Terrorism in Japan is considered premeditated, politically motivated violence committed by members of underground organizations against the civilian population, usually in order to influence public sentiment and change domestic or foreign policy. Since the end of the Cold War, the Japanese have been increasingly targeted by international terrorists. In the country, it is customary to distinguish between domestic and international terrorism.

Keywords: terrorism, extremism, Japan, Middle East, USA, foreign policy.

THE PROGRESS AND TROUBLES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM IN JAPAN

Article tackles the problem of contemporary terrorism in Japan, which includes domestic and international components. Domestic terrorism is represented by underground militant groups mainly of Japanese origin, which practice terrorist methods of struggle to reach their political objectives, primarily aimed at influencing domestic policies of the government. International terrorism targets Japan and Japanese in order to modify Japan s foreign policy so that Japan stops supporting the USA in their struggle with the jihadist branches of the Islamic State (IS) throughout the world.

Keywords: terrorism, extremism, Japan, Middle East, USA, foreign policy.

Mikhail Ivanovich KRUPYANKO-Doctor of Political Sciences, Leading Researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, info@japanesefirst.ru;

Liana G. ARESHIDZE-Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor of the Department of History and Culture of Japan, ISAA, Lomonosov Moscow State University.

Mikhail KRUPYANKO - Doctor of Sciences (in Politics), Leading Research Fellow, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, Moscow, info@japanesefirst.ru;

Liana ARESHIDZE - Doctor of Sciences (in History), Professor, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Japanese department.

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For the ruling circles of Japan, domestic terrorism is primarily the activity of underground armed groups that use terrorist methods of struggle. Such activities involve the implementation of premeditated, politically motivated violence directed against the civilian population, individuals or civilian objects in order to intimidate the government in order to encourage it to change its domestic or foreign policy [Alekseev, 2013, p. 1-2]. Domestic terrorism has not reached the same scale in Japan as, for example, in the Middle East, but ensuring security, which is necessary to maintain domestic political stability and improve the international rating, remains the most important concern of the Japanese authorities.

The problems of terrorism and extremism in Japan have traditionally been associated with the illegal activities of a number of large illegal extremist structures, both right-wing and left-wing. At the beginning of the XXI century, there were about 800 ultra-right organizations in the country, uniting more than 120 thousand people. However, only 50 groups, which had approximately 23,000 members in their ranks, showed significant activity.

The most influential far-right organizations, which included many supporters of terrorist methods of power struggle, include the Aikokuto (Japanese Patriotic Party), the All-Japan Council of Patriotic Organizations, the Society for the Study of Youth Thoughts, the Great Eastern School, the Production Party of Japan, the Council of New Japan, and the Accord Party. The All-Japan Council of Patriotic Organizations covers 330 nationalist associations and publishes a large-circulation magazine "Zenai" ("All-Japan Patriotism") and the newspaper"Kaibyaku"("Creation"). The Society for the Study of Youth Thoughts, established in 1960, publishes the newspaper Seinensiso ("Ideology of Youth") and unites 28 organizations. The Greater Japan National Association Council operates in Osaka, the Kyushu People's Movement Council operates in Fukuoka, and the Tubu Patriotic Organizations Council operates in Nagoya.

There are more than 14 thousand left-wing extremist groups in the country with a total number of members reaching 35 thousand. The most active ultra-left organizations are the Nihonsekigun (Red Army of Japan - KAYA) and the religious terrorist sect Aum Shinrikyo. The goal of the extremist left is to overthrow the bourgeois government, renew the leadership of the Communist Party of Japan, and oppose the creation of a Japanese-American military alliance. The social base of the ultra-left movement consists of the middle urban strata, the intelligentsia, and students. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the number of left-wing extremist organizations and their membership in Japan increased markedly.

The creation of KAI in 1971 was preceded by the activities of a left-wing extremist organization with a similar name "Sekigun" ("Red Army"), created in 1969 and widely known for its use of terrorist methods of struggle. Its core was made up of student activists who demanded an end to the Vietnam War. Students called for the creation of a "revolutionary army of the peoples of Africa, Latin America, Vietnam, Korea and Japan", whose activities would be directed against the global hegemony of the United States.

The first "Sekigun" terrorist act was the hijacking of a Japanese civilian plane with passengers on board to the capital of the DPRK, Pyongyang, in 1970. After merging with a number of Maoist groups, the organization became known as " Rengo Sekigun "("United Red Army") and became famous not only for numerous terrorist attacks directed against representatives of the political and economic elite of Japan and American military personnel in the country, but also for "purges" in its own ranks: 14 of its members were killed, charged with in opportunism. Internal disagreements predetermined the split of the organization. On the basis of the breakaway student association "Zengakuren", a KAYA emerged, which spread its activities to the countries of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Europe and the United States.

