The United States of America, China and Japan form a triangular configuration of leading regional players, which today have a decisive influence on the nature of changes in the political map of the Asia-Pacific region (APR). Since the" center of gravity " of economic development, as well as global political processes, has gradually shifted to the Asia-Pacific region over the past two decades,the political image of the world is largely formed here.

Recently, the regional game has developed most dramatically on the relatively narrow strip of sea enclosed between the east coast of China, as well as a number of Southeast Asian countries, and the so-called "First Island Line"* (Figure 1). The latter passes through the Ryukyu Archipelago, the island of Taiwan and the Malay Archipelago, on which the Philippines is located, Indonesia, Brunei and part of Malaysia. Here, in the last 2-3 years, China's territorial disputes with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines over several groups of islands have escalated. There are also two other sources of potential conflict that persist because of the unresolved Taiwan and Korean issues.

Although the interests of the United States are global in nature, and the US-China rivalry (which is the main content of regional and global political processes) is manifested to some extent on almost all continents, it is in this band that it is most acute. It also shows the main features of the development of US-China relations, in particular:

* The "Second Island Line" starts from the east coast of Japan (in the area of Tokyo Bay) and extends to the southeast, including the islands of Izu, Bonin (Ogasawara), Mariana and Caroline. The largest of the Mariana Islands is Guam (541 ^km2), which belongs to the United States.

Figure 1. Western Pacific region

of which Japan is increasingly present*.

Territorial disputes in the South China Sea

Territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCM) are currently one of the main sources of threats to stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The subject of these disputes was several groups of islands (mostly of coral origin and uninhabited). Although applicants for ownership of the islands can be roughly divided into the PRC and "everyone else", there are incidents between these latter. For example, in February 2011, two Vietnamese fishing trawlers were intercepted by Indonesian patrol vessels in the Natuna Archipelago. According to Indonesian sources, in 2009, about 180 "foreign" fishing vessels were engaged in fishing in the Zone of Exclusive Economic Interests (EEZ) of Indonesia.

A "war of names" is actively waged between participants in territorial disputes. In the People's Republic of China, archipelagos in the South China Sea are designated in their own way: Paracels-Xisha, Spratly-Nanina, Pratas-Dunsha. Since the summer of 2012, the Philippines has called the South China Sea "West Philippine", the Scarborough Islands - Panatag (in China, the same islands are called Huangyang). Chinese comments on Filipino names refer to a "ploy aimed at creating a new language".,

* According to some experts, several years ago China allegedly offered the United States to divide the spheres of influence in the Asia-Pacific Region along the "Second Island Line". It seems obvious that in any hypothetical scenario for the further development of US-China relations, the prospect of such a division will not suit Japan in the first place.

to gain sovereignty over a part of another country's territory..."(In the following article, we will mainly use the most commonly used names in the world press.)

China currently controls all of the Paracel Islands and has military garrisons on eight or nine atolls in the Spratly Archipelago. Vietnam has placed military garrisons on 21 islands of the same archipelago, the Philippines - on eight, Malaysia-natreh. Taiwan controls one, but the largest island of the Spratly archipelago - Taipingdao.

For the first time, the Chinese government declared its sovereignty over all the disputed islands and over most of the South China Sea back in 1951. In May 2009, the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelves (one of the three UN bodies monitoring the implementation of the 1982 "Maritime Law" - UNCLOS 82) asked all participants in territorial disputes in the South China Sea to send their versions of claims. Vietnam and Malaysia were the first to respond to this request.

However, in the PRC, the claims of these countries were perceived as infringing on "legitimate Chinese interests." Therefore, Beijing has distributed its own so-called "nine-dotted" map to the UN, which is not tied exactly to any geographical coordinates (Figure 2). This map was compiled back in 1947 by the Kuomintang government. In it, almost the entire South China Sea with all its archipelagos is designated as a zone of exclusive national interests of the PRC ("at the level of Tibet and Taiwan").

From the moment the UN receives an official message with the specified card

Figure 2. "Nine-point" demarcation map

There is an aggravation of previously sluggish territorial disputes between China and most coastal countries, as well as the active involvement of the United States in them. At the same time, although Washington is trying to declare its neutral position, it is actually on the side of the PRC's opponents.

