40 years have passed since the end of World War II. The collapse of Japanese militarism in 1945 as a result of the rapid actions of the Soviet Armed Forces, which defeated a select group of troops of imperialist Japan in Manchuria, meant the beginning of a new stage in the life of this country. The state-political system of Japanese monarcho-fascism, which was based on militarism and its accompanying reactionary institutions, was shaken to its foundations. The ideological and political concepts spread by the ruling class before the war about the "special" features of the Japanese national state system and Japan's "chosen mission" in the world turned out to be completely untenable. The entire system of moral and ethical values that served Japanese monopoly capital as a justification for its aggressive policy against Asian countries for decades has gone bankrupt.
At the request of the world and Japanese progressive public, the occupation authorities in the first post-war years carried out a number of reforms that significantly changed the political structure of Japan and brought to life positive processes in social life. The dissolution of the pre-war monopoly associations (zaibatsu), land reform, the adoption of a new constitution that limited the power of the emperor and proclaimed the sovereign power of the people, the rejection of war as a means of resolving international disputes and creating armed forces, the democratization of the school system, various labor laws-these and other measures became integral elements of the social development process, which took over the country in the post-war period.
The changes observed in Japan at that time were inconsistent and contradictory. Political and social reforms were a reaction of the ruling circles to the growth of the workers ' and democratic movement and were aimed at stopping the growing wave of popular revolution through administrative measures implemented from above. They were carried out within the framework of the bourgeois system and were ultimately aimed at preserving and strengthening capitalist relations by eliminating the feudal remnants that dominated the Japanese people during the reign of monarcho - fascism.
A special role in determining the nature of the internal political process in Japan was played by the American occupation army, through which the monopolistic capital of the United States carried out its policy towards this country. The American monopolies, in the name of class interests, were particularly interested in strengthening the bourgeoisie in Japan.-
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social relations, the existence of which was threatened as a result of the defeat of militaristic forces and the growth of mass democratic movements. With the rise of anti-communist aspirations in the politics of the US ruling circles and the increasing role of Japan in the American plans to gain world domination, the nature of the occupation policy began to change. With the onset of the Cold War, it took on the character of a political course aimed at eliminating the proclaimed civil liberties, limiting and canceling democratic reforms.
But while recognizing the historical limitations of the political and social transformations carried out in the country, it is impossible not to see their positive significance for the fate of Japanese society. It is necessary to emphasize their fruitful influence on the development of mass democratic organizations, on the growth of the workers ' and communist movement, which for the first time in the history of the country were able to develop work among the masses, resorting to legal methods, within the framework of bourgeois democracy. The reforms contributed to the political awakening of Japanese workers, especially the working class, and created more favorable conditions for their liberation struggle.
Until 1945, Japan was dominated by militarism, which permeated the entire state-political structure of society, its ideology, and culture. The Japanese military unleashed one after another aggressive wars against the peoples of Asia and, being an ally of Hitler's Germany, prepared an attack on the Soviet Union. The adoption of the new Constitution of Japan in 1947 significantly changed the situation. The law proclaimed the refusal of Japan "for all time from war as a sovereign right of the nation, as well as from the threat .or the use of armed force as a means of settling international disputes " 1 . According to the Constitution, in Japan, it was forbidden to create any armed forces in the future and the right to wage wars was completely denied to the state. The inclusion of these provisions in the basic law of the State meant condemning the militaristic past of imperialist Japan. At the same time, they created a real political and legal basis for the country's development along a peaceful, democratic path. For almost 40 years, the country's democratic forces have been relying on the anti-war articles of the Japanese Constitution in their struggle for peace.
Meanwhile, the ideological and political life of Japan is increasingly showing a tendency to distort the socio-political content of the post-war transformations, to reduce or even suspend their impact on social development. The general trend of political and ideological processes in Japan shows that the Japanese monopoly bourgeoisie is no longer satisfied with the existence of bourgeois - democratic institutions introduced in the recent past. Linked to the American monopolies by the unity of strategic goals, it is increasingly striving to turn Japan into a "great military power", to revive the ideas of revanchism and militarism, and on this basis to force the country's rearmament.
