Colonel-General I. V. Shikin
More than a quarter of a century has passed since the end of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. Its last volleys died down in August 1945 on the hills of Manchuria and in the fields of the Central Manchurian Plain.
Exactly three months after the unconditional surrender of Hitler's Germany, on August 9, 1945, the Soviet Union, true to its Allied obligations, entered the war against militaristic Japan. In fierce battles, Soviet soldiers defeated the main striking force of Japanese imperialism-the Kwantung Army, on which the Japanese military pinned its last hopes. The rapid fighting of the Soviet troops deprived Japan of the opportunity to resist. It was forced to abandon its carefully planned plans for a protracted war and shared the fate of Hitler's "Reich", surrendering unconditionally to its allies in the anti-Fascist coalition. The last line was drawn under the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union and the Second World War.
The victory over Hitler's Germany, and then over militaristic Japan, was of great, truly world-historical significance. It showed the indisputable superiority of the strategy, operational art and tactics of the Soviet command, the high combat skills and moral strength of our soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals. This great victory once again confirmed the decisive advantages of the socialist economy, demonstrated the powerful vitality of the Soviet system, and the invincibility of the socialist ideology. The successful solution of the most complex military and economic problems of wartime was an unprecedented feat of the Soviet people, the result of the skilful and correct leadership of the army and the country by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. The unity, organization, courage and heroism of the Soviet people showed with exceptional force their devotion to the great cause of the party, their loyalty to the precepts of the immortal Lenin.
The result of World War II was not only the complete defeat of Hitler's Germany and militaristic Japan, but also the most profound changes in the entire international situation. Socialism broke the hostile capitalist environment, went beyond the borders of one country and turned into a world system that became the main factor of peace, democracy and social progress. The fact that Communists everywhere proved to be the most persistent and fearless fighters against fascism contributed to the rise of the international communist and labor movement, which has become the leading social force of our time. The national liberation movement received a powerful new impetus, which accelerated the disintegration of the shameful colonial system, under the yoke of which the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America had languished for centuries. This radical turn in world history took place against the will and plans of imperialist circles, including the United States and Britain. They were powerless to stop him.
The uncompromising struggle of the Soviet Union against German fascism and Japanese militarism reinforced the already emerging liberating and just nature of the Second World War on the part of the anti-fascist powers, and accelerated the action of those objective historical laws that, after the Great October Revolution, determine all social development along the path of humanity's transition to communism.
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As you know, the Second World War was unleashed by the most aggressive imperialist powers-Germany, Italy and Japan, which claimed world domination. At the same time, Hitler and his clique, acting as the main initiators and inspirers of this criminal international conspiracy, assigned Italy a relatively subordinate role in a limited area (the Mediterranean Sea, North Africa), while Japan was assigned a leading role in the Far East and throughout the vast territory of Southeast Asia. As early as 1937, when the first outlines of the Triple Pact (Germany, Italy, and Japan) were already beginning to appear, Hitler put forward as the most important task of the future war for world domination "the weakening of British positions in East Asia as a result of Japanese actions."1 The Triple Pact, signed in 1940, was preceded by the so-called "Anti-Comintern Pact", which was concluded between Germany and Japan in 1936, and a year later Italy joined it. This pact was directed mainly against the USSR and served as a smokescreen to cover up the true goals of the Axis powers, as the then Japanese Foreign Minister Arita frankly put it: "From now on, Soviet Russia must understand that it has to face up to Germany and Japan."2 . US Secretary of State C. Hall (and he certainly cannot be suspected of "sympathizing" with communism) This is how he regarded the pact: "Although the pact was ostensibly concluded for self-defense against communism, in fact it was a preparatory step for further measures of violent expansion on the part of the robber states."3 On the eve of the attack on the USSR, Hitler expressed confidence that this treacherous act would increase the military activity of his Asian ally: "The defeat of Russia will allow Japan to turn all its forces against the United States." 4 At about the same time, the chief of the General Staff of the Nazi Wehrmacht, Colonel-General Halder, wrote in his diary: "Japan is ready for serious cooperation. The solution of the Russian problem will untie Japan's hands for action against England in the east. The solution: a radical change in the situation on the continent. As soon as possible!.. " 5 .
While Hitler strongly encouraged the Japanese military's aggression against China and the countries of Southeast Asia, he assured them that the Soviet Far East would also be easy prey for Japanese imperialism. For himself, Hitler took "only" the European part of the USSR and Transcaucasia. At a meeting in his headquarters on July 16, 1941, Hitler said:: "The creation of a military power west of the Urals cannot be on the agenda again, even if we have to fight for a hundred years..." 6. In other words: what is west of the Urals should belong to Germany; and with those territories that are east of the Urals, Japan can do as it pleases. Such a "division" of Soviet land fully corresponded to the long-standing desires of predatory Japanese militarism.
Since the 19th century. the Japanese military was pulling its paws to the Russian lands in the Far East. The first object of its aggressive aspirations were the Kuril Islands, which were discovered and mapped by Russian navigators and explorers in the XVII century. For the first time detailed information about them was given by the famous Russian explorer of the Far East V. V. Atlasov (1679). Russian navigators and explorers D. Ya. Antsiferov and I. P. Kozyrevsky (1711), F. F. Luzhin (1721), I. F. Kruzenshtern (1805), V. M. Golovnin (1811) and others. In 1745, most of the Kuril Islands were plotted on the "General Map of the Russian Empire" and marked in the "Academic Atlas" under Russian names.
The exclusive strategic importance of the Kuril Islands was obvious to Japan: they were a powerful ridge encircling the Russian Far East, blocking Russia's access to the Pacific Ocean. In 1855, taking advantage of the fact that the tsarist government-
1 " Top secret! Only for command purposes." Documents and Materials, Moscow, 1967, p. 56.
2 TsGAOR, f. 7867, op. 1, d. 482, ll. 829-830.
3 Ibid., l. 828.
4 " Top secret!..", p. 158.
5 Ibid., p. 173.
6 Ibid., p. 105.
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The Russian government was defeated in the Crimean War and was not up to the distant islands in the Pacific Ocean, Japan took over part of the Kuril Islands without warning. In 1875, when Russia's attention was again distracted by the extremely tense situation in Europe, especially in the Balkans, Japan imposed a treaty on the tsarist government, according to which the Kuril Islands would come under its control, and Russia would receive the southern part of Sakhalin as "compensation". As further events showed, Japan looked at the treaties as if they were scraps of paper: by attacking Russia in 1904, Japan violated the 1875 treaty and recaptured Southern Sakhalin.
The predatory appetites of the Japanese military were particularly inflamed after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Under the pretext of "fighting communism", Japan landed occupation troops in Vladivostok in 1918, captured the Far East and a significant part of Siberia, and held out there until 1922, when the Red Army drove the interventionists out of Soviet soil. At the end of 1920, at the VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets, V. I. Lenin said: "The Far East, Kamchatka and a piece of Siberia are actually now in the possession of Japan... We know perfectly well what incredible calamities the Siberian peasants are suffering from Japanese imperialism, and what an unheard-of number of atrocities the Japanese have committed in Siberia."7 Forced by the Red Army to withdraw from Siberia and the Far East, the Japanese imperialists did not abandon their aggressive plans, the essence of which, as Shiratori Toshio, a prominent Japanese diplomat and one of the main Japanese war criminals, later admitted, was to "make Russia a powerless capitalist power and keep its natural resources under control." resources"8 . The desire to alienate the Far East and a significant part of Siberia from the Soviet Union was elevated to the rank of Japanese state policy.
Back in 1927, Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka presented his emperor with a memorandum stating this policy: "In order to conquer China, we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China. If we can conquer China and all the smaller Asian countries, India and the South Sea countries will fear us and capitulate to us... Our national development agenda seems to include the need to cross swords with Russia again. " 9 Tanaka's memorandum became the leitmotif of all subsequent state policies and strategies of Japanese militarism. In 1931, the then Ambassador to Moscow, Hirota, advised the Japanese general Staff "to take a resolute position in relation to the Soviet Union, to make a firm decision to fight the USSR at any time when it becomes necessary. However, the goal should not be so much to defend against communism as to occupy the Far East and Siberia. " 10 In 1933, Minister of War Araki (by the way, he was the head of the Japanese military mission under Kolchak), speaking at a meeting of prefectural governors, expressed himself just as clearly and definitely: "Japan must inevitably face the Soviet Union, So Japan must be secured by military seizure of the territory of Primorye, Transbaikalia and Siberia." 11
Preparing for the implementation of this aggressive program, the Japanese imperialists continuously launched various provocations on our Far Eastern borders for 23 years (1922-1945), up to a direct military attack on the USSR and the friendly Mongolian People's Republic (1938-near Lake Baikal). Khasan, 1939-on Khalkhin Gol). The crushing defeat suffered by the invaders cooled their ardor, but did not force them to abandon their plans.
The aggressive aspirations of Japanese imperialism directed against the Soviet Union did not in any way weaken the main inter-imperialist contradiction in the Pacific region between Japan and the United States. This is a long-standing contradiction. It grew and became more acute as the imperialism of the United States and Japan developed, that is, since the end of the last century. "Because of the Pacific Ocean and the possession of its coasts," V. I. Lenin said in 1920, " for many decades there has been a most stubborn struggle between the two countries.
7 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 42, p. 93.
8 TsGAOR, f. 7867, op. 1, d. 256, l. 222.
9 "History of the War in the Pacific", Vol. 1, Moscow, 1957, pp. 338-339, 344.
10 TsGAOR USSR, f. 7867, op. 1, d. 482, l. 819.
11 Ibid., l. 236.
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Japan and America, and the whole diplomatic, economic, and commercial history concerning the Pacific Ocean and its coasts is full of very definite indications of how this clash is growing and making war between America and Japan inevitable... " 12 ; "The war between America and Japan will be as imperialist a war as it was an English group with a German one in 1914 " 13 .
The Japanese imperialists were the instigators of almost continuous wars and conflicts in the Far East and in the Pacific basin. Over the past 50 years (1895-1945), Japan has waged 37 years of wars - declared and undeclared. For decades, it was preparing for World War II, which, according to the Japanese military, was supposed to lead to its capture of the Soviet Far East, Siberia, People's Mongolia, China, a number of other continental countries and islands of the South Seas. To this end, a total militarization of the entire Japanese economy was carried out, and the "cult of the warrior", the "cult of war", the racist theory of the "superiority" of the Japanese over other peoples became the core of the ideology that the militaristic clique instilled in its people. The myth of the divine origin of the emperor - the "descendant" of the goddess Amaterasu-was used as the basis for all the indoctrination of the military personnel and the people. This myth was also associated with another-about the "divine" origin of all Japanese people in general. For centuries, therefore, the idea has been instilled in them day after day that the Japanese are God's chosen people, called to rule other nations and spread the imperial system, as the best system in the world, to all countries. The imperial army should serve as the main means of this distribution. It is called upon to wage wars of conquest, declared "quite legitimate".
