The difficult military and political situation in East Asia and a certain sense of its own strategic defenselessness have recently become the most important factor that pushes Japan to search for ways of long-term reconciliation with Moscow. I would argue that Tokyo no longer sees Russia as a potential threat and, on the contrary, sees it as an essential resource for ensuring national security.

It was this consideration that primarily motivated the Japanese leadership when, in the late 1990s, it began to establish a dialogue with our country and to make rather active attempts to bring the negotiations on solving the problem of the Southern Kuril Islands and signing a peace treaty out of a dead standstill.

Other factors of rapprochement are working so far, I must admit, poorly. Interest in developing economic relations with Russia is rather sluggish here: big business does not believe that the neighboring country experiencing a crisis can become a significant buyer of Japanese goods - both household goods and, say, complete factory equipment. The Japanese business community does not yet see any opportunities for significant investment in Russia. For the most part, small and medium-sized businesses are also wary of establishing contacts with Russian entrepreneurs, as they have heard enough frightening stories about the failure of many joint ventures. Tokyo does not believe that the stagnant situation in economic relations between the two countries can improve dramatically in the near future, and the private sector does not include Russia among its foreign policy priorities.

However, there is a strategic interest. This is an interest in the energy resources of the East of Russia - in particular, in gas. Japanese firms are involved in the development of Sakhalin's oil and gas fields, and Tokyo is working on options for laying an inter-island pipeline. In the mid-90s, Japan began to talk about the possibility of participating in the development and operation of gas fields in the Irkutsk region (primarily Kovyktinsky). However, the implementation of these plans was slowed down due to the financial crisis in Russia in 1998 and the unprecedented economic cataclysms in East Asia, which temporarily removed the question of accelerating the economic development of this region and, accordingly, attracting additional resources for this purpose.

TOKYO IS IN NO HURRY...

Today, the crisis has been overcome, but interest in Russian oil and gas has not yet recovered. This is largely due to the difficulties of Japan's own recovery from the longest economic crisis in its post-war history, which led, for example, to a sharp tightening of conditions for obtaining bank loans. Many state resources are now also directed at stimulating economic development within the country.

In addition, Japan itself does not experience an acute momentary need for new energy resources - oil and gas supplies to the country are well established, supported by long-term contracts. All this makes the interest of private businesses in energy projects in Russia not urgent, but rather long-term. The government also does not see the need to throw state resources into Eastern Siberia yet; it intends to first see how things will go with the Sakhalin projects that are closer to full-scale implementation. By the way, the sale of Sakhalin gas is also not clear yet - consumers in Japan are provided with this fuel. In other words, Tokyo is confident that Russia, with its energy resources, will not run away.

Geopolitics is another matter. At a leadership meeting of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party last summer, LDP Political Council Chairman Shizuka Kamei called for flexible diplomacy towards Russia, based on the interests of strengthening peace and stability in East Asia. These seemingly banal words are the key to understanding the position of those forces in Tokyo that are in favor of developing a dialogue with Moscow.

As a rule, these are the so - called "new nationalists" - conservative politicians who believe that Japan should pursue a more independent policy and build a system for protecting national interests itself, not relying only on a security treaty with the United States. Among them are former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, LDP General Secretary Hiromu Nonaka, the already mentioned Shizuka Kamei, former Minister and now head of the LDP Administrative Department Muneo Suzuki, who is called the "engine" for developing dialogue with Russia. A group of fairly influential diplomats is also associated with them.

It should not be forgotten that Japan has no global security interests. In the affairs of distant regions, be it Kosovo or the Middle East, it takes part either under pressure from the United States, or for a rather empty demonstration of the activity of its diplomacy.

However, the situation in Northeast Asia is extremely worrying for Tokyo. Moreover, after the end of the Cold War, his only reliable friend there was the United States. According to the closed forecast, which was made at the direction of the government by experts from the National Defense Administration of Japan, there is no threat of the United States withdrawing from the region in the foreseeable future. The United States, Tokyo believes, will maintain its military and political presence there until at least the middle of the next century. Tokyo was also convinced that the fears that had arisen at one time about a possible strategic rapprochement between Washington and Beijing were unnecessary: the strategic differences between the two powers were too great.

WHY DO WE NEED A US MILITARY PRESENCE?

An alliance with the United States for the foreseeable future will undoubtedly be the basis for ensuring Japan's security. Despite significant military expenditures, Tokyo is unlikely to have the opportunity and desire to build a system of independent defense against large-scale aggression.

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With the end of the Cold War, the already small threat of amphibious assault on Japanese territory has dramatically decreased. In this regard, Tokyo is taking measures to reduce some ground forces. In particular, two divisions are being reduced to brigades, and troops and equipment are being transferred from the north - from the "Russian direction" to the "western" - that is, they will cover the country from China and North Korea.