At present, in the bourgeois scientific circles of Japan, which cooperate with the government in developing an ideological course, there is a whole trend that is increasingly openly proclaiming conservatism as its ideological and political platform. Modern Japanese conservatism is far from an unambiguous phenomenon, as it seems to me.
1 Constitution of the States of South-East Asia and the Pacific, Moscow, 1960, p. 715.
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the degree of manifestation of conservative ideological concepts in it, as well as the nature of the methodology used by the authors of historical, political and sociological research. But with all this, it has some common features that are more or less evident in the views of its representatives. This is the nationalist rejection of the democratic aspects of the political process that developed in Japan under the influence of post-war transformations, the rejection of democratic reforms that are considered to be" imposed " on Japan from the outside, as a result of military defeat, and the opposition of traditional political institutions to them. Such an attitude to the political realities of Japan today in the views of reactionary representatives of the neoconservative current results in the preaching of militarism, which inevitably leads to an increase in political reaction.
The social process, which means the strengthening of conservative tendencies in the bourgeois scientific circles of Japan, is based on the political and ideological realities of public life in Japan. Due to its class content and the purposeful political activity of the ruling elite, which is not interested in the existence of genuine democratic freedoms in the country and in every possible way hinders the process of democratization, bourgeois political institutions in Japan are now experiencing a deep crisis. During the years of occupation, the American army acted as a force that took the path of violating the proclaimed democratic principles. The period of its undivided rule in the country was marked by a series of anti-democratic measures and actions aimed at infringing civil liberties. These included, in particular, the drastic restrictions on the right to strike that were implemented in the late 1940s, up to the point of depriving certain groups of workers of this right, various kinds of "purges", bans on professions, etc. One of the reactionary actions of the occupation authorities was the adoption, contrary to the peaceful constitution, of a course aimed at the revival of Japanese militarism, the early release and involvement in active socio-political activities of many war criminals.
After the end of the occupation period in 1952, the Japanese Government began to pursue a policy of violating democratic freedoms with particular zeal. It strengthened reactionary legislation, which often negated the positive effects of post-war transformations, and began to apply more and more repressive measures against progressive movements. The activity of militaristic forces intensified in the country, and rearmament began to be carried out on an ever-increasing scale. In other words, the course was taken to abandon the anti-war provisions of the constitution.
One of the most striking indicators of the degeneration of the political structure of the Japanese bourgeois state is the collapse of parliamentary politics in Japan. As a result of the introduction of a special electoral system that does not reflect the true alignment of class forces and ideological and political aspirations of voters, the Liberal Democratic Party has remained at the helm of state power for several decades. Torn apart by factional struggles, it forms governments based on the interests of internal party groups. Government circles are caught up in corruption, and the party is run by figures caught taking unprecedented bribes and convicted by the courts. As the role of elected bodies, including the Parliament, declines, the role of the executive branch increases. This division of roles at the highest level of the political structure, which puts the bureaucracy beyond the control of the outside
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it further undermines the principles of bourgeois parliamentarism2 .
In the context of the decline of the political mores and customs of the ruling elite, in the context of increasing competition in the sphere of capitalist entrepreneurship with the inherent violations of the norms of public morality, the ruling class has taken a course to indoctrinate the population in a direction that is favorable for itself. In particular, the idea that the source of negative phenomena in the political life of modern Japan lies in the very nature of post-war transformations is strongly held. Bourgeois theorists began to argue that, being a product of the political culture of the West, these transformations contradict national institutions and cannot be implemented in the political practice of Japanese society. A slogan was put forward calling for "a return to Japanese traditions" in the sphere of political life. It became the ideological basis of Japanese neoconservatism. The neoconservative trend that developed in bourgeois scientific and political circles at the turn of the 70s and 80s is now beginning to have an increasingly noticeable impact on bourgeois public consciousness.
