The Roman institution interregnum was intended in the Republican constitution for critical situations of violation of the continuity of the highest executive power. Its two main branches were, first, the patres, which served as the collective bearer of the supreme powers of community administration and the electoral college for the extraordinary magistrate, and, second, the extraordinary magistrate himself, who was replaced every five days, the interrex. The purpose of introducing the interregnum and the main task of interrex during the republic was to conduct consular elections to restore the normal order of government. The conduct of these elections was regulated (like the entire mechanism of the interregnum institute's functioning in general) by traditional norms, one of which is most often defined by researchers as a ban for the first interrex to manage consular missions. Let's first consider what this ban was.

According to Asconius, it was not the custom for the first-proclaimed interrex to hold elective comitia (2). Titus Livy constantly notes the election of consuls during the interregnum under the leadership of the second and subsequent interrexes (Liv. VI. 5. 6; VIII. 17. 5; X. 11. 10, etc.), and this seems to be the norm of political practice. Given that the interregnum institution was established before the consuls, the corresponding rule is more generally formulated as follows: the first interregnum did not preside over electoral meetings. There are, however, two exceptions. At the first interrex, King Tullus Hostilius (Dionys. III. I. 1) and dictator Sulla (Arr. SUN.I. 98-99) were elected. Since one of these exceptions relates to the reconstruction of early archaic times, and the second to the non-standard situation of electing a dictator through an interrex, their presence does not change the idea of researchers (mostly those who do not remember them) that the first interrex did not have the right to hold elections. The problem for historians has always been to find an acceptable explanation for the prohibition that they did not doubt. The first person who tried to do this was T. Mommsen, whose hypothesis on this subject has long remained the only one in historiography. It came down to the fact that the first interrex could not hold consular elections, since it was appointed without the necessary auspiciaries. The second and subsequent interrexes held office after the preliminary bird assignments conducted by their predecessors, so they were entitled to perform their own auspices for candidates for consulship(3). Mommsen's explanation

(1) The article was prepared within the framework of the project "Roman Republican Interregnum as a Political Institution", developed with the support of the Russian Humanitarian Science Foundation (grant 98-01-00344). Let us note at once that the Russian word " interregnum "is used only as a tracing paper of the Latin word"interregnum".

(2) Asc. P. 37 (Pro Mil.): "Non fuit autem moris ab eo qui primus interrex proditus erat comitia haberi".

(3) Mommsen Th. Abriss des romischen Staatsrecht. Lpz, 1893. S. 104.

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it has very vulnerable points, regardless of which path of logical reasoning we will follow.

In any case, as a starting point, we must accept the existence of the following norm: the patres to which the auspiciaries returned with the advent of the interregnum (Cic. Ep. ad Brut. I. 5. 4), having them collectively, could not conduct them collectively - this was done individually by one of them. In the first variant of further reasoning, we will assume that each of their representatives could act in this role.

In this case, first of all, it is not clear why one of the patres could not also have carried out bird tracking for the first interrex. If the patres could delegate their (collectively owned) right of auspiciousness to the first interrex, then why couldn't they have someone else do it for him as well? Secondly, and most importantly, the practice of resigning consuls who were wrongly elected from the point of view of the augurs(4), i.e. in case of violations in the preliminary bird assignments, shows that a consul who was elected under incorrect auspices could not conduct such in relation to the successor. No less revealing are the resignations in such situations by the dictator comitiorum habendorum causa, whose purpose was precisely to hold consular elections, which turned out to be impossible due to errors in the auspices before his proclamation. Thus, in Rome, there was a sacral legal norm of political life: only a magistrate announced after unmistakable auspiciums could direct the election of another top official (i.e., first of all, make bird orders in relation to him). It follows that if we accept the appointment of the first interrex without any auspices at all, then it looks not only not logical, but also not entirely legitimate to conduct auspices by him.

A different chain of reasoning is also possible. Patres are collective carriers of auspices, but they could be performed individually not just by one of them, but necessarily by a magistrate (in this emergency case - interrex). Therefore, as long as there was no designated interrex, auspices were not performed. He also conducted bird searches for the second interrex on the grounds that he was a representative of patres and a magistrate in one person. In other words, he had the right of auspicium not on the basis of delegating this right from the patres (as was the case in the case of electing a magistrate in the centuriate comitia and granting him the imperium and auspicium in the curiate), but "by nature": being one of the" fathers", he was the natural bearer of auspicium. We can proceed from this and say that no auspices were conducted in relation to the first interrex, but even in this case, T. Mommsen's hypothesis about the prohibition for the first interrex to lead electoral campaigns is shaky. For then it is not clear why the first interrex could have held auspices for a successor, but could not have done so for a candidate for the consulship. Based only on the absence of preliminary bird names for the first interregnum, this difference cannot be explained.

Having presented two possible variants of logical reasoning, we note that we are still inclined to the first of them, since Titus Livy defines the appointment of the interrex patres as performed suspicato. Moreover, the patricians conducted their auspices on the first interrex as private individuals (et privatim auspicia habeamus-Liv. VI. 41. 6), and not as magistrates, which undermines the main premise of the second version of the issue (as if the auspices could be performed not just by one of the patres, but by a magistrate). However, in our opinion, regardless of whether the first interrex was subject to bird orders or not, he himself was entitled to carry out inspections of candidates for the consular post, because in principle he was entitled to conduct them (as is undoubtedly evidenced by the exercise of this right when appointing a successor). The right of public auspices,

(4) See Dementieva V. V. Roman Republican Interregnum as a Political Institution, Moscow, 1998, p. 46 sll.

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if a certain official had it, it could be used by him on any state occasion. A magistrate could not be granted this right "half-way".

Despite the weak points in the argument, Mommsen's view that the first interrex could not hold consular elections, since it was appointed without auspiciaries, was accepted by historians of both the 19th and 20th centuries. His opinions were shared by E. Herzog (5), O. Karlova (6), I. V. Netushil(7), X. Scullard(8), E. Frizer(9), E. Lindersky(10), G. Radke(11). The first person to question Mommsen's interpretation of the custom in question was W. von Lubtov, who offered his own vision of its causes[12]. Developing the theory that interregnum did not arise during the tsarist period, but after the expulsion of the last tsar and lasted for a year as a transitional stage to the republican system(13), he believed that the very idea of this institution was based on a large number of interrexes. Being, in his view, at first a one-year magistracy, the position of interrex was replaced every five days by a new person, and such persons inevitably had to be numerous (the purpose of such frequent changes was, in his opinion, the desire of the aristocracy to avoid usurpation of power by one of its representatives). This "idea of a large number of interrexes" was then preserved in the republican state system proper, when interregnum became an extraordinary method of restoring the consulate, and caused at least two interrexes to appear in each interregnum. Since we, following the ancient tradition, recognize the epoch of the first tsars as the time of the emergence of the institution under consideration, we cannot (as, probably, other researchers who stand on this point of view) accept the explanation of W. von Lubtov.

