At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, relations between the United States and Japan shifted from a friendship based on Washington's patronizing and benevolent view of Tokyo to an apparent wariness over Japan's growing colonial appetites for China and Korea. The conflict between the two countries grew both on the basis of Japan's growing military power, which was manifested during its war with Russia, and in connection with the spread of American racism to Japanese immigrants. Japan was becoming a rival to the United States in the Pacific, and relations with it were an important part of American foreign policy.

Keywords: history of US-Japanese relations, colonialism, Far East, USA, Japan, Russia, China, Korea.

On August 17, 2010, New Hampshire Governor John Lynch signed a state law declaring September 5 as Portsmouth Peace Treaty Day. The agreement signed in 1905 in Portsmouth is still regarded as a victory for American diplomacy, which, in the person of President Theodore Roosevelt, really made serious efforts to achieve peace between Russia and Japan. At the same time, the Portsmouth Treaty opened a new stage in the development of relations between the United States and Japan.

The chronological framework of the article is limited to 1895-1912. In 1895, Japan emerged victorious from the war with China and made a serious bid for full participation in the politics of the world's leading powers, which led to the beginning of the transformation of US-Japanese relations. In 1912, after Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, was elected president of the United States, the Republicans who had occupied the White House since 1896 left the White House. In Japan, with the death of Emperor Mutsuhito (in 1912), the Meiji era ended, during which the country made the transition from medieval feudalism to the level of the world's leading powers. During the period under review, the U.S. attitude toward Japan shifted from condescending admiration for the recent student's achievements to an equal relationship that increasingly showed wariness.

* NOSOV Mikhail Grigorievich-Doctor of Historical Sciences, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Deputy Director of IERAN. E-mail: mikhailnosov@yahoo.com

Article 4. For previous articles in the series, see: "USA * Canada: Economy, Politics, Culture". 2011: N 1, pp. 81-98; N 2, pp. 93-108; N 7, pp. 77-93. - Ed.

The foundations of American policy in Asia were laid by Democratic President Grover Cleveland in his first presidency (1885-1889) and, despite party differences and a different foreign policy approach to foreign policy, were preserved in the policies of Republican Presidents William McKinley (1897-1901) and Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909). All these years, the United States has viewed Japan as a counterbalance to the colonial policies of European powers, and itself as a force capable of ensuring the stability of the Pacific region. The Americans mediated two major military conflicts in the Far East - the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905; American troops took part in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in Beijing in 1900.

The US policy in the Far East during these years was determined by a number of factors:

First, in the eyes of the Americans, Japan remained a victim of the Germans, the French, and the Russians, who in 1895, after the end of the Sino-Japanese War, forced it to give up the Liaodong Peninsula, and less than three years later they themselves began to seize territories in China.

Second, even the contradictions between the United States and Japan, including differences over policy toward China, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were overshadowed by American admiration for the Japanese success in modernizing their country, largely achieved with the assistance of the United States. China, on the other hand, was perceived as a conservative and xenophobic country that resisted anything new.*

Third, the United States viewed Japan as a counterweight to Russia in its struggle for influence in China. In 1896, Russia signed a secret military alliance agreement with China, part of which was the agreement on the construction of the China-Eastern Railway (CER). The Americans, with the support of Japan, tried to get the right to build the Canton-Guanzhou-Beijing railway and then to Manchuria. However, these plans were not implemented due to the opposition of Russia, which sought to strengthen its position in Manchuria. Russia and Japan increasingly competed for influence in this northeastern part of China, while the United States supported Japan, whose position in China was much weaker than that of Russia. In 1902, the principal amount of investments in the economy of China had in the UK (33% of total), Russia (31.3 per cent) and Germany (20,9%). Japan accounted for only 0.1% of total investment, while the United States accounted for 2.5% [4, p. 126].

Fourth, the existing government in China was characterized by extreme unpredictability and instability. The Boxer Rebellion that began in 1898 in northern China, which was directed against the dismemberment of China and against foreigners, led to the actual loss of control over the country by the imperial court, which marked the beginning of the summer of 1900 intervention in China by six European countries, the United States and Japan.

* In the 1890s, China experienced hostile actions against American missionaries. The American envoy to China, Charles Denby, who believed that China was on the edge of a political abyss, called for "the destruction of a number of Chinese cities in retaliation for actions against American missionaries" [19, p.60].

Fifth, Japan has become an increasingly important trading partner of the United States. From 1895 to 1910, US exports to Japan increased from $ 4.6 million to $ 22 million (as a percentage of US exports, sales to Japan increased from $ 0.6 million to $ 1.3 million), and imports - from $ 23.7 million to $ 66.9 million (an increase from $ 3.2 million to $ 4.3% of US imports) [17]. As for Japan's foreign trade, from 1895 to 1910, the United States accounted for an average of 30.9% of Japanese exports, while China accounted for 14.1%. In Japan's imports over the same period, the United States accounted for 12.4%, Great Britain-26.2%, India-14.1%, and China-12.5% [4, p.128].

Sixth, after the annexation of Hawaii in 1898 and the capture of the Philippines in the same year, US interest in the Pacific region increased. For Washington, recognition by Japan, which has become the strongest maritime power in the Pacific, of American interests in this area has become extremely important. For its part, Tokyo expected the United States to recognize Japan's special interests in Korea as a response. The US and Japanese policies towards China have intensified every year. Tokyo's actions in the Far East during this period were viewed quite positively by the Americans. The United States supported Japan in the war with Russia in 1904-1905, encouraged it to annex Korea, which it carried out in 1910.