A special place in the moral, political and psychological training of the army and the population was occupied by the" cult of war "and the propaganda of"death". Even in medieval Japan, a kind of moral code of the samurai warrior "Bushido" was developed, according to which unquestioning obedience, boundless courage and contempt for death are required from a warrior. The Japanese were trained from childhood to their "true purpose" - to serve in the imperial army and to die heroically for the divine emperor. This is what they saw as the meaning of life. A samurai proverb said ," The best of flowers is the cherry blossom, the best of men is the samurai." In the political and moral treatment of soldiers, an important role was played by the canonization of the souls of soldiers who died in battle, instilling faith in the afterlife. Japanese Shinto religion teaches that a soldier who falls on the battlefield immediately goes to heaven: "Military duty is a mountain, death is lighter than fluff." After death, the soldier becomes the guardian angel of the empire. The names of all those killed were recorded on special tablets in the largest Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, and they were canonized as patron saints of Japan. Surrender was regarded as the greatest disgrace and betrayal. The militaristic clique that led the government and the army did everything possible to ensure that religious and fanatical education took deep roots in the minds of Japanese soldiers and officers. Commissions for the moral and political education of soldiers were established in all military associations, formations and units. They were headed by the respective chiefs of staff. School, art, social education, the moral training of the masses of soldiers - all were subordinated to one goal: preparation for the "great war". That is why it was relatively easy to recruit people from soldiers and officers drugged by chauvinistic propaganda to "suicide" units ("Teishintai").
The predatory appetites of Japanese imperialism were enormous. Having captured Manchuria in 1931, which was considered the "lifeline of Japan", and in 1937 - a significant part of China, he concentrated there a powerful, heavily armed army intended to serve as the main base of aggression both to the north-against the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic, and to the south, where US interests prevailed of Great Britain and other capitalist powers. For this purpose, both expansion options - northern and southern-were developed simultaneously. The order of implementation of these options, as expected by the Japanese military, will be determined by the specific international situation. In the 1930s, the Japanese government twice rejected Soviet proposals for a non-aggression pact.
12 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 42, p. 94.
13 Ibid., p. 99.
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In April 1941, having made a tactical maneuver and concluded such a pact, the Japanese militarists did not consider themselves in any way bound by this document. Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who signed the pact on behalf of the Japanese government, told Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo: "No Japanese Prime Minister or foreign minister can force Japan to remain neutral in the event of a conflict between Russia and Germany. In this case, Japan will be forced by necessity to attack Russia on the side of Germany. No neutrality pact will help here. " 14 And indeed, during 1941-1945. Japan has repeatedly and grossly violated it. This is also convincingly evidenced by Japanese historians who note that " after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, Japan, while remaining an ally of Germany, essentially changed the spirit and requirement of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality treaty. In accordance with the well-known plan "Yeantokuen" (strategic plan of the war against the USSR under the conditional name "Special maneuvers of the Kwantung Army") Japan has concentrated unprecedented military forces on the Soviet-Manchurian border. Since all the attention of the USSR was diverted to the front against Nazi Germany in Europe, it did not have the forces necessary to concentrate on the Far Eastern borders... The Japanese Navy prevented Soviet ships from sailing in Far Eastern waters, and several ships were sunk... " 15 . Border incidents, which were constantly provoked by the Japanese military, were combined with pirate actions of the Japanese fleet: in 1941-1944, the Japanese military authorities detained 178 Soviet merchant ships, and three ships were sunk by Japanese submarines.
Throughout the war, the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan provided Hitler's Germany with military intelligence data on the economic, political and military situation of the USSR, which corresponded to the decision taken on July 2, 1941 at the Privy Council in the presence of the emperor: "Although the attitude towards the Soviet-German war is determined by the spirit of the Rome - Berlin - Tokyo axis, However, we will not interfere in it for some time, but will take measures on our own initiative, secretly arming ourselves for war against the Soviet Union. In the meantime, we will continue our diplomatic negotiations with great caution, and if the course of the Soviet-German war takes a favorable turn for Japan, we will use weapons to solve the northern problems and thereby ensure the stability of the situation in the northern regions." And then: "An attack on the Soviet Union should have been made when it became clear that the Soviet Union was so weakened by the war that it would not be able to offer effective resistance." The Prime Minister, General Tojo, was a supporter of this plan and declared that "Japan will gain great prestige by attacking the USSR when it is about to fall like a ripe plum." 16
In the beginning, when Japanese political and military leaders hoped that Hitler's Germany would succeed in implementing its plan for a lightning war against the Soviet Union, they were ready to give preference to the "northern option", that is, to attack the USSR first. They were even afraid that they might be late in their military preparations for the attack. Thus, being in alliance with Nazi Germany, militaristic Japan was worried that Hitler would not bypass it in world plunder. In this regard, the statement of the former colonel of the Japanese Army S. Hayashi, who worked for a long time in the general staff and was the secretary of the Minister of War, is interesting. In his book, he writes:: "The basis of the conclusion of the triple alliance was, as the British say, the fear of "missing the bus", manifested on the part of the Japanese army command, blinded by the brilliance of the military successes of German troops in the early period of World War II. Japan has been gripped by a wave of unease about missing an opportunity to pursue a cautious policy, while Germany is "plucking" the world by choice. " 17 The Foreign Minister especially insisted on the implementation of the "northern option".
14 TsGAOR USSR, f. 7867, op. 1, d. 482, l. 862.
15 Suzuki Masahi. Sengo Nihon no shiteki bunseki (m. Suzuki. Historical review of post-war Japan). Tokyo, 1969, p. 31.
16 TsGAOR USSR, f. 7867, op. 1, d. 482, ll. 835, 968.
17 p. Hayashi. The Japanese Army in military operations in the Pacific Ocean, Moscow, 1964, p. 35.
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del Matsuoka (the one who just signed the Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact). At a meeting of the so-called "coordination committee" on June 27, 1941, he said:: "Until the end of last year, we thought to act first against the South, and then against the North... This should be abandoned now. It would be more correct if we turned North and advanced at least as far as Irkutsk. " 18 Supporters of the "northern option" had the upper hand: the Japanese general Staff hastily began preparing for war against the USSR under the code " Kantokuen "(special maneuvers of the Kwantung Army)19 . A calendar was even developed: July 5, 1941 - the order to mobilize; July 20-the beginning of the concentration of troops; August 10-the decision to start military operations; August 24-the end of the first stage of activities; August 29-the beginning of military operations; September 5-the end of the second stage of activities; mid-October-the end of military operations 20 . As a" minimum program", the ruling circles of Japan believed that under any circumstances "Primorye should be annexed to Japan; the areas adjacent to the Manchurian Empire should be included in the sphere of influence of this country, and the Trans-Siberian Road should be given under the full control of Japan and Germany, with Omsk being the point of demarcation between them.""21 .
Being aware of Japan's military plans and preparations, Hitler's diplomacy made every effort to encourage Japan to launch a rapid attack on the Soviet Union. In the verdict of the International Military Tribunal, which tried the main Japanese war criminals, appears, in particular, the following telegram from Ribbentrop addressed to the German Ambassador to Japan Ott on July 10, 1941: "I ask you to continue to make efforts to ensure the speedy participation of Japan in the war against Russia, as already mentioned in my telegram to Matsuoka use all the means at your disposal, because the sooner this participation in the war is realized, the better. As before, the goal should naturally be for Germany and Japan to meet on the Trans-Siberian Railway before winter sets in. As a result of the collapse of Russia, the position of the Axis powers in the international arena will increase so enormously that the question of the defeat of England, that is, the complete destruction of the British Isles, will only be a matter of time."22
The Japanese ruling circles, having developed a detailed plan for attacking the USSR, considered the question of seizing the Soviet Far East to be essentially resolved. It was only necessary to "clarify" which part of this vast territory should be occupied. They even drew up a " plan for the management of territories in the sphere of resistance in Greater East Asia." For the same purpose, the "Institute of Total War"was created under the Cabinet of Ministers. The "management plans for Siberia, including Outer Mongolia" he developed contained rules that should guide the occupation authorities: "All old laws and decrees should be declared null and void, and simple but strong military orders will be enforced instead. Under the powerful leadership of the Japanese Empire, the local population will in principle not be allowed to participate in political life. If necessary, lower-level self-government bodies will be created. Japanese, Korean, and Manchu colonists will be sent to these territories if necessary from the point of view of the economy and state defense. If circumstances require, forced emigration of the local population will be implemented. Our goal should be to introduce our power, and for this we should make every effort, without descending to the so-called paternal guardianship. " 23
While preparing for this predatory attack at full speed, the Japanese ruling circles did not completely lose their sense of the real: the situation on the Soviet-German front changed dramatically and Hitler's "blitzkrieg" failed.-
18 "Taiheye senso e no michi" ("The Path to the Pacific War"), Vol. 5. Tokyo, 1963, p. 313.
19 Ibid., pp. 320-321.
20 Ibid., p. 319.
21 TsGAOR USSR, f. 7867, op. 1, d. 482, ll. 842-843.
22 Ibid., pp. 836-837.
23 Ibid., pp. 854-855.
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they were like a cold shower. Already on September 4, 1941, Hitler's Ambassador Ott telegraphed to Berlin: "In view of the resistance offered by the Russian army to such an army as the German one, the Japanese general staff does not believe that it can achieve decisive success in the war against Russia before winter sets in. This also includes memories of the Nomonkhan [Khalkhin-Gol] events, which are still alive in the memory of the Kwantung Army." In view of this, the ambassador sadly informs, "the Imperial headquarters recently decided to postpone actions against the Soviet Union for the time being." 24 The Japanese military did not dare to start a war against the USSR for another reason. She expected that in the face of Hitler's aggression, the Soviet command would be forced to transfer its divisions located in the Far East to the west. However, these calculations were crossed out: despite the fact that the fight against the Nazi invaders required constant replenishment of reserves, the USSR was able to maintain large forces in the Far East. And this confused all the plans of the Japanese military. It did not risk a clash with the Red Army, which is in full combat readiness. For all their adventurism, the ruling circles of Japan were aware that such a clash was fraught with great danger for them. As Hitler and his clique vigorously tried to force their Japanese ally to ignore this danger and enter the war against the USSR, they realized that even Japan's" neutrality " was of great help to them. "It also makes our work easier," Ribbentrop telegraphed in Tokyo in 1942, "since in any case Russia must keep troops in Eastern Siberia in anticipation of a Russo-Japanese conflict." 25 The victory of the supporters of the "southern option" did not, in fact, change anything in the program of Japanese militarism; it had a purely tactical significance. Given that the forces of England and the resources of the United States, which was actually involved in the war, are tied up in Europe, and without in any way weakening preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union, the Japanese military chose the direction of the first strike to the south in order to seize the entire coast of the South Seas and the most important strategic points in the Pacific Ocean. The result of this decision was a surprise attack by Japan on the US naval base Pearl Harbor, which caused the United States to enter the war on the side of the anti-fascist coalition.