Attempts are being made to completely separate the post-war history of Japan from the pre-war one, and to contrast the post-war period nihilistically with the entire centuries-old history of the Japanese people as supposedly alien to it and meaning almost the end of the existence of the Japanese nation itself. It is in this false-dramatic way that the modern stage is characterized by the social scientist and historian Morita Akio, who acts, in essence, as a herald of the nationalist ideology of "neo-Japanese", longing for the "good old" past. Morita claims that "the defeat of the war ended Japan's two-thousand-year history." 3 He explains the achievements of the Japanese people in all areas of life in the post-war period only by the fact that Japan was " led by people who inherited Japanese traditions." This theorist complains that when the old generation "disappears from the scene "and most of the Japanese nation is made up of people" who do not know two thousand years of traditions", there will be an" extremely acute problem " in the management of the state.
Naturally, in modern Japan, the importance of traditions generated in the past by the socio-political system of exploitative society with all its inherent "national" attributes of state power has weakened. As for the traditions that have filled the life of the working people of Japan throughout its centuries-old history, they continue to live on and will be strengthened and developed as the country's social renewal progresses.
Some bourgeois social scientists, on the contrary, deny that a new stage in the country's history has begun after 1945 and insist on the "continuity" of the line of development of pre-war and post-war Japan.
2 In Japan, the political science field has now developed a trend whose representatives have devoted themselves to analyzing the state and prospects of parliamentary politics in the country. Adhering to liberal-bourgeois views, they are far from correctly understanding the true driving forces of the political life of modern Japan. But their analysis of the political structure, especially the electoral system, the activities of the ruling party, and the characteristic features of the electorate's behavior, helps to recreate the depressing picture of political mores and customs rooted in the LDP (see Shiratori Ray (ed.). Picture of political parties in Japan. Tokyo. 1980. (in English); Split-based governance. Tokyo. 1983 (in Japanese); Uchida Kenzo. Success and limits of Nakasone's acting skills. - Chuo Koron, 1985, N 1 (in English); et al.).
3 Matsushita Konosuke, Morita Akio. What should Japan re-evaluate now? Tokyo. 1977, p. 44 (in Russian).
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Defending the concept of "continuity" of Japan's historical development, Ishida Takeshi, in particular, argues that " the changes observed after the war did not arise suddenly, but were a continuation of the process of change, which, albeit in a hidden form, developed to a certain extent in the pre-war years." Isis sees the significance of the post-war reforms in the fact that they were "a driving force that contributed to the disclosure of pre-war trends," nothing more.
Ishida is a proponent of structural and functional analysis. Together with the socio-psychological method, this method is the basis of his scientific and theoretical position. This predetermined the purely formal attitude of the Japanese researcher to the assessment of the social role and social content of post-war democratic reforms. Thus, he sees the reason for the growth of mass organizations in the post-war period not in social and class shifts and the desire for political renewal, but in the traditions laid down in the pre-war years by the "Tron Aid Association", which, in his words, "completely dominated the life of the people"4 .
In the works of some conservative authors, it is argued that even in pre-war Japan, a course towards "renovationist democracy" was being implemented, which allegedly led to bourgeois-democratic transformations in the post-war period. At the same time, the genealogical line of such "renovationist democracy", along with the "Tron Aid Association", includes the so - called control group-"toseikha" from among the military and the current "renovationist" bureaucracy "Kakushin kanre", which arose in the circles of high officials in the 30s.
Organizations characterized by some historians as institutions of "renovationist democracy" served to strengthen the monarcho-fascist structure and were designed to create the appearance of a mass base for the military - bureaucratic regime. This is clearly demonstrated by the nature of their activities on the eve and during the Second World War. Being integral elements of the so-called new political structure that became the basis of the monarcho-fascist regime that emerged in Japan on the eve of the war, they were formed to replace the dissolved political parties and public organizations.