On June 21, 2012, the National Assembly of Vietnam adopted the" Law on the Sea " (Vietnamese Lawofthe Sea), which defines the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos as territories that are subject to the sovereignty and jurisdiction of Vietnam. On the same day, the Vietnamese ambassador was summoned to the Chinese Foreign Ministry to present an official protest. The corresponding letter to the National Assembly of Vietnam states that the issue of sovereignty of the PRC over the archipelagos is not subject to discussion.

An important preventive measure was the decision of the Chinese leadership to raise the administrative status of all groups of islands in the South China Sea from county to parish level and give the status of a city to the village of Sansha on one of the islands (an area of 2.3 ^km2) of the Paracel Archipelago. New Parish is part of Hainan Province. China believes that these administrative measures are only the first step towards strengthening Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea, as well as developing the fishing and fish processing industry here.

These events caused expected protests from Manila and Hanoi. On July 23, Philippine President Benigno Aquino said in his annual State of the nation address that his country "will not back down" in its territorial disputes with China. In the same statement, he announced the allocation of $ 30 million by Washington for the creation of a monitoring center for the situation in the South China Sea, as well as the intention of the Philippine government to purchase 40 military aircraft in the next two years to improve the country's defense capability.

The ambiguity of the international legal aspects of the problem of sovereignty over the islands in the last two decades complicates the growing importance of the South China Sea as a source of hydrocarbons lying on the seabed near the coasts of the Southeast Asian countries, and not many thousands of kilometers away (for example, in the Persian Gulf). This fact becomes especially important as the dependence of national economies on energy exports is becoming more and more intense. Already in 2009, China became the second largest consumer of hydrocarbons after the United States and is estimated to become the first by 2030. In 2010, it imported 52% of its oil consumption. At the same time, Angola and the Gulf states accounted for 66% of oil exports, which were delivered via a long and vulnerable route that runs through the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea.

So far, the leader among development companies in the South China Sea is Vietnam's Petrovietnam. To compensate for losses from the emerging depletion of developed fields, it has signed several dozen contracts with foreign partners for the joint operation of new ones. However, Vietnamese oil companies are beginning to face active Chinese opposition.

The Philippines is also trying to solve its energy supply problems by developing deposits in the area of Palawan Island. At the end of 2011, Manila reported seven cases of" hostile actions " by China. The situation became particularly acute in the spring of 2012, when the vessels of the border services and the Navy of both countries came into direct confrontation.

Against the background of the general aggravation of the situation in Southeast Asia, the presence of the United States is becoming increasingly noticeable here, which fits into the general context of the" shift "of American foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region (held under the slogan" return to Asia") and the movement of the PRC to the center of American foreign policy problems. Speaking at the ASEAN summit held in November 2011, Barack Obama said that by reducing its presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will increase it in the Asia-Pacific region.

During the ASEAN Security Forum (ARF) held a year earlier, then-Secretary of State H. Clinton harshly stated the existence of concerns related to the policy of the PRC in some Southeast Asian countries. It explicitly stated American interests in this sub-region and called for the resolution of territorial disputes in the South China Sea to adhere to the provisions of UNCLOS 82, as well as to take into account the peculiarities of the coastal shelf of each country. In addition, the Secretary of State insisted on the multilateral nature of the discussion of territorial disputes.

Similar statements were made by the head of the US Pacific Command (USPACOM), Admiral S. J. Locklear, during his visit to Beijing at the end of May 2012. He claimed that the United States "does not take sides" in disputes over the ownership of islands in the South China Sea, but immediately stated that they are against "anyone's heavy hand being imposed on the settlement process" of the situation, and also denied the existence of "anyone's exclusive rights".

Thus, until recently, Washington has clearly shown that it does not intend to discuss any options for delineating spheres of influence with the PRC and claims to participate in all processes in any part of the Asia-Pacific region. This sends a signal to the Southeast Asian countries about American support for their confrontation with China, which is positively perceived by most of these countries. The latter are wary of the "assertive" statements of some Chinese media*. So far, there is no reason to talk about any significant progress in the policy of the new American administration in Southeast Asia**.

Japan is also paying increasing attention to the sub-region. It is noteworthy that the new Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of this country made their first foreign tour to the Southeast Asian countries in January 2013. While previously the main area of cooperation between Tokyo and these countries was the economy, now no less importance is attached to the problem of ensuring security***.