At the same time, Japan's growing military power and increasingly expansionist policies began to clash with U.S. interests in the Pacific and China. Theodore Roosevelt, who was appointed Deputy Secretary of the United States Navy in March 1897, responded to the calls of the American theorist of the naval power of the state, Alfred Thayer Mahan, to strengthen the US Pacific Fleet. In a private letter to Mahan, he suggested that American warships be sent to Hawaii "before the two new Japanese battleships leave England," where they were being built. Roosevelt wrote: "I am fully aware of the danger that threatens us from Japan, and I know that it is foolish to rely on sentimental goodwill towards us" [2, p.138]. It was Theodore Roosevelt who initiated the program of building a fleet that could operate both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific. Prior to this, the US Pacific Fleet consisted of small cruisers and gunboats, whose task was only to protect the lives of American merchants and missionaries in the Asian region.

After the war with China, Japan took the path of a sharp increase in the military fleet. If in 1894 she was armed with 8 battleships and 6 cruisers, most of which were built in England and France, then by the beginning of the XX century, 18 battleships, 22 cruisers and about 90 destroyers sailed under the Japanese flag. The size of the fleet was almost 40 thousand lower ranks and 3,4 thousand officers. The number of workers employed in the military industry increased from 13.4 thousand in 1893 to 128 thousand in 1903 [3, pp. 125-126]. The main attention of island Japan was paid to the construction of a modern navy.

In 1902, the military Governor of the Philippines, General Arthur MacArthur, was appointed Commander of the Pacific Fleet, with headquarters in San Francisco. Its area of responsibility included the Philippines and Hawaii. Makar-tur's reorganization of the armed forces in the Pacific was a consequence of the potential threat to the United States from Germany and Japan.

In 1903, the general visited Hawaii, where he stated the need to strengthen the defense of the islands. This displeased President Roosevelt, who, although he initiated the construction of the US Pacific Fleet, was very sympathetic to both Kaiser Wilhelm and the Japanese. This incident ended with a diplomatic scandal, first with Germany, and then with Japan, and a telegram from US Secretary of Defense E. Root in Honolulu instructing MacArthur to refrain from such statements in the future [11, p. 56].

A sign of American concern about Japan's growing ambitions was the emergence of the American "open door" doctrine, which, according to its creators, was supposed to provide all countries with equal economic opportunities in China and stop further colonization of this country. The "open door" policy was the result of both American interest in developing the Chinese market and the inability of the United States to compete with other colonial powers.*

The United States saw China as a huge potential market and a place to apply its capital. Japan, being on a par with the colonial powers, considered neighboring China a natural, although also potential, sphere of influence and territory that it could and should colonize. The United States was the only country among the world's major powers that did not have territorial acquisitions in China, and American policy was based on the principle of ensuring equal opportunities for all countries in relations with China.

For the first time, the idea of equal access to eastern markets was formulated at the end of the XVIII century by Thomas Jefferson, who believed that "trade with the East should be as open as possible to all, regardless of the influence of any country" [19, p. 125].

* The Americans started their advance to Asia from China. This was done not by the state, but by merchants who, taking the initiative in 1784, sent their first ship to this country. Before that, Americans had been to China, but they got there on ships under the English flag. The US administration's not very active attempts to support the efforts of businesses that actively penetrated China with politics did not bring much success. In 1832, the Americans sent a diplomatic mission to Beijing, but it failed. The treaty, signed in 1844 by Caleb Cushing, the U.S. Special Envoy to China, and a diplomatic representative of the Chinese court, failed to provide the Americans with the same trade privileges that the British had.

** In March 1898, Germany received the territory of Tsingtao and special rights on the Shandong Peninsula for 99 years. Three weeks later, it was followed by Russia, which leased Port Arthur (Liushun) on the Liaodong Peninsula for 25 years and effectively established control over a large part of Manchuria and territories north of the Great Wall, Japan obliged China not to transfer the territory of Fujian Province to other powers and began to strengthen its position in Korea. In April of the same year, France leased the Canton Bay and the railway construction rights in Yunan Province and special rights on Hainan Island for 99 years. In July of the same year, Great Britain, in addition to Hong Kong, which it had owned since 1842, received Weihai on the Shandong Peninsula and special rights in the Yangtze River area. The United States did not participate in this division of China's territory.

The US Open Door doctrine was formulated on September 22, 1899, in a note sent by US Secretary of State John Hay to the Governments of Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, and Japan. It focused on a policy that guarantees equal trade rights and economic opportunities for interested States in China. This document reflected Washington's desire to break into the Chinese market, which in a particular situation was achievable only by limiting the opportunities of those countries that had already received serious privileges in China. After troops from Europe, the United States and Japan were deployed in northern China during the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, Hei sent a second note to the interventionists, where they discussed the importance of preserving the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

The realization of this goal was seen by the United States, first, in free access for all great powers to open ports or other facilities; second, in the fact that only the Chinese government can collect trade duties; and third, the Americans insisted that none of the great powers that have the right to open ports or other facilities. It may not be exempt from paying port dues or railway transportation fees. In essence, the doctrine was an attempt to ensure America's place in the Chinese market, but objectively assumed the preservation of China's territorial integrity and the existence of a national Chinese state.

The "open door" doctrine was actively supported by the United Kingdom and Germany. Japan's position remained very ambivalent. On the one hand, Tokyo was well aware that Japan could resist Russia in China only with the support of the United States, which determined the formal support for the "open door"doctrine. However, in practice, neither Japan nor Russia, involved in strengthening their positions in Manchuria, were going to do this. By the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan controlled over 60% of Korean trade, building railways between Seoul and Busan and Seoul and Incheon. Under the agreement of 1896, Japan had small military contingents in Seoul, Busan, and Wonsan [4, p. 75].