The basis of the "new political structure", according to the plans of the ruling elite, was to be a "new party", which was a corporate organization based on the principle of "leadership". Its task was to unite disparate political forces around the imperial throne and unite all segments of the population in a single movement for "service to the fatherland". In 1940, the central body for the leadership of this movement was created, which was later reorganized into the association. The Association functioned under the leadership of the military district. A similar role was played by the" societies for service to the fatherland", with the creation of which the ruling class pinned its hopes for establishing cooperation between labor and capital, for the ideological mobilization of workers in the interests of preparing for war.
The toseikha and Kakushin Kanre groups had nothing to do with democracy. Both represented the interests of those circles of the Japanese military and the Japanese bureaucracy that tried to insist on a partial restriction of the absolutist regime and, to this end, hatched plans to push back from power the "imperial way group" - "kodoha", which consisted of fanatical supporters of the policy of fully strengthening the absolutist regime. In the end, the toseikha group, as well as the Kodoha group, achieved nothing limited
4 Ishida Takeshi. Organization and symbol of modern politics. Tokyo. 1978, p. 117 (in Russian).
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As a result of the dominance of the military in the state, its activities were aimed at strengthening the role and influence of the army. During the internecine struggle between army groups, the Toseikha leadership, supported by major government officials, managed to strengthen the position of the generals in the armed forces and raise the political role of the military in the country. The "control Group" took part in the development of all the laws of wartime, and above all the "law on the general mobilization of the nation", based on which the ruling elite carried out preparations for war.
The ideological and political current of "Kakushin kanre" consisted mainly of representatives of the financial and industrial circles, the highest bureaucracy, and the bureaucracy. This group within the ruling elite of Japan, in contrast to the fanatically minded representatives of the military, sought to develop a political course that more closely corresponded to the real possibilities of Japanese capitalism. At the first stage, it tried to oppose its program to the military circles. However, its ultimate goals remained the same as those of the entire ruling camp. On the eve and during the war, the Kakushin Kanre group completely exhausted itself, merging with the main current of the ruling elite, which consisted of fanatical supporters of the policy of strengthening the monarchical power in every possible way.
The idea that the process of democratization of the country allegedly originated and matured in the bowels of the political structure of pre-war Japan is particularly insistent, trying to carry out bourgeois social scientists, whose ideological activity began in the 30s, during the growth and establishment of Japanese fascism. One of the former ideologues of the absolutist regime, Koyama Iwao, for example, argues that " the democratization of Japan is the path that Japan has gradually moved along since the Meiji Revolution." Koyama reproaches the progressive Japanese intelligentsia for accepting the post-war transformation "very easily", believing that " Japan was on the path of democratic governance at the same time as the defeat in the war." Denying the historical significance of the post-war transformations, he argues: "Democratic governance is just an abstract concept, devoid of state affiliation, historical principles and national features." Koyama contrasts the socio-political alternative to the monarcho - fascist regime embodied in post-war reforms with traditional, "national" democracy, "created and tested in the crucible of Japanese history" and "having a unique, impermeable personality." 5
The Meiji bourgeois Revolution (1867), which opened up the path of capitalist development for Japan, did not eliminate all feudal remnants in the country. The Japanese capitalism entangled in them developed into an imperialist stage and took the form of "military-feudal imperialism". Established at the end of the 19th century, the Parliament had no real rights. The right to vote was severely curtailed. The bourgeois political parties in Japan were weak and constantly dependent on the imperial bureaucracy.