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At first, the KAYA consisted of only 300-400 fighters, but gradually the number of its members grew to 2 thousand, while several thousand more fighters were in reserve. The leadership of the organization sought to show representatives of the left - wing movements of capitalist countries how to prepare "socialist revolutions". Its ideologues argued that revolutions do not arise as a result of the revolutionary struggle of the masses, but are the result of the armed struggle of a group of revolutionaries. They considered world capitalism, Zionism, anti-Arabism, and "Soviet revisionism"to be their opponents. In their opinion, the stages of development of the world revolutionary situation should have been the creation of" red armies "in Asia, Africa and Latin America, their unification into the" world red army "and the formation of the" world revolutionary front " (Rotaenko, 2004, pp. 121-125).

The targets of KAI's terrorist activities in Japan were supposed to be government offices, the imperial Palace, luxury hotels and foreign embassies, hijackings of civilian aircraft, kidnappings, attacks on police stations, and robberies of large banks. In 1970, an assassination attempt on Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaka was planned, but the police managed to arrest the conspirators.

KAYA relied on attracting young people who rejected the capitalist system of values to its ranks. The organization provided military training for new members and indoctrinated them. The charter of the CAI provided for unquestioning subordination of ordinary members to the leadership and strict measures to ensure internal security: unreliable members were often punished with death.

Meanwhile, the organization's active activities in Japan lasted only one or two years. After the arrest of a number of leaders and militants, KAYA was on the verge of collapse. The surviving activists joined the ranks of the United Red Army, which, however, also collapsed after mass arrests, and about 50 people were forced to emigrate. Initially, the extremists who left the country established the KAI headquarters in Lebanon, then in Paris, where they collaborated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, together with which they carried out several high-profile terrorist attacks in the 1970s and 1990s.

In March 1970, the Japanese media leaked information that the Japanese Red Army was planning to turn North Korea into the world center of the revolutionary movement. A group of 9 people led by Tamiya Takamaros on board a Japanese airliner en route "Haneda-Itazuke", demanded to grant them political asylum in North Korea.

This was the first case of hijacking and hijacking of a passenger aircraft in Japan. The crew commander landed the plane at South Korea's Kimpo Airport, claiming to have landed in Pyongyang. After lengthy negotiations with the criminals, the crew members, with the exception of the commander and co-pilot, and the passengers were released. Instead, Japanese Deputy Transport Minister Yamamura Shinjiro (who later became Transport Minister) boarded, and the plane with the terrorists headed to Pyongyang, where the remaining crew members and Shinjiro were released. One of the organizers of the 1996 hijacking, Tanaka Yoshimi, was arrested in Thailand, where the authorities handed him over to Japan in 2000. In his homeland, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison [The Japan Times, 09.11.2001].

On May 30, 1972, KAYA militants, with the assistance of Palestinian terrorists, carried out a terrorist attack at the airport of Lod (now the International Airport named after him. Ben-Gurion), shooting 26 Israelis and wounding 72 others.

The targets of KAI's terrorist attacks were large industrial enterprises in Japan. So, on August 30, 1974, militants organized a series of explosions at several large factories, in particular those belonging to the Mitsubishi concern. Then 8 people were killed, and 385 were injured. On October 14, 1974, an explosion occurred in

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At Mitsui's main office in Tokyo, 17 people were injured. On November 25, 1974, the terrorist attack occurred at the central research institute of the Teijin Corporation, and on December 10, 1974-at the main office of the Taiseikensetsu construction company, and on February 28, 1975 - in the administrative and factory premises of the Hazamagumi Corporation.

In July 1975, a terrorist attack organized by KAYA was carried out on the island of Okinawa. For the first time since the United States returned the island to Japanese jurisdiction, the family of Crown Prince Akihito (now Emperor) visited the International Maritime Exhibition held in Okinawa. Although the security of the imperial family was carefully organized, the terrorists managed to throw a molotov cocktail in the direction of the crowned heads during their visit and laying flowers at the foot of the Himeyuri monument (created in memory of field nurses who died in 1945 in the battles for Okinawa) in Itoman. The Prince and his wife were not injured in the explosion. And in January 1990, left-wing radicals threw homemade bombs at the imperial residences in Tokyo and Kyoto.

Since 1994, the KAI leadership has been using chemical warfare agents, including sarin gas, to organize terrorist attacks. The first incident occurred in the city of Matsumoto in Nagano Prefecture on July 27, 1994: corpses of people allegedly poisoned with sarin were scattered throughout the city. As a result, 7 people were killed and another 660 seriously injured.

In May 2002, activist KAYA Ekita Yokiko was sentenced to 20 years in prison [The Japan Times, 05.07.2002], who in 1974-1975 participated in attacks on the buildings of the Mitsui and Taisei corporations, as a result of which more than 20 people were injured.