For its part, Russia, at the top of which there was a group headed by the Minister of the Interior V. K. Plehve, who believed- " to hold the revolution... we need a small, victorious war", increased its presence in Korea, which obviously contradicted the interests of Japan. Nicholas II, according to S. Y. Witte, "was deeply convinced that Japan, although it may be with some effort, will be smashed to smithereens." In his resolutions, the tsar referred to the Japanese exclusively as "these macaques" [1, p.291-292].

There were also influential groups in Japan who believed that the war with Russia should be a prelude to further territorial expansion. As Uchida Ryohei, one of the founders of the Kokuryukai nationalist organization, wrote back in 1901, the war with Russia should "create the basis for a solution

* The author of the note was an American orientalist and expert on Tibet, William Rockhill, who served for five years as secretary of the American mission in Beijing, and upon his return to Washington was appointed the third Deputy Secretary of State and represented the entire Asian division of the State Department.

The continental task is to capture and unite Manchuria, Mongolia, and Siberia into one region" [12, p. 61]. In the same year, Japanese Prime Minister Katsuro Taro wrote that " Russia will inevitably expand its influence in Korea and will not stop until there is no room for the Japanese there." He considered any agreement with Russia as a "temporary and short-term measure" [4, p. 77].

The clash of Japanese and Russian interests in Manchuria and Korea eventually led to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The United States formally observed strict neutrality, but on an unofficial level, President Roosevelt noted in his letter to the British diplomat Cecil Spring-Rice: "Since the beginning of the war, I have informed Germany and France in a very polite and friendly manner. in a restrained form, that if a coalition is formed against Japan, as was done in 1894 by Russia, Germany and France, I will not hesitate to support Japan and will do so for as long as it is necessary" [18, p. 2]

The Americans closely followed the actions of the Japanese army, to which 11 American observers were seconded. Among them were the future commander of the American Expeditionary Force in World War I, Captain John Pershing, and the already mentioned General Arthur MacArthur, who was accompanied by his son, Lieutenant Douglas MacArthur. In 36 years ' time, MacArthur Jr. would be commanding American forces in the war against Japan after Pearl Harbor, but in the meantime, in October 1904, the father and son visited Japan and met with the heroes of the Russo-Japanese war-Oyama Iwao, Kuroki Tamemoto, Nogi Maresuke, and Togo Heihachiro. Jack London was assigned to the Japanese forces as a war correspondent.

For Japan, Russia was a clear competitor and enemy; for a number of reasons, the Japanese were much closer to the Americans than the Russians. President Roosevelt, who served in the White House from 1901 to 1909, had a strong reputation as a friend and protector of Japan. His attitude to this country was based not only on personal sympathies, but also on obvious geopolitical considerations. The United States (and with good reason) believed that Russia was trying to strengthen its position in Manchuria, while Japan did not declare its expansionist plans for China for the time being. In advocating for equal opportunities in China, the United States saw Russia as a greater threat than Japan.

In 1902. Tokyo entered into an alliance with Great Britain, with which the United States maintained close and close relations. Among other things, Washington hoped that in response to American assistance to Japan, the British would be sympathetic to American policy in Asia and, in particular, to the seizure of the Philippines, Hawaii and Guam.

* Roosevelt was referring to the demand made by Russia, Germany and France in 1895 against Japan regarding the undesirability of annexing the Liaodong Peninsula.

** The situation was further aggravated by the fact that after the Kishinev pogrom in April 1903, the attitude of world public opinion towards Russia sharply worsened. As President Roosevelt stated, "no human being, whether black, yellow, or white, can be so deceitful, so insincere, so arrogant, or, in short, so unreliable in any sense of the word, as the Russians are in the conditions of the existing system there" [7, p. 205].

Despite the military victories, the Japanese economy was in a difficult situation. During the war with Russia, Japan's external debt increased from 600 million yen to 2.4 billion yen. with an annual debt service payment of 100 million yen. At the same time, in the 1903 fiscal year, the Japanese government managed to collect only 27 million yen in tax revenues [18, p. 2]. As for Russia, the "small victorious war" did not work out. The war demonstrated the unpreparedness of the Russian army for combat operations and ended in its heavy defeat. Admitting this went against Russia's great-power attitude toward Japan. This situation led to the fact that the initiative for peace talks came from the Japanese. Already in July 1904, Japanese Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro introduced the Prime Minister of Japan to

Katsuro Taro draft peace treaty with Russia. Japan insisted on the independence of Korea under a Japanese protectorate, on the territorial integrity of Manchuria, on expanding its interests in Manchuria, Korea, and Russian Primorye, and on "creating the basis for effective intervention to protect Japan's interests when necessary" [12, pp. 112-114]. However, wanting to save face, the Japanese turned to President Roosevelt with a request to "invite both belligerent powers to meet", but this was to be done on" their own initiative and initiative " by the US president [9, p. 1222].

T. Roosevelt's attitude to the war was largely determined by the fact that Japan paid great attention to the propaganda support of its military campaign in the United States. At the end of March 1904, Ambassador-at-large Kaneko Kentaro, who at various times served as Minister of Agriculture and Commerce and Justice, was sent to Washington. (Kaneko met the future president in 1889, when he was a Harvard graduate visiting America to study the parliamentary system.) Immediately after arriving in Washington, the Japanese ambassador was received by the president at the White House, and before the negotiations began in Portsmouth, Roosevelt and Kaneko met several times for consultations, which resulted in American mediation in the United States. peace talks between Japan and Russia.