Japan is the second largest trading partner of the ASEAN countries after China. Already in 2007, the volume of its trade with the five countries that make up the Greater Mekong (BM) association - Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar - reached $ 60 billion, and direct investment in their economies increased to $ 6 billion. Japan is the main one

* In this regard, the Global Times ' comment on the aggravation of China's relations with its neighbors is typical: "Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines... In fact, they are in a state of anxiety and panic about a growing China... "" The right policy is not to wage a war of words with the Philippines and Vietnam, but to teach them an unforgettable lesson when the time comes to fight back."

** During a tour to South Korea, China, and Japan on April 13-15, the new "pragmatic" Secretary of State John Kerry gave different speeches in different capitals. So, in Beijing, he spoke about the need to "expand the dialogue, formulate a road map" for joint work with China in the South China Sea and VCM. But in Japan, he said much more specific and very important words for Tokyo: "Some people are skeptical about American commitments in the region. Let me make it very clear that President Obama is making effective, strategically meaningful decisions, as well as reaffirming [the United States'] commitment to rebalancing our interests and our investments in Asia." It is not clear how the United States will "work together" with China from the positions indicated in Tokyo (in fact, the former "hawkish" ones).

*** In particular, paragraph 3 of the joint communique following Abe's visit to Vietnam states that "both leaders agreed on the need to actively promote dialogue between them and cooperation in the political and security spheres."

An external source of concessional aid to Vietnam under the United Nations Official Development Assistance program, the accumulated amount of which is close to $ 10 billion. South Korea, which ranks 2nd in this indicator, lags behind Japan by more than 4 times).

In November 2009, the first Japan-BM summit was held, which ended with the adoption of the Tokyo Declaration. In August 2012, the ASEAN countries and Japan agreed to finalize an economic cooperation program for the next 10 years. It is likely to be approved this year in Tokyo (when the 40th anniversary of the establishment of relations between ASEAN and Japan will be celebrated). Kyodo news agency reported that Japan intends to propose a set of joint measures to strengthen security in the South China Sea by this time, referring to the " rapid expansion of the Chinese Navy's potential in Asia." In this regard, the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Marty Natalegawa, is noteworthy: "There is no doubt that ASEAN-Japan relations make an exceptional contribution to the expansion of the region's space of peace, stability and prosperity."

Expert assessments of the territorial problem in the South China Sea are reduced to the fact that it is in a "stalemate with no prospect of any positive developments."

The Taiwan problem

The emergence of the Taiwan problem is connected with the occupation of the island by Japan in accordance with the Shimonoseki Agreement, which ended the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895. In the final phase of the 50-year occupation of Taiwan, the process of "Japanization" of Taiwanese people was intensified, primarily affecting the education system. Chinese was gradually replaced by Japanese, and Taiwanese youth adopted Japanese names. It was at this time that a certain part of Taiwanese people began to view China as a foreign country.

In its current form, the Taiwan problem largely (but not entirely) boils down to the opposing views of the United States and China on the future of Taiwan. The international legal status of the island today is often defined by the vague term "specific". Since 1949, Beijing has considered it an integral part of the PRC and considers the method of its accession exclusively an internal matter of China. At the heart of the American strategy for solving the Taiwan problem is actually preserved (despite all the changes in official rhetoric) the thesis of General D. MacArthur, voiced by him at the height of the Korean War, who said that the loss of Formosa (Taiwan) "...it will push our borders back to California, Oregon, and Washington."

With the end of the war in the Pacific, according to the Cairo (1943) and Potsdam (1945) declarations adopted earlier by the Allies, Japan gave up its rights to Taiwan. In October 1945, Chiang Kai-shek's government announced that Taiwan and the surrounding Pescadores were returning to China. This date was the point of a sharp turn in the life of Taiwanese people.

Today, the 40-year rule of Chiang Kai - shek (before 1975), his son Jiang Jingguo (1978-1988), and the Kuomintang Party is controversial among Chinese experts. China has a positive attitude to the "one China" principle, which was defended by the Kuomintang despite American pressure. At the same time, the de facto dictatorship of "newcomers from the continent" contributed to the further alienation of Taiwanese from the "mainland". As a result, " the level of (ideological. - V. T.) the isolation of Taiwan from mainland China today is comparable or even greater than that observed during the occupation of Taiwan by Japan."

