S PROBE

The very next day after the attack of the Japanese Fleet on the US Pacific naval base Pearl Harbor, US President F. Roosevelt expressed his wish to the Soviet government for the participation of the USSR in the war against Japan, receiving the new Soviet ambassador M. Litvinov on December 8, 1941, immediately after his arrival in the United States, without protocol formalities, when presenting his credentials.

Roosevelt was interested in the possibility of using the territory of the Soviet Union for bombing attacks on the Japanese metropolis. This would mean that the USSR would automatically join the war and would be contrary to the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact.

Stalin's position was formulated in a telegram from Molotov to Litvinov dated December 10, 1941. It instructed Roosevelt to inform him that at the moment the USSR would not be able to declare a state of war with Japan and would remain neutral as long as Japan respected the Soviet-Japanese pact. The message read in part:"...We think that our main enemy is still Hitler's Germany. Weakening the U.S.S.R.'s resistance to German aggression would lead to the strengthening of the Axis powers to the detriment of the U.S.S.R. and all our allies. " ¹

After receiving Stalin's message, the President of the United States on December 11, during a meeting with the Soviet ambassador, said that he regretted this, but in the place of the Soviet Union would have done the same. At the same time, Roosevelt asked the Soviet leaders not to publicly announce their intention to observe neutrality with Japan, thereby creating the impression among the Japanese that the issue remains unresolved.

Somewhat differently, Stalin spoke about the possibility of the USSR entering the war against Japan 10 days later with the British Foreign Minister A. Eden, who arrived in Moscow, who, on behalf of his government, like Roosevelt, directly raised the question of Soviet assistance in the war with Japan. Stalin declared:"...At present, the USSR is not yet ready for war with Japan. A significant number of our Far Eastern troops have recently been deployed to the Western Front. New forces are now being formed in the Far East, but it will take at least another four months before the USSR is properly prepared in these areas... It would have been much better if Japan had attacked the USSR. This would create a more favorable political and psychological atmosphere in our country. A defensive war would have been more popular and would have created a monolithic unity in the ranks of the Soviet people..."² Stalin expressed his readiness to resume negotiations with Great Britain on the Far Eastern situation in the spring of next year.

In June 1942, Japanese troops landed on the islands of Kyska and Attu (Aleutian Islands). The capture of these islands, which are part of the territory of the United States, shocked the Americans. This prompted Roosevelt, acting at the urgent request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), to step up probing the Soviet position in relation to Japan. In his message to Stalin of June 17, Roosevelt, from-

dropping the diplomatic language, he essentially called on the Soviet government to open joint operations in the Far East: "The situation that is developing in the North Pacific and in the area of Alaska clearly shows that the Japanese government may be preparing for operations against the Soviet Primorye. If such an attack occurs, the United States is prepared to provide the Soviet Union with American air force assistance, provided that the Soviet Union provides these forces with suitable landing sites in Siberia..."³ Warnings about the danger of a Japanese attack on the USSR from the East could not be considered only as a manifestation of Washington's desire to quickly draw the Soviet Union into military operations in the Far East in its own interests. The increase in the number of Japanese troops in the north, which was recorded by Soviet and American intelligence services, was connected with plans for Japan to speak out against the USSR in the event of the success of Hitler's summer military campaign, on which Japanese supporters of the war against the USSR pinned considerable hopes.

Roosevelt's proposal was so serious that Stalin did not immediately respond to it. However, the unsuccessful Soviet offensive near Kharkov and the subsequent battle for the Caucasus and Stalingrad, as well as the ongoing siege of Leningrad, forced the Soviet leadership to avoid a military clash with Japan.

A WHISPERED PROMISE

The meeting of Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill in Tehran was preceded by the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the United States ,and Great Britain (October 19-30, 1943). The instructions prepared for the negotiations of the OKNSH specifically stated: "Russia's full participation in the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany is essential for a more rapid and crushing defeat of Japan with the least losses for the United States and Great Britain." The question of the possibility of the USSR's participation in the war with Japan was raised by US Secretary of State Karl Hall in his conversation with Stalin.