In the 1920s, the authorities decided to expand the right to vote somewhat, but this measure did not change the essence of the military-bureaucratic system. The buildup of military-bureaucratic tendencies in the state - political system was accompanied by rampant reaction, increased police oppression, and incessant repression of mass workers ' movements. These are some features of politi-
5 Koyama Iwao. The soul of the Japanese people. Cultural and typological analysis. Tokyo. 1972, pp. 3-4 (in Russian).
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the political structure of Japan, which some bourgeois theorists try to pass off as manifestations of "national democracy".
As for the transformations after 1945, they were not a continuation, but a negation of the political realities that these authors characterize as an expression of" renovationist","national democracy". The main condition for carrying out these transformations lies in the fundamental features of the Second World War, which, thanks to the participation of the Soviet Union and other progressive forces, had an anti-fascist, liberation character, as well as in the broad liberation movement of the Japanese people, who, after the defeat of Japanese militarism in the war, put forward demands for democratic reforms.
Publicist Kawakami Gent-aro and social activist Matsushita Konosuke, known for their reactionary views, denounced the post-war reforms .6 Kawakami is dissatisfied with the broad scope of the democratic struggle of Japanese workers that broke out in Japan in the post-war years. He would like to direct the process of socio-political development and the activities of mass progressive organizations in a direction that would allow the ruling class to preserve to a greater extent the influence of reactionary ideology dating back to the past. It is through the prism of this attitude to the political and ideological processes of recent decades that Kawakami's statement that Japan "has not sufficiently demonstrated the positive aspects inherent in democracy" and that the masses in it "have shown a tendency to act wilfully"7 should be interpreted .
The resolute statements of the representatives of the advanced public in defense of their rights, which they describe as "self-willed actions", indicate that on the basis of post-war reforms, Japanese workers sought to further deepen the process of social renewal, so that it went beyond the formal bourgeois democracy. As for the mention of the" positive aspects "inherent in democracy" initially", which allegedly did not manifest themselves in Japan, it is not difficult to guess what the author means in this case: "positive" in his eyes would be such forms of political activity that would not undermine the dominance of monopolies, but would promote strengthening it.
Matsushita Konosuke unsuccessfully tries to deny the positive aspects of the system of parliamentarism introduced in the country in the post-war years, compared with the previous monarchical system. Under the conditions of post-war Japan, the parliament, due to the reform of the electoral system, began to play a positive role. It has been used and continues to be used by opposition forces as a platform for defending the rights of the working masses, criticizing the Government for anti-popular actions, for attempts to impose reactionary legislation. Especially important are the speeches made in Parliament by representatives of the Communist and Socialist Parties of Japan, who repeatedly thwarted the attempts of the ruling class to pass this or that reactionary bill.
The hatred of the ideologues of the reaction to the process of social renewal of the country is so great that the idea that any progressive changes are incompatible with the pre-war political tradition in Japan is deeply rooted in their minds. Their protest against the legislation implemented in the post-war years is sometimes open-
6 Kawakami Gent-aro. Is there a policy in Japan? Tokyo. 1979 (in Japanese); Matsushita Konosuke, Morita Akio. Uk. op.
7 Cit. by Uchiyama Hideo. Post-war democracy as an incomplete revolution. - Sekai, 1980, N 6.
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this translates into a call for the forcible abolition of all innovations implemented during that period. The reactionary historian and publicist Tanaka Masaaki, for example, calls for "pulling out the bad roots" of post-war policies in order to restore a "healthy Japan" and eliminate the" corrupting influence " of democratic ideas on modern Japanese youth .8
In recent years, reactionary views on the essence of the State have become widespread. The political concepts of Japanese bourgeois social scientists reflect the complex ideological and socio-economic processes that developed in Japan in the post-war decades.
On the eve and during the Second World War, the ruling elite of Japan managed to establish a totalitarian system of fascist-style state government. "The state of supreme defense", "one hundred million - one heart", "general mobilization of the nation" - these and other ultra-nationalist slogans of the period of preparation and unleashing of aggression expressed the ideological credo and socio-political content of the Japanese monarcho-fascist structure, which subordinated the life of each individual to the interests of imperialist circles. The state itself was seen as an entity that expressed the interests of the entire nation, and its cult was brought to a size that excluded any possibility of protest against the rule of the military and bureaucracy. Reactionary ideologues, following German historians like L. Ranke, deified state power as given from above.