A different view on the solution of this problem was expressed by I. Yang, who attributed the emergence of the interregnum institute to the era of the early Roman archaic (14). Starting from the connection of the interregnum with the custom of the king's flight (regifugium), this researcher saw the reasons for the ban on holding consular elections by the first interregnum in the oldest beliefs. The flight of the king was associated with the phases of the moon and fell at the end of the lunar year, the last month of which - February - was for the Romans the month of redemption, purification and death. Interrex, who replaced the king during the period of his ritual flight, was like a "master at the time of death" (15), and therefore had no authority (by the way, I. Yang also attributed this to the fact that even in the late period of the interregnum institute, the facets were located in the grove of the temple of the goddess of death at the initial moment of the interregnum Libitins). According to I. Yang, later on, when the interregnum became a political institution, the idea remained that the first interregnum did not have the proper power, and this was manifested in the ban on it to direct consular elections. While we agree with the recognition of the original connection between the rite of regifugium and the institution of interregnum, we still do not see in the presentation of I. There is no real evidence that interrex, which was prescribed for the period of the king's ritual flight, did not

(5) Herzog Е. Das Institut des Interregnums im System der romischen Staatsverfassung // Philologus. 1876. Bd 34. S. 504.

(6) Karlowa 0. Romische Rechtsgeschichte. Bd I. Lpz, 1885. S. 45.

(7) Netushil I. V. Essay on Roman state antiquities. State structure of Rome. Issue 1. Kharkiv, 1894, p. 167.

(8) Scullard N. N. Roman politics. 220-150. B.C. Oxf., 1951. P. 49.

(9) Friezer Е. Interregnum and patrum auctoritas // Mnemosyne. 1959. Ser. IV. V. XII. Fasc. 4. P. 301.

(10) Lindersky J. The Auspices and the Struggle of the Orders // Staat und Staatlichkeit in der Friihen Romischen Republik. Stuttgart, 1990. P. 38.

(11) Radke G. Fasti Romani. Betrachtungen zur Fruhgeschichte des romischen Kalenders. Aschendorf- Miinster, 1990. S. 53.

(12) Lubtow U. van. Das Romische Volk. Frankfurt am Main, 1955. S. 191.

(13) See Dementieva V. V. Problema vremya vozrozhdeniya rimskogo interregnuma [The problem of the time of occurrence of the Roman interregnum]. Drevneye pravo [Ancient Law], Moscow, 1997, N 1 (2), pp. 35-36.

(14) Jahn J. Interregnum und Wahldiktatur. Kallmunz, 1970. S. 23-25.

(15) Ibid. S. 24.

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he did not have the power (at least theoretically, since he still had too short a period of time to actually use it).

Not finding a really convincing explanation in historiography for the principle of holding consular elections by the second and subsequent interrexes, but not by the first, we suggest looking at this problem from a slightly different angle. Let us pay attention to the above statement of Asconius: it was not customary for the first-appointed interrex to direct the comitia. It is not that there was a custom that forbade him to call comitia. Asconius does not even say that there was a custom for the second to do this. Therefore, it is possible to understand these words in such a way that the first interrex was not generally forbidden to direct elections, but usually his successors did it. It is not difficult to understand why it was normal for at least the second interrex to lead election campaigns. In the first five days, it was difficult to identify candidates, coordinate them with patres, conduct an auspice for them, and call people's meetings. Interrex, as a rule, could not meet them, but began preparing for elections, and after the deadline allowed to him, appointed a successor, who either completed the task to its logical end, or again proclaimed interrex. In addition, even if the first interrex managed to hold the election of a consul during his term, there was still a margin of time for the elected magistrate to take office. Taking into account that the Romans, according to custom, sought to hold this act on "solemn days" - kalends or Ides (Liv. V. 11. 11), it should be recognized that the term of office of the interrex is also clearly insufficient to wait for the nearest of such days. After the proclamation of the highest ordinary magistrates, the interrex could probably retain its powers until the elected consul took office, if he had enough of his five-day term, but he could not appoint an interrex successor. The consul-elect, on the other hand, was only in the position of designatus when he did not take office. Consequently, it was necessary that the term of office of the interrex should last until the official beginning of the consulship of the person proclaimed the highest ordinary magistrate, otherwise a situation could be created that was not regulated in any way by law and had to be avoided. Therefore, the first interrex did not hold elections as usual, but only prepared them. His successor could already appoint electoral committees so that his term would last until the consuls took office. Thus, in our opinion, it was the difficulties of implementing the task of restoring the consulship in the first five days of the interregnum, and not some special legislative ban, that lay at the heart of the usual practice of conducting consular comitia with the second and subsequent interrexes. It seems to us, therefore, that the two cases mentioned above of holding a comitia by the first interrex were not a violation of the law (or custom, which is also a legal concept for the Romans), but a theoretically possible, but rarely encountered in practice, combination of circumstances that allow all the procedures necessary for the election of a magistrate to be carried out very quickly. In particular, the transience of the interregnum of 82 BC is easily explained by the fact that it was prepared in advance by the future dictator himself. Let us add that the interpretation of the fact that the second and subsequent interrexes convened elective committees not as a prohibition on the first one to do so, but as a practice established (due to the short duration of the powers of an extraordinary magistrate), is also consistent with the fact that interrexes were not chosen by lot by a dozen at once, but each next one was appointed by until the main task is completed - the election of the highest ordinary magistrate.

In passing, let us turn to the question of whether interrex could proclaim not ordinary magistrates, but an extraordinary dictator. If so, this would potentially increase patres ' ability to use emergency structures. Dionysius reports on the appointment of the dictator through interrex (Dionysus. XI. 20), but in this case it is not necessary to trust him. The practice of functioning of the early Roman dictatorship (V-III centuries BC) does not know the case of electing a dictator during the Second World War.

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interregnum(16). Apparently, the Roman constitution did not provide for the proclamation of one extraordinary magistrate through another, also extraordinary. The same principle was also reflected in the fact that one dictator never proclaimed another. However, in the history of the interregnum as a state institution, we have already mentioned the only example when dictatorial powers were handed over during the interregnum. In this way, Sulla gained power in 82 BC. But here we must take note of two things. First, Sulla's dictatorship was a very different position from the magistracy of the same name in the Early Republic. Secondly, the Sullan dictatorship was introduced on the basis of a special law proposed by Interrex Lucius Valerius Flaccus (Arr. VS. I. 98-99). After the adoption of this law, the procedure could be twofold. Either, according to L. Lange(17), the lex Valeria stipulated that the dictator could be appointed by interrex, and after that Lucius Valerius Flaccus made the appointment; or this law directly named Sulla dictator - this is how M. Crawford sees the development of events(18). Consequently, the declaration of a dictator during the interregnum period was in any case based on constitutional changes. In the period up to the first century BC, the requirement of custom-interrex can only proclaim collegial magistrates-was strictly observed.