Stalin then for the first time declared his readiness to help defeat Japan. And this was done not during official negotiations, but at a dinner in the Kremlin on the occasion of the completion of the Moscow Conference.

V. Berezhkov, who was serving as an interpreter at the dinner, recalled: "... Then I noticed that Stalin was leaning in my direction behind Hall's back and beckoning me with his finger. I leaned closer, and he said, almost inaudibly::

Listen to me carefully. Translate the following to Hell: The Soviet government considered the situation in the Far East and decided immediately after the end of the war in Europe, when the Allies defeated Hitler's Germany, to move against Japan. Let Hall pass this on to President Roosevelt as our official position. But for now, we want to keep it a secret. And you keep your voice down so that no one else can hear. Do you understand?"

It was obvious that Hall was extremely excited by what he had just heard. ... Now the US government has received an official statement from the head of the Soviet government on a matter of such importance to Washington, of course in strict confidence. " ⁴

Describing Stalin's position on the Far East issue, Hall reported to Washington that the head of the Soviet government "showed a deep desire for cooperation with the United States and Great Britain." As Hall wrote in his memoirs, Stalin made this statement "confidently, completely unselfishly, without demanding anything in return." ⁵

A month later, at the Tehran Conference, Stalin declared: "We Russians welcome the successes that have been achieved and are being achieved by the Anglo-American troops in the Pacific. Unfortunately, we cannot yet join our efforts to those of our Anglo-American friends, because our forces are occupied in the West and we do not have enough forces for any operations against Japan. Our forces

In the Far East, they are more or less sufficient only to conduct defense, but for offensive operations, these forces must be increased at least three times. This may be the case when we force Germany to capitulate. Then - a common front against Japan. " ⁶

Despite the fact that Stalin's promise was of a general nature, and even a joint protocol record was not made in Tehran on this subject, the Americans and the British enthusiastically accepted the words of the Soviet leader that the USSR's appearance in the East could take place 6 months after the German surrender.

At the Tehran conference, for the first time, a conversation was held about the possible results of the defeat of Japan in order to restore the territorial rights of the USSR in the Far East. Moreover, the initiative of such a statement of the question was shown by the Western allies. Churchill began by declaring "that the Soviet Navy should be able to sail freely in all seas and oceans."

Responding to Stalin's question about what could be done for Russia in the Far East, Roosevelt suggested turning Dayren, for example, into a free port. Emphasizing that the Soviet Union was effectively locked up in the Far East by the Japanese, Stalin noted that " Port Arthur is more suitable as a naval base." As if summing up the preliminary discussion of this issue, Churchill said that "it is quite obvious that Russia should have access to warm seas." At the same time, remembering that as a result of the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Russia has lost part of its territory in the Far East, and he emphasized that "the management of the world should be concentrated in the hands of nations that are fully satisfied and have no complaints." ⁷

Finally, the political conditions for the participation of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan were formulated and fixed at the Crimean (Yalta) Conference of the heads of government of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain.

American and British leaders were clearly aware that the timing of the victory over Germany directly depended on the prospects of defeating Japan. A "Memo" prepared for President Roosevelt and the American delegation for the Yalta talks emphasized: "We must have the support of the Soviet Union to defeat Germany. We desperately need the Soviet Union for war with Japan after the end of the war in Europe. " ⁸

American official documents indicate that "the main task of the American government was to ensure that the USSR entered the war with Japan as soon as possible in order to prevent the relocation of the Kwantung Army to the mother country at the time of the invasion."⁹

Stalin was sympathetic to these concerns. While in Tehran he agreed in principle to enter the war against Japan "six months after the end of the war in Europe," in Yalta, despite the great difficulties of transferring Soviet troops to the East, this period was halved. Stalin promised to start the war with Japan "in two or three months after the German surrender."

IS THE WORLD "HARD" OR "SOFT"?

The prospect of Soviet participation in the defeat of Japan hastened the development of the US occupation problems of this country, which the Americans began to study 10 months after the attack on Pearl Harbor. To this end, the US State Department established a Committee for Post-War Programs, chaired by Secretary of State Hall.