During the Russo-Japanese war, President Roosevelt repeatedly spoke out in support of the Japanese, emphasizing in his private correspondence that Japan "fights on the side of civilization" and "represents the Anglo-Saxon peoples" [9, p. 1309]. When, at the end of May 1905, he returned from a bear hunt in Colorado and learned of the defeat of Admiral Rozhestvensky's Russian squadron in the Tsushima Strait, he made no secret of his joy and promised Kaneko that he would help her in the future.-

send the skin of the largest bear (symbol of Russia) as a gift to the Japanese emperor*.

At the beginning of the war with Russia, on February 23, 1904, Japan signed an agreement with Korea stating that "the Imperial Government of Japan resolutely guarantees the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire." This reassured the Americans, who believed or pretended to believe Tokyo. Moreover, the Japanese convinced the US administration that the agreement with Korea would not in any way affect the agreements concluded by Korea with other powers or the concessions granted to them. Americans were also reassured by the fact that Megata, a Japanese graduate of Harvard University, was appointed financial adviser to the Korean government. However, in fact, Washington recognized the Japanese annexation of Korea.

At the end of July 1905, the so - called Taft-Katsuro Agreement was signed in Tokyo. In accordance with this document, signed by the Secretary of War in the Roosevelt administration and future US President William Howard Taft and Japanese Prime Minister Katsuro Taro, the United States approved the establishment of a Japanese protectorate over Korea in exchange for Japan's confirmation of US rights to the Philippines .

In November 1905, Japan and Korea signed an agreement, according to which the foreign policy of Seoul became the prerogative of the Japanese, and the Japanese "resident general"was accredited at the court of the Korean king. Just a few days later, Secretary of State E. Root informed the Japanese envoy that the United States was withdrawing its diplomatic mission from Seoul, and all issues related to Korea were transferred to the competence of the American embassy in Tokyo. In Japan, this step was regarded as "a very kind and friendly act" [7, 1905, p. 615].

As for China, on whose territory the war was taking place, immediately after it began, the US State Department sent telegrams to Tokyo and St. Petersburg stating that "the United States is sincerely interested in observing China's neutrality and its legal existence will be respected by both sides during military operations that have begun between Russia and Japan" [7, 1904, p. 418].

* Roosevelt did this after the Peace of Portsmouth [8, p. 229].

** Taft led the first U.S. government mission to Asia to reaffirm China's "open door" policy and strengthen relations with Japan in the context of U.S. mediation in concluding a peace treaty between Russia and Japan. The representative mission included 35 congressmen, seven senators, journalists, and President Roosevelt's daughter Alice. The delegation left San Francisco on the ship "Manchuria", and the travel plans included Hawaii, Japan, China, and the Philippines. American journalists called "Manchuria" an ark, and Tafta Noah, who went to Asia. The American delegation was received by Emperor Meiji, who personally shook hands with each of the members of the delegation, after which they were allowed to explore the garden of the palace, where not only foreigners, but also Japanese were rarely allowed. The Japanese emphasis on the American group was primarily due to their interest in signing a peace treaty with Russia as soon as possible, which now largely depended on Washington.

In January 1905, after the fall of Port Arthur, Great Britain, Germany, and France initiated peace talks between Russia and Japan, which Roosevelt informed Kaneko. For the head of the White House, who was leading his second presidential campaign, it was important to take the initiative to hold a peace conference himself. Roosevelt suggested that Japan in the course of negotiations with Russia claim Port Arthur for itself, get control of Korea, but Manchuria, in his opinion, should have been returned to China and turned into a neutral zone under international guarantees.

Japan generally agreed with the American proposals, with the exception of the clause on the transfer of Manchuria under international control. According to Tokyo, Manchuria should be returned to China, but only when China can exercise control over this territory, and until then Manchuria should remain under Japanese control. Japan also put forward a demand for Russia to pay an indemnity and cede Sakhalin. The Japanese proposals were formulated in a telegram sent by the Japanese Government to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, Takahira Kogoro.

Further events developed around the unfulfilled hopes of Russia for a military solution to the problem of relations with Japan. On February 14, 1905, Roosevelt informed Kaneko that he had made a proposal for a peace conference to the Russian Ambassador, Arthur Cassini, but St. Petersburg refused the American initiative. Russia motivated this by the fact that the outcome of the war is not clear and there is a chance to defeat Japan at Mukden and at sea.-

* The outcome of the war between Russia and Japan caused serious concern to Germany, which feared that in the event of a Japanese victory, German possessions on the Shandong Peninsula would be in danger of capture.

lami of the fleet that comes from the Baltic. On March 10, 1905, the battle of Mukden ended with the defeat of the Russian army, and at the request of the Japanese, Roosevelt authorized the new US Ambassador to Russia, J. R. R. Tolkien. Meyer, who represented the interests of Japan in Russia, to inform the tsar about the desire of the United States to promote peace between Russia and Japan. However, Russia again rejected the American proposal. On May 27, Admiral Rozhestvensky's squadron was destroyed in the Tsushima Strait, and on May 31, Japanese Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro sent a telegram to Ambassador Takahira Kogoro to the United States. It asked President Roosevelt to "find it possible to immediately and entirely on his own initiative invite both opponents to meet for direct negotiations" [1, p.617].

Three days later, Roosevelt again offered Cassini mediation services to the Russian Ambassador. The answer was to disagree with any territorial concessions and reparations payments. A few days later (June 8, 1905), Roosevelt again called on Russia and Japan to start negotiations, while emphasizing that " the President of the United States does not believe that any interference in the peace negotiations is permissible, he is full of a desire to do everything possible if both powers consider that his cooperation will be useful." [7, 1906, p. 807]. Already on June 10, Russian Foreign Minister Vladimir Lamsdorf informed Washington that Russia had accepted the proposal of the American president.