The Interrex was to choose the consuls, as Cicero put it (Leg. III. 3.9), appropriately-rite. However, the sources do not tell us whether the nomination of candidates and the election procedure itself within the interregnum differed in any way from those under normal conditions, when elections were held under the direction of an ordinary magistrate. Researchers therefore have to assume that the voting procedure was the same under any head of the committee. But even the recognition of this fact does not remove the question of whether interrex had more influence on the outcome of the elections than other presidents of the people's assemblies-the consul or the dictator. In turn, the solution of this question determines the idea of whether interregnum could be an effective tool in the class and political struggle. In the absence of information about the actual procedure for managing elections on the part of interrex, historians can analyze this problem using only data on the results of such elections. The idea that interrex had special prerogatives in consular elections was first expressed by A. Schwegler (19). It was further developed in the writings of S. A. Staveli, who believed that interrex could only propose two candidates for the elections, and the People's Assembly either approved or rejected them (20). The opposite position was defended by I. Yan, who believed that the influence of interrex on the election result was less than that of the consul, since interrex left his position after the election of one magistrate[21]. However, R. Rilinger saw in the same fact that Interrex left after the election of the first consul a different character of his influence on the outcome of the elections [22].

Whether interrex managed the election of only one consul (and the second was already elected under the leadership of a previously proclaimed colleague) or both of them - sources report both (Liv. XXII. 35. 2; Plut. Marc. VI. 1) and another (Liv. III. 8. 2; 55. 1; IV. 7. 10; Dionys. IX. 69. 1) variants. In particular, in Libya, for the situation of elections through the interrex of the consul of 216 BC Gaius Terence Varro, it is absolutely certain that the election of the Consul of 216 BC, Gaius Terentius Varro, was carried out. -

(16) See Dementieva V. V. The Dictator's Magistracy in the Early Roman Republic (V-III centuries BC). Yaroslavl, 1996. p. 64.

(17) Lange L. Romische Alterthumer. Bd I. V., 1876. S. 152-153.

(18) Crawford М. The Roman Republic. New Jersey, 1978. P. 152.

(19) Schwegler D.U. Romische Geschichte. Bd 2. Tiibingen, 1870. S. 150.

(20) Stavely E.S. The Conduct of Elections during an Interregnum // Historia. 1954/55. P. 193-207.

(21) John. Op. cit. S. 26.

(22) Rilinger R. Der Einfiup des Wahlleiters bei den romischen Konsulwahlen von 366 bis 50 v. Chr. // Vestigia. Beitrage zur Alien Geschichte. Bd 24. Miinchen, 1976. S. 17-24.

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delenno claims that a single consul was elected so that the proclamation of a colleague at the comitia would be in his power. 23 Similarly, Plutarch reports the election of Marcellus as consul, who, upon taking office, held the election of Gnaeus ' colleague Cornelius.24 We must therefore recognize that both options are possible. True, T. Mommsen believed that the election of one consul Gaius Terence in the interregnum of 216 BC should be considered an exception(25), and S. Stavely called this report of Livy a fiction(26). However, the sources also record the option of appointing only one consul via interrex. Having accepted it, I. Jan explained how Pompey was elected consul without a colleague in 52 BC: interrex left after the election of one consul, namely Pompey, who himself did not consider it possible to conduct the election of a colleague [27]. R. Rilinger, in turn, gives an interpretation of the reasons why it was considered sufficient for the election of a colleague to be held in the first place. interrex to elect only one ordinary magistrate. He believes that this was the case historically, since the interrex initially held the election of a single king, and with the transition to a republic, at first also the only high magistrate that existed at that time (in his opinion, this was praetor maximus or dictator)(28).

It seems to us that regardless of whether interrex elected one or both consuls, its leadership ensured that the patres ' interests were fulfilled. The election of the first interrex from among them created, during the Early Republic, a subsequent chain of pro-Patrician successors, and thus a similar electoral leader. He had the opportunity to reject an objectionable candidate after the auspiciaries were held, he could limit the list of candidates to two candidates, and then their election would almost certainly take place (it could not take place only in the case of a mass refusal to submit votes). Interrex thus had at its disposal the usual set of ways to influence the outcome of elections: not to accept someone's candidacy in the calculation (rationem non habere), not to include a name in the list of candidates (warm pop accipere), to force centuries to vote again (in suffragium revocare), to refuse to proclaim (non renuntiare). (29). In addition, we add the influence of his authority (which, of course, the representative of patres-senatores had, since the interrexes were prominent political figures, generals, influential senators-consulars) and the conditions of a political emergency, which in themselves forced citizens not to think too much and agree to the proposed candidates. In one famous case in 291 BC, interrex Lucius Postumius Megellus, who presided over the election, was himself chosen consul (Liv. XXVII. 6. 8). Researchers find few facts of" self-declaration " of the leaders of comitia(30). We recognize five cases as historical: 451, 350, 291, 215, 210 years BC (Liv. III. 33. 3-4; VII. 24. 10-11; XXIV. 7. 11; 9. 1-3; XXVII. 6. 2-11). Of these, extraordinary leaders (dictators and interrexas) account for three, i.e. more than half, which characterizes to some extent their ability to influence voters. Let us add that during the interregnum in 351 BC, the second interrex, Marcus Fabius, held the election of the first interrex, Gaius Sulpicius, as consul, and the latter in turn re-elected the patrician Quinctius (Liv. VII. 22. 1-3).

(23) Liv. XXII. 35. 2: "С. Terentius consul tinus creatur, ut in manu eius essent comitia rogando collegae".

(25) Mommsen Th. Romisches Staatsrecht. Bd I. Lpz, 1871. S. 659.

(26) Staveley. Op. cit P. 206.

(27) John. Op. cit. S. 26.

(28) Rilinger. Op. cit. S. 18.

(29) See l (v. IV. 7. 9; X. 15. 10-12; XXIV. 8. 20; XXVI. 22. 5; XXVII. 6. 2; Val. Max. III. 8. 3.

(30) Rilinger R. Die Ausbildung von Amtswechsel und Amtsfristen als Problem zwischen Machtbesitz und Machtmipbrauch in der Mittleren Republik (342 bis 217 v. Chr.) // Chiron. 1978. Bd 8. S. 261-263.