However, Tokyo is not going to ask Washington to reduce its military presence in Japan, although questions about why it is needed are increasingly heard both in the press and from the public - especially on the island of Okinawa, where 70 percent of all US military facilities in the country are concentrated. Tokyo considers US troops on its territory a guarantee against any surprises. Moreover, he began considering the issue of legislative expansion of the powers of the allies - in particular, they are supposed to be given the right to seize any property and to prioritize the use of the transport network and ports in Japan in case of emergency.

However, much more than an enemy landing, Tokyo is now concerned about the missile problem, since immediately after the disappearance of the "Soviet threat", Japan discovered that it was still under the gun. Most people here speak out loud about the North Korean "Nodong" and "Taepodong". The hype around them reached a degree of hysteria after Pyongyang, in August 1998, without warning, tested its new ballistic missile, which flew over Japan and plopped into the waters of the Pacific Ocean.

Of course, Tokyo does not like the fact that the DPRK already has about twenty Nodons capable of reaching certain areas of Japan. However, they are aware that North Korea is on the verge of economic collapse and is unlikely to be able to deploy and maintain a real missile force in combat readiness. It will be difficult for her to continue the program of creating more advanced "Taepodons" capable of striking across Japan. In addition, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il has pledged not to test any more ballistic missiles. These words will be difficult for him to refuse without jeopardizing his new image of"a politician with whom you can deal."

Tokyo therefore sees a more real threat in the military program of China, which, in addition to consistently strengthening the army, Air Force and Navy, is testing new ballistic missiles capable of hitting parts of the United States and throughout Europe, not to mention Japan. It is from them, first of all, that the United States offers Japan to cover itself with the so-called theater missile defense shield (Theater of Operations missile defense). The American goals are clear: Theater of Operations missile defense is not formally prohibited by the ABM Treaty with Russia. However, it can serve as a component and an advanced frontier of the notorious national missile defense system, the creation of which violates agreements with Moscow.

AN ALLY WHO IS BEING "LED BY THE NOSE"

Japan believes that there is an acute need to protect itself from a Chinese or North Korean missile threat, but Tokyo is hesitant. The option offered by the Americans is extremely expensive, and there are no guarantees of its effectiveness. On the other hand, the deployment of theater missile defense systems can seriously strain relations with China. The creation of this system will undoubtedly increase the arms race, as Beijing will try to neutralize the Japanese-American shield with new missile developments. Tokyo also understands that the deployment of the Theater missile defense system will displease Moscow and will become an additional factor in Russian-Chinese rapprochement and cooperation, including in the field of military technologies.

In short, Tokyo has so far agreed only to a joint study with the United States on the feasibility of creating an anti-missile shield. At the same time, he tries to keep quiet about the US missile defense system: Japanese leaders do not want to support Washington too loudly, seeing that not only Russia, but also Western European countries condemn his plans to create this system. On the other hand, Tokyo has already "expressed an understanding" of the reasons that encourage the United States to think about NPR: you can not, in fact, lead by the nose the main ally on which the main hopes are placed in the face of a Chinese or North Korean threat.

However, they realize that an alliance with Washington is quite enough to defend Japan from unlikely direct aggression, but it may not be enough for more subtle diplomatic moves in the region. Tokyo would like to increase its participation in the affairs of the region, where the United States plays a crucial role on behalf of the West. In particular, Japan would like to participate directly in multilateral consultations aimed at resolving the situation on the Korean peninsula. So far, at least until the direct meeting of the leaders of Pyongyang and Seoul, they have been held in a quadrilateral format - the United States - South Korea - China - North Korea.

Tokyo's proposal to involve Japan and Russia in these consultations did not arouse enthusiasm in Washington. They did not say "no", but clearly made it clear that they do not approve of such zeal of the Far Eastern ally. Similarly, Washington has consistently rejected Tokyo's informal initiatives to hold any high-level or high-level trilateral meetings with the participation of the United States, South Korea, and Japan to develop a unified approach to the DPRK and the situation in the region. So far, such consultations operate only at a relatively low working level and pass without noise.

Washington clearly does not want a noticeable increase in Japan's status in the region, where it is assigned mainly a financial and economic role. Politically, the country is kept on the sidelines, making transparent references to the fact that the strengthening of Tokyo may awaken a bad memory of its past in East Asia.

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aggressive imperial past. As a result, for example, the United States only metered out information about negotiations with Pyongyang to Japan and only takes into account Tokyo's opinion in the negotiations. Such a line clearly corresponds to the American understanding of leadership in relations even with close allies.