The decisive role in this coalition belonged to the Soviet Union. Before the Red Army defeated and forced the surrender of the main striking force of the Japanese military, the Kwantung Army, it broke the military power of Hitler's Germany, the strongest and most dangerous member of the "Triple Alliance", during the Great Patriotic War. This was at the same time the most crushing blow to Japanese militarism, which made its main bet on the victory of Germany. The Japanese military hoped that by winning a lightning war against the USSR, Hitler would turn all his forces against England and the United States and thus completely tie their hands in the Pacific. The political and military leaders of the United States and Britain were well aware of this. "...The best strategy that the united nations should adhere to, - wrote on October 5, 1942, the President of the United States of America, F. R. Tolkien. Roosevelt to J. V. Stalin-is primarily to unite to ensure the possibility of German defeat and that this is the best and surest way to ensure the defeat of Japan " 26 . In a letter dated October 19, 1942 to Stalin, Roosevelt again returns to this issue, which most concerned the United States and Britain: "The threat from Japan can be most effectively dealt with by destroying the Nazis first of all... You, Churchill and I are in complete agreement on this issue."27 . However, the United States, even before joining the ranks of the anti-Hitler coalition, sought to draw the USSR into a war with Japan for its own selfish purposes. However, the story then went a little differently.
The victory over Hitler's Germany predetermined the final outcome of the entire Second World War.
24 Ibid., pp. 837-838.
25 M. Raginsky, S. Rozenblit. International trial of the main Japanese war criminals. Moscow-L. 1950, p. 246.
26 "Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945". Vol. II. Moscow, 1957, p. 33.
27 Ibid., p. 38.
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world War II. The defeat of Hitler's hordes meant the collapse of not only the" third Reich", but also all the strategic plans of the Japanese military. From now on, the Japanese command could no longer make calculations based on the "decisive successes of German weapons." Together with the defeated Fascist divisions, the insidious hopes of the Japanese command to "use the favorable situation" on the Soviet-German front to invade the USSR and fulfill their long-standing aggressive desires were dispelled like smoke. Moreover, Japan also lost its strategic initiative in the Pacific Theater of war, because its best divisions, half of all artillery and almost two-thirds of tanks were concentrated in the north, near the Soviet borders .28 This was one of the main reasons that the Japanese command in the south was also forced to go on the defensive. Thus, the turning point in the course of the war in the Pacific was closely connected with the decisive victories of the Red Army on the Soviet-German front. However, Japan still had very significant forces for armed struggle. At the end of 1944, when the war machine of Hitler's Germany was basically already broken, the imperial Japanese headquarters developed a plan, the meaning of which was as follows: "Continuing resolute efforts in the field of warfare and counting on a favorable turn in military events, the empire at the same time creates a system of active defense based on Japan, Manchuria and China will continue to wage a protracted war. " 29 On the eve of the Yalta Conference, American intelligence assessed the situation as follows: without the USSR entering the war against Japan, its armed forces will be able to continue resistance on the continent (Manchuria, China), even after the Allied occupation of the Japanese Islands, until the end of 1946, and perhaps until 1947 or 194830 . And this assessment was quite reasonable: as long as Japan had more than a million troops on the continent, it remained capable of long-term resistance.
Under the impression of the heavy trials and heavy losses of the American army during the operation for the Philippines, the commander of the US armed forces in the Pacific, General MacArthur, recognized that " from a military point of view, we must take all measures to ensure that the Russians enter the war with Japan before we begin to land on its territory, otherwise we will have to bear the brunt of the Japanese divisions 'attack and suffer serious losses." 31 D. Conde, who served as an officer in the Psychological warfare department at MacArthur's headquarters in Manila, testifies to MacArthur's assessment of the fact that the USSR entered the war with Japan. On August 9, 1945, MacArthur made a statement to the press: "I am glad that the Russians have declared war on Japan." The Psychological Warfare Department, as Konde mentions, printed and distributed millions of leaflets over the positions of Japanese troops in the Philippines announcing the entry of the USSR into the war against Japan, which was supposed to undermine the morale and strength of resistance of the Japanese army. General MacArthur's position was also connected with the fact that he had reliable data on military preparations on the territory of Japan proper and on the real possibility of transferring reinforcements from Manchuria and Korea there if the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union did not enter the war against militaristic Japan. General J. R. R. Tolkien also writes about this in his memoirs. Dean, who led the U.S. military mission to Moscow in 1943: "My primary and enduring goal was to ensure Soviet participation in the war against Japan." 32 MacArthur and his staff were extremely alarmed by the situation, when the "spring of the Japanese military machine" was getting tighter and tighter as the theater of operations approached Japanese territory. And this indicated the preparation of the entire local adult population for stubborn resistance to the American paratroopers. In addition to the numerous losses that American troops could suffer, there was a danger of prolonging the war for another year and a half or two. That is why the United States and Britain, beginning in 1943, have been doing everything possible to achieve UCH-
28 "International Relations in the Far East", Moscow, 1956, p. 583.
29 Hattori Takushiro. Daitoa senso zenshi (T. Hattori. Complete history of the Great East Asian War). Vol. IV. Tokyo, 1956, p. 156.
30 "Final". Historical and memoir essay, Moscow, 1969, p. 37.
31 Cit. by: D. W. Conde. Korea. The American Occupation 1945 - 1964. Sacramento. 1966, p. 24.
32 Y. Deane. The Strange Alliance. N. Y. 1947, pp. 46 - 47.
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participation of the USSR in the war in the Far East. In addition to strategic necessity, they had other considerations: MacArthur cunningly hoped to achieve some weakening of the Red Army in this way, since the Kwantung Army of Japan was powerful and efficient and, according to his calculations, could offer serious resistance .33
It is also impossible to ignore the testimonies of such an ardent anti-communist as W. Churchill. In his memoirs, even he admits that if the Soviet Union had not entered the war against Japan, "a large Japanese army in Manchuria might have been sent to defend Japan itself." 34 Even earlier, in a letter to Stalin dated September 27, 1944, Churchill wrote:: "I sincerely wish, and I know that the President also wishes, for the Soviets to intervene in the Japanese War, as you promised in Teheran, as soon as the German army is defeated and destroyed. Opening a Russian military front against the Japanese would make them burn and bleed, especially in the air, so it would greatly accelerate their defeat. " 35 In reply to this letter, Stalin stated with all certainty:: "As for Japan, our position remains the same as it was in Tehran." 36
This unwavering position of the Soviet Union was reinforced by the agreement signed at the Yalta Conference, according to which the USSR accepted the proposal of the heads of delegations of the United States and Great Britain to enter the war against Japan on the side of the Allies two or three months after the surrender of Germany. Under this agreement, the Allies accepted the following conditions for the entry of the USSR into the war against Japan:: 1. Preservation of the status quo of Outer Mongolia (MNR); 2. Restoration of the rights that belonged to Russia, violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904, namely: a) the return to the Soviet Union of the southern part of the island. Sakhalin and all adjacent islands; c) internationalization of the commercial port of Dairen, ensuring the Soviet Union's pre-emptive interests in that port and restoring the lease on Port Arthur as a Soviet naval base; c) joint operation of the China-Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway, which provides access to Dairen, on 3. Transfer of the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union 37 .
The situation that was developing in the Pacific, despite the seizure of the strategic initiative by the Allies since the end of 1943, indicated that it would still take a lot of forces and casualties to force Japan to lay down its arms. This circumstance forced the United States and Britain to persistently ask for military assistance to the Soviet Union, whose Armed Forces gained fame during World War II as the most efficient and resilient in the world. As early as January 25, 1945, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a memorandum to President Roosevelt stating: "Russia's entry into the war as soon as possible... necessary to provide maximum support to our operations in the Pacific. " 38
Perhaps a radical change in the situation in the Pacific theater of War occurred after the Yalta Conference? Facts and documents show that this is not the case. Military experts from the United States and Great Britain, who participated in the Potsdam Conference of the heads of the three powers in July 1945, reported to Truman and Churchill even before the conference began that an operation to invade American troops in Japan would require long preparation and significant forces and resources. Therefore, a two-stage amphibious operation plan was proposed: the first stage, codenamed "Olympic", provided for the invasion of the US 6th Army in the southern part of Kyushu (November 1945); the second stage, codenamed
33 From the testimony of Colonel Arimoto Yonejiro, former chief of the Gendarme Department of the 5th Army Headquarters in Manchuria (Archive of the USSR Ministry of Defense, f. 32, op. 9167, d. 214, l. 37).
34 W. Churchill. The Second World War. Vol. VI. Boston. 1953, p. 340.
35 "Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945". Vol. I. M. 1957, p. 260.
36 Ibid., p. 262.
37 "Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam". Collection of documents, Moscow, 1970, p. 199.
38 H. Feis. Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. N. Y, 1957, pp. 502 - 503.
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"Coronet", - amphibious units of the 8th and 10th American armies on the east coast of the island. Honshu and the development of the offensive to the west of Tokyo (March 1946). Plans for amphibious operations and their stages, according to Allied military experts, should have taken into account not only the significant forces of the Japanese army, which was estimated at about 3 million soldiers and officers, 6 thousand army, navy and air defense aircraft (mainly aircraft fighter aircraft), but also possible additional deployment of forces on the basis of the laws adopted at the 87th emergency session of the Japanese Parliament (June 9-13, 1945) "On emergency measures of wartime", "Voluntary military service of the population", "On strengthening the" volunteer civilian corps " and on granting the Government special powers to: conscription and formation of new formations and units through "general mobilization of men aged 15 to 60 and women aged 17 to 40 into the army" 39 . Military experts warned that Japan's armed resistance may continue for a long time and is associated with new tangible losses for the US army.