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When talking about the election of consuls under the leadership of interrex, Titus Livy usually uses the expression: interrex ... consules creat. Thus, the election of the supreme ordinary magistrate is characterized by Livy as the appointment of consuls by an interrex, in the absence of an important role of the comitia in this act. We can agree with S. Staveli that the interrex made the choice of an ordinary magistrate, and populus ratified this choice(31). We support the opinion of E. Gjerstad only in the part where he speaks about the decisive role of the interrex in the election of magistrates, but his statement that the people did not participate in the appointment of the magistrates chosen by him(32), but we still consider it too categorical. The above thesis of S. Staveli seems to us more correct. A. Giovannini (considering, however, not interregnum situations), notes that it is incorrect to assume that the People's Assembly did not have the initiative at all when electing magistrates - it was also authorized to vote for someone who was not announced as a candidate in advance (33). This was indeed the case (Liv. X. 9. 10;

X. 22. 1-9), however, for periods of interregnum, in the context of election in a short time (if not in a hurry), the probability of nominating a magistrate from the centuries was less than in the usual situation. Moreover, the head of the election had the right to vote in favor of such a candidate. As is known, the lex Maenia de patrum auctoritate of the beginning of the third century BC introduced the approval of the patres prior to the election for candidates. K. Helkeskamp sees the immediate purpose of this law as to limit the freedom of maneuver and political game opportunities available to the person who managed the elections(34). But again, this was not essential for interrex to conduct elections, since even before the adoption of this law, it undoubtedly put to the vote candidates who were satisfied with patres.

If a single consul was appointed (and he, who was elected through the efforts of interrex, also most likely represented patrician interests in early republican times), and the interrex transferred to him the right to direct the election of a colleague, then this consul could also have a serious influence on the outcome of the election, because, in addition, he could postpone them, i.e. according to R. Rilinger, "make time work for yourself" (35). In any case, the election of praetors and lower magistrates was not conducted by the interrex, but by one of the proclaimed consuls (Liv. XXII. 35. 5; Cass. Dio. XXXIX. 32.2); the influence of interrex on the selection of their candidates was very indirect, and therefore not so significant.

Since there is no doubt that interrex was a creation of patres, it is natural to assume that in the V-IV centuries BC the Patricians sought to use the transition to the interregnum in solving the problems of class struggle. At first, it was a method of achieving one's interests while delaying the election campaign due to inter-word contradictions (especially when it came to electing tribunes with consular power), and after the adoption of the Licinius - Sextius laws, it was a way to circumvent the requirement of parity between patricians and Plebeians in the consulate. This is eloquently shown by our sources - either directly, reporting on patrician (or senatorial) interests, or indirectly, telling about the situation that preceded the interregnum. Thus, Dionysius, writing about the interregnum of 482 BC, motivates the transition to it by disagreements between the consuls and the Plebeian tribunes (Dionys. VIII. 90). For the situation of 413 BC, Livy notes that the transition to the interregnum was based on

(31) Stavely. Op. cit. P. 197, 200. Ogilvie R. M. A Commentary on Livy was based on his opinion when commenting on Livy: Ogilvie R. M. A Commentary on Livy. Books 1-5 Oxf., 1963. P. 40910.

(32) Gjerstad Е. Innenpolitische und militarische Organisation in friihromischer Zeit // ANRW. I. I.E.- N.Y., 1972. S.156.

(33) Giovannini A. Magistratur und Volk: Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Staatsrechts // Staat und Staatlichkeit in der Friihen Romischen Republik. Stuttgart, 1990. S. 424.

(34) Holkeskamp K.J. Die Entstehung der Nobilitat. Stuttgart, 1987. S. 193.

(35) Rilinger. Der Einflup... S. 23.

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the Senate feared that the people would elect Plebeians as military tribunes with consular authority; the interregnum allowed them to win (Liv. IV. 50. 7-8). In 389 BC, the military tribunes were also not trusted to conduct the election of magistrates and the matter was brought to an interregnum (Liv. VI. 1. 5). In connection with the interregnum of 355 BC, Livy states the desire of the patricians to hold two of their own candidates in the consular elections, noting that in the end they succeeded (Liv. VII. 17. 11-13). The conflict over the observance of the laws of Licinius-Sextius Livy considers a deep reason for the interregnum of 352 BC (Liv. VII. 21. 1-3). The desire of the Patricians to hold their representatives to both consular posts suggests Livy to be the main reason for the transition to interregnum and in 343 BC (36). Against the Plebeians ' wishes, they resorted to an interregnum in 326 BC (Liv. VIII. 23. 17). Cicero informs us that Appius Claudius Caecus, while serving as interrex, rejected the contra leges in the popular assembly of a Plebeian consul (Cic. Brut. 55). It is difficult to say exactly in what year this happened, since the elogy of Appius Claudius states that he was interrex three times(37). Giovannini puts 298 in question (38), and this year is also considered possible by Fr. Cassola(39), but Livy for this year calls Appius Claudius the first interrex and notes that the elections were conducted by the second - Publius Sulpicius (Liv. X. 11. 10). I. Jan was inclined to attribute this event to 300 BC (40), and R. Rilinger-to the beginning of 291 BC. 41 Finally, we note the description of the interregnum of 216 BC, namely Livy's statement that the interregnum was intended to transfer the leadership of the elective comitia to the patricians (interregnum initiretur, ut in patrum po-testate comitia essent-VII. 28. Yu). Since the class struggle was already in the past by this time, the question arises about the reliability of such a characterization. I. Yang not without reason believed that Livy transferred elements of the class struggle to the time when other political forces were active(42). However, in our opinion, even the recognition of this interpretation as an anachronism does not change the idea that Livy was convinced of the fundamental possibility of using the interregnum as a means of Patrician politics, although from the point of view of chronology, his references to this are not always appropriate.

These examples create a picture of the use of interregnum partly in the social and political interests of patres. Therefore, it is quite natural that many historians who dealt with the Roman interregnum mentioned this in one way or another. E. Herzog called interregnum beneficial to the Patrician party (43), a means of preserving the patrician monopoly on political power. Staveli(44), the method of political struggle for the consulship - I. Jan(45), the percussive instrument of patrician estate politics - K. Helkeskamp(46). As for the comparison of this tool with the use of the dictatorship and the consul - chairman of electoral committees for similar purposes, T. Mommsen also noted that the Senate had more influence on elections if they were led by an interrex than under the leadership of a consul or dictator, since the interrex was always from the patricians, while the Senate was always from the patricians. the consul or dictator could also be Plebeians (47). V. Pirogov believed that the patricians hoped "by means of an interregnum it was more likely to have elections in their hands than by means of an interregnum."