One of the central issues of rather heated discussion among the committee members was the attitude to the imperial system of government in Japan.

From the very beginning, two groups were identified-supporters of a "hard" and "soft" peace with Japan. The first group included individuals led by Assistant Undersecretary of State B. Long, who demanded strict punishment of Japan. The second group, which was headed by former US Ambassador to Japan and then head of the Far Eastern Department of the State Department, J. R. R. Tolkien.Gru, played for the "generous world".

The position of the former was as follows: "It is impossible to limit oneself to disarmament and then leave Japan alone. To ensure peace and security in the Pacific, it is necessary to take measures that prevent Japan from repeating aggressive wars. It is necessary to eliminate the very reasons for such a policy, namely, to eliminate the imperial system as a structure for centralizing power... As long as there is a deified emperor, there will be a Japanese threat to the United States... U.S. public opinion overwhelmingly demands the elimination of the imperial system. In the countries of our allies, there is a firm intention to punish the Japanese emperor on a par with Hitler and Mussolini. Without eliminating the imperial system, one cannot speak of victory over Japan."

Proponents of the" soft world " responded:: "It would be wrong to consider the imperial system and aggressive war inseparable. In Japan's more than 1,300-year history, the Emperor continued to exist as the sole source of legitimate power. The war did not start on the initiative of the emperor, he was only used to unleash it... If the imperial system is destroyed and Japanese territory is dismembered, the Japanese people will refuse to cooperate with the occupying forces. In this case, the United States will have to use several hundred thousand soldiers to carry out military control. If the United States cannot remain indefinitely in Japan, a highly anti-American government will emerge after the occupation period. On the other hand, if the imperial system is maintained and Japanese administrative bodies are used, rather than direct US rule, the Japanese people will cooperate with each other.-

your company is with us... The Emperor is necessary as a psychological basis for the post-war reconstruction of Japan. " ¹⁰

In May 1944, the committee decided that the imperial system would be preserved, the territory of Japan would not be divided, and the Japanese government would independently manage the country.

However, the generals had their own opinions. Shortly after the German surrender, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began to deal with the occupation of Japan. The generals and colonels assigned to the "White Team" created in this regard were concerned not so much with the problems of the future of Japan, but with current issues of the use of troops.

Planning the landing in the south of Kyushu in November 1945 (Operation Olympic), and then in March of the following year on the east coast of the main Japanese island of Honshu (Operation Coronet), the developers of these operations proceeded from the likely prospect of losing from 500 thousand to one million soldiers and officers. It was believed that after the surrender of Japan, 23 divisions, or 850 thousand people, would be required to occupy its territory. According to the team,"The peculiarity of Japan is that even after the surrender of the central government, local resistance can continue in various parts of the country." ¹¹

FOUR ZONES OF OCCUPATION

The allocation of 850 thousand American troops for the occupation of Japan could create great domestic political difficulties, since in the United States after the surrender of Germany, expectations increased for the speedy return of American soldiers to their homeland. This greatly worried Truman, who became President of the United States after Roosevelt's death in April 1945. A. Gromyko noted in his memoirs that Truman under Roosevelt "as a politician shone like the moon-with reflected light" ¹².

The inner circle of the new president began to lean towards occupying Japan together with the main countries participating in the coalition. Admiral W. Leahy, the chief of the president's personal staff, who had a great influence on the president, believed that the United States should not assume the main responsibility in managing the defeated Japan and the number of American occupation troops should be reduced as much as possible. Perhaps the Legi memo "On reducing the participation of the US military in the occupation of Japan and the early demobilization of military personnel" reflected Truman's sentiments. After receiving this note, the JCS accelerated the development of a plan for the occupation of Japan by dividing it into occupation zones.

The developers of the plan assumed that in addition to the United States, Great Britain, China, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines and a number of other countries could take part in the war against Japan. At the same time, however, it was believed that the involvement of small countries for the occupation of Japan would only complicate the situation of the United States, because in this case they would have to take on additional responsibilities for providing them with weapons, means of transporting troops, etc.