The defeat of Japanese imperialism in the war undermined such concepts and attitudes. The transformation of the post-war period in the eyes of the general population contributed to the decline of the authority of the bourgeois state. The new constitution significantly weakened the attempts of the ruling class to ideologically justify the course of maintaining a reactionary system of state power in the country, which it tried to oppose to the ongoing reforms.
In the 1960s, due to rapid economic growth, the process of merging monopolistic capital with the state apparatus intensified, and the practice of state regulation of capitalist entrepreneurship expanded. The State power has once again openly acted as a force hostile to the interests of the working people. Criticism was directed at the state, caused by the inevitable aggravation of social problems in the context of an economic boom. The economic crisis of the mid-70s and the difficulties it caused contributed to a further decline in the authority of the state in the eyes of workers. Such an ideological situation could not meet the interests of monopolistic capital. From the ideologues of the ruling circles, new efforts were required to exalt the idea of Japanese statehood.
Identifying the state and the nation, representatives of conservative circles launched a broad campaign, trying to prove that the ideas of democracy and peace, which became widespread in the country in the post-war years and seriously undermined the position of militaristic forces, allegedly contributed to the "disintegration of the Japanese nation."
The post-war history of Japan is full of examples of mass actions of workers in defense of the won democratic freedoms, for compliance with constitutional norms and increasing the role of elected bodies in the country's governance. All this does not suit those circles that are trying to revive reactionary concepts of the state. Their goal is to justify the course of militarization of the country, to sum up the ideological and theoretical basis
8 Tanaka Masaaki. Japan is not to blame. Tokyo. 1973, p. 48 (in Russian).
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under the efforts of the ruling class to expand the punitive functions of state power. For example, the publicist and historian Shimizu Ikutaro, known for his extremely conservative views, stands for strengthening the "authority of the state" .9 Another conservative author, Shimizu Hayano, denounces the participants of mass progressive movements that demanded a consistent democratization of the state system, reproaches them for "not taking care" of "their state". In essence, he advocates the introduction of an undisguised bourgeois dictatorship in the country, unwilling to accept the fact that thanks to the ideological activity of progressive circles exposing the reactionary role of state power in the history of Japan, the idea of the "greatness" of bourgeois state institutions has weakened among the Japanese population, and a critical attitude towards the bourgeois idea of a "national state"has appeared.
In unison with the point of view of Shimizu Hayano, the concept of "national defense", put forward by the historian and sociologist Kurusu Hiromi, sounds. Kurusu insists on strengthening centralized state power in every possible way, which is considered as the main tool of "self-defense". Under his concept of the state, he tries to put a pseudo-theoretical basis, proclaiming views that are very similar to social Darwinism. "Self-defense," Kurusu argues, is a" necessary function " of the State. The basis of being is supposedly the struggle of living beings against attack from "their own kind", the instinct of" self-defense " supposedly guides all human behavior. Such reasoning is seen as an attempt to undermine confidence in the anti-war provisions of the Japanese constitution.
The bourgeois state, like the entire political system under capitalism, is an instrument for protecting the interests of the ruling class. Kurusu takes a different point of view: he sees bourgeois institutions as structural units whose function is to implement the idea of "self-defense" of people. 11 Similar thoughts can be found in the works of other Japanese authors who complain about the "crisis of the idea of the national state" in the post-war period. They do not stop at denouncing those healthy forces of the Japanese nation who, from the standpoint of genuine patriotism, reject the idea of the unity of the interests of the nation and the bourgeois state, reproaching them with being "deaf and dumb" in relation to the state, not realizing their national identity and "indifferent" to the very idea of the nation 12 .