September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in New York City ended with the destruction of the twin towers of the World Trade Center. There was very little open information about the attack, but Japanese radicals from KAI were the first to declare their involvement in it. On the day of the terrorist attack, an unknown person called the Jordanian office of the Al-Jazeera TV channel. In broken Arabic, he said that the series of terrorist attacks in the United States was revenge for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The director of the Amman weekly Al-Wahd also received similar information in the same way. However, the version of KAI's involvement in the September 11 terrorist attack was questioned. The FBI officially stated that it was organized by the then little-known Saudi billionaire Osama bin Laden, who later claimed responsibility for the attack on the World Trade Center.

In April 2001, KAI's leader, Shigenobu Fusako, disbanded the organization, and in October 2001, KAI was removed from the list of active international terrorist organizations. By then, Shigenobu herself had already been in custody for a year, awaiting trial. In 2006, she was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

On February 20, 2015, it was revealed that one of KAI's active members, Shirosaki Tsutomu, who had served 20 years in the U.S. prison in Yazoo City, Mississippi, on terrorism charges, was released on January 16, 2015 and deported to Japan. Upon arrival, he was arrested by the Tokyo police, who put him on the wanted list back in 1992 for attempting to set fire to a hotel in Jakarta.

In addition to KAI, the radical religious sect "Aum Shinrikyo", included in the list of international terrorist organizations and banned in the European Union, Canada, Moldova, Russia, the United States and some other countries, has left a significant mark on the history of modern Japanese terrorism. Known as "Aleph" since 2000, the sect was founded in 1987 by Shoko Asahara and became widely known after the terrorist attack in March 1995, when its members organized a sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway. Currently, the sect is under the public supervision of the Japanese police and special services. The organization attracted students from prestigious Japanese elite universities to join its ranks, which earned it the name "for elites" sect.

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The criminal activities of Aum Shinrikyo first became known in August 1989, when the Japanese media reported that new members were forcibly detained in its ranks and forced to donate money to the organization. In the early 1990s, the leadership of Aum Shinrikyo clearly defined its terrorist orientation: there was a series of murders of people who criticized its actions.

In 1992, the chief ideologist of Aum Shinrikyo, Hayakawa Kiyohide, published the treatise "Laws of Civil Utopia", in which he criticized the 1947 Constitution of Japan. Hayakawa made several friendly visits to Russia, where he negotiated the purchase of weapons, military vehicles, including Kalashnikov assault rifles and Mi-8 helicopters, and documentation for production sarin gas. In 1994-1995, "Aum Shinrikyo" began to use toxic substances-sarin and VX-gases in the commission of terrorist attacks. One of the most high-profile terrorist attacks with the use of toxic gases was committed on June 27, 1994, as a result of which residents of Matsumoto were injured.

In May 1995, during nationwide raids, police arrested Aum Shinrikyo leader Shoko Asahara, who was hiding in a specially equipped bunker, and more than a dozen other members of the organization. Later, about 200 more militants were captured. The court found Shoko Asahara guilty of 13 of the 17 charges against him and sentenced him to death by hanging in 2004. Another 12 death sentences were handed down to other leaders of the organization.

Despite the preventive measures taken by the police and Japanese special services, extremism in Japan still remains a serious socio-political problem. First of all, this is due to the existence of conditions in the country for spreading the ideology of terrorism and carrying out terrorist activities.

International terrorism in Japan is understood as a specific form of terrorist activity, the main purpose of which is to encourage the country's authorities to adjust their foreign policy course, to refuse to follow in the wake of the US international strategy. International terrorism is mainly of Islamic origin [Alekseev, 2012, p. 13].

Why did Japan suddenly fall into the sphere of interests of international terrorists and what are their goals in relation to this country? During the Cold War, Japan generally followed a peaceful foreign policy and did not experience the actions of hostile external forces. However, after the end of the Cold War, the Japanese authorities became increasingly insistent on revising the peace Constitution of 1947, seeking to intensify their foreign policy. In particular, the Japanese military began to go-in order to please the strategic interests of the United States - to various hot spots, for example, in the Middle East; as a result, the threat to the country from international terrorism increased markedly. The inability of the Japanese authorities to protect citizens from terrorist attacks was also revealed.

The Japanese first encountered the problem of terrorist danger in October 2003, when 10 Chechen militants entered the country to commit a series of terrorist attacks [Asahi Shimbun, 12.10.2003]. The Japanese leadership was particularly concerned about the links between Chechen militants who were well-trained to carry out terrorist acts and Al-Qaeda, which sent instructors to Chechnya. By that time, Al-Qaeda had already claimed responsibility for a number of terrorist attacks against Russian citizens in various countries, and could have chosen Japan for this purpose.