Tokyo, on the other hand, has been rather timid in hinting at its willingness to play a more active role in the region. Nor does it have a well-thought-out concept for reinvigorating its activities in East Asia. However, in general, they believe that establishing special trusting relations with Russia would raise Tokyo's weight in the Asia-Pacific region, including in the eyes of Americans, and would enable Japan to conduct more independent diplomatic games.

THE MAIN SOURCE OF CONCERN

As mentioned above, the main source of concern for Japan right now is China. Formally, a friendship game has been played with him for many years. The Japanese media, unlike the American ones, do not criticize Beijing on issues of human rights, oppression of national minorities, etc. Tokyo acts as Beijing's main advocate, seeking its admission to the World Trade Organization( WTO), and provides it with concessional loans through official development assistance.

However, Japan is increasingly aware that Beijing's policy of appeasement is not yielding the expected results. The PRC is not going to abandon its anti-Japanese rhetoric and at every opportunity talks about preserving the influence of militaristic forces in Tokyo. Japan's insufficiently sincere remorse for its aggression in China in the first half of the 20th century is a constant and seemingly eternal theme of Beijing propaganda.

Tokyo, however, itself gives many reasons for this: here they do not want to repent as unconditionally for the crimes of the past, as, for example, Germany does. Nor do the Japanese recognize many of the bloody events of aggression in China - for example, the scale of the massacre in Nanjing, which for Beijing serves as a symbol of the suffering of its people. With Oriental subtlety, a dispute is being waged over terms: the concept of "remorse" in Japanese can be expressed in different words that have subtle shades for a European in expressing the intensity of guilt. As a result, Beijing is constantly saying that Tokyo has not yet reached the right level in its apologies to the Chinese people.

"By attacking historical issues," a representative of the Japanese Foreign Ministry told ITAR - TASS, " Beijing conceals its intention to permanently leave our country in the position of an ever-penitent pariah who has no right to a significant political and even more so military role in the region." This opinion is not usually expressed publicly, but is constantly present in the private statements of Japanese politicians and diplomats.

However, it should not be forgotten that the PRC skillfully combines its constant pressure on Tokyo with the development of bilateral economic ties in all areas that are total and mutually beneficial. Japan is the most important source of foreign investment for China and one of its largest trading partners. Many of the country's assembly plants, including electronic ones, are being moved to China, and a huge array of goods is being imported from there. Active economic ties and growing economic interdependence are also an integral part of the contradictory relations between Tokyo and Beijing.

A separate topic is territorial and maritime disputes between the two countries. The intensity of emotions around the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu) is not comparable to the current emotions around the Southern Kuril Islands. Several times in the late 90s, the conflict resulted in attempts to land troops on these territories, which were made by "outraged citizens", mainly from Hong Kong, with the tacit approval of Beijing. Officially, the PRC continues its policy of leaving the territorial issue to the judgment of future generations, but it has never said a word that it is ready to give up its claims. The conflict over Senkaku is connected with a much larger problem - the delimitation of economic zones between the two countries. Beijing's position is that it has rights to the entire continental shelf that stretches from the Chinese coast. In practice, this means claims for free exploration and production of minerals, primarily oil and gas, and within the Japanese economic zone up to Okinawa.

China is increasingly defiantly backing up its claims with real actions. Its research vessels, in particular those belonging to the Navy, almost regularly enter the Japanese zone without warning. Recently, Beijing has taken a new step in increasing this activity. China leased a state-of-the-art Norwegian vessel for oil exploration in the fall of 1999 and in the first half of last year. The area of its activity, which openly got into the Japanese zone, was officially closed to foreign shipping in accordance with the warning of the Chinese Navy headquarters. The Chinese military calmly sent a corresponding notification to the Japanese Maritime Security Administration.

Tokyo was taken aback by such audacity, sent a request to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, but received an empty reply in response. As a result, Japan was forced to accept the "Chinese invasion", which sets a precedent for the expansion of Beijing's onslaught on the sea borders. By the way, it is also supported by the growing activity of warships of the Chinese Navy, which are now constantly operating at the very edge of Japanese territorial waters.

Tokyo clearly does not know what to do with Beijing's steadily increasing power and influence in the region. In protest at its latest nuclear test, Japan froze a small portion of its financial aid, but did not dare to touch the main block of preferential yen loans. In addition, this restriction was quickly lifted. In response to the latest test of a Chinese long-range intercontinental missile, Tokyo issued a statement of concern, but did not inflate the matter further.