Before leaving for America, S. Y. Witte, who was appointed to negotiate with the Japanese, was received by Nicholas II, who stated that he could not allow even one penny of an indemnity, nor the cession of one inch of land. At the same time, Japan strengthened its position even before the negotiations, landing troops on Sakhalin on July 7, 1905. Within a month, the island was occupied by her.

Negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty between Russia and Japan were held in Portsmouth (New Hampshire) from August 9 to September 5, 1905.Before they began, Roosevelt received both delegations and wished them to reach an agreement on peace as soon as possible. The head of the White House did not formally participate in the Russian-Japanese meeting, but Ambassador-at-large Kaneko remained in New York for the duration of the negotiations and maintained constant contacts with both President Roosevelt, who was at his dacha in Oster Bay, and with the chief Japanese negotiator, Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro. In fact, Roosevelt played on the Japanese side and remained a secret adviser to the delegation during the negotiations. According to Witte, " Roosevelt tried to support Japan from the very beginning of the negotiations and all the time... and his sympathies were on her side" [1, p. 418].

August 7, 1905 Roosevelt assured Kaneko of his readiness to intervene in the negotiations if they reached an impasse. Already on August 18, at a meeting with Kaneko, the head of the White House decided that it was time to intervene, since the parties could not come to an agreement. The US President decided to appeal directly to Nicholas II, having previously informed Witte about the demands made. Roosevelt recommended that if Witte did not agree to the Japanese proposals, insist on the rejection of Sakhalin and compensation by Russia for the Japanese costs of the war. If Russia does not accept these conditions, then Japan should demand a 48-hour break in negotiations. If the recess is announced, it will give an opportunity to address directly the tsar, the German Kaiser and the President of France.

Roosevelt suggested that Russia agree to the Japanese offer and pay Tokyo compensation for the return of the northern part of Sakhalin. From his point of view, in this case, Russia "will not lose face" by paying not a military indemnity, but simply "buying out" part of Sakhalin. The Japanese offer was rejected, and Roosevelt in his telegram warned the tsar that if the Japanese conditions were not accepted, "Russia could lose all of Siberia, which brave Russian soldiers had won with their blood for 300 years" [9, p. 251]. The US President sent telegrams requesting mediation to both the Kaiser and the French President.

Russia categorically refused to pay the money, and then Roosevelt managed to convince the Japanese to abandon this demand, which allowed them to sign a peace treaty. Under the Portsmouth Treaty, Japan received the southern half of Sakhalin, Southern Manchuria (the Liaodong Peninsula, the southern branch of the CER from Mukden to Port Arthur with all Russian rights and concessions) and the right to fish in Russian waters. Japan could also host on the software-

Luostrova has its own military garrison. For Witte, reaching a compromise did not come at an easy price. The night before the signing of the treaty, he spent, in his words, "in some kind of fatigue, in a nightmare, in sobbing and prayer" [1, p. 436].

The conclusion of the Peace of Portsmouth was received differently in the United States and Japan. American newspapers described the treaty as the greatest achievement and that only a great nation could offer such generous and acceptable terms to a defeated enemy after successful victories. Since it was President Roosevelt who persuaded the Japanese to abandon their demand for an indemnity from Russia, the credit for achieving a peace treaty applied to him. For his mediation, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906.

In Japan, the Portsmouth Peace was received extremely negatively. On September 5, 1905, major anti-government protests took place in the country; the army took part in their suppression. Foreign Minister Komura was accused of failing to get Russia to pay an indemnity. He returned to Tokyo secretly and under police guard.

T. Roosevelt's mediation in the signing of the peace treaty between Russia and Japan can be called the high point of relations between Washington and Tokyo, since after 1905 both capitals increasingly faced difficulties and mutual distrust. Relations between the two countries were determined primarily by three factors:

First, rising Japanese immigration to the United States and Hawaii has sparked an outbreak of racism and persistent anti-Japanese sentiment in America;

Secondly, the United States was increasingly concerned about the growth of Japanese military power, which they saw as a potential threat to American interests in the Far East;

Third, Americans were increasingly convinced that Japan's interests in China were at odds with the country's "open door" policy.

In 1909, just four years after the signing of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, President Roosevelt, who had declined to run for a third term in the presidential election, sent Philander Knox, the future Secretary of State in President William Taft's new administration, a letter of instruction to the future head of American foreign policy. This peculiar political testament dealt with both the potential military threat from Japan and issues related to immigration. The message began with the words:"There is one foreign policy issue of such great and ongoing importance that I am forced to put it before the President - elect and you: the relationship between the United States and Japan." The letter went on to say that "Japan is the most formidable military force. The Japanese have a special ability for war. They are proud, belligerent, vulnerable, and subject to two contradictory feelings - the greatest self-confidence, both cruel and vain, that comes from their victory over the mighty Russian Empire, and the greatest sensitivity associated with their desire to be considered completely equal to the fraternal peoples of the West. Instead, they are bitterly humiliated to find that even their allies are British,

and even their American friends do not recognize them as equal citizens, as they do in relation to the less developed and more backward peoples of Europe" [13, p.120-126].

Roosevelt saw the main threat to the United States in the conflict with Japan over immigration laws. "Allowing the Japanese to come to us in large numbers will cause racial problems and will certainly lead to racial conflicts," he said. - It is necessary to prevent this. But it is equally necessary that we show all possible courtesy and consideration in carrying out the always unpleasant policy of expulsion, and at the same time be thoroughly armed in order to prevent the Japanese from being ready to attack us. Unfortunately, a huge number of our people demonstrate both a stupid indifference to the need to arm themselves, and an equally stupid desire to offend the Japanese" [13, p.121].