In February 2004, Japan was declared the highest level of terrorist threat. Security measures were strengthened at 650 strategic sites, including nuclear power plants, airports and government agencies. The police received reinforcements from the self-defense forces. Security at the Prime Minister's residence, the U.S. Embassy, train stations, ports, and major supermarkets has been stepped up.

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The increased security measures were taken after the deployment of a Japanese peacekeeping contingent to assist the new Iraqi authorities after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime. This proved to be Japan's largest military operation since World War II. The introduction of unprecedented security measures by the Japanese government has affected the state of global financial markets: the yen has fallen against the dollar to a record low.

On February 17, 2004, two explosions occurred near the building of the Self - Defense Forces Directorate (since 2007-the Ministry of Defense) of Japan in Tokyo. According to the police, they could have been organized by terrorist groups opposed to sending Japanese troops to Iraq. Police claimed to have found two steel pipes used to launch projectiles from the grounds of a Buddhist temple located 500 meters from the Control complex in Tokyo's Ichigaya district. Primitive devices made from scraps of metal pipes were aimed at the military department. The police acknowledged the possibility of a terrorist attack.

January 16, 2013)A terrorist attack against Japanese citizens took place in In Amenas, Algeria. As a result of the attack on a large natural gas production and processing enterprise, 10 employees of the Nikki Corporation of Japan were killed, and more than 40 Japanese were taken hostage [Chikhi and Bate, 2013]. Following this incident, the number of Japanese personnel abroad, primarily in the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel region of Africa, which separates the Sahara Desert from the savanna regions of Tropical Africa, and Pakistan, declined markedly.

In January 2015, the news spread around the world about the capture of two Japanese citizens by the Islamic State (IS or ISIL) - Kenji Goto, a journalist who worked on the creation of a documentary and was abducted by IS militants in Syria in October 2014, and Haruna Yukawa, who was captured in August of the same year. The IS leadership demanded a ransom of $ 200 million from the Japanese authorities, promising to behead the Japanese in case of non-payment [The Japan Times, 21.01.2015]. Photos circulated in the media at the time showed the Japanese hostages wearing orange-colored clothing, just like those worn by the Europeans and Americans executed earlier. The ransom was not paid, and the Japanese were executed. Japanese and international media were flooded with materials about the danger posed by IS militants, including for the Japanese [Asahi Shimbun, 02.02.2015].

The hostage-taking of Japanese citizens by IS militants came as a complete surprise to the country's authorities. The fact is that traditionally official Tokyo positioned itself in the Middle East as a pacifist state that generously provided financial and humanitarian assistance to peaceful Muslims. True, the Japanese authorities have repeatedly officially declared their support for the fight against international terrorism, but at the same time stressed the humanitarian nature of the assistance provided.

Japanese leaders genuinely did not understand why Japanese citizens were taken hostage, since the Japanese Air Force did not participate in the aerial bombing of IS targets carried out by the US-led coalition since August 2014. In an editorial in the Asahi Shimbun newspaper titled "Why the Japanese?", prepared by Shiro Kawamoto, a leading expert on terrorism issues at the Cabinet's "Public Policy Committee", it was clearly stated that "the incident with the Japanese hostages is primarily aimed at drawing the attention of the Japanese public to the question of what position should be taken." take the country's leadership in relation to the actions of ISIL-openly join the countries that are fighting it, or distance yourself from the policy of the United States and its allies, including Russia, in this matter." Kawamoto noted that clarity in this issue depends on whether or not Japanese citizens are taken hostage again [Asahi Shimbun, January 20, 2015].

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The execution of Japanese journalists and its televised demonstration were primarily aimed at the peace-loving Japanese public, the Japanese authorities, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to encourage them to withdraw their support for the anti-ISIS coalition. I must say that the amount of ransom demanded by the IG was comparable to the amount of humanitarian aid that Abe promised to the countries of the Middle East for development, and was not "exorbitant". However, the signal sent in this way to the Japanese authorities did not reach its goal. Immediately after watching the footage of Japanese hostages kneeling in front of terrorists awaiting execution, Abe urgently convened the Cabinet of Ministers and officially announced that "I am very annoyed by what happened, but the Japanese government will never make concessions to terrorists and in turn will continue efforts to stabilize the situation in the region" [Asahi Shimbun, 24.01.2015].

In part, the IS leadership has achieved its goal: the Japanese media began to publish more often materials critical of Abe's policies in the Middle East, reproaching him for refusing to pay a ransom to terrorists and enter into negotiations with the Jordanian authorities on the exchange of Iraqi terrorist Sadzida Mubarak al-Rishawi for Japanese journalist Kenji Goto, which was one of the conditions for his release. releases. Many Japanese desperately urged the Prime Minister not to allow the execution of a Japanese citizen, but Abe remained adamant.