(36) Liv. VII. 28. 10: "Ex interregno, ut id actum uideri posset, ambo patricii consules creati sunt".

(37) CIL. I. 1. P. 192; Degrassi A. Inscriptiones Italiae. V. XIII. Fasti et Elogia. Roma, 1937. P, 59. N 79.

(38) Giovanmni. Op. cit. S. 420.

(39) Cassola F. I gruppi politici Romani nel III secolo a. C. Trieste, 1962. P. 13.

(40) Jahn.Op. cit. S. 99.

(41) Rilmger. Die Ausbildung... S. 262.

(42) Jalm. Op. cit. S. 121.

(43) Herzog. Op. cit. S. 503-504.

(44) Staveley E.S. The Significance of the Consular Tribunate // JRS. 1953. 43. P. 33.

(45) Jahn. Op. cit. S. 28.

(46) Holkeskamp. Op. cit. S. 68.

(47) Mommsen Tli. Romisches Staatsrecht. Bd 1. S. 657.

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dictatorships"(48). S. Stavely emphasized that the interrex was in a stronger position than the consul or dictator to exercise the interests of the patricians, so the leadership of elections by the interrex was more unprofitable for the Plebeians than the dictator's conduct of them(49). I. Yang, on the contrary, in terms of influencing the outcome of elections he preferred the dictator(50). We think that the patricians may have relied more on extraordinary election managers (interrex and the dictator) than ordinary ones to fulfill their political aspirations. The point here was not so much the special "technical" capabilities of the extraordinary leaders as the very circumstances that brought their magistracies to life and eased pressure on the electorate, as well as the authority of them and the patres-senatores behind them. Comparing the interrex and the dictator with each other as election leaders is extremely difficult, and the preference for interrex as the representative of patrician interests in the act of electing consuls can only be given on the basis suggested by T. Mommsen: interrex was always guaranteed to be a protégé of patres. Moreover, it is possible to take into account Livy's statement of the position of the tribunes of the Plebs in 352 BC, from which it follows that they agreed to a dictatorship and did not want an interregnum (Liv. VII. 21.2).

Accepting the definition of interregnum as a "percussive instrument of patrician estate politics" (Helkeskamp), we will focus on finding out when it was most actively and effectively used. To begin with, we will present statistics related to the entire period of existence of the republican political institute interregnum.

From 509 BC to the adoption of the laws of Licinius-Sextius (367 BC), we count, following John, about 15 interregnums (51). Because after the publication of the work And. Since it is customary in foreign historiography to date the interregnum with the year of the consuls elected in its course, we will adhere to this dating, although in domestic literature dating by the previous consular pair is also often found. In accordance with this principle of determining the dates of the interregnum, they fall on the following years BC: 509, 482, 462, 451, 449, 444, 420, 413, 401, 396, 393, 391, 389, 387, 370. Of these, interregna 451, 401, 393 can be called hypothetical, since the information about them in the sources is contradictory or not completely clear, and the dating is problematic. R. Palmer offers his own figure of interregnums for this period of time - ten[52]. Us the calculations and. Yana's comments seem more complete, and his argument is quite convincing. But even if we subtract from the number of interregnas that he calls not precisely established, there will remain 12 interregnums that fall on the first stage of the republic's existence, before the Plebeians gained access to the consulate. In the Yandex Business Directory, see T. According to Broughton, the interregnum of 463 B.C.(53) is also in question, but the fact of which, apparently, should still be excluded. From 366 BC to 326 BC, there are 7 interregnums: 355, 352, 351, 343, 340, 332, 326 In the period from 325 BC to 293 BC (until the end of the first decade of Titus Livy), only four interregnums can be counted:

320, 300, 298, and 291 B.C. Then, over a seventy-year period, until 222 B.C., it is impossible (in the absence of such an important source for statistical calculations as the work of Livy) to establish a single interregnum. The Interregnum of 222 BC (54) and 220 BC.

(48) V. Pirogov. Research on Roman history, mainly in the area of the third decade of Livy. St. Petersburg, 1878, p. 212.

(49) Staveley. The Conduct. P. 200.

(51) ./a/i/L Op. cit. S.53. ''l./a/w.Op.cit. S. 56-64.

(52) Palmer R. The Archaic Community of the Romans. Cambr., 1970. P. 301.

(53) Broughton T.R.S. The Magistrates of the Roman Republic (with the collab. of M.L. Patterson). V. I-II. N.Y., 1951-1952 (repr. 1986). V.1. P. 35.

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B.C. fall on the eve of the Second Punic War, the years of which fall no more than two - 216 B.C. and interregnum, accepted by I. Jan, but, in our opinion, unlikely, 208 B.C. For the entire II century B.C. there are only four interregnums: 175, 162 Of these, interregnum 109 BC can only be assumed. I. Yang also called interregnum 106 BC, but we can neither confirm nor deny this, since no sources of information about the interregnum of this year have been found, and the author himself about them doesn't mention it. Finally, in the first century BC, there were five fairly accurately recorded figures.(82, 77, 55, 53, 52 BC) and one hypothetical (43 BC) interregnum. In general, it turns out that in the entire history of the republican interregnum, we know about 40 cases of its use. In T. Broughton's reference book for the period from the end of the tsarist era to 52 BC, there are 29 interregna (including those that the author defines in question) [55]. However, in the many decades that have passed since its first publication, researchers have done considerable work to establish the facts of the interregnum,which now allows us to call the figure a dozen more.

Let us now return to the interregnums of the age of class struggle. Most of them occurred in the IV century BC. In this century, according to R. Rilinger's observations, there were no regular election managers - only extraordinary ones (dictators and interrexes), and all of them were patricians(56). Their leadership provided mainly for the election of Patrician high magistrates, but in 396 BC, as a result of the interregnum, a college of military tribunes with consular power was elected, consisting of five plebeians and one patrician (Liv. V. 17-18). It is possible that this was the case when interrex left office after the proclamation of the first tribune (Patrician), and the latter was already conducting the election of colleagues. It is possible that, on the contrary, it was previously decided to elect a majority of military tribunes from among the Plebeians (Liv. V. 17. 5). As a result of the interregnum introduced after the adoption of the laws of Licinius-Sextius before 326 BC, for 355, 351 and 343 BC, the consular fasts list two each elected. patricia (CIL. I. 1. p. 21). For 352 and 340 BC - one patrician and a Plebeian each, but the sources are unanimous that the Patrician consul was proclaimed first. For 332 BC sources differ on whether the consul is a Patrician or a Plebeian he was the first to be elected (57), but it is more likely that the Patrician, since Livy calls him the first (VIII. 17.5). The turning point in this respect was 326 BC, when Gaius Petelius, a Plebeian, was first proclaimed consul under the leadership of Interrex Lucius Aemilius (Liv. VIII. 23. 17). Researchers have already pointed out that this is definitely a fundamental event [58]. After it, the number of interregnums decreases (in 32 years, from 325 to 293 BC, there are only three of them, whereas in the previous 40 years - seven). It is not difficult to see this as a trend that characterizes the decline in the role of interregnum as a means of Patrician politics. We connect this with the general process of development of the class struggle: its acuteness subsides by 340 BC. e. Livy under 342 BC reports on the plebiscites of Genucius, according to which it was forbidden to hold the same position earlier than 10 years and allowed to elect two consuls from the Plebeians (Liv. VII. 42. 2). Whatever one's attitude to the reliability of reports about these plebiscites (Livy does not speak very confidently about them), there is a sharp rivalry for the highest ordinary magistracy between the two countries.