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is an implacable opponent of the Kuomintang, became the expression of the desire for political independence of the island. Chen Shui-bian, who represented the DPP, served as President of Taiwan from 2000 to 2008. During this period, there was a rapid development of China-Taiwan relations in the economic sphere. Thus, the volume of bilateral trade has increased 10-fold (from $ 10 billion to $ 100 billion). Moreover, it is conducted with a constant positive balance in favor of Taiwan (in 2008 it amounted to 44 billion dollars). The volume of accumulated Taiwanese investments in the PRC economy (depending on the degree of accounting for "indirect" ones, that is, flowing, for example, through Hong Kong) increased 10-fold (from approximately $ 7 billion to $ 70 billion).

At the same time, Chen Shui-bian announced a course for declaring Taiwan's independence through a referendum, which could provoke a US-Chinese confrontation (quite likely armed). However, a few months before the planned referendum, George W. Bush said that Washington would oppose any unilateral actions by Taiwanese leaders aimed at changing the existing situation.

After the election of Kuomintang representative Ma Ying-jeou as president in 2008, Taiwan began to skillfully balance the interests of China and the United States. Maintaining Taiwan's status as a de facto independent state was a consequence of the "three no's" principle (Taiwan's international legal independence, unification with the PRC, and the use of military force in the Taiwan Strait), which he always adhered to (and long before being elected president in 2008).

Ma Ying-jeou did not focus on the issue of de jure independence from the PRC. This paved the way for the relative stabilization of the military situation in the Taiwan Strait, the improvement of political relations with Mainland, the development of versatile ties with it, and (apparently most importantly) the acceleration of the penetration of Taiwanese businesses into the giant Chinese market. More than 40% of Taiwan's exports and about 70% of investment* are now accounted for by the PRC, which is especially important in the "turbulence" of the global economic system. In the summer of 2010, a framework agreement on economic cooperation was signed, according to which the parties intend to gradually reduce or eliminate customs duties and protect investments.

With the development of bilateral relations, the effect of further strengthening Taiwan's status as a de facto independent state began to emerge (seemingly unexpectedly for the PRC).

As for US-Taiwan relations, Ma Ying-jeou did not give Washington any reason to worry either. There were regular requests for the purchase of American military equipment, which were far from being fully met by the US administration, which was trying not to give rise to excessive irritation in Beijing.

Under the close attention of Washington and Beijing, the next presidential and parliamentary elections were held on January 14, 2012. Both China and the United States have made it quite clear that they prefer to keep Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan's president. According to experts, the Taiwanese population has accepted this message from both external "patrons". As a result of the election, Ma Ying-jeou remained as president, receiving 51.6% of the vote (in 2008, he was supported by 58.5% of those who came to vote). DPP representative Tsai Ing-wen was supported by 45.6% of voters.

* Experts, including the authors of this study, note various difficulties in obtaining reliable data on the real scale of trade and financial relations between Taiwan and the PRC, since not all transactions between them are transparent.

The comments of analysts from China and the United States on the election results indicate that the capitals of the main regional players "breathed a sigh of relief." However, the key question remains: how long will China continue to accept the current state of uncertainty around the strategically important Taiwan issue? In an official greeting to the winner, Beijing declared its readiness to cooperate with him on the basis of denying Taiwan's independence. It is unlikely that China will be completely satisfied with Ma Ying-jeou's post-election remark: "With mainland China, we must first work on economic issues and only then on politics... There is no rush to start a political dialogue with China."

In general, The Economist magazine's assessment is quite consistent with reality, according to which " even the current Taiwan administration friendly to China... it is rather an ally of the United States, " which is especially evident in the field of defense policy. So, in 2008, as soon as he took the post of president, Ma Ying-jeou declared the need to build a "strong Republic of China", based on"sufficient, but not provoking military reforms".

To this end, Taiwan continued to develop its own ballistic and cruise missiles. In addition, it buys various American military equipment, including patrol aircraft (R-ZS), universal and attack helicopters (UH-60M and AN-64B Apache), electronic reconnaissance aircraft E-2 Hawkeye AW ACS, minesweepers, missiles to combat ground, sea and air targets. modern communication and control systems. In addition, a contract was signed for the modernization of Taiwan's first-generation F-16 fighters.

According to experts, if all the planned purchases of American weapons are completed (including, first of all, the RAS-3 missile defense system, as well as the completion of the modernization of Taiwan's existing RAS-2 systems to the RAS-3 configuration) and the development of its own weapons systems continues, Taiwan will be able to carry out "active defense" of the island for quite a long time in a full-scale attack by the PRC.