Japan's preparations for armed resistance to the American army, which was preparing to land on the islands, inspired the American command with the most serious and gloomy fears. The US General Staff estimated that an army of 7 million men would be needed to defeat the Japanese ground forces, and that it would take at least a year and a half to prepare these forces for the operation. On August 16, 1945, Churchill said that an amphibious operation on the Japanese Islands would require unprecedented efforts, and "no one was able to determine how much lives of British and American soldiers they would cost and what material values they would require. Even less was it possible to know how long the suppression of Japanese resistance would last in the many territories it had conquered, and especially in ... Japan. " 40
On July 28, 1945, after the Potsdam declaration demanding the unconditional surrender of Japan was adopted, Japanese Prime Minister Admiral M. Suzuki, speaking on the radio, said:: "I think that it (the declaration) is nothing more than a revision of the declarations of the Cairo Conference. I don't think it has any significance for the Japanese government. We will only ignore it. We will resolutely move forward towards the complete end of the war. " 41 This samurai tenacity of the Japanese leaders was based on the "strategy of resistance on the mainland" adopted by militaristic circles. The former prime Minister (from October 18, 1941 to July 22, 1944), the main war criminal, General Tojo Hideki, on the day of the official resignation of his cabinet, as a "testament" to the new Prime minister, General Koisho Kuniaki, said:: "We have lost the initiative at sea, we must not lose it on the mainland, where millions of soldiers and officers of the Imperial army in Manchukuo, Korea, China and on the land of our emperor since the time of Jimmu are ready to fight and win..." he further stated: "Well-developed principles of defense and offensive, with the consistently high morale of our soldiers, officers and generals, can become a turning point in the war of mainland strategy. The Anglo-Saxons were never strong with their land armies, they were strengthened as world powers by their power on the sea and ocean ... " 42 .
The heads of the military Ministry and palace circles agreed with this position of the former prime minister. The Japanese military understood that the territory of Japan was extremely vulnerable from the sea and especially from the air (at that time, the bombing of Japanese cities by American aircraft became more frequent). Therefore, the "mainland strategy" was designed to use the occupied territories of China and Korea. This calculation was supported by the fact that Manchuria and Korea had a powerful military-industrial complex and rich raw materials. In these territories, the most efficient Kwantung Army was stationed with a total of 1040 thousand people, which could have been used not only against the USSR and the MNR, but also against the forces of the US invasion of the Japanese Islands, if the Soviet Union had not entered the war with Japan. In the direct subordination of the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army were 170-thousand people.-
39 "Haisen no kiroku" ("Documents of defeat in the war"). Tokyo, 1967, pp. 262-263.
40 Pravda, 19. VIII. 1945.
41 T. Hattori. Edict. op. vol. VIII, p. 93.
42 "Senan Shimbun", 23. VII. 1944.
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the main army of Manchukuo, as well as the troops of Prince De Wang's Inner Mongolia and the 110,000-strong Sub-Nan Army Group. It was also planned to use a 100-thousandth contingent of armed detachments formed from Japanese reservists who, in the name of "patriotic service to the throne", were resettled from Japan to Manchuria on the border with the USSR during the war years. Thus, for the final stage of the war, the Japanese command prepared and concentrated on our Far Eastern border a powerful group of troops consisting of three fronts and a separate army, the total number of which, without reservist detachments, was 1,320 thousand people. This group, according to some sources, was armed with 1,900 aircraft, 1,155 tanks, 6,260 guns and mortars, as well as 25 warships of the Sungari Flotilla 43 . The Kwantung Army was a force capable of waging a long and stubborn struggle.
The Kwantung Army, being the main military force of Japan, was provided with a well-developed military-industrial base on the spot. By July 1945, the metallurgical industry of Manchuria had the capacity to produce 3 million 550 thousand tons of steel and rolled products; the actual steel production was 2 million 524 thousand tons. 26 million tons of coal were extracted here (the Japanese coal industry in 1944 gave 44.5 million tons). Only one Anshan Iron and Steel Works produced 450 thousand tons of steel and 530 thousand tons of rolled products in January - June 1945 .44 How significant this figure is can also be judged by the fact that in January - August 1945, the metallurgical plants of Japan produced only 500 thousand tons of pig iron and 1D million tons of steel, and produced 500 thousand tons of rolled products .45 Japanese economists estimate that by 1946, the military-industrial base of Manchuria and Korea will be able to produce 4.5 million tons of steel, 10.94 million tons of iron ore and 44.93 million tons of coal .46 The industry of Manchuria received electricity from power plants built by the end of 1944 with a capacity of 1,711 thousand kw47 . By July 1945, the factories of Manchuria, and especially the factories of the Shenyang (Mukden) military arsenal, were repairing and assembling aircraft, cars, artillery pieces, etc.
Japanese imperialists exploited the economic resources of Manchuria, plunging its population into colonial slavery. They deprived the Chinese population of 40 million and the Mongolian population of 1.5 million of basic political rights, and introduced a harsh system of economic oppression and tax robbery. More than twenty different types of taxes were imposed by the Japanese in Manchuria, including taxes on dogs, carts, weddings, funerals, guests, etc. 48. During the 14 years of occupation of Manchuria, its territory was transformed by the Japanese into a powerful military base and, in their own words, into a " great arsenal of war for Greater East Asia." On the borders of Manchuria with the Soviet Union, 17 fortified areas were built with a length of fortified strips of 930 km. The depth of the fortified strips, consisting of interconnected long-term concrete and earth structures, reached 30-40 km, and then there were defense nodes inscribed in the mountain and taiga terrain. These nodes .They were equipped with field fortifications to a depth of 150-230 km49, and the total number of such structures reached 4,500-4,650 50 . By July 1945, the developed network of railways, mainly for operational purposes, amounted to 14 thousand km, highways-about 23 thousand km, the airfield network in Manchuria was designed for the simultaneous deployment of 6,200 aircraft .51 Kwantung Army Storage Facility
43 Cm. "Military-historical journal", 1955, N 8, p. 64.
44 "Taiheye senso shuketsuron" ("Assessment of the final period of the Pacific War"). Tokyo. 1958, p. 764.
45 M. I. Lukyanova. Japanese monopolies during the Second World War, Moscow, 1953, p. 90.
46 "Taiheye senso shuketsuron", p. 777.
47 Ibid.
48 Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, f. 32, op. 11306, 683, l. 132.
49 "Japanese Intelligence Planning against the USSR". Japanese Special Studies on Manchuria". Vol. XII. Pt. V. S. 1. 1946, p. 39.
50 Ibid., p. 39. According to Soviet sources, the number of such structures reached 8 thousand (see " The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. A brief history", Moscow 1970, p. 543).
51 "Japanese Intelligence Planning...", p. 63.
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(370 basic depots) allowed storing 300 thousand tons of ammunition for small arms and artillery weapons, 12 thousand tons of aerial bombs and 250 thousand tons of fuel 52 . The barracks fund on the territory of Manchuria in 1945 was sufficient to accommodate 55-70 divisions with a total number of 1.5 million people .53
The bridgehead in Korea was also significantly strengthened (especially in its northern part), where by August 1945 the troops of the so-called 17th Front were concentrated, which included 260 thousand soldiers and officers; roads were built to the Yalu River crossings, new airfields and landing pads, the capacity of which allowed to base 750 - 800 aircraft 54 . The fortified areas were expanded, especially Racine and Kenghin, whose field population was about two divisions .55 The Japanese created a powerful fortified area along the land border with the USSR on Sakhalin. The total depth of this area reached 20 km. On the Kuril Islands, coastal batteries were installed, hidden in reinforced concrete structures; numerous pillboxes, anti-tank ditches, various underground structures were equipped, and wire barriers were set up. 23 airfields were built on Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, and two large naval bases were built in the area of the Shumshu and Paramushir Islands closest to Kamchatka .56 The Japanese military turned Manchuria and Korea, South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands into a base of aggressive actions against the USSR and built up forces for a surprise attack on it.
Shortly after assuming the post of Prime Minister, General Tojo, in a conversation with the German Ambassador Ott, stated that " Japan is a mortal enemy of the USSR, and Vladivostok is a constant threat to Japan from the flank, and that in the course of this war (i.e., the war between Germany and the USSR - I. Sh.) it is possible to eliminate this threat. This is not difficult to do, as there is an excellent Kwantung army, consisting of the best units"57 . As General Kita, the commander of the 1st front of the Kwantung Army, who was later captured by the Red Army, showed, the plans for active military operations of his front against the USSR underwent only some changes depending on the situation on the Soviet-German front. In particular, an active offensive plan was adopted for 1940-1943, which included: a) at the Khutou - Khulin line, deploy six infantry divisions to operate in an easterly direction in order to cut the Voroshilov (Ussuriysk) - Khabarovsk railway. After the occupation of Iman and Lesozavodsk, two infantry divisions will move north to Guberovo, while providing the main group from the north. With four other divisions, move south in the direction of Spassk-Dalny and then join up with the main group of troops operating in the direction of Voroshilov; b) the strongest group consisting of fifteen infantry and two tank divisions is deployed at the Mishan, Dunning line. The main forces of this group are concentrated in the Pogranichnaya area to act in the direction of Manzovka and capture the city. Voroshilov from the north; c) an auxiliary strike in the Voroshilov direction should be delivered by five infantry divisions. Three divisions from the Tuminjiang region advance on Razdolnoye and capture Voroshilov from the south, and two divisions advance on Barabash with access to the western shore of the Amur Bay, while cutting the Razdolnoye - Kraskino road. The main group after the occupation of Voroshilov develops its main attack in the south-eastern direction, towards Vladivostok, captures the city and port, goes to the southern coast of Primorsky Krai and captures Shkotovo, Suchan, Cape Pivotny 58 . The thorough preparation of the territories of Manchuria, Korea, South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, as well as the maintenance of the Japanese troops stationed there in constant combat readiness, clearly indicate that an aggression was being prepared against the Soviet Far East at "the most suitable time for Japan".
As it became known after the defeat of the Kwantung army and the surrender of Japan-
52 Ibid., p. 78.
53 TsGAOR USSR, f. 7867, on. 1, d. 275, l. 103.
54 P. Hayashi. Op. ed., p. 164.
55 Ibid.
56 "Finale", pp. 61-62.
57 TsGAOR USSR, f. 7867, op. 1, d. 482, l. 840.
58 Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, f. 32, op. 11306, d. 591, ll. 447-449.