It is appropriate to recall that during the Cold War, the Japanese authorities maintained friendly relations with the leaders of the countries of the Middle East region, which allowed them to quickly negotiate on any aspect of bilateral relations. It is well known, for example, that more than 90% of the total volume of crude oil consumed in Japan came from the Middle East, and 10% from Iran. Therefore, throughout the second half of the XX century. Japan has maintained stable trade and economic ties with Arab oil-producing countries, distancing itself from the Middle East policy of the United States and NATO countries. Japan directly benefited from such a course and effectively separated politics from the economy. At the same time, it remained neutral in its relations with all the players involved in the Middle East conflict. For many Japanese, this area of the world remained an unfamiliar region with an alien religion and traditions.

However, since the end of the Cold War and Tokyo's growing involvement in Washington's globalist agenda, Japan's relations with the Middle East have changed markedly - they have become inconsistent and not always clear. Moreover, Japan, as a strategic ally of the United States, began to experience considerable difficulties in maintaining neutrality in relations with Middle Eastern states, which did not meet the strategic interests of the United States, which is interested in destabilizing the region and organizing various kinds of "orange revolutions". The events of 1973, when the OPEC countries imposed an oil embargo on Japan, sobered Japanese politicians for the first time in the entire post-war period and made them realize that the country strongly depends on stable relations with the countries of the region not only in the economic but also in the political sphere. Therefore, distancing oneself from the United States in the Middle East was in line with Japan's national interests.

Tokyo, as a military and political ally of the United States, recently experienced strong political pressure from Washington, which forced Japan to actively participate in the armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, join the US sanctions against Iran, and fight ISIS in Syria. In all these areas, the hands of the Japanese authorities were always tied, as the government was forced to take into account the negative reaction of the Japanese public, which opposed Tokyo's cooperation with Washington in armed conflicts in the Middle East, participation in which did not meet the national interests of Japan. The Japanese hostage crisis was directly linked to Abe's promise - with Washington's approval - to allocate $ 200 million to countries in the Middle East to fight ISIS.

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In turn, the IS leadership, having executed the Japanese hostages, reminded Tokyo that Japan's ill-conceived policy in the Middle East will force it to pay for providing financial assistance to the enemies of the IS - those forces that are fighting international terrorism.

The Japanese authorities hoped to use the hostage crisis as a strong argument to justify amending the peace Constitution of 1947 to legalize the use of force if necessary. However, the crisis also highlighted the inability of the authorities to protect their citizens.

Organizers of mass anti-government protests that took place after reports of the execution of Japanese journalists were received demanded that Abe reassess his values: he had to understand that foreign policy is becoming more closely linked not only to national security, but also to the protection of every citizen. However, on February 1, 2015, Prime Minister Abe issued a sharp statement, which implied that Japan would not make any concessions to terrorists:

"We will resolutely not tolerate terror," Abe said. The Japanese Government has clearly demonstrated its position by doing everything possible to protect the lives of the country's citizens. At the same time, we will adhere to the fundamental principle adopted by the international community: not to give in to the demands of terrorists and not to negotiate with terrorist organizations. These principles are based on the counter-terrorism policy set out in the final declaration of the summit of the leaders of the seven leading industrialized countries (the G7 Summit) in 1973, as well as in United Nations Security Council resolution No. 1904, adopted on December 17, 2009, concerning the terrorist activities of the leadership of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda."The Qaeda." The principles provide for a complete and categorical refusal to pay ransom to terrorists for hostages" [Resolutions..., 2009].

However, it would be wrong to say that the Japanese Government has always refused to negotiate with international terrorists. Any State can counter terrorism in two ways. One involves using non-violent methods, including negotiating with terrorists, meeting their demands, and paying ransom for captured hostages. But there is another way - the use of force methods and the defeat of terrorist groups by the combined forces of national armies, by launching air attacks on militant bases, using naval forces for the same purposes, etc. A clear example of the effective use of force methods in the fight against the IG in September-December 2015 was demonstrated by the Russian aerospace forces, acting with the consent and at the request of the Syrian leadership. The Russian Aerospace Forces carried out massive air strikes on the bases and headquarters of militants, on transports transporting oil to Turkey.