The basis of the current American position on the Taiwan issue as a whole remains the "Taiwan Relations Act" (TRA 1979), adopted by the US Congress in 1979, which today is assessed "as a symbol of American obligations to ensure the security of Taiwan." The content of this law is reduced to three main provisions: the United States accepts the thesis of "one China"; warns Beijing against the use of force (or the threat of its use) in resolving problems" between the shores of the Taiwan Strait"; and undertakes to support Taiwan's defense potential - in particular, by selling it American weapons.

This American formula makes illusory the prospect of Taiwan joining the " mainland "in one form or another, which remains the number one goal in the list of long-term foreign policy tasks of the PRC. The "Defense Authorization Act" passed by Congress for fiscal year 2013 reproduces the main provisions of TRA 1979, which are designated as "basic" in the subsequent American policy on the Taiwan problem.

Moreover, the president is charged with the duty to "take steps" to sell Taiwan new F-16 fighter jets or "other similar aircraft." It should be recalled that the sale of such fighters until recently was considered in Beijing as a "red line" in US-Chinese relations.

US policy is considered" strategically ambiguous " by the Americans-

Russian experts. R. S. Bush, a professor at the Brookings Institution, believes that " all recent American administrations have repeated as a mantra the thesis of respecting the interests of Beijing and Taipei," warning against actions that can change the current status quo. "But this formula in one way or another bypasses the core of the problem."

As for Japan, it should be recalled that, while fulfilling the demands of the victors in World War II, it did not specifically transfer to anyone the territories that it was forced to give up. In paragraph 3 of the Joint Communique of September 29, 1972 (which established Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations), following the Chinese thesis that Taiwan "is an integral part of the PRC", there is a short entry: "The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this position of the Government of the People's Republic of China."

Over the next 40 years, when drafting various kinds of bilateral documents in which the PRC considered it necessary to recall its claims to Taiwan, the Japanese side limited itself to referring to this entry. Signs of a new involvement of Japan in the situation around Taiwan in the PRC began (with caution) to be noted already in the second half of the 90s. In 1997, then-Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian spoke of "extending to the Taiwan Strait" the responsibility of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

In 2005, following a regular meeting of the US-Japan "2 + 2 committee" (that is, the US and Japanese Foreign and defense ministers), the list of "common strategic goals" of the Joint Statement (paragraph 10) stated that both countries were committed to "peaceful resolution of all problems related to dialogue through the Taiwan Strait".

In his 2007 book "Safe Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia," a well-known American Japanist and director of the Center for International Studies at the University of Massachusetts, R. Samuels, cites data that a year after the aforementioned meeting of the "2 + 2 committee" in Japan, military action plans were developed in three scenarios, one of which it corresponded to the "Taiwan Strait crisis".

Despite the fact that Japan (like the United States) ended official diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1972, they are successfully developing at the "semi-official" level. It is also worth noting the generally complimentary attitude of the Taiwanese elite towards Japan. Thus, former President Li Denghui in his monograph "Taiwan's Position" notes:: "It's no exaggeration to say that Japan has been Taiwan's economic educator."

Ma Ying-jeou's re-election in early 2012 was received quite positively in Japan, hoping to strengthen bilateral ties. During the second meeting with former Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu held in Taipei on March 10, 2012 (the first one was held a year earlier) Ma Ying-jeou said that " through the efforts of both sides, bilateral relations are at the highest level in recent years."

The visit of 66 members of the Lower House of the Japanese Parliament to Taipei in October 2011 was a symbol of the activation of the Japanese Parliament in the Taiwanese direction. On March 26, 2012, Ma Ying-jeou received the First Deputy Speaker of the lower house of the Japanese Parliament, Seishiro Eto. The very visit of a Japanese parliamentarian of such a high level was the occasion for another statement by Ma Ying-jeou about " deep and friendly relations between both nations "(emphasis added-V. T.). It can be fairly confidently stated that Japan (like the United States) is categorically not satisfied with Taiwan's accession to the PRC in one form or another.

The situation in the Senkaku Islands area

A significant symptom of the state and transformation of relations in the US-China-Japan triangle is the development of the situation around the five uninhabited Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu) with a total area of about 6 ^km2. They are located in the East China Sea approximately equidistant from the Japanese Ryukyu Archipelago and the coast of the PRC*. Today, the issue of ownership of these islands is the main "irritant" of Sino-Japanese relations**.