A. Lippold (Lippold A. Consules. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des romischen Konsulats von 264 bis 201 v. Chr. Bonn, 1963. S. 107-108).

(55) Broughton. Op. cit. V. I. P. 3, 23, 35, 36, 53, 71. 76, 88. 93, 97, 99, 124, 126, 127, 135, 142, 146, 153. 174, 183, 233, 259, 291, 442; V. II. P. 68, 89, 217, 229, 236. T. Broughton notes the Interregnum 509, 482, 463, 462, 444, 420, 413, 396, 391, 389, 387, 355, 352. 351, 340, 332, 326. 320, 298, 291, 222, 216, 208, 162, 82, 77, 55, 53, 52 years BC

(56) Rilinger. Der EinfluB... S. 19.

(57) Degrassi. Op. cit. 107, 412.

(58) Jahn. Op. cit. S. 89; Rilinger. Der EinfluB... S. 20.

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the number of representatives of the Patrician and Plebeian elite decreases. At the same time, the privilege of the patrician consuls to appoint a dictator was lost.

At the beginning of the 6th century BC, interregnum becomes even rarer. Patricians at this time, according to the text of Livy (X. 24: 4), still had a majority in the Senate, but the Plebeian consulars became an increasingly influential group in it (59). At the same time, the Plebeians gain access to the College of Augurs (lex Ogulnia 300 BC), which indicates recognition of their competence in the field of examination of auspicii (in other words, this also confirmed their right to the imperium of the highest magistrate, given the indissoluble unity of imperium and auspicii that existed in the Roman public consciousness). The institution of interregnum as an instrument of estate policy becomes irrelevant-this is indirectly confirmed by the duration of the interregnum itself: if there were long periods of interregnum before 326 BC, then in 325-216. they were limited to the term of office of two or three interrexes. Consequently, in the transition to the interregnum, it is precisely the task of restoring ordinary power as soon as possible that comes to the fore, and not solving issues of interconditional contradictions. Thus, changes in both the number of interregnums and the number of interregnums during these periods reflect the logic of the patrician-Plebeian struggle, which in turn is an indicator of the use of this extraordinary institution in this struggle.

Consideration of the use of the interregnum institution as an instrument of estate politics includes another question: whether tribunal intercession was possible in relation to the actions of interrex during the conduct of the consular elections. The Plebeian tribunes could not really influence the appointment of interrex, but could they protest against his actions? Sources confidently and unambiguously answer this question positively (Liv. VII. 17. 12-13; 21. 3; XXII. 34. 1-2; Cic. Brut. 55). It is interesting that, for example, in 355 BC. e. discord began during the second interrex, i.e. actually when it came to elections. What we know about this year's conflict between the Plebeian tribunes and Interrex from the speech of Interrex Marcus Fabius constructed by Livy does not negate the recognition of the authenticity of the conflict itself. As K. Helkeskamp pointed out, although this speech is, of course, a fiction, it does not in any way contradict the authenticity of the message about the Tribunician resistance(60). The tribunes insisted mainly on the observance of the Licinius-Sextius law, and it was their protests that led to the prolongation of the interregnum. These political clashes in the election of ordinary magistrates under the leadership of the interrex are in themselves evidence of the Patricians ' desire to use the interregnum as a tactical tool in opposing the Plebeians in their struggle for the consulship. The explanation of the fact that the Plebeian tribunes could not object to the proclamation of interrex, but resisted it, seems to us quite simple. Their right of interdiction extended to the actions of officials, but not to the decisions of the patres, as the collective bearer of power in the initial period of the interregnum. With the proclamation of interrex, a magistrate appeared, whose actions could be protested.

When we record inter-religious clashes during the interregnum period, we cannot but draw attention to the fact that, despite the obvious aspirations of the opposing forces to achieve their own interests, when the situation became extremely acute, the parties made compromises. In 352 BC, the patres ordered interrex Lucius Cornelius Scipio concordia causa to observe the Licinius - Sextius law (Liv. VII. 21.4). Even if the Patricians prevailed in the interrex elections, the Patrician consuls made concessions to the Plebeians, given the tense situation. This was the case in 413 BC, when at the beginning the consulates who had come to power through the interregnum (patres) fought against the election of military tribunes from the Roman Empire.

(59) Rilinger. Der EinfluB... S. 23.

(60) H8lkeskamp. Op. cit. S. 68.

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the Patrician magistrates Aulus Cornelius Cossus and Lucius Furius Medullinus passed a senatorial decree in the interests of the Plebeians (Liv. IV. 51. 2). It can be considered as a compromise and the election of a college of military tribunes with a consular power of five Plebeians and one patrician during the interregnum of 396 BC (Liv. V. 18. 2), regardless of whether such an agreement was previously reached, or whether the tribune proclaimed by the first elected Plebeian colleagues from among the patricians.

