"NATURAL" AND "PROPER". PHYSICAL AND LOGICAL JUSTIFICATION OF SOME ASPECTS OF EARLY ACADEMIC ETHICS *

I

The great historical turning point, conventionally marked by the deaths of Alexander the Great in 323 and Aristotle in 322, required philosophy to develop such foundations and guidelines that would remain unshakable in the face of general instability. It is not surprising, therefore, that the two most influential philosophical schools of Hellenism, whose birth coincided with the birth of the epoch itself, turned to nature in search of a cornerstone for their systems. Zeno followed Epicurus in his assessment of the importance of the primal tendencies of living beings from the moment they were born. In this, as well as in the materialism and nominalism of the Stoics, one can see that Stoic philosophy belongs to the Hellenistic era. However, in contrast to the empirical hedonism of Epicurus, who chose pleasure as the criterion of truth, Zeno took a different path. Its "nature" is strictly rational, and feelings are not something independent and valuable in themselves, but only an epiphenomenon of its rational manifestations. The fundamental transparency of" nature " for thought is intended not only to explain the structure of the world in such important aspects as the unity of beings, the formation of things, etc., but also to indicate the place of man in it, that is, to indicate the place of man in it. set a paradigm of moral excellence by defining its goals and objectives. With the well-known rigorism of stoic ethics, which manifests itself in the obvious gap between the recognition of the failure of most of the everyday practice of humanity, on the one hand, and the inaccessibility of the moral ideal, i.e., the fulfillment of a person's task, on the other, the validity of the stoic concept of "nature" itself is questioned, because it defines both these levels and there is no other factor in space that can prevent it. Thus," nature " for Stoic philosophy was (among its other functions) the link between what is and what is due, and allowed the Stoics, while remaining on the basis of materialism, to raise the standard of spirituality to an unprecedented height. It is clear, however,that this could not but be bought at a rather high price: the concept of nature often, instead of cementing various levels of teaching, splits itself. On the other hand, we have no evidence that the Stoics themselves refused to see "nature" as having different aspects.

* For an introduction to the whole range of problems of stoic ethics, the author recommends using the book by A. A. Stolyarov "Standing and Stoicism "(Moscow, 1995), which, if it does not contain a detailed and detailed analysis of all the issues of stoic teaching (which is not possible at this stage), then in any case introduces the reader to the problem and indicates possible solutions. To the creator of this first truly in-depth and comprehensive study in Russian, the author would like to take this opportunity to express his sincere appreciation for a number of valuable comments that helped avoid some miscalculations. The author is also pleased to thank A. A. Rossius for his interest in this work and for his active participation in preparing it for publication.

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On the contrary, there are both direct and indirect indications that this term is far from homogeneous, but, unfortunately, the state of our sources not only does not allow us to clearly define clear boundaries for splitting the concept, but even to establish one or another aspect of meaning for each case of using the term "nature". This article is an attempt to reveal the system of meanings of the concept of nature in Stoic teaching, especially in physics, and extend the conclusions obtained to related issues of the ethical section.

Thus, this theme is based not only on the fact that the Stoics, namely Chrysippus, saw in nature the beginning and starting point of the doctrine of happiness and virtue, of good and evil .1 but also the fact that it is in the ethical section that the concept of nature is most blurred and indistinct. This circumstance explains both the numerous accusations of inconsistency and inconsistency made against Stoicism in antiquity, and the incorrect assessment of some methods of stoic argumentation in modern critical literature. As for the modern Stoe opponents, the most acute criticism was developed by academicians of the skeptical period from Arkesilai up to Karnead. The most complete version of their argument is the 26th chapter of Plutarch's De communibus notitiis. Its course is approximately as follows.

1. The goal is something that all actions should relate to. (Chrysippus ' statement.)

2. Things that correspond to nature are not good.

3. Their justified selection is a blessing and a goal.

4. Justified selection (including stoic selection) can be made by definition only if there is a purpose for this selection

5. The purpose of this selection cannot be itself.

6. Therefore, there are two goals, which contradicts proposition 1-3 . At the same time, it should be borne in mind that even earlier, namely in chapters 4 and 5 of the same work, Plutarch demonstrates the incompatibility of the following statements: a) things that correspond to nature are indifferent; b) to live in accordance with nature is the goal and, therefore, the good. Obviously, the conclusions drawn in chapter 5 only add to the contradiction of chapter 26. For its resolution, Cherniss 4 recommends referring to Kidd's article 5 .

Kidd analyzes the provisions of chapters 23-27 of Comm. not. 6 and as a result removes the contradiction, convincingly demonstrating that the goal is one, namely, the correct idea of God-knowledge, without which correct goal setting is impossible 7 . This is what is meant, he writes, by . And then he adds that in comparison with this good, they are indifferent. Kidd is certainly right in his statement, but the contradiction presented by Plutarch is not removed if we take into account the content of chapter 5: indeed, it is unclear what role is assigned to nature, if living according to it is an end and good, and things and actions corresponding to nature are indifferent. 8 At the end of his article, Kidd himself admits that he has achieved his goal, that is, he has reconciled various representatives of the Stoic school by destroying the integrity and consistency of the entire teaching as far as the concept of "nature" is concerned. 9 Further, the author outlines possible ways to solve the problem, but, unfortunately, does not develop them.

Plut. 1 St. rep. 1035C = SVF III. 326, 68.

2 Pint. Comm. not. 1071E; 1072C.

3 Cf. Cic. Fin. IV. 78; SVF III. 145.

Cherniss N. 4 Plutarch "Moralia" vol. XIII part II. With Introduction, Translation and Commentary. L., 1997. P. 673, n. C.

Kidd I.G. 5 Stoic Intermediates and the End for Man // CQ. 1955. P. 181-194.

6 Ibid. P. 181.

7 Ibid. P. 188.

8 SVF III. 141; 118; 119.

Kidd. 9 Op. cit. P. 194.

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So, we know that:

1. The achievement of wealth 10 corresponds to nature.

2. The attainment of wealth is completely indifferent to the goal of human life, which in turn is defined as living in harmony with nature. There are at least two ways to resolve this contradiction:

1. Postulate that nature in the first case is not identical with nature in the second (the most consistent application of this principle is found in all of Long's works).

2. To recognize the indifference of wealth itself and, consequently, the fact of owning it, and the desire for it - the goal (this direction is developed in detail by G. Stricker).

Both methods were used to defend Stoic teaching both in antiquity and now, although not always consistently. However, before proceeding to the analysis of their applicability, we note that difficulties in understanding those aspects of the stoic system that are presented to us through the concept of nature arise precisely where movements and actions are possible in spite of it, i.e., in the moral sphere, because, as Long rightly points out, "nature creates conditions for good and bad relations." bad deeds, and evil consists in a lack of agreement with nature. " 12 When we are told that air naturally tends upward (SVF II. 671), we have no reason to doubt our understanding of the reasons for appealing to nature. The conclusion is that we should start our research at the point where we expect to find some clarity, i.e. physics, especially since in this case we will follow the methodology of Chrysippus 13 .