Traditionally, Japanese authorities have avoided using military force in the fight against terrorists. Even today, they are not ready to do this. The Japanese prefer to limit themselves to soft methods - providing financial assistance to Middle Eastern states that are fighting terrorists by force. In other words, they strive to fight terrorism without too much noise, avoiding direct armed clashes. The country's authorities are aware that any participation of Japan in the power struggle can lead to new attacks on Japanese citizens both in the country and in other states. It is significant that, according to opinion polls conducted by the Levada Center in October 2015, answering the question of what harm can be caused to Russia as a result of participation in the war with the Islamic State in Syria, 41% of Russians surveyed said that the war is spent on funds necessary to solve social problems. Almost the same number (39%) considered the main problem to be the death of Russian servicemen, both during military operations and as a result of terrorist attacks directed against them. Among other threats, respondents identified the danger of getting bogged down in this conflict for a long time and the growing terrorist threat from the IG [Russians were scared..., 2015].

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Unlike the United States and NATO countries involved in the fighting against ISIS, Japan still retains a certain "margin of safety and credibility" among the foreign public as a country capable of pursuing a peaceful foreign policy, which is commonly called a "soft power" policy and which involves achieving the desired results on the basis of mutual agreement between the parties to the conflict. conflict. The Japanese are convinced that such an outcome is in principle impossible in the case of the use of "hard power", which implies forceful coercion of terrorists to disarm or destroy them. Japan, for example, would be willing to play a mediating role in negotiations between the US and the NATO leadership with the leaders of the Islamic State. Tokyo could establish closer contacts with the authorities of Egypt or Iran and encourage them, in turn, to step up efforts to stabilize the situation in the Middle East, while isolating the IS leadership politically. In addition, Japan has a rich experience in conducting humanitarian actions and working with refugees.

Prime Minister Abe made attempts to activate the policy of "soft power" during his mission to the Middle East on January 16-21, 2015, when he paid official visits to Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Abe held a direct dialogue with the leaders of these countries on their possible assistance in freeing the Japanese hostages. At the same time, Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida held talks on the same issue with colleagues from the United States, France and Germany. True, in all official speeches of Japanese leaders, the thesis was voiced that Tokyo would never meet the demands of the IS terrorists. Thus, in a speech in Cairo on January 17, 2015, on Japan's Middle East policy, Abe promised that Tokyo would provide additional financial assistance to the region in the amount of $ 2.5 billion (about 294 billion yen), including $ 200 million for the needs of refugees and displaced persons.

Abe's Cairo speech gave some optimistic observers reason to conclude that Japan could accept the militants ' terms and hand over $ 200 million as a ransom for the lives of Japanese hostages. This, in particular, at a press conference on January 21, 2015, was unequivocally stated by the Secretary General of the Cabinet of Ministers of Japan Yoshihide Suga. His statement came immediately after the IS militants announced a threat to execute the hostages. Then the IG leadership gave Tokyo 72 hours to make a decision.

The reaction of the Japanese authorities was immediate. Suga said, " ISIL's threats to kill two Japanese citizens are inexcusable. We will take all necessary measures to save the lives of these people. We do not exclude that the required amount may be paid for them. Now this option is being worked out." However, the Japanese politician explained that Tokyo will continue to counteract the IS in Syria.: "We will not let terrorism bend us and will continue to work together with the international community to contribute to the fight against this evil" [Asahi Shimbun, January 20, 2015].

According to Suga, he was in touch with Prime Minister Abe, who during the phone conversation stressed (clearly hinting at the possibility of ransom) that " the lives of the country's citizens are above all else. Japan will act based on the fact that human life is a priority " [Asahi Shimbun, January 20, 2015]. However, Abe later, for unknown reasons, changed his "soft" rhetoric to a more belligerent one and demanded that the IS leadership immediately release the Japanese hostages.

After the news of the execution of Kenji Goto on February 1, 2015, Abe was forced to declare that in the context of globalization, Japan cannot effectively counter terrorism alone and that the key to success in this fight is the united actions of the world community. At the same time, he reiterated Tokyo's intentions to provide additional humanitarian aid to Middle Eastern countries and recalled that when Al-Qaeda militants captured a Japanese citizen on October 27, 2004, they threatened to execute him if Tokyo did not withdraw its troops from Iraq within the next two years.

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For example, Japanese officials hinted at the" personal responsibility " of the Japanese hostage-taker [Al-Qaeda militants..., 2004].

On January 29, 2015, it became known from the media that the traditional refusal of the US authorities to make deals with terrorists is being revised due to the increasing number of hostage-taking cases. This was then stated by the official representative of the US President Eric Schultz. However, when commenting on the exchange of American soldier Bowie Bergdahl for several Guantanamo prisoners in 2014, he claimed that the action took place only because the White House considered the Afghan Taliban not terrorists, but armed rebels [Asahi Shimbun, 30.01.2015].