In addition to Great Britain, which as the closest ally of the United States was considered a natural participant in the occupation of Japan, China was also supposed to be involved. But it was feared that a civil war could break out in China immediately after the victory over Japan, which would make it difficult to allocate Chinese troops for the occupation of the Japanese metropolis.

The prospect of Soviet participation in the war against Japan created prerequisites for the widespread use of Soviet troops for the subsequent occupation of part of the territory of the Japanese Islands. However, American politicians were concerned that in this case the USSR would gain greater rights in the management of Japan. It was suggested that under the occupation of Japan, the United States, by analogy with a joint-stock company, should secure a chairman's position as a majority shareholder. The fact that from a political point of view, the active participation of the USSR in military operations in the Far East is unprofitable for the United States, was stated by many American politicians and diplomats. Thus, the US Ambassador to the USSR A. Harriman wrote in the fall of 1944 to the presidential adviser G. Hopkins:"...Their policy will undoubtedly extend to China and the Pacific ... " This opinion was shared by the director of the US Office of Strategic Services, Wu. Donovan, who wrote in a memorial to Truman on May 5, 1945:"...We cannot ignore the fact that after the defeat of Japan, Russia will become an even more formidable force in the Far East." Neither did the commander of the Allied forces in the Far East, American General D. A., want to strengthen the political and military role of the USSR in East Asia. MacArthur, koto-

roi admitted: "At that time (since 1942-A. K.) I strongly supported the entry of the Russians into the war in the Pacific, but later, when victory was already in our hands, I strongly opposed this step ..." ¹³

Nevertheless, purely military considerations forced the American command to continue insisting on the mandatory involvement of the USSR in the defeat of Japan. The experience of the bloody battles for the islands of Iwo Jima and Okinawa convinced that the Japanese would desperately resist. Secretary of War of the United States G. Stimson reported to the President on July 2, 1945: "Once we begin the invasion, I believe we will have to end it with even more brutal battles than those that took place in Germany. As a result, we will suffer huge losses and will be forced to leave Japan." Therefore, during the Berlin (Potsdam) conference, despite the information received about the successful test of the atomic bomb, Truman emphasized that "the United States expects help from the USSR." In response, Stalin assured: "The Soviet Union will be ready to go into action by mid-August, and it will keep its word." ¹⁴

By this time, the OKNSH already had a concrete plan for the occupation of the Japanese metropolis by the armed forces of four states - the United States, Great Britain, the USSR and China. At the same time, the concept of "metropolis of Japan" included four main islands - Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and about a thousand adjacent islands, with the exception of Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands and Okinawa. It should be noted that such a definition of the territory of Japan was then recorded in the text of the Potsdam Declaration on the conditions of surrender of Japan sent to the Japanese government on July 26, 1945.

When defining the occupation zones, the American developers assumed that the central area of the main Japanese island of Honshu with a developed infrastructure should be controlled by the United States. The island of Kyushu, which was sufficiently developed industrially, was supposed to be allocated for occupation by the British troops. The backward agricultural areas of Shikoku Island were allocated to accommodate contingents of Chinese troops.

The proposed zone of occupation by Soviet troops even exceeded the area of the American one. The Soviet Union was to deploy its troops not only on Hokkaido (Japan's second largest island), but also to occupy the north-eastern part of Honshu.

Special attention was paid to the Japanese capital. To ensure the leadership position of the United States in occupied Japan, it was planned to control Tokyo by American troops. However, other powers might not agree with this. Therefore, the OKNSH decided that, as in Berlin, Tokyo will have to allow the presence of representatives of the command of Great Britain, the USSR and China, creating at least the impression of a joint administration.

An essential aspect of the plan of the Joint Venture was the intention to introduce troops of other powers into Japan not immediately, but as American troops were withdrawn. So, in the first 3 months after the surrender, 23 US divisions (850 thousand people) were planned to be deployed on the Japanese Islands. Over the next 9 months, it was planned to have the following allied forces on the Japanese Islands: the United States - 8.3divisions (315 thousand people), Great Britain - 5 divisions (165 thousand people), China - 4 divisions (130 thousand people), the USSR-6 divisions (210 thousand people). At the final stage, the occupation forces were to be reduced by about half. 4 US divisions, 2 British divisions, 2 Chinese divisions, and 3 Soviet divisions remained in Japan.¹⁵

However, these calculations were kept strictly secret - the allies were not informed about them. According to the American documents, the JCS concluded its discussion of occupation-related issues on August 16, the day after Emperor Hirohito announced his surrender. The plan for the partition of Japan proposed to the US government was set out in the document "Final Occupation of Japan and Japanese Territory".