II

From the definition of nature (SVF III. 1132), it follows that the Stoics themselves put at least two meanings into this word: nature as containing the world and nature as generating what is on earth. The following sentence provides a justification for this duality: nature is a constituent force, but at the same time it indicates the function of nature as the cause of development. Movements correspond, according to Origen (SVF II. 988), to the vegetative level of organization, but, as Inwood rightly suggests , 14 each higher level includes all the lower ones. Therefore, it becomes clear why Galen (SVF II. 1133) gives the definition of nature as "a warm pneuma moving out of itself and... generating, perfecting and supporting man" 15 .

Thus, we have an indication of three functions of nature: generation, development

10 Standard example for

11 The third method proposed by Kidd is that nature in both cases means the same thing and is always identical with itself, and the value difference between moral and extra-moral goods is terminologically conveyed by the uncertainty of the meaning of kati (in accordance with the direction of) and (compete inequality with) (Kidd. Op. cit. P. 194). This can hardly be considered a successful solution, firstly, because the above two (provided they are correctly combined and consistently applied) eliminate the same contradictions much more successfully, and, secondly, because the attribution to the good or to the indifferent is unstable and varies depending on the context. So it is usually presented as indifferent (SVF III. 126; 145), and-as a goal (SVF III. 13; 16). Forschner (M. Die Stoische Ethik. Uber den Zusammenhang von Natur-, Sprach- und Moralphilosophie im altstoischen System. Stuttgart, 1981. p. 222) writes that "to live by nature" can mean three different things (in different ways related to the good), depending on what kind of "nature" and in what aspect is meant.

Long A.A. 12 The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics // Long A.A. Stoic Studies. Cambr., 1996. P. 140.

13 See, for example: Plut. St. rep. 1035C-D; Cic. Fin. III. 73. See also Kidd. Op. cit. P. 187.

Inwood B. 14 Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism. Oxf., 1985. P. 19.

15 For the time being, I deliberately avoid mentioning the "seed principles", the meaning of which will be analyzed below.

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and prevention from decomposition at each stage of this development, and the emphasis is shifted in comparison with previous philosophical systems to the last two, which in the categories of causality fall under the type of "supporting cause" Long in this regard notes the dependence of the nature of changes that the subject undergoes on its pneuma, which is the reason for its existence .16 And this applies both to the world as a whole and to its parts (for example, to a person). Thus, nature in a broad sense manifests itself as a constitutive or supporting cause in any bodies, including inanimate ones, although they are lower on the "natural scale" than plants and animals, whose constitution is determined by nature in a narrow sense (i.e., in the case of animals).e. properties inherent in plants and higher organisms). Animals and plants are combined on the grounds that nature operates in animals as well, and the soul is often defined as " nature having additional feelings and impulses "(SVF II. 458). An illustrative example of how the soul "binds" the body is Chrysippus ' joke about a pig that God gave a soul to preserve its meat, just as we salt meat for canning. In this analogy, all the necessary conditions are present: the mass of salt is negligible in comparison with meat; salt evenly penetrates its surface , really protects it from decomposition.

Along with this, we know another distinction between the concept of nature - the opposition of universal nature and private nature Cicero 19 compares the nature of the universe with private nature, pointing out common features-generation, development, maintenance, the presence of an impulse. In Fin. III. 73 he writes about the importance of understanding universal nature for human beings.

For us, however, the evidence of Plutarch may be more important, because he does not compare, but contrasts the two natures. In the 34th chapter of St. Rep. Plutarch tells us, referring to Chrysippus himself, that the universe is arranged in such a way that our condition, which does not correspond to our nature , for example, illness or injury, corresponds, however, to the cosmic nature, the testimony of Diogenes Laertius is also important: "The nature in accordance with which one must live, Chrysippus interprets as general and as properly human" (VII. 89 = SVF I. 555, translated by A. Stolyarov).

First of all, we should be interested in the relationship between nature in a broad and narrow sense, on the one hand, and universal and private nature, on the other. We have no right to assume that these pairs mean the same thing, since nature is introduced in a narrow sense to distinguish between the living and the inanimate. Accordingly, when it comes to the particular nature of a rigid body, the concept of nature in the narrow sense simply could not be applied. The example is quite illustrative: "Particles have the same motion (as the universe. - A. G.) from the nature of the body and there are reasons to believe that the first movement of bodies by nature is directed to the center of the world " (St. Rep. 1055A-a direct quote from the treatise of Chrysippus "On movement"). That it is private nature that we are referring to is also clear, because the problem posed in this chapter is that we should not be able to do so.

Long А.A.. Sedley D.N. 16 The Hellenistic Philosophers. V. 2. Cambr., 1987. P. 341.

17 Existence not only determines the existence of a thing as an integral unit (i.e., it keeps it from disintegrating), but also determines its qualities (this aspect is conveyed in the first part of the phrase , in contrast to the second part, where we are talking about the current state of a thing with certain qualities). The Stoics believed that qualities depend primarily on the binding element, the pneuma, which is the type, so when using this term in relation to organic matter, the emphasis shifts to quality. So, it should be understood as such a device of a living organism that provides a response to external factors (cf. SVF III. 169), and - as such a feature of the body's device that leads to gluttony. Thus, the term takes on the meaning that the word "constitution"has in Russian.

18 Cp. definition

19 Os. Nat. deor. II. 58.

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to reconcile the two kinds of motion: Many more examples of appeals to the particular nature of solids can be given. Thus, if we deprive nature in the narrow sense of the possibility of representing any particular nature, we get the following scheme::

As for the introduction of" nature in a special sense", it must be said that it has a purely classificatory meaning and therefore cannot exist .20 When we say that "of the existing things, some are governed by structure, others by nature, others by the soul", etc., it would be more correct to say not "nature", but "natures" (which is what Simplicius does when describing the plant level - SVF II. 499), that is, their own, which, however, are not the same as those of nature., have certain general properties, and by their presence they are combined into one group. In the narrow and special senses, we will consider only in connection with the levels of complexity of the movement. Thus, the main thing that enters into our task is to describe the relationship between universal and private nature.

It follows from the above scheme that in any context the word "nature" can be defined as "universal" or "particular" (except in the case of "nature in a special sense", which, however, is easily recognized) and this will not lead to a distortion of the meaning - of course, provided that this definition is made correctly. However, as far as the extra-moral sphere is concerned, pointing out the general or particular nature often leads to almost the same result. So, if we say that a stone is moving downwards, then this means moving downwards in the absence of obstacles to this, i.e. the cosmic nature will act both "through the stone "(SVF II. 979 (24), 991), creating the substantial cause of movement - its gravity, and through the surrounding bodies, forming the previous reason, i.e. the conditions for its fall. If we say that a stone falls , then the very fact of its fall requires the presence of previous causes. The same applies to the movements of animals (ibid.). The main reason lies, of course, in the animal itself (however, as in the stone in the case of its fall), but its movements