The incursions of Chinese ships into the Japanese economic zone and the activity of the Chinese Navy off the coast of the country is causing protests in the Liberal Democratic Party, especially in its extreme nationalist wing. Last August, LDP lawmakers blocked a resolution supporting the allocation of a new yen loan to China, protesting against Beijing's" provocative actions." However, influential people intervened.-

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business community bists. They referred to the fact that the loan is provided on a linked basis, that is, the PRC will be obliged to purchase equipment for it only in Japan, which will serve to stimulate its industry. As a result, the issue was "postponed". This small example clearly illustrates the contradictory nature of Tokyo's policy towards the PRC.

THE COOPERATION QUADRILATERAL?

Tokyo, of course, does not believe that China, with all its efforts to build up its military power, can go to direct aggression, but the long-term forecasts of the National Defense Administration, as the Yomiuri newspaper wrote, foresee, for example, that an armed conflict may break out between the PRC and Taiwan in the first half of the coming century under certain conditions. This prospect is also extremely frightening for local politicians and diplomats: fighting on sea transport routes can cut off Japan from, say, oil supplies from the Middle East and destabilize the entire region.

They are no less afraid of Beijing's efforts aimed at gradually ousting the United States from East Asia in the strategic perspective and securing a "blocking stake"there, if not a leading position.

"We believe," a Japanese diplomat told me privately, " that an alliance with the United States alone is not enough to deter China's ambitions. From our point of view, it would be ideal to create a well-functioning Japan-US-China-Russia quadrilateral of cooperation in the region. Such a geometric shape, as is known, is not very rigid. Now its sides are skewed - Russia, for example, is closer to China than to Japan. Therefore, to strengthen this figure, we urgently need to tighten the Japanese-Russian side of the regional quadrilateral. Japan knows that neither Moscow nor Beijing is now seeking to restore the Soviet Union to the model of the 1950s. At the same time, we are not interested in excessive military-strategic rapprochement between Russia and China, in particular, we are concerned about the supply of your weapons and military technology to Beijing. Although, of course, Tokyo consistently supports friendly relations between all countries in the region and welcomes the calm situation on the giant Russian-Chinese border."

In short, proponents of this approach believe that strengthening dialogue or establishing a strong partnership between Tokyo and Moscow can stabilize the balance of power in the region. In Japan, they think that Russia should share this point of view, since it also cannot be interested in unilateral strengthening of Beijing in East Asia - after all, this is allegedly fraught with the expansion of indirect Chinese expansion in the Russian Far East.

Tokyo sees a similarity in the approach of Russia and Japan to the situation on the Korean Peninsula. They believe that both countries are interested in maintaining stability and even in a certain freezing of the situation in this area. Japan does not believe in the possibility of war between the two Koreas, but it also rejects the possibility of their rapid unification.

TOKYO'S ANXIETIES AND HOPES

Rather, Tokyo is afraid of an uncontrolled destabilization of the regime in the DPRK, which may lead to a complete collapse of the economy, riots, and a massive influx of refugees, including to Japan. There is no less concern here that Pyongyang, if the situation worsens, may decide to commit local hostile acts such as saboteurs ' attacks, organizing explosions in Japan, including at its nuclear power plants, etc., in order to distract attention from its problems.

Japan would like to gradually pacify the DPRK by developing its slow positive dialogue with Seoul and with the West in general. At the same time, it is afraid that North Korea will make too quick concessions along the way, which will strengthen its arrogance. For example, Japan does not like that Seoul, in its desire to get closer to Pyongyang, does not put pressure on it "properly" on the missile issue.

Tokyo also fears that Seoul and Pyongyang will willy-nilly seek rapprochement on an anti-Japanese basis, since dislike for the former metropolis is perhaps one of the few "ideological foundations" for the historical reconciliation of the two parts of the divided peninsula. Here, in particular, it was noted with annoyance that the exchange of visits of members of separated families of the North and South was timed in 2000 to coincide with August 15 - the anniversary of the liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule.

Tokyo, of course, has its own channel of relations with Pyongyang: it has been engaged in difficult negotiations with it since 1992 to establish diplomatic ties. However, they are stalling due to Japan's demands to clarify the fate of at least ten of its citizens, who are believed to have been abducted by North Korean agents in the 70s and 80s. Pyongyang calls this a provocation and, for its part, seeks monetary compensation from Tokyo for the damage caused by colonial rule. This cannot be called a full-fledged dialogue channel, and Japan is annoyed that it is effectively excluded from influencing Korean affairs.

It also increases the value of Japan's partnership with Russia, which has recently proved to have a strong position not only in Beijing, but also in Pyongyang. At the same time, it seems that it is precisely Moscow's activity in the region and its growing influence in East Asia that will encourage Japan to develop a more compromise position on the Southern Kuril Islands.

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