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In preparation for an attack on the USSR, the Japanese military was determined to use one of the most inhumane means of aggression - bacteriological weapons. At the Khabarovsk trial (1949) in the case of former soldiers of the Japanese army, it was irrefutably established that the Japanese militarists began preparing for the use of these weapons shortly after the capture of Manchuria. A laboratory for the production of bacteria was set up there, and Ishii Shiro was put in charge of it. This fascist fanatic made experiments on people-Chinese partisans who were captured. In 1936, entire death factories were built in Manchuria. Ishii Shiro's laboratory was transformed into a Bacteriological Warfare Institute under the false banner "Kwantung Army Water Supply and Prevention Administration". Subsequently, this "department" was renamed "Manchurian detachment No. 731", which included about 3 thousand scientific and technical workers. 59 Soon a second bacteriological formation appeared, called "detachment N 100". The misanthropic plans of the Japanese military were not carried out by no means through its "fault". Former commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, war criminal Yamada, testified at the Khabarovsk trial: "The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan and the rapid advance of the Soviet Army into the depths of Manchuria made it impossible for us to use bacteriological weapons against the USSR and other countries." 60 Japanese militarists, who planned to open a front against the USSR and reject the Soviet Far East, did not wait for this cherished time for them. The victorious battles of the Red Army on the main Soviet-German front-near Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk - completely discouraged the Japanese militarists from opposing the USSR. These victories had a direct impact on the events that took place in other theaters of military operations, including the Pacific. This created favorable conditions for the armies of the allied Powers to concentrate their efforts against Japan. The most important of these conditions was that the Kwantung Army, which was the most efficient and powerful grouping of troops, was chained up near the borders of the Soviet Union. Thus, the Soviet Armed Forces and their heroic struggle against the Nazi invaders became the determining factors in achieving victory not only in the Western, but also in the Far Eastern theater of War.
In the light of these facts, the attempts of bourgeois falsifiers to distort both the course of events in the Far East and their military and political consequences look helpless and absurd. In the memoirs of the same General MacArthur (his memory turned out to be so "weak" that he forgot his own statements of 1945), in the "Diplomatic History of the Pacific War" by the Japanese historian Kosaku Tamura 61, in the posthumous edition of the already mentioned book by Hattori Takushiro, in the memoirs of statesmen of the United States and England by W. Churchill, Truman, J. F. Byrnes, K. Hall, H. L. Stimson, and others persistently draw the line: if not to deny it completely, then at least in every possible way belittle the significance of the contribution of the USSR and the MNR, their armed forces, to the victory over Japanese imperialism. One of the first to set the tone for all this concoction was H. Truman, who, before the end of his presidential term, insistently instilled in American historians: "Russia did not make any military contribution to the victory over Japan."62 Truman, when he gave such "instructions", was not even confused by the fact that in 1945 he said to the Soviet Union: the United States "cordially welcomes the participation of our glorious and victorious ally in this war."63
Bourgeois authors began the " reworking of history "by trying to cast a shadow on the decisions of the Yalta Conference, to" disavow " them in hindsight. Kosaku Tamura writes: "... just as the Munich Meeting of 1938 went down in history as Britain's unwarranted retreat from Hitler, so the Yalta Conference will certainly remain in the history of diplomacy as America's retreat from Steel-
59 See "Materials of the trial of former Japanese Army servicemen accused of preparing and using bacteriological weapons", Moscow, 1950, p. 414.
60 Ibid., p. 99.
61 Kosaku Tamura. Taiheye senso gaiko si (T. Kosaku. Diplomatic history of the War in the Pacific). Tokyo, 1966, p. 554.
62 "Army Air Force in Wold War II". Vol. V. Chicago. 1955, p. 512.
63 Pravda Publ., 5. IX. 1970.
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new " 64. The author claims that the heads of the allied powers gathered in Yalta not to discuss issues related to the victory over Germany, but mainly to discuss the conditions that " the Russians presented as the price for entering the war against Japan and which they were already promised by Roosevelt and Churchill through A. Harriman on December 15, 1944. during a conversation with Stalin, that is, at a time when there was still a fierce war in the West and the Pacific." Kosaku Tamura tries to portray the situation as if the situation in the West and the Pacific had already changed radically during the Yalta Conference, and therefore, they say, " the price for the USSR's entry into the war against Japan could be reduced." Here the author comes into conflict with his own description of the extremely tense situation in the final period of the war in the Pacific. He writes that "the spring of Japanese resistance was stretched to the limit", and this was fraught with many victims for the belligerents; that the militaristic circles of Japan, playing on the problem of preserving imperial power and its "sacred prerogatives", were preparing the Japanese people" for a hundred years ' war " against the allies. "The Hundred Years' War " is, of course, too flowery a phrase. But the fact that Japan is seriously prepared for prolonged resistance is absolutely indisputable.
The correctness of the decisions of the Yalta Conference is equally unfounded questioned not only by Japanese, but also by many American historians and military memoirists. They claim that the Pacific front was and remained a "purely American front", and that the Soviet Union allegedly fought Japan for only "six days"; that military events on the Soviet - German front did not have any influence on the course and outcome of the struggle in the Far Eastern region.
Thus, the book "The Campaign of the War in the Pacific", which is an official report of the government commission created by the directive of the President of the United States, explicitly states that " by January 1945, Japan was already a virtually defeated country...", "Japan was defeated; it only remained to convince her of this circumstance" 65 . In the same spirit, the American historian R. Batow draws the situation in the Pacific and the Far East, claiming that thanks to the actions of the American air force and navy, Japan was cut off from the main sources of raw materials and food and therefore "lost the war economically." 66 K. Greenfield tries to assure readers that the US armed forces "brought the Japanese empire to its knees"67 . Repeating these and similar conclusions, Mr. Face states that there was no military necessity for the USSR to participate in the war in the Far East at all: "Russia entered the Pacific war almost on the eve of Japan's agreement to the terms of unconditional surrender." 68 The facts speak eloquently against such statements. First, it was only as a result of the Red Army's victories and the defeat of the main military forces of Hitler's Germany as the main axis partner that the British and Americans were able to wrest the strategic initiative from the Japanese in the Pacific and launch broad offensive operations in this theater. Secondly, the falsifiers of history deliberately ignore the fact that due to the systematic violation by the Japanese side of the terms of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact of April 13, 1941, continuous Japanese provocations on the border, on sea and ocean communications, the Soviet Union was forced to keep about 40 divisions in the Far East as a counterweight to the Kwantung Army, deployed near our borders. Meanwhile, these Divisions were sorely needed on the Soviet-German front, where our troops were breaking and grinding the Fascist war machine one by one. Third, the Manchurian strategic offensive operation of the Soviet Far Eastern forces to defeat the Kwantung Army lasted not six days, but for almost a month, and there were bloody battles that broke the main striking force of Japanese militarism on land.
All attempts of falsifiers of history are aimed at one goal - to portray the matter as if the defeat of Japan by the time of the Yalta Conference turned out to be a matter of fact.
64 T. Kosaku. Op. ed., p. 510.
65 "Campaign of the War in the Pacific", Moscow, 1956, p. 368.
66 R. Butow. Japan's Decision to Sorrender. Stanford. 1954, p. 11.
67 K. Greenfield. The Historian and the Army. New Brunswick. 1954, p. 85.
68 H. Feis. Op. cit, p. 655.
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almost resolved, and finally it was forced to lay down its arms and capitulate after the two American atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 8, 1945. The Japanese historian Kosaku Tamura mentioned above also links the Japanese government's decision to surrender only with the news that "the second American atomic bomb was dropped over the city of Nagasaki." 69 He is not bothered by the fact that even after the atomic bombing, the Japanese military circles and some of the ministers of the Suzuki government said that since it is a question of intimidating the Japanese people, the latter will respond to this with the slogan "Die, but do not give up" .70 The author is not confused by the fact that after the second American atomic bomb, for another week, up to August 15, there was no official statement from the Japanese government about accepting unconditional surrender. Moreover, as early as August 10, the Japanese government in a note to the Allies put forward its conditions for ending military resistance. The declaration of unconditional surrender came only when Tokyo became aware that the Red Army's offensive had begun and was developing successfully in the fields of the Central Manchurian Plain, and the Kwantung Army was dismembered and isolated.
The historical truth is that US President Truman's order to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which killed hundreds of thousands of civilians and reduced these cities to rubble, was a barbaric and inhumane act that was not caused by any military necessity. He only pilloried himself and the perpetrators of this monstrous crime. In essence, it was an attempt to intimidate the Soviet Union. The atomic bombing, wrote W. Z. Foster, a prominent figure in the American and international communist and labor movement, " demonstrated Wall Street's intention to establish its dominance in the post-war world by relying on a terrible new weapon. The atomic bomb was intended more for the Soviet Union than for Japan. " 71 The claims of the bourgeois falsifiers of history that the use of the atomic bomb decided the outcome of the war can be contrasted, for example, with the testimony of W. Churchill: "It would be a mistake to believe that the fate of Japan was decided by the atomic bomb" 72 . This is confirmed by the chief military adviser to the US President, Admiral Lehi: "In my opinion, the use of these barbaric weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not provide any significant assistance in our war against Japan." 73
If, as already mentioned above, after the atomic bombing, Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki declared that Japan would not give in to intimidation and did not intend to surrender, then when he received a message about the beginning of the Soviet offensive in Manchuria and Korea, he was forced to admit that this circumstance put Japan in a hopeless situation and made it impossible to continue wars. It was not the atomic bombardment of two cities, but the crushing blow of the Soviet troops against the land forces of Japan that brought it to its knees. The above facts and documents show the persistence with which the governments of the United States and England, as well as the military command of these countries, sought the entry of the USSR into the war against Japan. And this is quite understandable: many years later, of course, it is easy to portray Japan as a "virtually defeated country", but then, in 1945, even after the surrender of Hitler's Germany, even after the senseless atomic bombing of Japanese cities, the political and especially military leaders of the United States and England knew very well that this "virtually defeated country"was a" virtually defeated country". It has about 500 warships, thousands of warplanes, and a heavily armed, well-trained seven-million-strong army (including such a striking force as the Kwantung Army). The enemy that the Red Army had to fight was real, efficient and formidable. As early as August 11 (that is, after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), the Japanese newspaper Kande Silwen, published in Manchuria, wrote: "The Japanese Army and the Manchukuo Army are fully prepared to defend
69 "Shusen no shire" ("Materials on the final period of the war"). Tokyo, 1956, p. 82.
70 Ibid.
71 Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, 1970, No. 8, p. 46.