20 Just as they do not exist (see Rist J. M. Stoic Philosophy. Cambr., 1969. P. 165).

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if necessary, they depend on external objects, and the causal relationship here is rigid 21 . When an external stimulus appears, it inevitably causes a corresponding effect. A frog, seeing a fly, cannot help but jump. It is in this way and from approximately the same positions that modern zoology evaluates the actions of animals in accordance with their so-called "specific sensitivity", i.e., the rigid dependence of motor reactions on sensory impressions. Attention is focused on the fact that this kind of movement occurs And then this formulation is explained: each body surrounded by other bodies (which in turn also did not develop by chance) can move in a strictly defined way and in no other way, i.e. we are dealing with a fundamental law of the world order 22 . By its very nature, the stone tends to move down, which is due to its weight. Heaviness, being a quality, is a direct consequence of the body having "Parts of all things in the world that have their own structure, have a tendency to the center of the world" (SVF I. 99, translated by A. A. Stolyarov; see also SVF II. 400) 23 . It can be said that heaviness (along with hardness) is the constitution of the stone. Reflecting the internal properties of the stone, the category also has methodological significance, i.e. it is a separate step in the analysis of its movement. Note, however, that the relative position of bodies (say, as in our case - the center and the periphery) already falls under the category, since the category does not describe what is outside the body. Chrysippus specifically emphasized that parts of the world do not exist by themselves but "in relation to everything" (St. Rep. 1054 F = SVF II. 550). But this is only an apparent difficulty, easily overcome in the framework of the stoic doctrine of categories. As follows from the message Simplikia (SVF II. 390), can be caused not only by external factors, but also by the quality of the object.This relationship is called and, as indicated in fragment 24 , equates to or, more precisely, requires its presence in order to form a certain "relative arrangement". it is a very convenient candidate for categorical determination of the mutual influence of particular natures in the system of cosmic nature. We will come back to this term when we talk about "proper" and moral actions.

However, the description of" natures " in the system of categories does not yet provide an exhaustive explanation of their interaction. We must find out what are the mechanisms of the manifestation of necessity, i.e., the universal nature in particular nature.

First of all, it should be noted that the concept of both general and private nature contains the idea of development by analogy with plant nature. In general, analogy as one of the logical moves occupies an important place in the Stoic system. So the Stoics took the growth of the seed as their model. This model accurately reflects two main points: the movement "out of oneself", i.e. the development and deployment of one's properties at the right time (the latter will be especially important for ethics). We get this idea of the seed from Philo (SVF II. 713) and Simplicius (SVF II. 499). The principles of the future thing are hidden and not visible, but with the involvement of the surrounding matter, the thing will be formed according to these principles. The comparison with modern genetics will not be crude or inaccurate, but with the only difference that in the Stoic view, the unity of the world was carried out at a higher structural level, because "the principles of the world's unity" are considered to be the same.

21 Nevertheless, animals in the stoic sense are not quite like well-regulated automatons: they have a sensus sui, i.e., some rudiments of consciousness.

22 Such an understanding of private nature in the system of other private natures is the basis of the doctrine of fate, the analysis of which, however, is not included in the task we have set.

23 The dependence of the type of movement on the constitution of the object (as well as the subject) can be demonstrated by an example . It is the cause of the impulse, and therefore of the movement.

24 See also Forschner. Op. cit. P. 62.

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seeds " also exist in inorganic matter. Strictly speaking, the Stoics did not even have such an opposition, and the main difference between living nature and inanimate nature was considered to be the presence of an internal source of movement and the absence of strong and long-lasting connections that support the unity of the body.

But what is most valuable to us is Plutarch's account in chapter 35, On General Concepts (= SVF II. 744), because in addition to the information we know from Philo and Simplicius, he gives two very interesting Chrysippus etymologies: from (twisting, folding) and (inflating, swelling). Thus, the process of becoming both the world as a whole and an individual thing is represented as the unfolding of life, and nature is represented as the actualization of fate. Nature releases principles and formulas, and in this sense it is " a creative fire that follows the path of generation."

Thus, both the general and private natures develop in a similar way, as if fulfilling a certain program. This program is as perfect as possible, but it is not executed in the same way. The fact is that the development of universal nature is not hindered by anything, and both it and its movements are characterized as (St. Rep. 1056 E = SVF II. 935), while "private natures are opposed by many obstacles and hindrances (Ibid. 1056 D). Cicero expressed this even more precisely (Nat. deor, II. 35): "It is natural for both the vine and cattle to advance towards perfection in some way of their own, if this is not prevented by some force... But nature as a whole cannot be hindered by anything - after all, it contains everything in itself" (translated by I. Rizhsky). Origen reports (SVF II. 1174) that although nature is one, what happens in the universe is not identical or uniform in SVF II. 986 and 991 we are talking about the fact that fate hinders impulses. We cannot attribute the imperfection of any particular thing (such as a stunted tree or a sick animal) to the imperfection of its spermatic logos, which are in fact as perfect as possible. We will simply say that this particular nature has encountered serious obstacles in its development.

Unfortunately, no classification of obstacles has come down to us, similar to the classification of movements that Origen brought to us. The most common words that convey this meaning are verbs Although we cannot state any terminological differences, it is still possible to make several assumptions.

First of all, each level of the organization must have its own obstacles, or rather, the ability to overcome some and the inability to overcome others. It is natural to assume that the higher the level of organization, the better the ability to adapt should be developed. "Spermatic logos" do not set a rigid and mechanical line of development. It is in this sense that the phrase "structures are capable of intensification and relaxation (SVF II. 393). An example of this is plants whose structure suggests taking root, but some of them do it better than others. Another hypothesis that we can accept with even greater justification is the assumption that particular natures are mutual obstacles to development. After all, the impulses of animals are caused by various objects that form the previous cause of movement, while the main cause is inherent in the animal. Thus, it is quite possible to apply to them the formula "they are not relative to each other, but to each other relative to the predicate" of the movement (Clem. Stromat. 8. 9. 30 3-4 = SVP. II. 349). This is how the necessity of fate works: it creates for every thing a network of antecedent causes, and moreover it creates the thing itself in such a way that under these circumstances any alternative cause is excluded.

25 See, for example: Edelstein L. The Meaning of Stoicism. Cambr., 1969. Section II, where "unfolding" is the keyword.

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the outcome, and what in one case played the role of the main cause, may also be the previous reason for something else-it all depends only on the point of reference, i.e., from the point of view of which part we begin to trace the causal relationship.

In general, the topic of obstacles is extremely important for all three parts of the Stoic teaching. In logic, the theory of the possible is based on this concept (see SVF II. 959). Its importance for ethics is indisputable, and we will return to it in the third section of this article.

As for the relativity of the criterion for assessing the state of various particular natures, it should be noted that ethics, as the doctrine of good and evil, is taken out of this relativism, i.e. good and evil are absolutely represented, and the system of relative values is an extra-moral sphere. However, this relativism, the consequences of which are fully manifested in physics, can shed light on the origins of the stoic doctrine of purpose.

Thus, the interests of private nature are taken into account only insofar as its structure is such that it ensures the infinite development of cause-and-effect relationships, i.e., the interests of the whole. It is for this reason that "(universal) nature takes care that no species disappears" (SVF II. 1139). How does this happen?