Racial issues caused the most acute contradictions in relations between the United States and Japan in the early twentieth century. There was a Russo-Japanese war going on, American newspapers expressed admiration for Japan's military victories, and at the same time the San Francisco Chronicle in March 1905 ran for a month with the headlines "Japanese invasion just around the corner", "Japanese threat to American women", "How the Japanese will displace whites". "As soon as the war with Russia is over," the newspaper wrote, " a flood of Japanese immigration will overwhelm America." Americans were warned that 100 thousand Japanese people are ready to move to the United States, but they, "just like the Chinese, are not ready for assimilation" [6, p.116].

The anti-Japanese campaign in California was a continuation of the anti-Chinese protests that began in 1871 with the Chinese pogroms, which resulted in the adoption of the law on the Expulsion of Chinese in 1882, which was initially set at 10 years, and in 1902 it became indefinite*. Asians were perceived as hostile in California due to both racism and cultural differences. The Chinese, for example, did not want to assimilate, their labor was cheap, which reduced the cost of labor. They weren't always law-abiding. Among other things, there were growing fears in California that the growing number of Chinese would lead them to seize control of the Pacific coast.

The outbreak of the anti-Japanese campaign in California was not economically motivated, and there was hardly any fear of a Japanese invasion of America. At the beginning of the century, the Japanese, whose population in the United States in 1900 was 24.3 thousand people, or 0.03% of the number of immigrants, did not pose an economic threat due to their small number [6, p.115]. It was all about equal intolerance. It was impossible to forgive the yellow-skinned Japanese victory over the white Russians. If at the beginning of the war, the Americans sympathized with the "small" Japanese who fought with a huge Russia, then their victory was a race against the Soviet Union.-

* The Chinese Expulsion Act was repealed by Congress only in 1943. There was also a law prohibiting Asians from buying land. It was declared unconstitutional only in 1952. Separate schools for children of Asian immigrants were abolished in 1936.

be viewed as a threat to internal security. The Americans feared that the demobilized Japanese soldiers would rush to the United States, and the Japanese army would become a threat to American possessions in the Pacific. President Roosevelt, who was sympathetic to the Japanese, expressed these concerns to Ambassador Kaneko Kentaro before he left for Japan after the signing of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty [8, p. 265].

In an era of political correctness, accusing Americans of racism only underscores the rapid path that American society has taken in a very short period of history. Since the mid-19th century, American racism has spread not only to people from Africa, but also to those who came to the country from Asia. The Chinese were its first victims. With the beginning of the gold rush of 1849. they rushed to California, and already in 1851 they numbered over 25 thousand people [17, p. 273].

In Hawaii, the confrontation between Japanese immigrants and Americans began with the arrival of the first settlers from Japan in 1868. There were only 148 of them, but immediately the Honolulu authorities imposed a ban on their further immigration [5, p. 55]. Japanese immigration to Hawaii resumed in 1885, and 12 years later there were already 25,000 Japanese. The number of the white population was only 8 thousand people. Mostly Japanese came to work on the sugar plantations; by the end of the 19th century, they formed the largest ethnic group in Hawaii, which caused the American colonists to fear the possible annexation of the archipelago by Japan.

And the US hastened to do what it suspected Japan of doing. In 1893, 162 sailors landed on the islands from the USS Boston; they overthrew Queen Liliokalani and, on their own initiative, created a provisional government of four Americans in Hawaii, which lasted until 1898, when the US Congress passed a resolution annexing the islands. Hawaii became a virtual American colony. According to the Canadian historian William Russ, one of the reasons for the American military intervention was "the fear that Asians will soon dominate the white civilization of the islands in terms of numbers" [14, p.34].

After the creation of the provisional government in Hawaii, the question arose of determining the citizenship of all those who lived on the islands at that time. It was suggested that the Japanese and Chinese living there should be treated as temporary residents with subsequent expulsion. However, Admiral J. Walker, who commanded the fleet in the area of Hawaii, sent a letter to the US Secretary of the Navy stating that such a measure was impractical, since "the Japanese are considered in Hawaii as a possible source of future troubles" [14, p.23].

In 1897, the island authorities did not allow a ship carrying over a thousand potential Japanese immigrants to dock, which caused tension in US-Japanese relations. Friction increased when the

* In 1900, the islands received the status of a territory of the United States, becoming a state only in August 1959.

Tokyo realized that the US was going to annex the islands. Alarmed, the Japanese sent the cruiser Naniwa to the coast of Hawaii, and the Japanese envoy in Washington informed Secretary of State John Sherman that "the Japanese government cannot but be concerned about the possibility of an unexpected and radical change in the status of Hawaii, which would infringe on the rights of Japan and the Japanese." In response, the Americans rushed to send their warships to Hawaii. At the same time, the Secretary of State explained that the US actions "do not in any way infringe on friendly relations between Japan and the United States" [10].

Japan withdrew its objections to the annexation of Hawaii in exchange for Washington's confirmation of the terms of the revised treaty between the United States and Japan, which was to enter into force in 1899. To resolve the dispute over Japanese immigrants in Hawaii, the United States paid Japan 75 thousand dollars before the annexation of the islands.

The U.S. Congress did not ratify the annexation of Hawaii, but it ultimately passed by a simple majority vote in both houses of Congress. In July 1898, President McKinley signed the relevant document. After Hawaii became a territory of the United States, the question of importing contract workers there disappeared by itself, since now they were subject to the same laws that existed in California. A Japanese person born in Hawaii automatically became an American citizen.