72 W. Churchill. Op. cit. Vol. VI, p. 646.
73 W. J. Leagy. I Wos There. N. Y. 1950, p. 445.
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northern borders of East Asia. The Japanese Army and the Manchukuo Army established a solid and solid defense here. It is difficult for the Soviet Union, which subjectively evaluates only resources, to judge our actual forces... We have a pre-eminent position in comparison with the Soviet troops. " 74
Let Messrs. E. May, D. Dean, W. Palston and others, who declare the participation of the USSR in military operations against Japan as" purely symbolic "or"a blow to the dying "75 , open The New York Times and read in the issue of August 15, 1945 that the actions of the Soviet Armed Forces against Japan were a direct result of the Soviet occupation of Japan. "the decisive factor that hastened the end of this war." 76 If that's not enough, let them look at President Truman's memoirs and find that " Russia's entry into the war was becoming increasingly necessary. It meant saving hundreds of thousands of American lives. " 77 One thing is clear: the rigging frenzy of the Cold War cannot change the facts of history; it only shows the mores of bourgeois propaganda.
The entry of the Soviet Union into the war in the Far East not only negated the plans for "prolonged resistance on the continent", but also greatly strengthened the just, liberating nature of the war in the Far East. The United States and Britain pursued the goal of getting rid of the Japanese rival in the Pacific Ocean, which claimed undivided domination in this area. The goals of the USSR were fundamentally different. Fulfilling its allied obligations, the Soviet state sought to accelerate the surrender of Japan, bring the end of World War II closer, secure its borders in the Far East, save the peoples, including the Japanese, from further victims and suffering, and help the peoples of Asia to free themselves from Japanese invaders. These just objectives of the war were achieved. Just as the Soviet people fulfilled their great mission of liberation in Europe by defeating Hitler's Germany, so with the defeat and capitulation of Japanese imperialism, the front of liberation and anti-colonial revolutions in China, Korea, Vietnam, Burma, Indonesia and other countries was widely developed in the Far East. Under the influence of these events, the great people of India also gained their national independence: its" best diamond "fell out of the"crown of the British Empire".
The brilliant victory over imperialist Japan strengthened our country's position in the Far East, which, of course, was not part of the plans of the United States and Britain. The borders of the Soviet Union in the Far East were strengthened, and the territories of the original Russian lands returned to the USSR-Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands-became henceforth "to serve not as a means of separating the Soviet Union from the ocean and the base of a Japanese attack on our Far East,but as a means of direct communication of the Soviet Union with78 . This meant a major victory not only for the Soviet people, but for all the international forces of socialism, peace and democracy.
* * *
The strategic situation in the Far East by August 1945, the preparation and course of offensive operations of the Soviet Armed Forces against the Kwantung Army, the defeat and surrender of the latter were widely covered in Soviet literature .79 Therefore, below we will focus only on some aspects of the Far Eastern military campaign, and first of all on the moral and political training of our troops and the ideological education of Soviet soldiers.
74 A.M. Dubinsky. Liberation Mission of the Soviet Union in the Far East, Moscow, 1966, p. 539.
75 E. May. The United States, the Soviet Union and the Far Eastern War. "Pacific Historical Review", 1955, May, p. 172.
76 A. M. Dubinsky. Op. ed., p. 537.
77 Ibid., p. 527.
78 And. Stalin. On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, Moscow, 1950, p. 206.
79 See "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945", Vol. V. M. 1963, pp. 523-604; A. M. Dubinsky. Edict. op.; L. N. Pratchenko. Victory in the Far East, Moscow, 1966; G. T. Zavizion, P. A. Kornyushin. And on the Pacific Ocean ... M. 1967, et al.
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The State Defense Committee, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and the General Staff developed in detail a plan for gigantic offensive operations against Japanese imperialism and directly supervised the implementation of this plan at all its stages. As a participant in these operations, I would like to note the huge role that political bodies, army and navy party and Komsomol organizations played in achieving victory, and especially mention the courage and heroism of our soldiers, sergeants and petty officers, officers, generals and admirals. The Supreme High Command masterfully carried out the largest regrouping of troops from the Western to the Eastern theater of operations: hundreds of thousands of people, masses of weapons and military equipment, ammunition, food, clothing, fuel and other cargo were relocated to a distance of more than 10 thousand km. The scale of these transfers is also characterized by the following figure: 136 thousand wagons and platforms with troops, military equipment and equipment were sent from the West to the East. Along with this, large regroupings of troops were carried out in difficult conditions.
By August 1945, one and a half million troops were concentrated in the Far Eastern Theater. It consisted of 11 combined arms, 1 tank, 3 air and 3 air defense armies, which were armed with more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, more than 5.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, more than 3.8 thousand aircraft, and a large number of rocket artillery installations. The Pacific Fleet had 2 cruisers, 1 leader, 12 destroyers, 78 submarines, about 500 other warships and over 1,500 aircraft in combat readiness. The Red Banner Amur Flotilla consisted of 8 monitors, 11 gunboats, 52 armored boats, 12 minesweepers and other ships. The Far Eastern troops outnumbered the Japanese in tanks-4.8 times and in aviation-1.9 times.
Not to mention the fact that military history has not yet known examples of the transfer of troops on such a scale, in such a short time, it should be emphasized that all this was done after four years of hard efforts and huge sacrifices that fell to the lot of our people and their army in the Great Patriotic War against Hitlerite Germany. At the same time, the regrouping of forces, their transfer and concentration at the borders in the Far East had to be carried out secretly from the enemy. And this secrecy was ensured. After J. V. Stalin's report on November 7, 1944, at a solemn meeting dedicated to the 24th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, where he called Japan an aggressive state, its government became more wary and instructed its ambassador in Moscow, Sato, "to find out what changes can be expected in Soviet-Japanese relations in connection with this statement." Japanese military historian Hattori Takushiro writes that as early as "in February 1945, the Kwantung Army headquarters began to closely monitor and obtain information about Russian transfers along the Trans-Siberian Railway and Soviet aircraft flights from west to east." 80 However, Japanese intelligence was not able to fully reveal the mass movement in May-July 1945 of numerous echelons of troops, flights of entire formations and units of Soviet aviation.
The command and political organs of formations and units that moved after the surrender of nazi Germany from the banks of the Elbe and Danube to the banks of Khalkhin Gol, Amur and Ussuri were actively assisted by the party organizations of those regions and districts through which this unprecedented transfer of troops and military cargo was carried out in military history. Especially noteworthy is the effective assistance of party organizations in the Khabarovsk and Primorsky Territories, Chita and Irkutsk regions. In those days, after the victory over Nazi Germany, soldiers and officers, tired of the four-year war, were naturally drawn to their families and native places. And the conditions for party-political work were not easy at that time, especially since it was still too early to speak openly about the specific goals and tasks of the troops. But the matter was urgent and imperiously dictated that the efforts of the party political apparatus should be aimed at explaining that while the hotbed of war in the Far East was not extinguished, and the Japanese militarists, who caused much grief and suffering to the Soviet people, were still resisting, it was too early to lay down their weapons; that it was necessary to rid our Homeland of the threat
80 T. Hattori. Edict. op. vol. VIII, p. 586.
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help the peoples of Asia in their war of liberation against the Japanese invaders and draw the final line under the Second World War.
Attaching exceptional importance to the party-political work and ideological education of the troops as one of the most important conditions for a victorious struggle against the enemy, the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, in accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee of the Party, sent about three thousand political workers to the troops of the Far Eastern and Trans - Baikal Fronts and the Primorsky Group of Political workers, party and Komsomol organizations were assigned the following task: relying on the asset, to carry out work aimed at maintaining high military discipline and the moral and political spirit of soldiers, explaining to them the significance of the great victory won over Hitler's Germany. In carrying out this task, the Political Department of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, for example, which was heading for the Far East (head of the Political Department, Lieutenant-General K. A. Zykov), allocated lecturers, speakers and informants, provided them with the necessary materials for conversations, in particular "On the significance of the Yalta decisions of the heads of government". Lectures, reports and information, along with other questions of the international situation, explained the situation in the Far East, where Japanese imperialism continued the war against the allies of the USSR, and the peoples still suffered huge sacrifices. During train stops at railway stations, when spontaneous rallies were held with the participation of the local population, the political apparatus of the troops and local party organizations focused on such issues as the military and political victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, the mobilization of the entire people for the rapid restoration of the economy destroyed by the war and the further strengthening of the power of our Motherland. At the same time, special attention was paid to improving organization, discipline and constant vigilance.
After the Soviet Government announced in the spring of 1945 that it had denounced the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact in connection with the systematic violation by the Japanese side of this pact and the ongoing war of Japanese imperialism against the Chinese people and the armies of the United States and Britain, closed party and Komsomol meetings were held in units and formations of the Red Army, at resulting from the new situation and the upcoming military operations against Japanese imperialism. The Communists and Komsomol members explained to the entire staff the policy of the Soviet Government, the need to defeat Japanese imperialism, and eliminate the hotbed of war in the Far East as soon as possible. The Communists and Komsomol members showed a deep understanding of the international duty of the Soviet people. In their speeches, they stressed that it is not only about ensuring the security of our borders, but also about helping the peoples of China, Korea and other Asian countries to gain peace and national independence.
In those days, the soldiers ' love and trust in the Communist Party and the Soviet Government were re-established. For example, only in one echelon, where soldiers and officers of the 39th Army followed, 132 applications for admission to the party were submitted during May 17-25, 1945 .81 Captain I. N. Dorokhov wrote in his statement: "I will be happy to join the battle with the Japanese invaders as a communist. I will spare no effort and life itself to achieve an early victory over the enemy. " 82 This and many other statements expressed the readiness of soldiers and officers to fulfill with honor the new task of the party and command. Party and Komsomol commissions of formations worked in the trains, approved admission to the party and Komsomol, and political organizations immediately, in the cars, handed out party and Komsomol tickets in a solemn atmosphere. Purposeful, deeply ideological mass political agitation and propaganda among the personnel of our troops caused a strong moral and political upsurge, contributed to strengthening military discipline and a sense of high responsibility for the implementation of upcoming combat tasks.
Political organizations, party and Komsomol organizations of formations and units that were previously located in the Far East had different conditions. Here, throughout the Great Patriotic War, as in previous years, the party and political-
81 Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, f. 32, op. 3191, d. 1, l. 88.
82 Ibid., l. 89.
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His work was aimed at fostering a fervent love of the Motherland, hatred of the enemy, the ability to preserve military secrecy, and constant vigilance against the Japanese imperialists, who had been waging a vicious anti-Soviet, aggressive policy since the civil war and, in fact, never deviated from it. After April 5, 1945, when the Soviet-Japanese pact was denounced, party-political and educational work became even more purposeful. The political organizations were instructed to immediately organize an in-depth explanation of the military-political situation in the Far East and our tasks arising from the Soviet Government's statement on denouncing the neutrality pact with Japan.