Each being, in an effort to fulfill its "program", makes certain efforts, and these efforts are of universal value due to the fact that they contribute to the continuation of the cause-effect chain, but achieving a positive result as the goal of these efforts may even be harmful both in the interests of the whole and from the point of view of the thing we are considering. Here we can talk about a certain balance. An excellent illustration of this can serve as an example with large and small fish from the article by G. Stricker. She writes: "The instinct tells small fish to avoid predators, thus preserving their lives. By staying alive and healthy and producing offspring, they follow a natural path. It may seem that their natural aim is to live to the end of their lives. But it is also known that small fish serve as food for large ones, and therefore it is also part of the natural plan that a certain number of them should be eaten. Thus, success in leading a natural life does not necessarily turn out to be part of nature's plan for small fish, but it is a question of nature's balance, which it maintains through each species following its innate impulses. After all, if the small fish were not able to escape, they would soon be wiped out, and the big ones would be left without food." 26

In a generalized form, the idea of the inevitability of the death of some bodies for the emergence of others is expressed in the doctrine of "consequences" or "side effects" Origen tells us that, since all bodies are fluid, their death and decomposition-The theory of "side effects" goes beyond the simple description of antagonism in nature. This teaching is the key to understanding the essential Stoic reservation that everything created by nature is as perfect as possible. Along with the subtle structure of the human body and head, which is predetermined by the complexity of their functions, the possibility of being exposed to various diseases was also created (SVF II. 1170). Much of man's imperfection is due to the coarseness of the material from which he is made.

Before I proceed to apply the physical principles formulated in this section to ethics, I will allow myself to summarize them once again.

1. The concept of "nature" is divided into "general nature "and"particular nature".

26 The article by G. Striker (Following Nature: A Study in Stoic Ethics / / Oxford Studies in an Ancient Philosophy. Oxf., 1991. 9. P. 1-74. N. 20), representing a detailed and thorough study of the concepts of purpose and indifference, unfortunately does not contain any analysis of various aspects "nature", nor references to studies that highlight these aspects, for example: Long, Sedley. Op. cit. P. 284-292; Long. The Logical Basis ... P. 134. See also Stolyarov, UK. op. p. 192.

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2. Particular nature can be described in isolation in the category and its qualities, states, and movements in the context of universal nature can be described in the category

3. Despite the differences in the degree of complexity of movements, all of them are performed by necessity both inanimate and living bodies.

4. The formation and development of things takes place according to a given program, for the implementation of which time is a necessary condition. This program is as perfect as possible, but its implementation may face various obstacles.

5. The ability to avoid or overcome certain types of obstacles also depends on the level of difficulty of movements.

6. The achievement of each organism's own goal is not part of the plan of cosmic nature. For the latter, the aspiration of the organism is important, since it is it that creates the prerequisites for the further development of the universe.

7. In addition to the fact that the imperfection of parts can be explained through their own antagonism and relativism, another reason for their imperfection is that each positive phenomenon carries some negative consequences

III

The task of this section of the article is to apply our conclusions to the sphere of human practice, i.e. to consider what role nature plays in determining the material content of an act and its motivation, depending on whether a person belongs to one of three groups: "low" "moving towards virtue" and sages. The first group consists of people who do not strive for possession "natural things") - performing all the proper actions and thus making an effort not to miss out on any of the available "natural things". Sages, in addition to the above qualities, have a number of properties that have a significant impact on both the motivation and the material content of the action. Having virtue, which is considered the only good, the sage perceives all other values, i.e., "natural things", insofar as they correspond to virtue - this makes the formal principle of action of the sage completely different from that of other people. The material criterion may also differ due to the fact that the sage knows more about the causes - factors operating in the present, and sometimes the consequences in the future. Although the motivations of sages and non-sages differ, it is obvious that the Stoics seek to bring their actions under a single "natural" basis, which we will have to reveal. For convenience of presentation, the order of consideration of the material will be the same as in the previous section of the article.

So, the first task that we have to solve is to label the term "nature" in the ethical sphere. The most common use of the term in ethics - The latter we know that: (a) Cleanthes added the word "nature" to it; (b) Chrysippus, recognizing this definition of purpose, introduced another, more detailed one, in which the word "nature", as he himself pointed out, should be understood as "universal nature". They are contrasted in different ways, for example, the former are indifferent, and the latter constitute the goal, or the former are not produced by virtue activity (and, consequently, by something else) (SVF III. 64), and the latter, on the contrary, presupposes the presence of virtue (SVF I. 179; III. 16). But our scheme shows that the universal nature can only be contrasted with the particular nature. If our assumption is correct, then the use of these stable combinations should satisfy a number of requirements given at the end of the second section of our article.

As for the definition of" natural "and" consonant with nature " in the system of categories, we must first resolve a number of difficulties. The fact is that in addition to

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of its narrow and special meaning, i.e. "objects that cause an impulse" (SVF III. 121, 142), for example, health, wealth, fame, etc., "natural" is also used to denote an action (SVF III. 114, 753) and the state or properties of an organism (SVF III. 493). In order not to add to the vagueness of the use of this term, we will use another one that has a well-defined meaning, which is based on the division of things into "natural" and "unnatural". I mean "proper" As for "consistency with nature", the form of its manifestation will be "right action" In defense of the legitimacy of such substitution, some arguments should be made.

Let's start with the pair "natural" - "proper". Even from the examples of "proper", it can be seen that "proper" includes a predicate aimed at the natural, for example, to take care of health (SVF III. 496) and property (ibid. 505), to be an ambassador or to marry (ibid. 494). At the same time, health and wealth are the most common examples of "natural", and marriage, having children, and participating in public affairs are "preferably 27 and follow from the nature of being intelligent, social, and endearing to similar beings" (SVF III. 686). Here we find an indication not only of the coincidence of the spheres of "proper" and "natural", but also of the correctness of our understanding of nature in the context of private nature. If we turn to the definitions of "proper", we will witness the same coincidence. "Proper - action proper to the natural arrangement "" Proper "from" natural " is also derived in the reports of Plutarch (ibid. 491) and Cicero (ibid. 497). As the latter points out, "the proper comes from the natural, and the former must relate to the achievement of the latter." It is necessary to note the correctness of this definition - it does not say that" proper "means " proper". it consists in achieving the "natural" result. For an explanation of this, see p. 37 and note 61.

As for the other definition of "proper" - "consistency in life" - we can conclude from many signs that the same thing is meant as in the first definition. Both Diogenes of Laertes and Stobaeus point out the existence of the sphere of "proper" also in animals, and Stobaeus even explains the reason for this: "They act according to their own nature" For intelligent animals,he somewhat corrects the earlier definition given by him - "sequence in intelligent life" and this explains to us the following definition - "that which is necessary for rational life". which has a reasonable justification for its commission." Reason here does not mean "true and cosmic" and not the mind of a wise man, but common sense, which is endowed with each person and thanks to which he takes his place in nature. We will return to the demonstration of this last point, but for now we will limit ourselves to referring to Long 28, who treats "consistency" and "reasonableness" in this context as generally accepted.

In the case of the correlation between "right actions" and "agreement with nature", we have a formal relationship through definitions. Cicero (Fin. III. 21) reports that " right actions must correspond to what the Greeks call Stobaeus "(SVF III. 394) cites the definition of "right action" as "actions according to virtue", which is often identified with"harmony with nature".

Categorical analysis of human actions will be complicated by two factors. First, proper and correct actions do not represent something mutually isolated that can be freely contrasted and placed in the context of the future.

27 "Preferred" is defined as "having value" (SVF III. 127), and "value" has everything that is "natural" (ibid. 124). This chain of definitions was necessary in order to separate "preferred" from "good", although "preferred" is a good in its ordinary, everyday sense (see ibid. 137).

Long. Sedley. 28 Op. cit. P. 366.

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different categories, since these actions coincide in material content 29 . Second, what used to be a constant at lower levels (I mean the stability of structures - and consequently the constancy of qualities) will now be highly variable and subject-dependent (SVF II. 390).