In 2012, mutual Japanese-Chinese public bickering over various incidents in the area of these islands became almost continuous. It was especially aggravated after the Japanese government" bought out "three of the five islands from a private owner, which was immediately protested by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which announced "taking countermeasures". In response to the growing anti-Japanese demonstrations in Chinese cities, Uichiro Niwa, the former Japanese Ambassador to Beijing, was recalled ("for consultation") on July 15. During the next ARF summit held in Phnom Penh in July 2012, there was an exchange of harsh statements between the then Foreign Ministers Koichiro Gemba and Yang Jiechi.

According to experts of both countries, the process of aggravation of the Sino-Japanese conflict over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu) moved to a qualitatively new level on December 11, 2012, when a Chinese maritime surveillance patrol aircraft was detected in the airspace near these islands. An F-15 fighter of the Japanese Air Force was raised to intercept it from the island of Okinawa. After that, mutual protests began to be declared in connection with "violations" not only of territorial waters, but also of airspace.

A month and a half later, the conflict was still escalating. According to the Japanese press, on January 30, 2013, in the East China Sea, the team of the destroyer" Yuudachi " recorded the operation of the fire control system (LMS) from a Chinese frigate located at a distance of 3 km. At the same time, it was explained that the Chinese frigate's artillery and missile weapons were not directed towards the Japanese destroyer. It is also reported that something similar happened earlier, on January 19, when a deck helicopter from another Japanese destroyer was allegedly also exposed to the radiation of the Chinese SUO****.

Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera assessed these incidents as the cause of a possible armed conflict. In his opinion, everything that happened on January 30 falls under the article of the UN Charter, which states the inadmissibility of the threat of use of force. Approximately the same plan was expressed by the official representative of the US State Department, Victoria Nuland, who assessed this incident as "an escalation of tension... undermining the peace, stability and economic prosperity of the world

* Such an arrangement of these islands allows the PRC not to consider them part of the Ryukyu Archipelago and, consequently, to deny the legitimacy of extending to them the act of transfer of the US to Japan of the specified archipelago, held in 1972.

** Taiwan, to which they are closest, also claims ownership of them.

*** In particular, the reason for mutual harsh statements was the publication in mid-April 2013 of the next "White Paper" on the defense of the PRC, which expresses " concern about Japan's actions in the area of the Diaoyu Islands."

**** MSA is a complex set of various equipment that allows you to automatically detect and identify a target, prepare onboard weapons for use against it, and also bring it (if necessary) into action.

an important region." At the same time, Abe once again called for acting "coldly and not succumbing to Chinese provocations."

As for the position of the Chinese Defense Ministry, an explanation followed on February 7, which noted that Japan had incorrectly assessed what had happened, that in fact the Japanese destroyer was exposed to radiation from a conventional surveillance system, and not an MSA. However, the current head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Fumio Kishida, refused to accept such explanations.

Important nuances of the situation around the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu) They were identified in connection with the signing of the Japan-Taiwan Agreement on April 3, 2013, which allows Taiwanese fishermen to fish in the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) surrounding these islands, but not in the 12 - mile zone directly adjacent to their coastline. In fact, Taiwan's "separate" behavior in the situation around the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu) makes illusory the prospect of Taipei's foreign policy consolidation with the" mainland "in the face of the" Japanese challenge", which was hoped for in Beijing. In this regard, the concern expressed by the official representative of the Chinese Foreign Ministry about the consequences of this agreement is understandable.

As for the real position of the new US administration regarding the situation around the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu), the results of S. Abe's visit to Washington on February 21-24, 2013 and his talks with B. Obama were remarkable. In the speeches of the leaders of both countries at press conferences and in the comments of the world's leading news agencies, there are quite expected general phrases about strengthening the bilateral union.

It is interesting to note, however, that the topic of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu) was absent from Obama's speech at a press conference held after his talks with the Japanese Prime Minister. The new Secretary of State, J. R. R. Tolkien. Kerry limited himself to approving the words of Shinzo Abe that Japan will be in" cold mode " to resolve its territorial differences with China.

Earlier, experts began to question the reliability of American guarantees to Japan, which are spelled out in Article 5 of the 1960 bilateral Security Treaty. It calls for an immediate joint military response to an armed attack on an ally carried out in Japanese-administered territory.