In order to study the precious experience of offensive operations in the war against the Nazi invaders, improve operational-tactical, political and technical training of personnel, sixty - day meetings of the command and political staff of armies, formations and units, staff members and home front service personnel were held in May-July 1945. In addition to lectures on military and political topics, training sessions with displays of military equipment and field exercises that were as close to combat reality as possible were held at the training camps. Commanders and members of military councils of fronts and armies, senior staff members, and heads of political organizations spoke at the training camps. Political and party workers who arrived from the fronts of the Great Patriotic War were invited to participate in these meetings, sharing their experience of team and party-political work in combat conditions. In total, 1,285 people participated in the training camps on the Trans-Baikal Front (including 33 generals, 81 colonels, 120 lieutenant colonels, 318 majors, 517 captains, 209 senior lieutenants and 7 lieutenants).83 In addition, training sessions and seminars were held for all other categories of employees of political organizations, party and Komsomol cadres of units and divisions. In the armies that did not take part in the battles with the Nazi invaders, special attention was paid to popularizing and generalizing the experience of the Great Patriotic War. For this purpose, special groups were created from war veterans, including political workers, who were sent to the troops to read reports and conduct conversations on special topics. Red Army meetings and meetings of the combat community were held in all units.
As troops arrived from the West and concentrated in the designated areas, political organizations, party and Komsomol organizations of formations and units previously stationed in the Far East, in turn, passed on their experience, helped them understand the specific situation, told them about the specific conditions of the theater of war in Manchuria and Korea, about the combat and morale of the Kwantung Army troops. armies, gave socio-political characteristics of the population of the areas where the fighting was going to take place. In June 1945, 327 people from the ranks of generals, staff officers and political organizations of the Trans-Baikal Front addressed the newly arrived contingent that became part of the front on this topic, who read 877 reports .84 Lectures and reports on the following topics were delivered at all training sessions, staff exercises, field rifle and tactical exercises, seminars and party and Komsomol meetings: "The Communist Party-the inspirer and organizer of the victory of the Soviet people over Hitlerite Germany", "The international situation of the Soviet Union", "Japanese imperialism - the worst enemy of the Soviet people", "The Manchurian military bridgehead of Japanese imperialism", "The atrocities of the Japanese invaders in the Soviet Far East during the intervention of 1918-1922", "Battles at the Soviet Border". oz. Khasan and R. Khalkhin-Gol", "Experience of party and political work in offensive battles", "Armament of the Japanese Army and its tactical and technical properties", "Experience of Komsomol organizations in offensive operations", etc.
Only in the 1st Red Banner Army officers from May to August 1945 were read more than 1,900 lectures and reports on general political and military-political topics, the experience of the Great Patriotic War, the aggressive policy of Japan, neighboring states and others. Mass-circulation pamphlets and leaflets were published for the troops and headquarters. Political Department of the 1st Far Eastern Front, for example,
83 Ibid., op. 11318, d. 195, l. 13.
84 Ibid., op. 3621, 3, ll. 46-51.
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During June - July 1945, it published pamphlets: "Economic and political characteristics of Manchuria", "Military and political situation of Japan", "Military and political situation of China", "Company Party Committee - on the situation in the Far East", "Company Party organization-support and assistant commander" , etc. Pamphlets were an important tool for the troops: "Japanese planes"," Japanese tanks"," Japanese mines"; memos: "Machine gunner", "Tankman", "Infantry fighter", "Mortar man", "Tactical techniques of the Japanese infantry" , etc. The circulation of printed materials issued on this front for June-July 1945 amounted to 161550 copies .85 It should be particularly noted that the preparation of troops for the upcoming military operations took place in an environment of a huge political upsurge of all personnel, due to the victorious end of the war over Hitler's Germany. The difficulties in organizing party-political work in the troops consisted in the fact that preparations for military operations with Japan were carried out in secret. Such means of influencing the masses as the press and radio could not be fully used.
By the end of July 1945, the transfer and concentration of troops, military equipment and materiel in the Far East was largely completed. Thanks to the tireless care of the party and the Government, the troops had everything they needed for the upcoming military operations. The general strategic plan, the areas of concentration of troops, the directions of the main attacks were developed in detail by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Specific tasks of all fronts (the Trans-Baikal, 1st and 2nd Far Eastern), as well as the Pacific Fleet were defined on June 28, 1945 by Stavka directives signed by Supreme Commander-in-Chief I. V. Stalin.
The Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet Government, fulfilling the allied obligations of the USSR, set the main political goal to speed up the elimination of the last hotbed of World War II, secure the borders of the USSR in the Far East, return to our country the Southern Sakhalin and Kuril Islands torn away by Japan, together with the allies expel the Japanese invaders from the countries they occupied, and promote the restoration of universal peace. In accordance with this goal, the most important strategic tasks were defined: the defeat of the Kwantung Army as the main strike force of Japanese imperialism, the liberation of Manchuria and North Korea. The strategic plan approved by the Supreme High Command provided for delivering crushing blows to the Japanese troops in three directions: two main strikes - by the forces of the Trans-Baikal and 1st Far Eastern Fronts, and an auxiliary strike-by the troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front with the task of encircling the main forces of the Kwantung Army, dismembering and destroying them in parts. The forces of the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Flotilla were involved in the campaign.
Given the great remoteness and vast territory of the Far Eastern Theater of Operations, its complexity and the need to use naval forces in the interests of three fronts, the State Defense Committee created the Main Command of Soviet Troops in the Far East, which was entrusted with strategic leadership and coordination of combat operations of the fronts and the Pacific Fleet. One of the most prominent military leaders, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky, was appointed commander - in-chief, and Combat General S. P. Ivanov was appointed Chief of Staff. The author of these lines was approved as a member of the Military Council of the High Command of the Far East. The following were formed: headquarters, political management, home front services and other operational management and support bodies for troops participating in combat operations in the Far East. According to the instructions of the Military Council and the Political Directorate of the Main Command of the Soviet Troops in the Far East, all party - organizational and ideological work in the troops was to be built specifically and differentially, taking into account the specific conditions in which each front and navy was to operate. An important task was to prepare the troops politically for the upcoming combat operation.
The troops of the Trans-Baikal Front, consisting of a tank, four combined arms and one air army and a horse-mechanized group of Soviet-Mongolian troops, were called upon to play a major role in the defeat of the Japanese. They did the main damage
85 Ibid., 7, ll. 15-16.
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strike from Transbaikalia, from the territory of the Tamtsakbulak salient of the MNR in the Khingan-Mukden strategic direction, where the 6th Guards Tank Army was intended as the main shock force of the front. The 1st Far Eastern Front (four combined arms and air armies and a separate mechanized corps) was to advance from Primorye, towards the strike from Transbaikalia, in the Harbin-Girinsky strategic direction, as well as towards Korea. The troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front advancing from Primorye (two combined arms, an air army and a separate rifle corps) in cooperation with the Amur Flotilla were to actively assist the Trans-Baikal and 1st Far Eastern Fronts in defeating the Kwantung Army. The task of the 16th Army, which united troops on Sakhalin and Kamchatka, was to take Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands in cooperation with the fleet.
The Trans-Baikal front in the course of the offensive was to overcome the mountain ranges of Bolshoy and Maly Khingan, and on the right wing, where the 17th Army and the horse-mechanized group of Soviet-Mongolian troops operated, the desert and waterless steppes of Inner Mongolia; the troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front and the Amur Red Banner Flotilla needed to cross such a powerful water an obstacle like the Amur River, and then advance through the swampy, roadless taiga; part of the forces of this front and the flotilla were to carry out an amphibious operation on Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. The 1st Far Eastern Front, after crossing the Ussuri River and a number of parallel ridges of the East Manchurian Mountains, was to advance through the most densely populated part of Eastern Manchuria and, in cooperation with the Pacific Fleet, carry out a number of amphibious operations in the northern part of Korea. The troops of all fronts, especially the 1st Far East, were to break through 17 fortified areas that encircled the powerful reinforced concrete strip of the border of Manchuria with the Soviet Far East. All these features required careful preparation of not only the physical, but also the moral forces of the soldiers and officers involved in the offensive. Moreover, the Far Eastern Theater of Military Operations introduced many new things, such as the command and party - political apparatus did not have to meet on the Soviet-German front.
The rugged mountain ranges of the Greater and Lesser Khingan, the parallel Eastern Manchurian mountain ranges covered with forest and cut by swampy gorges, the desert-steppe, waterless and roadless expanses of Inner Mongolia, the Amur, Sungari, Ussuri, Mudanjiang, Tuminjiang Rivers, and dozens of their tributaries with swampy banks - all this created exceptional difficulties for the advancing troops. Amur, for example, has a predominant width of 1.4 - 1.8 km, and together with the islands - from 5 to 7 km. By the beginning of the crossing, due to the flood, its width reached 15-20 km, depth-10-12 m, current speed-1.2-1.5 m / sec .86 The Ussuri River in the crossing area, opposite the city of Zhaohe, has a predominant width of 500-1250 m, a depth of up to 2 m, and by the beginning of the crossing by our troops it had spread 1.5-4.5 km, with a depth of 3-4 m and a current speed of 0.6-0.8 m / sec .87 The Mudanjiang and Tuminjiang rivers, which were located in the direction of the offensive of the 1st Far Eastern Front, spread for tens of kilometers, and their floodplains turned into impassable swamps for a long time .88 At the crossing of the troops of the 15th Army of the 2nd Far Eastern Front (Leninskoe-Kukelevo), when the Amur River was flooded to a width of 6 km, the approaches to the banks became so swampy that even tracked vehicles were unable to approach the riverbank .
Extremely difficult conditions have developed in the direction of the offensive of the troops of the 17th army and the horse-mechanized group of Soviet-Mongolian troops, as well as the 39th and 53rd combined arms and 6th tank armies of the Trans-Baikal Front. On the one hand, salt marshes, sand dunes, off-road conditions, lack of water and fuel, a sharp change in temperature (during the day up to +50°, at night-up to 0°), on the other - mountain ranges, steep cliffs and steep descents, a small number of passes and trails covered with to-
86 Ibid., op. 77213, d. 1, p. 11.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., l. 12.
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mu also has dense taiga vegetation. Behind the advancing tanks, a continuous cloud of dust rose to a height of 200-300 m, which not only unmasked the movement of battle formations, but also disabled tanks and vehicles ahead of schedule. From August 1 to September 1, 1945, 6.64 tanks and 90 self-propelled guns failed on three fronts due to a technical malfunction . Tank and mechanized troops had to cross such a powerful barrier as the Amur, conduct an offensive along the Sungari River through heavily swampy terrain in the absence of any tolerable roads. Cars, tanks, and self-propelled guns often failed due to engine overheating.