As far as we know from Epictetus 30, "proper" is determined by "relative dispositions" to things. These are the rules of action that universal nature has established for a given species. the difficulty lies in the fact that a person with intelligence, i.e. an internal source of motivation and causation, can deviate from the path of development intended for him (and, as a rule, does so). Therefore, if we are talking about a proper action performed by a conscious agent, then the best candidate for its categorical definition is as follows from SVF II. 390, the Stoics sought to understand the problem of human responsibility for their actions and to indicate the reasons for their actions in the system of categories. In this fragment, states and relationships are divided into current and permanent, or into incidental and inherent, which , according to Rita 31, means the same thing. Permanent states or structures, as they are more appropriately called here, lead to the formation of corresponding qualities. The incoming states, understood here as the agent's current states, create a simple relation that is not conditioned by an internal quality. Such an "attitude", without being immanent to the subject, means that similar external stimuli will not always elicit a corresponding reaction, while the stoic doctrine of causality assumes that a cause inevitably leads to its effect. Thus, in this category of actions, the actions of agents cannot be regarded as independent. Responsible and independent action can only be performed by someone who has the appropriate "quality", the development of which, according to the stoics, is within our capabilities. "Quality-forming" creates a rigid causal relationship between the subject and a certain type of object. This connection is called The categorical classification of human actions is clearly visible in this scheme. Thus, taken conditionally, before its realization 32 (or after it, but without specifying specific circumstances, the main one being the agent's condition), a "proper" action falls under category a " mean "or" perfect proper" , which is described from the point of view of the part as-in our case, respectively, vice or virtue. In the light of what has been said, it is clear why Chrysippus attached such importance and why Zeno might have been influenced by Speusippus ' own formulation in determining the goal -

29 To confirm this, see note 54 below.

Epict. 30 Ench 30; Arr. Epict. 4. 4. 16; 4. 12. 16; Mure. Aur. 1. 12. См. также De Lacy P. The Stoic Categories as Methodological Principles //Transactions and Proceedings of American Philological Association. 1945. 76. P. 257.

Rieth O. 31 Grundbegriffe der Stoischen Ethik. В., 1933. S. 25.

32 See Stolyarov Uk. op. p. 194.

33 As already mentioned, the category is very capacious and covers a large number of meanings.

As applied to the sphere of human practice, it can include: a) the attitude of a person to external objects b) the mutual arrangement of these objects (the main condition of the category is fulfilled - whether we choose another object depends on the presence or absence of one, and in this latter case there are no internal changes); c) their combination. Of course, we would like to see a special form of category for "right action" - for example, one that conveys the subject's relation to its relation to the object (cf . Forschner calls this "distancing". For the variety of meaning and application of a category, see De Lacy. Op. cit. P. 255 f, and Forschnei, respectively . Op. cit. S. 63.

34 See Stolyarov Uk. op. p. 166.

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It can be argued against our interpretation that" proper "and" right " actions should not be described in the same way in the system of categories. However, this is not entirely true. The fact is that the use of the term

not always correct. "

it should be used in its pure form only if we mean an act that has not yet been performed, and then such a "proper" would fall under the category of After the action is performed, it is marked with definitions, or in this case it is considered as the fact that "average proper" and "right action" are described in one category, it does not mean that they are identical. it is like a formula where you can substitute various variables. In the case of an ordinary act, this will be (the qualities defined by it, to be precise), and in the case of "correct" - Our approach is quite consistent with the Stoic desire to separate the "structure" 37 and the "stable structure" that ensures the constancy of qualities and, consequently, the immutability of attitudes to external objects and reactions to them.

We have just discussed how nature works to create the principle of action. Now we have to consider how nature determines its matter, i.e., what role it plays in human behavior. To be very brief, I will say at once that on this issue I share the position of Kidd, Long, Rist, and Forschner (except for one point, which will be discussed on pages 36-37). So, I will not give the characteristics of "natural things" that most researchers (including those mentioned above) agree on. We will try to get straight to the problem that has been a stumbling block in recent years38 : how to reconcile matter and the principle of action, which are equally determined by nature and which come into clear contradiction in the case of the so-called "appropriate in circumstances".

It seems to me appropriate to take two very obvious facts as a starting point: first, that "what is right in the circumstances " is still in the realm of" what is right "and not" what is right in the circumstances", and second, that" what is right in the circumstances " is not done only by the sage .39 If we also remember that the "proper" is completely dependent on the sphere of the "natural", which is dominated by a system of relative values, then it becomes clear that the "proper" must preserve this relativism. We do not have any information about "natural by circumstances", and this can hardly be attributed to the poor state of our sources. The fact is that "natural things" are good for everyone, regardless of the circumstances. In terms of action, however, the concept of choice comes into play, and we know very well that Chrysippus was interested in the mechanism of choice (for example, which coin from two identical ones to choose or which runner from those who came at the same time).

35 A possible objection is that "proper" is never expressed in the abstract, but is attributed to a particular species (for example, shrubs). This is similar to but is not the case, since here we are dealing with things that do not really exist.

36 In fact, this is

37 Of course, the various "structures" that collectively make up the human individual are not the same in their degree of variability, and the dependence of this variability on his will is very different in the "structures" of different levels. In terms of behavior, this gradation of "structures" is reflected terminologically as Such, a person, regardless of his desire, must eat quite specific food (and, say, not wood), because the "structure" that determines the process of his nutrition is only marginally amenable to control on his part (for example, a consciously developed habit of eating more or less, to eat or not to eat meat, etc.). In terms of values, this level corresponds to "primary natural things" As for the level that is exclusively inherent in a person, here he is given complete freedom, up to the possibility of doing exactly the opposite of "proper".

38 See Stolyarov Uk. op. p. 185, 214.

39 See, for example: Long, Sedlev. Op. cit. P. 366.

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award a victory). In the above examples, we should be interested in the scheme of their construction: it is assumed that only one thing can be chosen, and both are natural. Thus, it can be said that the "appropriate according to circumstances" is a reflection of the interrelationship of the two values of "natural things" and that the ability to orient oneself to the "appropriate according to circumstances" and its choice is the prerogative of reason, and the human mind, which is determined by its particular nature. Human impulses and movements are extremely complex and can be described as an orientation in a vast number of different values, which are values in so far as they are natural to human nature.

Cicero in Fin. III. 20-21 indicates five stages of personality formation: 1) the desire for self-preservation; 2) the selection of "natural things" and the avoidance of "unnatural"; 3) the choice determined by "proper"; 4) the rooting of this choice in the form of habit; 5) its absolutization, which achieves complete harmony with nature.

First of all, we must pay attention to stages 2 and 3. The presence of stage 3 shows that it is not enough to follow the principle of selecting "natural things" in order to fulfill the "proper"one. What ability is additionally given to a person at the third stage of development?