In a report to Congress on the state of Japanese-American relations dated February 15, 2013, prepared by a group of American experts, its authors, repeating the well-established thesis about the" critical importance " of strengthening these relations, nevertheless believe that the most dangerous element of them "may be the involvement [of the United States] in an armed conflict between Japan and China."for the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu)."

In this regard, attention is drawn to an article that appeared a little earlier in Forbes magazine under the remarkable heading " Is the United States obliged to defend the Senkaku Islands?". The author's answer to his own question is contained in the following quote: "The crisis in the Senkaku region (Diaoyu) poses a variety of risks. The main ones are caused by incorrect assessments of partners ' intentions. For Japan, such mistakes can be associated not only with incorrect assessments of the intentions of China, but also of its ally, the United States." The author has no doubt that China's "silence" on Article 5 of the 1960 Japan-US Treaty means nothing more than giving the United States the opportunity to avoid the need for its implementation in connection with the conflict over the mentioned islands.

Features of the current American position towards the PRC, as well as-

The words of their key ally are fully reproduced in the official formula regarding the seemingly very local conflict that has occurred. This formula includes three main provisions: it confirms the effectiveness of American obligations towards Japan under the 1960 Treaty of the Year, states the possession of them by Japan de facto; and also states the lack of a final opinion on their owner de jure. Accordingly, both sides to the conflict are strongly encouraged to avoid escalating the conflict and resolve it through bilateral negotiations.

The above formula avoids "automatism" in Washington's fulfillment of its obligations to Japan and confirms the author's guesses of the article cited above. It is very similar to the main provisions of TRA 1979, which sets out the US position on the Taiwan issue, which is no less important for Americans. This formula was generally followed by X. Clinton (as well as former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta). Some of the nuances of her public rhetoric in connection with this conflict were rather stylistic in nature.

The situation on the Korean peninsula

After the unsuccessful launch of a space rocket in April 2012 in the DPRK (which was a violation of the UN Security Council resolution of June 12, 1874 of 2009), the next stage of aggravation of the situation on the Korean peninsula began. Initially sluggish, this process accelerated sharply at the end of the same year and finally reached its peak in March-April 2013.

This was preceded by a chain of events: the repeated (already successful) launch of a North Korean satellite in December 2012; the condemnation of this launch by all members of the Security Council; the statement of the North Korean leadership on its readiness to conduct a third nuclear test; the categorical warning of the Security Council about the inadmissibility of such a test; the DPRK's conduct of the specified test on February 12; the unanimous adoption of UN Security Council resolution 2094 of March 7, 2013, imposing new sanctions on North Korea; announcing, almost simultaneously with its adoption, the start of (allegedly "pre-planned") comprehensive US-South Korean exercises in the south of the peninsula.

This was followed by a statement by the DPRK about "the loss of all meaning of the North-South non-aggression agreement... long-lost", a joint statement with Seoul on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, as well as the severance of the only telephone line ("with a group of traitorous puppets") in Panmunjong. The right of the DPRK to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike was also mentioned. The South Korean Defense Ministry reacted no less harshly and emotionally to such statements.

This whole chain of events directly contradicts the logic of solving the key problem of the Korean Peninsula, which is caused by the division of a single people in 1945. Other relatively specific issues (for example, those related to the same nuclear missile program of the DPRK, the transformation of its political structure, the procedural problems of the process of rapprochement of both states with different socio-economic systems) can be resolved only with visible progress towards solving this key problem. Meanwhile, it has been in a frozen state since 1953, when an armistice was signed on the peninsula after three years of devastating war.

During the two consecutive terms of government of the Democratic Party of Korea (ROK) (that is, until the end of 2008), a process of gradual strengthening of ties between the two countries was established. In this regard, there is a prospect of settling the-

It is necessary to study the Korean problem both in general and in particular. However, the question inevitably arose about the prospects for the further stay of the 25-thousandth contingent of American troops on the Korean Peninsula. Together with the 50-thousandth group stationed in Japan, they make up the US "forward-based" forces in the Asia-Pacific region, and their anti-Chinese "focus" is not in doubt.

This issue has already lost its relevance two or three months after the presidential elections held in late 2008 in the Republic of Kazakhstan, during which Lee Myung-bak, representing the Great Country Party, the opposition to the Democratic Party, was elected to the highest state position. The new leadership of the Republic of Korea curtailed the inter-Korean dialogue, and tensions began to rapidly increase on the Korean Peninsula itself and in the surrounding seas. It should be considered as one of the main reasons for the next stage of updating the DPRK's nuclear missile program.