SYMBOLIC DISEMBARKATION

There is no evidence in the historical literature that Stalin knew about the American plan to divide Japan into occupation zones. Only the opinion expressed by him on May 28, 1945, in a conversation in the Kremlin with the US presidential envoy Hopkins, about the expediency of concluding a special agreement with the governments of the United States and Great Britain on determining the zones of responsibility and areas of occupation before the USSR entered the war, is documented. However, it is not clear what Stalin meant - the confirmation of the Yalta agreements on the occupation of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands by Soviet troops and their subsequent inclusion in the USSR, or even the allocation of an occupation zone on the territory of the Japanese metropolis.

Stalin's position on the future of the defeated Axis countries can be judged by his attitude to the question of the dismemberment of Germany. While in Moscow in October 1944, Churchill, in a conversation with Stalin, proposed to dismember Germany into 3 states-Prussia, the Austro-Bavarian state, as well as Württemberg and Baden. The Rhenish industrial area was proposed to be placed under international control. Roosevelt also spoke in favor of dividing Germany into 5 independent states. Stalin agreed with this idea. At the same time, it was believed that "a real, effective obstacle to the revival of German military potential can only be created by dismembering Germany, i.e. dividing it into separate, completely independent states."

The question of the dismemberment of Germany was considered at the Crimean Conference. In Yalta, Roosevelt said that defining the zones of occupation of Germany could be the first step towards its dismemberment-

nenia. Then Stalin did not object. However, on May 9, 1945, Victory Day, in an address to the Soviet people, he declared that "the Soviet Union is triumphant, but it is not going to dismember or destroy Germany." It is logical to assume that this applied equally to Japan.

Although specific questions about the conditions of occupation of the Japanese metropolis were not directly discussed between the allies, Stalin believed that participation in the war in the Far East allowed the USSR to count on at least a limited zone of presence of Soviet troops directly on Japanese territory proper. However, Truman changed his mind and abandoned the plan to allocate a zone of occupation for the USSR on the Japanese Islands. He admitted in his memoirs: "Although I fervently wanted to involve the USSR in the war with Japan, then, based on the hard experience of Potsdam, I was strengthened in the opinion not to allow the Soviet Union to take part in the management of Japan. In my heart, I decided that after the victory over Japan, all power in this country would be transferred to General MacArthur. " ¹⁶

Moreover, in the "General Order No. 1" sent to Stalin on August 15 on the surrender of the Japanese armed forces, Truman "forgot" to indicate that the Japanese garrisons in the Kuril Islands should surrender and capitulate to the troops of the USSR. This was a signal that Truman may violate the Yalta agreement on the transition of the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union.

Stalin responded cautiously but firmly, proposing in a personal letter to Truman dated August 16 to make the following amendments to General Order No. 1::

Include in the area of surrender of the Japanese armed forces to the Soviet troops all the Kuril Islands, which, according to the decision of the three powers in the Crimea, should pass into the possession of the Soviet Union.

Include in the area of surrender of the Japanese armed forces to the Soviet troops the northern half of the island of Hokkaido, adjacent to the La Perouse Strait, located between Karafuto (Sakhalin-AK) and Hokkaido. The demarcation line between the northern and southern halves of Hokkaido Island should be drawn along the line running from the city of Kushiro on the eastern shore of the island to the city of Rumoe on the western shore of the island, including these cities in the northern half of the island.

Explaining the desirability of having an area of occupation on the territory of Japan proper, Stalin pointed out that this "is of particular importance for Russian public opinion. As is well known, the Japanese occupied the entire Soviet Far East in 1919-1921. Russian public opinion would be seriously offended if the Russian troops did not have an area of occupation in any part of Japanese territory proper." Stalin described his proposals as modest and expressed the hope that they would not meet with objections.