Taking into account that "natural things can be used well or badly, and the same is true for unnatural things" (SVFIII. 123), we are inclined to think that the only stage out of these five that could correspond to the ability of such use is stage 3 - after all, selection and use are not at all one and the same thing. At the same time, it should not be overlooked that the sequence of stages proposed by Cicero is diachronic and reflects the development of the individual, and not the sequence of motivation for an individual act (then each previous stage would determine the subsequent one). Here, the next step can cancel the previous one. This consideration is important for understanding the fact that the "choice" made in stage 3 does not come from things supposedly already selected in stage 2, but simply from the fact that things are divided into useful and harmful, and therefore our choice is not indifferent. The object of choice in the third stage can be the desire for the "unnatural" and the avoidance of the "natural", because, in our opinion, "the right and wrong use of unnatural things" can not consist only in avoiding them. And the choice of unnatural things does not constitute a situation of "appropriate circumstances"?

There is another important point in the order of stages described by Cicero. Taking into account its goal-to deduce the stages of development precisely in their sequence, it is impossible not to notice that " appropriate for circumstances "(if our hypothesis is correct) is available to most people. However, other arguments will be given in favor of such an assessment (see pp. 35-36, ed. 54 and 59).

This approach makes it possible to remove many contradictions, some of which Chrysippus himself considered paradoxes. In his third book, On Nature, he writes: "Such are human goods that at a certain turn (of events) evil may even have an advantage over indifferent" 42 . By evil in this fragment, in fact, is meant non-good (namely, the loss of virtue by a wise man in the event of suicide - after all, it is possible only during life). Most researchers recognize that it is the" average things " that determine the decision to leave life 43 . This is also indicated by the majority of fragments (except for those that indicate the threat of data loss).-

40 Which, by the way, are taken from the 6th book of Chrysippus "On the proper", which indirectly confirms our idea about the special role of choice in the sphere of "proper".

41 Forschner speaks of the " graduelle Ordnung "of" natural things " (Op. cit. S. 166).

Plut. 42 St. rep. 1042B = Comm. not. 1064E = SVF III. 760.

43 See, for example: Sandbach A. H. The Stoics. L., 1975. P. 50.

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children due to insanity as a reason for justifiable suicide 44). However, Cicero clearly informs us that if something natural is lacking, everyone must die (Fin. III. 60). This suggests that the choice occurs only in the sphere of relative values, since the average person is able to navigate in it. When we say that life and health are preferred, it means nothing more than that" we prefer health to disease and life to death " (SVF III. 124). However, it is particularly emphasized that this happens only if there is a pure choice between them .45 Kidd himself points this out, but in a different connection, and apparently for this reason does not relate his observation to another, not entirely correct formulation: "a general rule that may be incorrect." It is not clear to what situation it applies: if it is a choice between members of a binary opposition, then this rule is never violated; and if something third intervenes in the alternative, then such a choice no longer falls under rule 46 , but rather under a system of moral precepts, the redundancy of which is a.A. Stolyarov, although describing it as "an incredible casuistry and difficult - to-predict pettiness" 47, is nevertheless an inevitable consequence of the relative value of "natural" things and thus an integral part of the teaching. If the choice is to be made within the framework of the binary opposition "natural" - "unnatural", then the answer is clear; if the choice is offered within the framework of a practical alternative, for example, illness - death, then it is not so obvious. The same situation arises in the case of choosing between two other "unnatural things" - conscious self-harm and service to a tyrant. This is a "due process" situation. It arises because the "marked ""proper" includes, in addition to indicating the state of the agent, two more elements: a) it is based on things that are "natural" for the "structure" of each organism, but are given, however, in the state of b) "relative location" to each other. This view is confirmed by the fact that in the examples of Diogenes Laertius (VII, 109) as examples of "unconditioned 48 A. A. Stolyarov writes 49: "Appropriate for the circumstances can be therefore, can arise on a different basis than With all the desire it is impossible to declare natural cannibalism or suicide." Impossible, of course. However, it is quite possible to declare it less unnatural than anything else. The point is simply that in the realm of the "natural", for the reason mentioned on page 32, this distinction is not reflected. It manifests itself in assigning a value to the "natural", and we have no reason to believe that the same value is assigned to different "natural things" - in this case, the act of judging would simply not make sense.

With this approach, it is possible to solve the difficulty that is seen in the division of values into "large" and "small". The answer to this question can be given as follows

Diog. Laert. 44 VII. 131; Stob. II. 7. 11.

45 see SVF III. 196; 192. See also Kidd. Op. cit. P. 189.

46 This opinion is shared by Long (Long A. A. Hellenistic Philosophy. Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. Duckworth, 1986. P. 192).

Carpenters. 47 Uk. soch. p. 218.

48 The translation "unconditional" (ibid., p. 185) seems to me misleading, because we run the risk of giving such "proper" the meaning of "what must be done under any circumstances" and confusing it with "constantly proper" , which is what A. Stolyarov came up with (ibid.), while However, what is meant is quite different - "something that none of the circumstances given to us prevent it from being appropriate, and therefore accepted for execution."

Carpenters. 49 Uk. soch. P. 215.

50 Let us leave out for the present the unwarranted identification of "appropriate in circumstances" with "right action." In the future, we will see that it is not only the sage who is capable of performing the first one.

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answer: more or less value is given to the positive members of different binary oppositions. A typical example to confirm this is the Stobey report (SVF III. 136). He gives a detailed classification of values, and among other things it turns out that "the natural in the mental sphere has a greater value than in the physical."

It is also widely believed that "permanently appropriate" coincides with and, accordingly, "impermanently appropriate" coincides with "appropriate in circumstances". The examples in our sources are completely different for these pairs and do not give rise to their identification. (our translation: "unconditioned proper") sets us a starting point: for example, it is better to have a family than not to have one. At the same time, the absence of a family may be "appropriate for the circumstances". "Permanently proper" refers to the relatively high value of a thing that is not only superior to its opposite negative value, but also to all other possible natural values, such as reverence for parents, 51 and thus the material content of such an action will never pass into the category of "impermanently proper" and will not be sacrificed to"appropriate by circumstances" 52 . What we have said about "proper" can be summarized in the following table:

However, this topic causes so many disagreements among researchers that it is impossible not to cite the opinions of at least some of them. It should be noted at once that in my assessment of what is "appropriate" and especially what is "appropriate according to circumstances" I follow Long 53, who is, however, more than brief on this issue, but quite categorical, as well as Forschner, who is of the opinion that "a wise man in a meaningful sense cannot do anything wrong." anything" 54 . I fully agree with this position and am even ready to reproach Forschner for not always being consistent in its application and insufficiently radical. Long shares this view: this follows from the fact that he does not even consider the report of Philo reliable (SVF III. 513 = 59 N), which tries to convince us of the existence of improper actions, which are nevertheless performed properly and vice versa. However, Long is convinced that this is simply an incorrect rendering of the term "appropriate for the circumstances." 55 He also believes that " ra-

51 Perhaps this" proper " was so important to the Stoics because it was on this basis that they built their social teaching.

52 The much-talked-about murder of my father is fortunately explained by Cicero. This is done out of the greatest reverence, which does not allow us to see the father as a slave. As for the other passage, it deals with the equal degree of guilt of the person who killed the rooster and killed the father, and of course the author is far from thinking that this is "proper".

Long, Sedley. 53 Op. cit. P. 365 f.

Forschner. 54 Op. cit. S. 200. The solution to this question depends directly on the assessment of "appropriate in the circumstances". If we believe that such an action is dictated by circumstances that can be accounted for and understood within the framework of generally accepted morality, and that there is no "proper, done improperly" (and Forschner repeatedly states both), then the material content of the actions of a sage will coincide with that of an ordinary person. Another question is that the sage's qualitatively excellent knowledge allows him to take into account the future consequences of his action more fully, recognizing them by signs in the present, which are an integral part of the initial circumstances of each of his actions. If these consequences were communicated to an ordinary person performing it, he would have acted just like the sage.