Only formally continuing to hold the post of President of the Republic of Korea and a month before the inauguration of Park Geun-hye (who won the 2012 elections), Lee Myung-bak initiated another warning to the DPRK about "serious consequences". It looked defiant against the background of North Korean rhetoric about the anti-American (but not anti-South Korean or anti-Japanese) orientation of the DPRK's nuclear missile program.

In this regard, Park Geun-hye's reserved rhetoric is noteworthy, both during the inauguration, which took place on February 25, 2013 (that is, after the DPRK's nuclear test), and ten days later, at the peak of a verbal duel between the two Koreas. Speaking at a public event on March 7, she recalled the problem of national security in connection with possible provocations from North Korea (but without making any "warnings"), uttered a symbolic phrase that she would be grateful if the political circles would give her a chance to work for the sake of citizens, trusting her as much as possible. how citizens trust you. Apparently, for some of these "circles", the opinion of their own new president on a number of important state problems is not sufficiently authoritative.

As for North Korea, in the face of external isolation and constant threats from land, sea and air, Pyongyang has virtually no freedom to choose its political course both inside and outside the country. Wittingly or unwittingly, the North Korean regime is now performing a useful scarecrow function for some leading regional players. Its "usefulness" can be very different. The "North Korean threat" factor is being used in Japan in the process of gradually removing all post-war restrictions on its security policy.

The nature of the" usefulness " for the United States of maintaining the DPRK in its current, virtually uncontested position was discussed above. Actually, the main "beneficiaries" of the DPRK's space rocket launches, as well as the third nuclear test, are the United States and Japan.

As for China, it was not difficult to assess the quite obvious and negative consequences of the DPRK's actions in recent months (especially the nuclear test), and therefore it was precisely from Beijing that particularly sharp warnings were heard against Pyongyang*. It is thanks to the position of the People's Republic of China that the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2094 became possible. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the PRC will not abandon its north-eastern client, so as not to repeat the situation-

* For these purposes, the Chinese leadership mainly used such a specific publication as the Global Times (with the help of this resource, official Beijing distributes its test "messages" to the media).

the situation with Myanmar, where China is losing its leading position in the struggle with the United States for influence in this country. Beijing has no choice but to prevent the collapse of North Korea (for example, due to famine).

* * *

The political map of the Asia-Pacific region is changing rapidly. The high dynamics of relations in the key US-China-Japan regional triangle is clearly evident in the sea strip enclosed between the east coast of China and the "First Island Line".

The uncertainty caused by this dynamic, which is the main difficulty in predicting the nature of the situation in the Asia-Pacific region even in the near future, is reinforced by the change of power in all three leading regional players that took place almost simultaneously at the end of 2012. Nevertheless, today we can speak quite confidently about the preservation for the foreseeable future of several fundamental trends that emerged in the mid-90s of the XX century.

First, the reallocation of "weight categories" in the system of US-China relations in favor of China will continue (despite all the internal problems of the latter) and, consequently, the United States ' concerns about maintaining its "leading position" in the region will remain (although perhaps not in such a clear form as until recently). and in the world as a whole. This task was at the core of American foreign policy for the entire post-Cold War period.

Secondly, the process of "normalization" of Japan will continue, which will be accompanied by the final elimination of restrictions (primarily constitutional) in the field of domestic and foreign policy of the country imposed on it by the victors in World War II.

This, as well as, third, China's comprehensive growth, will remain objectively determined (i.e., unavoidable) reasons for the persistence (and possibly growth) of tension in Sino-Japanese relations. In this regard, the situation around the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu) is more a symptom than the main reason for the current negative state of these relations.

It seems obvious that none of the three main regional players (even the current world leader, the United States) have freedom of action, and their policies are determined both by a combination of internal factors and trends in the foreign policy situation. Of the latter, the strategies of the others are particularly important for each leading player.

In view of the above, it seems that party-personal changes in the power structures of the leading players may affect (and significantly affect) the tactics rather than the strategy of their policy in the region.

Russia's position on the political game unfolding in the Asia-Pacific region is based on the position of strategic neutrality expressed quite clearly by the leadership of our country*. Russia's maintenance of mutually beneficial relations with all the leading regional powers can be considered as its feasible contribution to ensuring much-needed strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

* In particular, this position can be traced in the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation of February 18, 2013.

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