In the United States, from 1900 to 1910, the number of Japanese immigrants increased to 72.2 thousand, while their share among all immigrants increased by only 0.05%. Since most of the Japanese settled in California, by 1910 57.3% of the Japanese who moved to the United States lived there [6, p. 115].

In 1905, the Japanese Exclusion League was established in the United States. After the war of 1905, Japan began to claim a place among the world leaders, and any propaganda of a new wave of immigrants from the Japanese islands to the United States began to be seen as a threat to the security of the United States in general and California in particular. In October 1906, the San Francisco School Board decided to segregate students from Japan, China, and Korea who were now required to attend special schools.

President Roosevelt tried to intervene and ease tensions between the United States and Japan on this issue, but the California authorities did not want to make concessions. Moreover, in 1909, the city's law on segregation in schools received the status of a regular one.

In 1908, the United States and Japan signed the so-called "gentlemen's agreement", according to which Tokyo promised not to issue passports for potential immigrants to the United States, except for those categories of citizens who are going to visit the United States in connection with business or plan to travel to America on official business. However, Japanese people already living in the United States were given the right to bring "their own people" from Japan.

* This provision did not apply to Chinese immigrants who were subject to the Expulsion Act, although children born to them after the annexation automatically became American citizens.

parents, wives and children" [7, 1924, p. 339], which preserved a real opportunity for the growth of the Japanese community.

In response, according to the "gentlemen's agreement", Roosevelt promised to influence the city of San Francisco to reverse the decision to segregate Japanese children in city schools. Japan fulfilled its promise, and the city of San Francisco, although it formally repealed the segregation law in 1936, but in practice kept it. Thus, racial contradictions in relations between the United States and Japan remained. On the one hand, the United States showed its friendship and support to this country in every possible way, which made it feel equal among the great powers. On the other hand, American racism against Japanese immigration set Japanese people back in the days of "opening up" and "unequal" treaties.

Japan's entry into the club of world powers gave the United States the task of ensuring security in the Pacific region. In December 1905, President Roosevelt, who had recently reprimanded General MacArthur for speaking out about the need to ensure the security of Hawaii, stated in his annual message to Congress: "In my opinion, measures should be taken immediately to strengthen Hawaii, since this is the most important point in the Pacific Ocean that requires such measures to preserve interests our country" [7, 1905, p. viii].

Japan, having won the war of 1905, became the only potential military rival of the United States in the Pacific region. The main, though again potential, threat to their interests in the Pacific, the US military still saw in the Japanese attack on the Philippines. Therefore, part of the US Pacific Fleet was based on Olangapo Island in Subic Bay, northwest of Manila, and was designed to repel the maritime threat to the capital of the Philippines. The army insisted on moving the fleet base to Manila Bay, as this would provide cover for its parking from land. However, the Roosevelt administration did not care too much about the defense of the Philippines, except for the real threat from Japan, which was still considered a friendly country. True, there was a plan of action in case of war in Washington and Tokyo.

The American "orange" plan was developed in 1903 by the Joint Committee of the Army and Navy, which was headed by Admiral George Dewey. The committee, consisting of two Army and two Navy officers, was unable to decide whether the US Pacific Fleet should be based in the Philippines, Pearl Harbor,or Guam. This was one of the reasons for its dissolution in 1913.

And in Japan, after 1905, its own analogue of the American "orange" plan appeared. According to it, if tensions over the racial persecution of Japanese people in the United States lead to war, Japan will take action by seizing the Philippines and Guam. This will force the US Navy to re --

* The US military plans had a color designation - the plan for a possible collision with Germany was called "black", with Great Britain - "red", with Mexico - "green".

sow the ocean and come to the rescue of the captured garrisons. The Japanese fleet will meet the American ships, tired of a long campaign, closer to the coast of Japan and destroy them [15, p. 27-28].

In 1907, Japan adopted a program of rearmament of the army and navy, which allowed it to double the strength of the navy by 1909. The United States, seeking to demonstrate its military presence in the Pacific in December 1907, moved the fleet from the Atlantic to the coast of San Francisco, from where a squadron of 16 cruisers went to the Far East. The purpose of the campaign was to demonstrate American military power, externally framed as an act of friendship between the United States and Japan. The visit of the American Navy (1908) outwardly went quite well, thousands of Japanese welcomed American sailors in Yokohama and Tokyo. A reception was organized for the emperor. However, there was tension behind it all.

According to the plan of the American command, one part of the squadron was to go to Japan, the other to China. The Japanese, under threat of canceling the visit, demanded that all ships go to Japan, since its status as a great power requires the visit of the entire squadron. The Americans conceded, but they were still going to visit China after Japan. Again, the Japanese said that such a visit would put Japan on a par with China. The Americans again conceded - part of the squadron went to China, the other to the Philippines*.

After the end of the Russo-Japanese war, the military establishment of the United States and Japan gradually prepared for the worst-case scenario. By limiting Russia's activities in China, Japan was in no hurry to share its influence in that country with Washington. Roosevelt's calculations that Japan would be able to reduce Russia's activities in Manchuria were not justified. After the Russo-Japanese war, relations between the former enemies began to improve. The Japanese General Staff continued to develop plans for further expansion in China, and the United States considered a threat to its interests not so much in China as in the Philippines, which was dangerously close to Japan.