Along with the use of interregnum as a tactical means of solving strategic problems of the Patrician estate policy, it was used as a tool in the intra-Patrician struggle. I. Yang paid sufficient attention to this aspect(61). So, for the IV century BC, he considered the confrontation of two political groups:

Fabia-Valeria-Manlia, on the one hand, and Emilia and Papyria, on the other. In the 40s of the IV century BC (348-343 BC), the leading positions were firmly held by the first group of clans, which was also manifested in situations of interregnum. During the interregnum of 343 BC, Marcus Valerius Corvus and Aulus Cornelius Coset were elected consuls. During the interregnum of 340 BC, the interrexes were Marcus Valerius and Marcus Fabius (Liv. VIII. 3. 5). In this Mark of Valerius, one can see both Mark Valerius Corvus, who was consul in 348 and 346 BC in addition to the aforementioned 343 BC, and Mark Valerius Publicola, consul of 355 (then elected under the leadership of interrex Marcus Fabius Ambustus) and 353 BC.E. Marcus Fabius can be identified with Marcus Fabius Ambustus, who as an interrex in 355 and 351 BC led two patricians to the consular magistracy. It could have been Marcus Fabius Dorsoon, consul of 345 BC. In any case, Marcus Fabius, as the second interrex in 340 BC, appointed a representative of his group, Titus Manlius Torquatus, as consul. But Tom, as noted by I. Yang, failed to re-establish the dominance of the gentes represented by him. Emilius Mamercinus, who replaced Manlius Torquatus as consul, interrupted the previous strong dominance of the Fabii-Valerii-Manlii. John called 339 BC a turning point in Roman history, because in that year the consulship ceased to be held by members of the politically closely related gentes; the law, which allowed the magistracy to be held only after ten years, came into force with the electoral victory of Aemilius(62). The strengthening of the leadership positions of gens Aemilia was halted by their political opponents during the interregnum of 332 BC. As the fifth interrex, Marcus Valerius Corvus proclaimed Aulus Cornelius Cossus, his colleague in the consulship of 343 BC, consul (Liv. VIII. 17. 5). The revenge of Aemilia was taken in 326, when, as the fourteenth interrex, Lucius Aemilius Mamercinus helped to bring to power a representative of the Papirii family, friendly to the Aemilii (Liv. VIII. 23. 17). The denouement of the interregnum of 320 BC seems strange at first glance. Interrex Marcus Valerius Corvus named Quintus Publilius Philo and Lucius Papirius Cursor consuls (Liv. IX. 7. 15); the former owed his elevation to Aemilius Mamercinus, and the latter's family name speaks for itself. Explaining this result of the elections, I. Yang noted that, firstly, the Roman political groups were not "rigid formations", secondly, the difficult situation of the war with the Samnites (and the elected consuls were previously famous for their military actions with the Samnites) shook the internal political situation, and thirdly, the influence of interrex on the outcome of the elections yet it was not absolute(63). The next interregnum, which took place in 300 BC(64), resulted in the election of Marcus Valerius Maximus, who had been dictator the previous year, as consul (Liv. X. 5.14). Given facts

(61) John. Op. cit. S. 77-80.

(62) Ibid. S. 79.

(63) John. Op. cit. S. 94.

(64) Livy does not know for certain whether there was an intenregnum in 300 BC, but I. Jan believed that the account of this year's interregnum went back to Valerius Anziatus, who had detailed information about the Valerian family (Op. cit. S. 99).

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evidence suggests that the institution of interregnum was used by opposing groups of Patrician gentes until the end of the fourth century BC.

Researchers also see the struggle within the ruling elite in the interregnums of the sixth century BC, which are known to us. For example, the circumstances of the transition to interregnum in 220 BC caused a discussion: various assumptions are made about the formation of various unions of Roman gentes. The fact is that this year two pairs of consuls came to power in turn: first Valerius Levinus and Mucius Scaevola, and then - apparently after the interregnum-Veturius and Lutatius (65). Perhaps one of the interrexes was Quintus Fabius Maximus. X. Scullard saw in the resignation of the first pair of consuls an attempt to undermine the rule of the Aemilii-Scipios (66); A. Lippold believed that the originally elected consuls Valerius and Mucius were not in a state of hostility with the Aemilii and Scipios, but an alliance could have developed between Veturius and the Aemilii - Scipio group.(67).I. Yang did not see any grounds for supposing such an alliance(68). Since we are not engaged in prosopographical research, it is important for us not to find out the balance of power in such political intrigues, but to state that the interregnum institute played a certain role in the struggle for power within the Roman nobility. Let us also note the interpretation of And. The Janomian Interregnum of 216 BC He connects them with the confrontation between supporters and opponents of the strategy and tactics of Quintus Fabius (69). That part of the senators who demanded an offensive, wanted to achieve this through the dictatorship. Most of the senators, while agreeing to Fabius ' defensive tactics, were betting on Interrex. Fabius was satisfied with the interregnum, and his political supporters submitted such a proposal to the Senate. When they finally resorted to dictatorship, Fabius persuaded the influential augurs to declare the election of the dictator a sinful one. There may be some randomness in the details of this interpretation of the events of 216 BC, but it seems certain that both the dictatorship and the interregnum were introduced during the Second Punic War for the purpose of political combinations.

We believe that the interregnum was used both as a tool for implementing patrician interests as opposed to Plebeian ones, and for resolving issues of intra-Patrician rivalry; both occurred in parallel, periodically intersected and supplemented one another. To contrast one with the other, in our opinion, is futile, and to consider the use of the interregnum as a means of exclusively intra-Patrician struggle (without great significance for relations with the Plebeian elite), which was sometimes done in the literature (70), the data of ancient authors do not allow us.

Another subject that is relevant to the consideration of the issue of holding consular elections by interrex is the timing of the entry into office of the magistrates elected by it and possible changes in the duration of their administrative year.

Titus Livy reports on the terms of taking office of consuls elected by interrex in different ways. Sometimes it is a "solemn day" (dies solemnis) - kalends or ides (Liv. V. 11. 11; 32. 1); sometimes it is a weekday: ante diem tertium idus Sextiles (Liv. III. 8. 3). The President of Livy says that the consuls took office immediately (III. 55. 1) or did so on the very day of their election (IX. 8. 1). Livy's clarification about the immediate assumption of consuls by patres decree suggests that the usual procedure was to do everything possible. or wait for the next "holiday" day. If we take into account that all the days before the kalends and most of the days before the Ides were considered Comitia days, then in any case, from the election to the entry of a new consul into office did not take much time. But, as we have already noted, it was very large

(65) Degrassi. Op. cit. P. 46-47.

(66) Scullard. Op. cit. P. 273.

(67) Lippold. Op. cit. S. 142, 272.

(68) John. Op, cit. S. 116.

(69) Ibid. S. 121.

(70) For more information, see Holkeskamp. Op. cit. S. 67.

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the probability is that five days - the term of office of the first interrex-would not have been enough to nominate candidates, prepare comitia, conduct them, and wait for the right day for the consul to officially take office. It was necessary to arrange for the election of a consul so that interrex, who was in charge of the election, could resign within one or two days after that. Probably, sometimes it was precisely for these "technical" reasons that the interrex chain was extended, so that the state would not find itself in a situation that was not regulated by law, when the interrex's powers expired (it could not appoint a successor if the consul had already been elected), and the consul had not yet begun to perform his duties. The simultaneous holding of the position of interrex and the highest ordinary magistrate was also not provided for. After the consul took office, interrex had to leave (Liv. VI. 1. 9); apparently, regardless of whether there was any time remaining from his five-day term or not. Apparently, having already taken office, the consul elected under interrex spent the next five days conducting the lex curiata de imperio. So, most likely, the high ordinary magistrates elected under interrex's leadership officially assumed their duties, usually in dies solemnis, but they could sometimes deviate from this rule if necessary. For it was better to break it than to deprive the civil community of the organs of government, the continuity of which the interregnum institute was supposed to maintain.