Since no one can rule out a repeat of abductions of Japanese people in the Middle East and other Islamic countries that are readily visited by Japanese tourists, the Japanese Government has urgently begun to develop appropriate preventive measures. First of all, it was decided to expand the staff of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's consular services and strengthen them with professional personnel. Currently, the number of employees of the consular service in the central office of the Ministry is small - only 150 people. In foreign diplomatic missions, there are no more than 450 of them - a number that is clearly insufficient given the increased level of terrorist danger. The harsh reality is that Japanese consulate employees working abroad are themselves constantly threatened with terrorist attacks, kidnappings, and attempts on their lives.

In order to strengthen the fight against international terrorism, the National Security Council was established under the Cabinet of Ministers, whose functions include collecting and analyzing information about upcoming terrorist acts directed against Japanese citizens and the country's national interests. Until recently, information confusion reigned in this area, there was no unified leadership, which caused fair criticism from the Japanese public. On February 1, 2015, during a press conference held after the execution of Kenji Goto, Suga Yoshihide refrained from directly answering the question of whether Japan should be considered to have entered the war on terrorism, emphasizing only the need to "strengthen the implementation of anti-terrorist measures", which is the responsibility of the new state structure.

In order to achieve greater effectiveness in implementing the anti-terrorist policy, the Government of Japan decided to increase the amount of budget allocations for these purposes. In principle, the authorities can always find the means to pay a ransom for Japanese citizens, as European leaders once did. However, in the case of the two Japanese hostages taken by IS, even if Tokyo did meet the terrorists halfway, this would not prevent such cases, but perhaps even contribute to their replication. In addition, having received a blowout, the leadership of the IG could not release the hostages.

Objectively assessing the results of the anti-terrorist activities of the Japanese authorities, we can certainly say that they are not sitting idly by and are trying to make a feasible contribution to solving this global problem. However, Tokyo's involvement in this struggle is very specific. First of all, Tokyo's efforts in this area are clearly insufficient. After all, the country's authorities failed to save the lives of two of their compatriots who were beheaded in February 2015.

It is only natural that the public execution of Japanese citizens has raised the debate in both houses of the Japanese Parliament on the insufficient role of Japan in trying to stabilize the situation in the Middle East and the inability to ensure the safety of Japanese people abroad. However, the actions taken by the Japanese authorities can also be assessed in terms of the benefits that Tokyo receives by joining the international anti-ISIS coalition. In particular, this applies to the adoption of laws that would not be possible to pass through Parliament in the absence of a negative reaction from the Japanese public to terrorist threats from outside.

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Thus, on December 17, 2008, the Parliament adopted the law "On special measures to counter terrorism". Lawmakers from all factions easily agreed to Japan's provision of refueling capabilities through its vessels of US, British, Indian and Pakistani warships that perform surveillance work on possible terrorist movements and drug and weapons shipments.

On January 14, 2015, the Japanese Parliament approved the state budget for fiscal year 2015 in the amount of 96.34 trillion yen (about $ 818 billion), more than 3.4 billion higher than the budget of the previous fiscal year. At the same time, a record 4.98 trillion yen ($41.7 billion) has been allocated for military spending.

At the beginning of July 2014, the government adopted a resolution according to which, for the first time since the end of World War II, the Japanese armed forces were granted the right not only to participate in peacekeeping missions, but also to provide military assistance to allies in the fight against terrorism. The United States, as Japan's main strategic partner, particularly insisted on this. Currently, the Japanese army can be used for the collective defense of allies, even if Japan itself is not under attack [Asahi Shimbun, 15.01.2015]. In turn, in the event of a threat to its security, Japan can count on US military support. In other words, Japan's ruling circles are now profitably using the intensification of international terrorism as a favorable excuse to justify any changes in the country's foreign policy.

Analyzing the tactical mistakes and miscalculations of Shinzo Abe's cabinet in the release of Japanese citizens, it can be noted that he probably should not have promised the leaders of Middle Eastern countries humanitarian aid in the amount of $ 200 million in the fall of 2014. In fact, the IG "caught" Abe at his word - " promised 200 million dollars. in the form of humanitarian aid, pay them for the release of hostages." Critics of Abe's actions in connection with the capture of Japanese citizens accused him of failing to establish a direct dialogue with the IS leadership. However, Abe could not do much in this situation.

The time has passed when Japan's policy towards the Middle East could be considered neutral. Today, Tokyo's actions should be viewed more correctly in the context of the implementation of the geopolitical interests of the United States, which seeks to maintain a state of instability in the region, displace the legitimate leadership of Syria in the person of President Bashar al-Assad and appoint a White House protege to this post.

Judging by the standard statements Abe made after the execution of Japanese journalists, which were a set of general phrases about Tokyo's determination to fight terrorists, his cabinet still does not have a well-thought-out and consistent anti-terrorist strategy. The Japanese authorities only loudly regretted the fate of their compatriots, and Abe never tired of repeating the government's promises to "do everything possible so that this does not happen again." In response to the Japanese Prime Minister's statements, one of the IS fighters noted in a video dated February 1, 2015: "You, like your allies, must understand one simple thing - we are thirsting for your blood" [The Diplomat, 06.02.2015].