Given the terms of the Yalta Agreement, Truman was forced to agree "to include all the Kuril Islands in the area that should capitulate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East." As for the proposal for the occupation of the northern part of Hokkaido by Soviet troops, it was rejected by Truman. At the same time, in his response, he unexpectedly stated his desire to "have rights to air bases for land and sea aircraft on one of the Kuril Islands, preferably in the central group."

Making no secret of his annoyance at Truman's refusal to allow Soviet troops to enter Hokkaido, Stalin bluntly rejected the US demand for bases in the Kuril Islands. It was pointed out to the American president that "demands of this kind are usually made either to a defeated state or to a union state that is itself unable to defend this or that part of its territory." Thus, it was made clear that in accordance with the Yalta Agreement, the USSR has the right to dispose of the Kuril Islands at its discretion.

Among the reasons why Truman did not want to allow Soviet troops to enter Hokkaido was the desire of the Americans to claim all the laurels of the winner, to assert the decisive role of the American atomic bomb in achieving victory. However, even the destruction of an entire city by a single bomb - Hiroshima - did not lead Japan to surrender. The Japanese government continued to prepare the country for a decisive battle on its territory. There were still hopes for the transfer of the Kwantung Army from Manchuria to the mother country, which was supposed to strengthen the defense of the Japanese islands during the amphibious operation of US troops. Only the Red Army could prevent such a development.

It can be argued that the Japanese government made the final decision on capitulation only after the Soviet Union entered the war. This was recognized in Japan. On August 9, 1945, at an emergency meeting of the Supreme Council for the Leadership of the War, the Prime Minister K. Suzuki stated: "The entry of the Soviet Union into the war this morning puts us completely in a hopeless situation and makes it impossible to continue the war." ¹⁷

A week later, in his rescript "To soldiers and Sailors" dated August 16, Emperor Hirohito, without mentioning the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, pointed out: "Now that the Soviet Union has also entered the war against us, continue resistance... it means jeopardizing the very foundation of our empire."

FAIR ASSESSMENT

The entry of the USSR into the war against militaristic Japan was received with enthusiasm and hope in the world. In a telegram dated August 9, 1945, the President of the Republic of China, Chiang Kai-shek, wrote to Stalin: "The Soviet Union's declaration of war against Japan from today on has caused the entire Chinese people to feel a deep sense of inspiration.

On behalf of the Chinese Government, people, and Army, I have the honor to express to you, as well as to the Government and heroic people,

sincere and joyful admiration to the Army of the Soviet Union " ¹⁸.

The Indian newspaper Lider wrote on August 10, 1945: "Russia's entry into the Pacific War justifies the hope that the dependent countries of Asia harbored." ¹⁹

The justice of the goals and the importance of the USSR's entry into the war were recognized in both the United States and Great Britain. The British government's statement read in part: "The war declared today by the Soviet Union against Japan is proof of the solidarity that exists between the main allies, and it should shorten the period of struggle and create conditions that will contribute to the establishment of universal peace. We welcome this great decision of Soviet Russia. " ²⁰

The influential American newspaper "New York Herald Tribune" on August 10, 1945 in an editorial article noted:: "There can hardly be any doubt that the entry of the Soviet Union into the war will be decisive in military terms."

Objective assessments of the role and significance of the USSR's participation in the war against militaristic Japan are also found in Japanese publications. So, in one of the works it is noted: "There are many people in Japan who view the Soviet Union's entry into the war as a treacherous act. Well, for the Japanese militarists who were eager to continue the war, this may have looked like treachery. However, joining the war was by no means disloyal to the peoples of Asian countries who groaned under the yoke of invaders and colonizers, as well as to the many Japanese who prayed for a speedy end to the war. Therefore, the accusation of the Soviet Union that at the time of entering the war "the neutrality pact was still valid" is nothing more than a formal approach."