Long, Sedley. 55 Op. cit. P. 366.

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smart justification "refers precisely to the correct consideration of circumstances, and" consistency in life " considers it common for both the sage and others, and reduces their actions to generally accepted morality. Rist 56 and probably Sandbach 57 are of the same opinion . As for Forschner, it should be noted that in his research, this topic is developed in the most detail. I fully share his original settings and am ready to complain that he makes an exception in their application for those cases that do not require it at all.

On the one hand, he quite rightly criticizes Tsekurakis, stating that for the latter "an act automatically passes into the category if its material content is something absurd" 58, and on the other hand , he characterizes his own interpretation, which consists in the fact that they can serve as the object of a moral act" 59 (meaning the situation of "proper behavior"). due to circumstances") as untenable 60 . But such a possibility inevitably follows from Forschner's own concept, although, of course, not at all in the sense that Tsekurakis has in mind. What Forschner wants to say (although he doesn't say it directly, for reasons that I don't understand) is that there is a situation in which a choice is impossible.This understatement has led to inconsistency in at least two points.

Having subjected to a precise analysis of "what is appropriate according to the circumstances", Forschner finds himself in a quandary about the case: (a) it is the only act that is morally good, but cannot be described in the framework (b) it is not so much the latter as what is done contrary to the goal that is possible and justified under the circumstances; c) but it is not so much as it does not fit into the framework of the concept of self-preservation and development. In this last premise (from which proposition a is derived) lies the error! Self-preservation and development belong to the realm of "natural" rather than" proper " 61 , which (as Forschner himself claims (!)) 62 in practice coincide only partially. It is possible that Forschner's error is caused by the same translation of terms in German - respectively

Here, however, we are again faced with the problem: do the spheres of "superlative" coincide?-

56 " The moral and the improper are incompatible. This is what the Stoics mean when they say that the wise man does everything right "(Rist. Op. cit. P. 98).

Sandbach. 57 Op. cit. P. 49.

Forschner. 58 Op. cit. S. 200. Anm. 99.

59 I have no intention of justifying Tsekurakis ' position, which seems to me to be deeply flawed. After all, the statement quoted by Forschner should be understood as follows: the sage is above the sphere of "natural things" and therefore in his behavior should not take into account the opposition "natural" - "unnatural" - the principle justifies the matter of action. Such a concept entails a lot of undesirable consequences, which should not be discussed here in order to avoid deviating from the topic, but one of them concerns the issue we are discussing. According to Tsekurakis, it turns out that only a wise person is capable of doing what is right according to "circumstances", while most examples indicate the opposite. The most striking of these is given in Cicero (Par. st. III. 24). The people of Saguntum, not being wise, put their fathers to death to save them from slavery. It is possible, of course, that it was at this point that they became "wise men for a moment" (see SVF III. 54; 210). I am still inclined to think that what they did was just reasonably justified and based on a simple premise: "it is better to die than to be a slave."

Forschner. 60 Op. cit. S. 225.

61 In general, it should be noted that the non-distinction between "natural" and "proper" has long been commonplace. In fact, "proper" is not even defined by " natural." The reason for their confusion was the use of the same examples, but we must not lose sight of the fact that these examples are given for exclusively when differentiating it from (for example, SVF III. 494) or from, while" natural things " are constantly accompanied by these examples (SVF III. 140-142, 146, 149, 150, etc.).

Forschner. 62 Op. cit. S. 200.

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existing" and "natural" (see p. 30)? There are some prerequisites for this: after all, "proper" is a predicate directed to "natural". However, it is worth noting that in this case, "proper" can not carry any additional semantic load and will mean the same as "natural", but only in terms of action. The texts convince us that this is not the case, or at least not always the case. I propose the following explanation: "natural things" are such for an individual by virtue of its structure This is confirmed by the definitions: (one of the definitions appeals to the fact that the" structure "of a given organism determines its response "impulse" Such a relationship between subject and object can be represented as the" relationship of a quality thing " which can be considered as a "quality thing"). (see pp. 26, 31), and, moreover, it is usually considered this way, because the study of relations between objects is aimed at revealing their properties. So, when assigning an object to the "natural - unnatural", the main role is played by the "structure" of the subject. If, however, we introduce the term shift the emphasis to the practical plan, the logical dominance of the" structure " remains. For example, instead of the sentence: "Apples are good for a person", we will have a sentence like this: "A person should eat apples". For what, exactly? "To maintain its' structure, ' of course. However, such "proper" cannot be defined as either "average" or "perfect" and provides little insight into the basics of human action, such as motivation, choice criteria, etc. This is how the logical side of category C. Objects are considered in isolation.

When we move to the next stage of analysis, we move in two directions at once: the subject and object are concretized and at the same time appear to be inscribed in a whole system of accompanying factors that enter into a complex complex of relationships. Now our sentence can take the following form: "Socrates should eat this apple", provided that the conditions are met: it can be reached without a certain risk; there is no fear that it is poisoned; Socrates did not eat too many apples the day before, etc. Obviously, the probability of non-compliance with such conditions is quite high, and, therefore, as a result of the final analysis (which is, as we know, the last, fourth category), the spheres of "natural" and" proper " may well not coincide.

There is another point in Forschner's interpretation that I cannot agree with. He quite rightly considers in the category but the consequence which he deduces from this does not necessarily follow from its properties. Forschner believes that "consequences" can transform a "proper action" into a "non - proper" one , 63 that is, in the language of categories, a thing undergoes a change due to a change in external relations, without changing its internal structure. All this is true, but will this requirement not be met if we recognize as external objects necessary for the existence of a "relative arrangement" not consequences, but actually external objects that actually coexist with the object and matter of the action and make up the circumstances of this action? After all, the circumstances are completely exhausted by such objects 64 . It is not the consequences that should be taken into account; this was clearly demonstrated by Edelstein .65 To assign a volume

63 Ibid. S. 205, 209.

64 Wed. Epict. Diss. II. 6.17: "What ' circumstances', my friend? After all, if by "circumstances" you mean the things around you, then everything is circumstances."

Edelstein. 65 Op. cit. Ch. 1. This opinion is also shared by Long, which is evident from the following statements: it is absolutely not necessary if it does not ensure the achievement of the object of action... In some situations, an attempt, even if unsuccessful, should be sufficient, despite the fact that the attempts of an ordinary person are incomparably weaker than those of a sage "(Long. Hellenistic Philosophy... P. 403. Not. 83).