After 1905, both Russia and Japan quickly returned to the topic of delineating their spheres of influence in China, which completely contradicted the American policy of "open doors". Both countries have recognized both the interconnectedness and interdependence of their policies in the region. In July 1907, the Russian Foreign Minister A. Izvolsky and the Japanese envoy to St. Petersburg Motono Ichiro signed an agreement, in the open part of which they discussed the "principle of China's territorial integrity" and the "status quo in the Far East". In its closed part, it was said that the spheres of influence in Manchuria were divided into Japanese (southern part) and Russian (northern part). Russia recognized Japan's special rights in Korea, and Japan recognized Russian interests in Outer Mongolia.

* Even by sending only half a squadron to China, the Americans were afraid of hurting the Japanese's heightened sense of national dignity. Initially, it was planned to send a squadron to the port of Chifu (Yantai) on the Shandong Peninsula, but the US State Department decided that the Japanese might object to this decision, since the port is too close to Port Arthur. In the end, it was decided to send ships to Amoy.

When the" secret " part of the agreement became known to US Secretary of State E. He agreed to the proposal of the Japanese Ambassador Takahira to sign a similar document. The Ruta - Takahira Agreement, signed in November 1908, dealt with the preservation of the status quo in the Pacific region, the policy of equal opportunities in China, and the preservation of China's integrity. In addition to the agreement, trade issues in the region were resolved and territorial possessions were mutually recognized. The Japanese recognized the annexation of the Philippines and Hawaii, and the Americans recognized Japan's" special rights " in Korea and Manchuria.

For Tokyo, the goal of the agreement, which the Japanese grandly called the US-Japanese Entente, was primarily to ease the tensions that had developed in relations with the United States after the Russo-Japanese war. Japan showed every effort to maintain the status quo in the Pacific region, which suited Washington as well. However, the Japanese refused to include in the text of the agreement, the provision proposed by the Americans on " preserving the administrative integrity of China." The instructions of Japanese Foreign Minister Komura to Ambassador Takahira stated: "This (proposal - M. N.) may conflict with the administrative rights of Japan in the leased territories in Manchuria and along the YUMZHD, which may lead to certain misunderstandings in the future" [8, p. 273].

By signing alliance agreements with the United States, Great Britain (1902), Russia and France (1907), Japan not only confirmed its equal status with the great Powers, but also created its own security system. At the same time, it managed to maintain a certain amount of freedom of action in China, where after the victory over Russia, its position was increasingly strengthened. The US-Japanese agreement on "equal opportunities in China" was quite declarative. In fact, the Americans ' plans to build a railway in Manchuria and internationalize the existing railways there met with strong resistance from both Russia and Japan. In July 1910, the two countries signed a treaty "amicably promoting" the improvement of railway communication in Manchuria and the maintenance of the status quo in the region. The secret part of the document stated that the parties would provide each other with assistance in case of encroachments on them by a third party. In 1912, another secret agreement was signed-Sazonova-Motono * on the division of spheres of influence in Inner Mongolia. The eastern part of Manchuria was declared a sphere of Japanese influence, while the western part was declared a sphere of Russian influence. Thus, the United States turned out to be the "third extra" in its plans to penetrate Manchuria.

In December 1908, Japan launched a campaign to revise the treaties of 1894-1895 to achieve full customs autonomy. The first in February 1911. The Treaty on Trade and Navigation, which abolished all customs restrictions that curtailed Japan's rights, was signed by the United States, which de jure finally eliminated Japan's inequality in relation to other leading countries that had persisted since the "discovery of the country".

* Sergey Sazonov-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Motono Ichiro-Ambassador of Japan to St. Petersburg.

List of literature

1. Witte S. Y. Memoirs. Volume 2. Moscow: Publishing House of socio-economic Literature, 1960. 639 p.

2. History of the United States. Anthology / Compiled by E. A. Ivanyan, Moscow: Drofa Publ., 2005, 399 p.

3. Japanese People about Japan (Collection of articles of first-class Japanese authorities collected and edited by A. Stead) / Translated from English by M. A. Schreider and S. G. Zaymovsky under the editorship of D. I. Schreider. St. Petersburg: Partnership "Prosveshchenie", 1906. 537 p.

4. Beasley W. Japanese Imperialism, 1894 - 1945. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. 280 p.

5. Conroy Hilary. The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii, 1868 - 1898. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953. 408 p.

6. Daniels Roger. Asian America: Chinese and Japanese in the United States since 1850. Seattle & London: University of Washington Press, 1988.

7. Foreign Relations of the United States, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. For the corresponding years.

8. Kamikawa Hikomatsu. Japan-American Diplomatic Relations in the Meiji-Taisho Era. Tokyo: Pan-Pacific Press, 1958. 462 p.

9. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt / Ed. by E. Morrison. Cambridge (Mass.). 1951 - 1954. Vol. IV.

10. The New York Times. 6.07.1897.

11. Nimmo William F. Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific. The United States, Japan, and the Asia/Pacific Region, 1895 - 1945. Westport (Conn.): Praeger. 2001. 289 p.

12. Okamoto Shumpei The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War. New York: Columbia University Press. 1970. 358 p.

13. Papers of Theodore Roosevelt. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

14. Buss Jr William Adam. The Hawaiian Revolution (1893 - 94). Cranbury (N.J.): Associated University Presses, 1992. 372 p.

15. Seno Sadao. Chess Game with no Checkmate: Admiral Inoe and the Pacific War // Naval War College Review, January-February 1974. P. 26 - 39.

16. Statistical Abstract of the U.S. For the corresponding years.

17. Treat Payson J. Japan and the United States, 1853 - 1921, Stanford (CA): Stanford University Press, 1928. 307 p.

18. Tyler Dennett. Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War. New York: Doubleday, Page, 1925; reprint, Gloucester, (Mass.): Peter Smith, 1959.

19. Van Alstyne Richard. The United States and East Asia. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc, 1973. 180 p.

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