Also interesting is the conclusion of Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, an American historian and ethnic Japanese who, in his work "Chasing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and Japan's Surrender" published in the United States and Japan, admitted: "It is obvious that the two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not have a decisive impact on Japan's decision to capitulate. ... Without the Soviet Union's entry into the war, the Japanese would have continued to fight until the use of multiple atomic bombs, the successful invasion of the mother country by Allied forces, or the massive aerial bombardment and naval blockade forced them to surrender. " ²¹

Unfortunately, these estimates are hushed up. Western and Japanese propagandists now claim that the entry of the USSR was " an unnecessary and even harmful action." Moreover, versions are being invented that the Japanese should almost thank the Americans for dropping atomic bombs, which "saved Japan from being captured by the Russians."

The sometimes absurd claims about the plans to create a "socialist republic of Hokkaido" in the north of Japan, which threatened to divide the Japanese nation from the USSR, have no evidence base. They also contradict elementary logic. Exhausted by the bloody war, the Soviet Union did not have the means, experience, or necessary personnel to implement such "plans". It was only about the symbolic landing of a small contingent of Soviet troops, who, after a short period, would most likely leave Japanese territory. Just as the Soviet troops were withdrawn from China by May 1946 and from the territory of the Korean Peninsula.

Declassified in the post-war period, American plans to allocate a vast area for the deployment of a significant contingent of Soviet troops in the Japanese metropolis were not based on recognition of the USSR's contribution to the defeat of the Far Eastern aggressor. Soviet divisions were planned to be used as "cannon fodder" in the event of a partisan war in Japan. However, the war-weary Japanese accepted the inevitability of occupation. To a certain extent, this was also facilitated by the fact that the Americans preserved the imperial system of government.

Under these circumstances, Truman decided to "make the occupation of Japan a purely American enterprise." And with the beginning of the Cold War in 1947, and especially the Korean War of 1950-1953, the course was set to turn Japan into a springboard, and then into an ally in the implementation of Washington's military strategy in the Far East. We can still see the results of this policy.

¹ Soviet-American relations during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Documents and materials. Moscow, 1984, vol. I, p. 144.

² From the personal archive of J. V. Stalin. Cit. by: Rzheshevsky O. A. Voina i diplomatiya [War and Diplomacy]. Documents, comments of 1941-1942, Moscow, 1997, pp. 58-59.

³ Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Moscow, 1976, vol. 2, p. 19.

^{Berezhkov V. M.} 4 Rozhdenie coalitsii [The Birth of a Coalition], Moscow, 1975, pp. 225-227.

^{Hull C.} 5 The Memories. Vol. 2, p. 1309 - 1310.

⁶ The Soviet Union at international conferences of the Great Patriotic War period. Teheran Conference of the leaders of the three allied powers-the USSR, the USA and Great Britain (November 28-December 1, 1943). Collection of documents. Moscow, 1978, p. 95.

⁷ Soviet-American Relations ... Vol. 1, pp. 454-455.

^{Yakovlev N.} 8 Franklin Roosevelt-a Man and a Politician, Moscow, 1969, p. 487.

⁹ United States Relations with China. Reference to the Period 1944 - 1949. Washington, 1949, p. 8.

¹⁰ Nihon bunkatsu (The Dismemberment of Japan). Tokyo, 1978, pp. 29-32.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 35-36.

^{Gromyko A. A.} 12 Pamyatnoe [Memorial], Moscow, 1988, book 1, p. 211.

¹³ World Wars of the XX century. Book 4. Moscow, 2002, pp. 327-328.

¹⁴ The Soviet Union at international conferences... Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, Moscow, 1984, p. 40.

¹⁵ Nihon bunkatsu, pp. 70-71.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 73-74.

^{Inoue Kiyoshi, Okonogi Shinzaburo, Suzuki Sesi.} 17 Istoriya sovremennoy Yapanii [History of Modern Japan], translated from Japanese, Moscow, 1955, pp. 263-264.

¹⁸ Foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War. Documents and materials. Vol. III. Moscow, 1947, p. 365.

¹⁹ Cit. In: International Relations in the Far East, Book 2, Moscow, 1973, p. 227.

²⁰ Izvestia, 10.08.1945.

^{Tsuyoshi Hasegawa.} 21 Racing the Enemy. Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 2005, p. 295.

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