Some bourgeois social scientists have suggested a special role for the elite bureaucracy in post-war Japan. They write about the crucial role of the bureaucracy in ensuring the life of the Japanese state, associate it with the rapid economic development of the country, while ignoring the importance of those political institutions, including the parliament and local authorities, which were repeatedly used by progressive forces to limit the arbitrariness of the authorities. Japan's "functioning elite" is defended, for example, by Sakakibara Eishi, who effectively negates the importance of positive socio-political transformations in the country13 . Openly elitist views are preached by Kakizawa Koji, a proponent of a "rigid" bureaucratic system that also captures the scope of political decisions.
9 Shimizu Ikutaro. Japan, become a state! Tokyo. 1981, p. 18 (in Russian).
10 Shimizu Hayano. Why there are refugees. Bungei shunju, 1980, N 2, p. 45.
11 Kurusu Hiromi. Fake Japanese people. Tokyo. 1978 (in English).
12 Japanese awareness of Japan. Tokyo. 1979, p. 125 (in Russian).
13 Sakakibara Eishi. The image of a new bureaucracy running Japan. Tokyo. 1980 (in English).
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parties. In one of his works, Kakizawa writes:: "In a society where there is a pluralistic view of values, we need people who can support them. Who can take on such a responsible role? Some of the functions of its implementation fall on political figures. However, in society as a whole, including political parties, I believe that leadership positions belong to the elite."14
The need to strengthen the role of the bureaucratic elite in all spheres of public life in Japan is particularly strongly defended by the reactionary sociologist Kakuma Takashi. He justifies a certain regularity of the existence of a leading core in bourgeois society, the inevitability of the creation of elite groups, through the functioning of which ideological, political and economic institutions and traditions are supposedly preserved. Kakuma denounces bourgeois democracy as a principle of behavior and the basis of ideological and political orientation, stating that its supporters tend to support the "anti-social tendency" to avoid responsibility for the fate of the bourgeois state. While extolling the role of the financial industrial bureaucracy in modern Japan, Kakuma suggests that it "bears the burden of leading the masses." 15 He justifies the elite system of domination of Japanese monopolistic capital, tries to prove the regularity of the existence of the structure of entrepreneurial organizations that gives specific features to Japanese capitalism. Moreover, Kakuma links the fate of the Japanese state and the entire Japanese people to its functioning, claiming that the bureaucratic elite is the "successor" and "follower" of the entire Japanese civilization.
In the concept of state priorities, which Kakuma defends, the financial and industrial circles-the presidents and directors of the largest Japanese banks, industrial and trading companies - act as the" leading elite". Ignoring the existence of an electoral system in Japan, as well as political parties that actually protect the interests of the broad working masses, he tries to convey the idea that it is the commercial and industrial elite that exercises "popular representation". Kakuma is so caught up in the idea of the chosen role of the bureaucracy that he does not stop at claiming that only its existence will help the Japanese "survive" 16 .
The authors of concepts that defend elitist ideas or prove the predominance of executive power, as a rule, proceed from the opposition of political parties to the state apparatus, while the main object of their attacks are progressive parties that express the interests of the working class and all working people. Defending the position of the bureaucracy, the commercial and industrial elite, which is closely associated with monopolistic capital, right-wing ideologues like Kakuma advocate a political system that fully serves the interests of monopolies. Elitist theories ignore the broad masses of the people as the driving force of history, and deny the contribution that the Japanese people have made to the reconstruction and development of the war-torn national economy.
Attempts to galvanize the cult of the tenno Emperor occupy an important place in the arsenal of means designed, according to the plans of reactionary ideologists, to establish the idea of the greatness of the Japanese bourgeois state. The conservative camp wants to let down the ideology of Tennoism
14 Cit. by Uchiyama Hideo. Uk. soch., p. 30.
15 Kakuma Takashi. The ruling class of Japan. Tokyo. 1981, (in English).
16 Ibid., p. 300.
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under the foundation of the entire state system, as it was in Japan during the years of absolutist rule. The thesis that the views, mores, and customs associated with the emperor are "values" of institutional significance is being propagated. Ideological structures that do not include the idea of the emperor are declared "anti-values", which allegedly have destructive properties.