It is more difficult to find out how the interregnum affected the terms of the administrative Roman year, given that it is not always possible to determine the agreement of the consular year with the calendar year. The author of the first (and in fact the only) special article on this subject, published more than a hundred years ago, G. Unger believed that the interregnum postponed the term of the consulship of the following year for the duration of its duration(71). Cicero's account (Pro Mil. IX. 24) of the interregnum of 53 BC, when Clodius gave up the praetorship because a prolonged interregnum would have made his term of office very short, suggests that during the Late Republic, the term of office of the consuls chosen by the interregnum was shortened by the interregnum. But how did interregnum affect the consular year in the Early Republic, when there was no fixed calendar date for the beginning of the consular year? We know that at the end of the fifth century BC, the Ides of December(72) was the day when the highest ordinary magistrates took office. Libya calls this the usual term (V. 11. 11), but further mentions the inauguration of tribunes with consular authority in 401 BC, not on this day, but on the October Kalends. In 391, military tribunes with consular authority assumed their duties on the Quintillian Kalends (Liv. V. 32. 1). This date of the beginning of the administrative year probably existed at least until 367 BC, since before that time most of the triumphs of the highest magistrates (and they were celebrated at the end of their term of office) fell on for May or June. At the same time, it is possible to determine with a high degree of confidence that in 341 BC there was no firm calendar reference to the beginning of the consular year. In that year, at the request of the Senate, the consuls resigned prematurely so that the new consuls could start preparing for war with the Latins earlier (Liv. VIII. 4-5). As J. Jan pointed out, the Senate's desire would be meaningless if the resignation of the consuls could not postpone the appointment of the next pair of high magistrates to an earlier date (73). In 329 BC, the consuls take office again on the Quintile Calends (Liv. VIII. 20. 3). According to T. Before the Second Punic War, the term of office of the consuls began on the Kalends of May (which is also found in the history of the Roman Calendar).

(71) Unger G.F. Interregnum und Amtsjahr // Philologus. 1884. Bd. IV. S. 283-333.

(72) Liv. V. 9. 3: "Idus Decembres, sollemnem ineundis magistratibus diem".

(73) John. Op. cit. S. 30.

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triumphal dates)(74); since the Second Punic War - in the Ides of March(75), and since 153 BC-in the Kalends of January (76). It seems that the date of the consuls ' assumption of office was determined (in the normal course of elections through the predecessor, i.e. in the absence of an interregnum) by the termination of the powers of the previous higher magistrates; for a long time in the Roman Republic, it was floating. What was the situation like in the interregnum? Calculations and. Jana shows that the consul Claudius Marcellus, who was proclaimed in the interregnum of 222 BC, served less than a calendar year(77). Consequently, with the introduction of the interregnum, the new consular year also began to count, but the time of the elected consuls in power was reduced by the duration of the interregnum. That is, even with the calendar-fixed, "floating" day of the consuls ' entry into office, the administrative year began not at the end of the interregnum, but after the termination of the empire of the predecessor consuls. It was not the interregnum itself, but rather the premature resignations of previous consuls, that caused the dates of the beginning of the consular year to move around the calendar. At the same time, there was no" calendar shift " of the end date of the term of office of the elected consuls, and they were terminated one year after the abdicationof the magistrates of the previous year. In other words, the "calendar shift" after the interregnum did not occur for the entire one-year period of the consular couple's stay in power, but only for the day they took office. In any case, for the period of the third and first centuries BC, such an observation can be made based on the analysis of individual facts reported by sources. As for the earlier time, it is very difficult to say anything concrete about it.

So, summing up the results of the consideration of the issue of holding interrex consular elections, we briefly note the following. We believe that the first interrex usually did not lead consular missions, not because of a legal ban, but because of the low probability that he would be able to meet the deadline allowed to him. In other words, there was no ban on the first interrex, but there was a well-established practice of holding elections by its successors. The role of interrex as chairman of electoral commissions was great, and he could influence their outcome using not only the usual set of methods, but also the conditions of an emergency, as well as the considerable personal authority and auctoritas of the patres he represented. This, in turn, led to the use of the interregnum institute both in the class struggle (especially until the last third of the IV century BC), and in the internal rivalry of the ruling Patrician groups or in the confrontation of opinions among the political elite. The law of the tri-Bunian intercession, which did not apply to patres during the interregnum, could apply to the actions of an interrex in the same way as to ordinary magistrates. Only one consul was allowed to be elected under the leadership of the interrex, but more often it provided for the recruitment of the entire higher magistracy. Consuls elected at the end of the interregnum usually took office on dies solemnis, but, as an exception, they could do so on another day. The interregnum reduced the term of office of the consuls elected under Interrex for the duration of its duration.

The institution of interregnum, which prevented anarchy, ensured the continuity and continuity of power in accordance with the constitutional foundations of the Roman Republic, and was one of the factors of its stable existence, was completed by holding elections and assuming the office of elected magistrates (consuls or military tribunes with consular authority).

(74) Mommsen Th. Romische Chronologie. V., 1859. S. 100.

(75) Zeller M. Rimskie gosudarstvennye i pravovye drevnosti [Roman State and Legal Antiquities], Moscow, 1894, p. 132.

(76) Unger. Op. cit. S. 330.

(77) Jahn. Op. cit. S.31.

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CONSUL'S ELECTIONS CONDUCTED BY AN INTERREX

V.V. Dementyeva

The author maintains that there were no legal limitations for the first interrex in conducting the elections of the supreme ordinary magistrates, but it was impossible to accomplish their election and inauguration in five days. The author denies that interrex's being appointed without auspices could be an obstacle for him to conduct elections, nor can we doubt in any other way about his competence. The very fact that the second interrex and the following ones used to comitia habere does not imply that the first one had no right to do it.

It is argued that the interrex could supervise one consul's elections, though it was more usual for him to take care of both consuls' elections. Presiding over the electoral comitia the interrex acted according to the political interests of the patres. Consequently, interregnum was used as an instrument of patrician policy (especially before late 4th с. ВС), as well as in political struggle between different factions of the political elite. The tribune's intercession not valid in respect of the patres during an interregnum, was appliable to the interrex's actions.

The article gives statistic and chronological data on interregnum in the Republican period. The author concludes that consul's elections during interregnum ensured the continuity of legal power, prevented anarchy and was a stabilizing factor in the political life of the civitas.

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