The failure of the Japanese authorities ' efforts to free the hostages prompted the Japanese public in early 2015 to urge Prime Minister Abe not to waste time on foreign trips, but to focus on solving security issues [Ibid., 05.02.2015]. Many Japanese politicians have realized the importance of cooperation in the fight against terrorism between individual countries and regional and international organizations - the UN, OSCE, EU, NATO, CSTO, SCO, etc. [Markin and Rogovaya, 2012, pp. 114-119].

An illustration of the failure of the authorities to take preventive measures was the symbolic explosion on November 23, 2015 at the south gate of the Yasukuni Shrine Complex in central Tokyo. Fragments of a homemade bomb were found at the scene.,

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traces of explosives and battery residue. No one was injured in the incident, but the police considered it a terrorist act, especially since the Yasukuni Shrine represents in the minds of Japanese people the souls of soldiers who died for the emperor, including Japanese war criminals executed after World War II. In China and both Koreas, this temple is considered the spiritual center of Japanese militarism and nationalism.

A new type of international terrorism, the devastating consequences of which are still difficult to fully assess, are cyber attacks on state institutions of the country, which the Japanese authorities accused hackers from China, Russia and North Korea [White Paper...]. As a result, Japan's virtual space has become the "fifth theater" of military operations after land, air, sea and sea. outer space.

The rise of international terrorism and the aggravation of the military-political situation in the world prompted the Japanese government in 2013 to start reviewing the main directions of the national defense program. Time will tell how effective these measures will be.

list of literature

Alekseev O. N. International terrorism and the fight against it in the largest states of the Pacific region. Diss. cand. ist. sciences'. Vladivostok, 2013.

Alekseev O. N. Extremism in Japan as a socio-political problem// Theory and practice of social development. Issue 5. Vladivostok, 2012.

Japan Self-Defense White Paper 2013 // http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2014-04-18/1_japan.html.

Al-Qaeda militants took a Japanese citizen hostage // http://www.rosbalt.ru/main/2004/10/27/182904.html.

Markin V. V. Rogovaya A.V. Counteraction to the spread of the ideology of extremism and terrorism in the youth environment. N 12, 2012.

Russians were spooked by military spending and possible casualties in Syria // http://www.rbc.ru/politics/29/10/2015/5630c3179a79470038fbb0ef.

Rotaenko N. G. Ekstremizm s nationalizmom v politicheskoi zhizni Jap'i [Extremism and nationalism in the political life of Japan]. Almanac. Issue 5. Vladivostok, 2004.

UN Security Council Resolutions 2009 // http://www.un.org/ru/sc/documcnts/resolutions/2009.shtml.

Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo).

Chikhi L., Bate F. Sahara Islamists take hostages spreading Mali war // http://ncws.tgfmonline.com/?p=21647 (дата обращения: January 16, 2013).

The Diplomat (Tokyo).

The Japan Times (Tokyo).

Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo).

REFERENCES

Alekseev O.H. Megdunarodniy terrorizm i bor'ba s nim krupneishih gocudarstv Tihookeanskogo regiona. PhD Thesis. Vladivostok, 2013.

Alekseev O.H. Ekstremizm v Yaponii kak obtshestvenno-politicheskaia problema // Teoria i praktika obshestvennogo razvitia. Vol. 5. Vladivostok, 2012.

Belaya kniga po samooborone Yaponii 2013 // http://nvo.ng.ru/conccpts/2014-04-18/1_japan.html.

Boeviki "Al-Kaidi" zahvatili v zalojniki grajdanina Yaponii // http://www.rosbalt.ru/main/2004/10/27/182904. html.

Markin V.V., Rogovaia A.V. Protivodeistvie rasprostraneniu ideologii ekstremizma i terrorizma v molodejnoy srede // Vlast'. N 12, 2012.

Rossiyan napugali voennie rashodi i vozmognie jertvi v Sirii // http://www.rbc.ru/politics/29/10/2015/5630c3179a79470038fbb0cf.

Rotaenko N.G. Ekstremizm s natsionalizmom v politicheskoy jizni Yaponii // Molodoy mejdunarodnik. Al'manah. Vol. 5. Vladivostok, 2004.

Rezolutcii Soveta Bezopasnosti ООН 2009 // http://www.un.org/ru/sc/documents/resolutions/2009.shtml.

Chikhi L., Bate F. Sahara Islamists take hostages spreading Mali war // http://news.tgfrnonline.com/?p=21647 (Accessed on January 16, 2013).

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