Our troops encountered numerous sabotage groups, manned by specially trained fanatics - "suicide bombers". Long before the war in China and the Pacific, the Japanese command paid special attention to the creation of special sabotage groups of "self-sacrifice" as one of the important forms of warfare. The actions of these groups on land were intended mainly for the destruction of command personnel and military equipment. A soldier from the suicide bomber sabotage group had to give his life without hesitation, committing sabotage against manpower, as well as tanks and other military vehicles.
The captured commander of the 3rd Japanese front in Manchuria, General Usiroku Jun, showed: "One soldier of the Teishintai (suicide bombers) detachment, with 10 kg of explosives, destroys 1 tank and its crew of 2 people; 100 people with 1000 kg of explosives should destroy 100 tanks and 200 - 300 crew members. Let's assume that the effectiveness of this method of destroying tanks is 50 %; then 1000 people, with 10 thousand kg of explosives, can destroy up to 500 tanks and up to 1-1.5 thousand crew. Successful completion of the task, as a rule, was accompanied by the death of the performer, but the family of the deceased... I received a commendation list from the army commander. The deceased posthumously received a military rank through one step and was awarded the order for a heroic act. I, as commander of the 3rd Front, have given orders to the corresponding formations to strengthen the training of troops and to steadily expand the use of this method in the war against the Soviet Union. " 91 Special detachments of "suicide pilots"were created against the Navy. However, all the Japanese attempts to widely apply this method of war against the advancing Soviet troops did not bring them any serious results.
With the total depth of the fortified strip of the border system in 120-150 km, the enemy had a large number of underground structures, communication passages, warehouses where ammunition and food supplies were stored, which made it possible to withstand a long siege. Finally, the peculiarity and difficulty of the theater of war was that the command and headquarters did not have up-to-date topographic maps. The names of localities were unusual for our officers (Chinese, Korean, Mongolian, then converted to Japanese). The survey of the local population was complicated by the presence of various local dialects. The political situation, even in the presence of serious anti-Japanese sentiments among the local population and the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement in Manchuria, was difficult, as the population was for a long time under the influence of anti-Soviet and anti-Communist propaganda.
The Military Council and Political Directorate of the Soviet Troops in the Far East, the military councils and political directorates of the fronts and the Pacific Fleet directed command cadres, political organizations of formations, party and Komsomol organizations to ensure that all party-organizational and ideological work among the personnel was carried out continuously, flexibly, in indissoluble connection with the assigned combat tasks and, most importantly, it corresponded to the high pace of the offensive, in the implementation of which the time factor, high morale and morale of the troops were crucial. And this task was carried out with honor. Taking into account, for example, the particularly difficult conditions for the offensive in the desert-steppe part of Inner Mongolia, the commanders, political organizations, party and Komsomol organizations of the 39th, 17th combined arms and 6th tank armies and the horse-mechanized Soviet-Mongolian group
90 Ibid., op. 12111, d. 110, l. 20.
91 Ibid., op. 11306, d. 588, ll. 156-159.
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The troops paid great attention to such vital issues as compliance with the drinking regime and sanitary requirements, saving fuel and technical water for tanks and vehicles. The more experienced and acclimatized soldiers of the Mongolian People's Army provided great help to our soldiers and officers in this, which contributed to strengthening the military friendship of the armies of the two fraternal countries. In a short time, mass-produced memos were issued to the Red Army soldier: "General duties of a soldier", "Observe the discipline of the march", "Know how to keep your legs", "Keep weapons and ammunition in combat readiness", "Learn to quench your thirst correctly", "To the driver of a car", "Summer operation of tanks and self-propelled guns in Mongolia" and others 92 . Meetings of personnel were held in all units and divisions, where they were told in detail how to overcome difficulties, how to help each other out during an offensive in a desert-steppe, waterless area. The Communists and Komsomol members were given the task of setting an example of perseverance and courage, discipline and endurance in the campaign and in battle .93
In order to provide assistance to the commanders and political workers of combat units and divisions and maintain a high level of party-organizational and ideological work with personnel, most of the political apparatus of the political departments of fronts and armies, corps and divisions on the eve of the offensive was sent directly to the units and divisions of the first echelon, that is, to organizational and ideological-political work. In all formations and units of the Trans-Baikal Front, on the instructions of the front's Political Directorate, party meetings were held with the agenda "A communist's place in battle". At halts, while following the initial positions for the offensive in the 6th Tank Army, party and Komsomol assets gathered to quickly discuss measures to eliminate the identified shortcomings. At the last gathering of party assets on August 8, 1945, the participants were handed a leaflet with the text of the Soviet Government's Declaration of War on Japan, printed in 100 thousand copies under the motto " Bolder and more resolute forward!". The results of this work had a positive effect on the discipline of the march to the initial positions for the offensive. In the 59th Cavalry Division (Trans-Baikal Front) on the initiative of the Komsomol organization of the 129th cavalry Regiment (Komsomol com. Kozhemyakin), a movement was launched for the right to march at the head of the column and carry the battle flag of the division. As a result of the competition, the 252nd Cavalry Regiment won this right.
In those days, the army press was truly a collective propagandist of the feat of arms, an agitator for patriotism and selflessness in the fight against the enemy. It provided commanders of all degrees with great assistance in mobilizing the personnel of the troops for exemplary performance of combat tasks, for the fastest defeat of the enemy. Front-line, army and divisional newspapers published in the Far East - and they were published over 100 times with a single circulation of more than 500 thousand copies. - day after day, they made topical editorials, published Sovinformburo reports, TASS materials, skillfully covered the life and combat activities of the troops, promoted the example of the front-line soldiers, instilled in the soldiers a sense of military duty, loyalty to the oath, unquestioning compliance with the orders of the commander, fervent love for the socialist Motherland and burning hatred for the enemy. For timely delivery of newspapers to units and divisions, all available modes of transport were used. The central press - the newspapers Pravda, Izvestia, Krasnaya Zvezda, and Komsomolskaya Pravda-was widely used in carrying out party-political work and ideological education of soldiers, which were delivered in large numbers by planes to all fronts and the Pacific Fleet.
Numerous examples can be given of the efficiency and purposefulness of the army press. Here is the newspaper "Red Warrior" of the 338th Rifle Division (editor Major Lipatov). Only for the period from July 15 to August 10, 1945, the newspaper published 25 articles and stories of participants of the Great Patriotic War, in which they taught young fighters the art of defeating the enemy using concrete examples and facts. Such stories as "On my account 116 killed Nazis", " Cheated -
92 Ibid., op. 3191, d. 15, l. 23.
93 Ibid., l. 11.
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I defeated the enemy", "How we won the night battle", "For which I was awarded the Order of Glory of three degrees"," Helmet and shovel protect life"," The Power of the Russian bayonet"," In weapons - our strength "and others, were used by officers as a valuable guide during combat training, they were read and discussed in all divisions of the division. The newspaper "Red Warrior" from issue to issue published a large number of materials on how to fight in the steppe, where and how to choose firing positions, navigate the terrain, etc. With the beginning of the march through the waterless steppes of Mongolia, the newspaper began to publish articles on the following topics:: "What the training march gave me", "Agitator on the march", "Vigilance on the March", "Political mass work at halts", "Mutual revenue and assistance", "A sample of care for weapons", and in total more than 50 correspondence.
An example of skillful and purposeful propaganda of the military oath, the requirements of the statutes and instructions can serve as the work of the newspapers "Onslaught" of the 61st Panzer Division and "In battle for the Motherland" of the 221st Rifle Division. During July and the first ten days of August, these newspapers published 24 articles and stories about the military oath, among them: "Stick to the oath - you will be a hero", "Strictly keep military secrets", "Commander's order - law", "Soldier's honesty", "In discipline - strength", " Essays on loyalty take the oath of office." The newspapers systematically published materials about the heroic deeds of soldiers and officers during the battles in East Prussia, about their military skill and courage. Using the rich experience of the Great Patriotic War, newspapers based on specific material brought up the personnel of the units in the spirit of devotion to military duty, perseverance, endurance, and taught them how to properly wield weapons. In July and August 1945, the newspapers "For our Victory" of the 124th," At the Battle Post "of the 358th," Forward to Victory "of the 91st Guards and" In Battle for the Motherland " of the 19th Guards Rifle Divisions published over 100 articles and notes on these topics. The materials published in the newspapers served as a good guide for commanders and political workers.
During the period of preparation for the offensive, the political and party organizations of formations and units of all three of our fronts, as well as the Pacific Fleet, paid great attention to educating soldiers and officers in the spirit of international friendship with the Chinese, Korean, and Mongolian peoples and with Japanese workers who suffered from the war unleashed by monopolies and militarism. The idea of the liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in relation to the colonial and dependent peoples of the East, as well as recent examples of the liberation of the peoples of South-Eastern and Central Europe from fascism, were widely promoted in reports, lectures, conversations and through front-line, army and divisional newspapers. As part of the Political Department of the Main Command, political organizations of fronts, armies and divisions, there was a large group of Oriental officers, headed by an experienced specialist, General B. G. Sapozhnikov. All of them were proficient in Eastern languages, knew well the history, economy and culture of the states and peoples of the Far East. These officers conducted extensive propaganda work in the troops, systematically informed the command and political organizations about the political and moral state of the Japanese army and the population of Japan, as well as the population of the countries of East and Southeast Asia occupied by the Japanese army.
During the period of preparation for the offensive operation, the departments for work among the enemy's troops and population of the political departments of the fronts and the Pacific Fleet conducted purposeful work, helping the political organizations and headquarters of newly arrived formations and units from the West to get used to the new situation. Reference books and memos were issued for officers and soldiers about the Kwantung Army, the theater of military operations in Manchuria and Korea, the political situation in Japan, the Sino-Japanese and Pacific wars. To help officers and soldiers, short phrasebooks were published in Japanese, Chinese, Korean and Mongolian, which provided a dictionary - at least for a brief interview of prisoners and elementary explanations with Chinese, Koreans, Mongols, and Japanese.
The whole complex of organizational and party-political measures carried out by the command, political organizations, party and Komsomol organizations ensured high moral, psychological and combat readiness of our troops for the offensive operation, which rapidly began on the night of August 8-9, 1945 on a giant front with a total length of more than 2,700 kilometers.
(The ending follows.)
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