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or other action of the "appropriate" character 66 (i.e., for its "reasonable justification"), it is necessary to take into account only those circumstances that are known to the agent at the time of the action. It is enough to quote the well-known statement of Chrysippus: "Because the consequences are unknown to me, I always adhere to what contributes to the achievement of the natural... If I knew that I was going to get sick, I would strive for it" (SVF III. 191). However, it should be noted that in many publications the second phrase is not considered a direct quote. But be that as it may, the situation is clear. If a person is not aware of the inevitability of the disease, it is natural for him to try his best to avoid it. If he somehow finds out about this (for example, from the oracle's divination), then he does not need to be a wise man to understand that if I am destined to get sick, I am not given a choice between illness and anything else, I have a choice between illness or death. Of these two things that are unnatural to me (considering my desire for self-preservation), I choose illness as the lesser evil, because it leaves me with the possibility of returning to my natural state. This kind of" reasonable justification " is found in the context of the stoic doctrine of suicide, the pathos of which is that a personalwayshas a choice. If we assume that our subject is a sage, then his "reasonable justification" is even simpler: since I once made a decision to live according to the laws of the cosmic mind, according to which decision I am going to get sick, on my part I will consistently strive to do so. Here we are dealing with a situation of "top-down deterministic action" 67, i.e., there is no such "right action" that is not also "appropriate". From the above, we should draw one very important conclusion: "right " and" proper " differ only in terms of motivation, but not in terms of the material content of the action. In support of my position, I can add that the idea of stoic philosophy as a doctrine that seeks to turn everything upside down did not arise at all simultaneously with stoicism. On the contrary, the intention to create a public teaching was initially obvious. And it is with this intention that it is difficult to link the ideal of the sage-superman. A real, humble Stoic visionary who is incapable of transgressing the "proper" should not have the features of a Nietzschean hero.

Based on the above, I cannot accept Forschner's position as entirely satisfactory as regards the assessment of "appropriate in the circumstances". However, my deviation from his concept consists only in two minor points.

As for the study of A. A. Stolyarov, our divergence with him is fundamental, since he puts the content of the actions of the sage beyond the limits of not only generally accepted, but also generally accepted morality. However, the author acknowledges that this kind of concept entails a number of insurmountable difficulties .68

The doctrine of" appropriate in circumstances " was probably closely related to the concept of obstacles, of which only traces have come down to us. Diogenes of Laertes (VII. 84) mentions the section "on obstacles" among other issues dealt with in the ethical part, while referring to the most prominent Stoics, starting with Chrysippus. However, we have evidence that the doctrine of obstacles was applied in all sections of Stoic philosophy. As for ethics, the Stoics saw the presence of obstacles to the development of each individual thing as the main reason for the apparent (i.e., from the point of view of this thing) imperfection of the world. Based on the considerations we have outlined on pages 27-28, we must assume that man, as the supreme being, is given the opportunity by nature to avoid the greatest number of obstacles.

66 Of course, we are referring to an act that has already been committed - there would be no point in justifying it.

67 See Huseynov A. A. Two-level system of values in stoic ethics // Ethics of stoicism. Traditions and Modernity / Ed. by A. A. Huseynov, Moscow, 1991.

Carpenters. 68 U. K. Op. pp. 216-217.

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There is no doubt about their existence-it is enough to quote the words of Epictetus: "We have an earthly body and earthly cohabitants. How can one avoid encountering obstacles here? " (Diss. I. 1.9).

Apparently, to clarify the situation, we should again turn to physics. First of all, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the ability to avoid obstacles is considered not only in connection with the classification of movements (this dependence is not subject to doubt), but also in connection with the ability of a particular "structure" to change direction .

Rocks and sticks are completely devoid of both possibilities. plants are highly variable (SVF II. 393), and thus they are given some opportunity to adapt to environmental conditions - of course, very limited. Animals, in addition to the variability of their "structure", have the ability to move. Man, as the highest animal, has the most perfect apparatus of adaptation and the most developed system of reactions to external stimuli. But at this level, it is still not fundamentally different from animals. Its main advantage is the ability to completely transform its essence, which makes it different from other animals. This is the pathos of the stoic doctrine of freedom. A person can and must transcend the attitude to "natural things" that was laid down in him by nature at the necessary stage of development. Whether he decides to do it or not is up to him. However, once a person has this ability, he is already freer than animals. If this ability is realized, then the person is free 70 , because nothing from outside can harm him, and his desires completely coincide with the course of the world's causal chain and therefore do not meet any obstacles.

Summing up all the above, we can come very close to revaluating stoic ethics and, in particular, the status of its hypothetical bearer-the stoic sage.

The theoretical basis of stoicism, built on the dialectic of the part and the whole and elevating them to unity on the steps of categories, does not at all aim to lead a person beyond reality, but, on the contrary, seeks to fit him as consistently as possible into the system of realities. As an anchorite, it is impossible to become a sage, nor to be one - for this requires performing "proper actions" and correctly evaluating "natural things". As we have seen, the sage's assessment should not differ from that of ordinary people. It is not surprising that among the adherents of stoicism we find the outstanding statesmen Cato and Marcus Aurelius, and among its experts and admirers - unsurpassed practitioners and experts in their field, such as Galen and Cicero. Stoic philosophy is a practical philosophy, both in its conception and in its essence. Deep theorizing does not lead to contemplation as an end in itself: it is necessary only in so far as the philosophical system of stoicism itself needs to be justified, and the phenomena of the surrounding world need to be adequately evaluated in order to perform the right action.. Chrysippus vigorously denied the value of the contemplative life to the philosopher 71, and for a wise man he considered it necessary to enter into all existing forms of social relations, 72 so the numerous reproaches that he himself lived a life of contemplation and idleness, 73 are hardly justified - after all, it is impossible

69 See note 37, and also note 17 and 23 of this article.

70 By the way, it should be noted that likening a wise man to a dog following a chariot at will is not so contrary to the concept of freedom. First, a dog running at will has freedom at least within the length of the leash; second, if we take into account the fact that the dog's desire to follow the chariot is immanent to it, we will not have to talk about lack of freedom.

Plut. 71 St. rep. 1033D.

72 SVF III. 691.

Plut. 73 St. rep. 1033D.

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to lose sight of the fact that it was in the Hellenistic era that the concept of professionalism actively began to form, and Chrysippus, being a professional philosopher, was engaged in his direct business-he wrote treatises, and very few people surpassed him in hard work - is another confirmation of the practical significance of stoicism.

"NATURAL" AND "PROPER" THE PHYSICAL SUBSTANTIATION OF STOIC ETHICS

A.Yu. Grishin

The paper is trying to solve the sharpest contradictions which were revealed in the ethical part of Stoicism during the last decades. Proceeding from the assumption that Stoicism was conceived as an integral and universal system with unified terminology and that the purpose of its physical teaching was to substantiate its ethics, the author in the 1st and the 2nd part of the paper attempts to clarify the terms of physics relevant for the ethic part as well: universal nature

The subject of the author's detailed analysis is the stoic concept of "conditionally proper" Unlike the majority of scholars (Forschner and Long excluded with some reservations) the author is inclined to think that the difference between "conditionally proper" and "unconditionally proper" can be explained by the Stoics' methodology and their teaching of categories, not by the change of the agent's status or the material content of the action, these latter being caused by the difference of the former. If the essence of "conditionally proper" in the context of action is formulated as "the situation in which the choice of natural is impossible" (i.e. when the lesser evil is to be chosen), then any attempt to seek for the basis of "conditionally proper" in anything else but the generally recognized morality seems to be groundless. This point is of great cultural importance, for it does away with the idea of double standard ascribed to Stoicism, i.e. with the idea that the motivation of a wise man's actions and their material content are different from those of a common man. In the authors' opinion, the "common standard" corresponds better to the aims of Stoa's founders to work out a widely accepted and practically orientated teaching.

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