The ruling class attempts to create a comprehensive system of organization and subordination of the population based on the cult of the emperor. In the pre-war years, the imperial constitution, militaristic propaganda, and the Shinto religion were used for this purpose, the task of which was to foster loyalty to the emperor and the imperial state. Holidays dedicated to the imperial family were introduced, and temples were built to glorify the emperor. As a result of post-war transformations, the myth of the divine origin of the Japanese emperor was dispelled, but his cult remained. The old system of honoring the emperor "still holds us very deeply," one study notes .17 It points out the contradictory reflection of modern social relations in the minds of Japanese people. The mainstay of Tennoist ideology, in particular, is the conservative psychology of the traditional Japanese community supported by the ruling class, which feeds the concept of the identity of bourgeois society and the family.
Shinto-based rites of worship for the imperial family are being revived, and temples and other places of worship dedicated to the Emperor are being restored. Despite the separation of Shinto from the state, Shinto organizations enjoy the constant support of the authorities - they are interested in reviving religious beliefs, which form the basis of a bureaucratic system riddled with theocratic tendencies. The ruling class, following the example of the pre-war years, is increasingly using the public education system to establish ideological attitudes that have absorbed the ideas of Tennoism as the ideological basis of the Japanese state. The so - called moral education, which aims to train the younger generation in the spirit of reverence for the emperor and veneration of relics symbolizing state power, is again being introduced into it.
Not limited to influencing the sphere of everyday consciousness, which is particularly influenced by traditional ideology, the ruling elite plans to revise the current constitution in order to restore the status of the emperor. It is assumed that it will be elevated to the level of the head of state, whereas now it is just a "symbol" of Japanese statehood.
Attempts are made to provide a theoretical basis for the thesis about the need to revive the cult of the emperor. The reactionary historian Kuroki Yatio, for example, openly advocates its restoration from the standpoint of nihongaku teachings that are close to Shinto theology .18 Idealist philosopher Yuasa Yasuo tries to convey the idea that the institution of imperial power is a necessary attribute of Japanese national culture. 19 He attributes the rise of the role of the emperor to the establishment of Japanese statehood in the ancient era and the reorganization of the state structure in the country as a result of the Meiji Revolution. The latter, according to him, was carried out under the slogan of restoring ancient political forms and ideological institutions. This facilitated the layering of the ancient image of the imperial system on the idea of the essence of imperial power, adding-
17 Japanese awareness of Japan, p. 70.
18 Kuroki Yatio. Japanese studies and the World Revolution. Tokyo. 1973 (in English).
19 Yuasa Yasuo. The spiritual world of the ancient Japanese. Tokyo. 1981 (in English).
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those who were born in the new age. Yuasa tries to find a "rational" basis for the cult of the emperor in Japan. He writes that with the secularization of philosophical and socio-political thought in Japan, which at first was directly related to Buddhism and Shintoism, the demand for an "earthly ideal" arose. As such, the emperor acted. The concept of Uas thus justifies the cult of the emperor and provides a historical basis for it. However, it does not reveal the social and class role and place that the emperor occupied in the system of means of political and ideological influence within the feudal and later bourgeois state.
According to Japanese social scientists, as a result of the ideological activity of government circles and reactionary professors to revive the cult of the emperor in Japan in recent years, new trends have emerged in the attitude of mass consciousness towards the state. The state is often seen as a symbolic system, with the emperor in the center and the government in the background. Therefore, the state is considered a more "sacred" entity than the government, and it is seen as the center of all "Japanese" 20 . As the difficulties and contradictions in the practice of monopolistic capital and the government protecting its interests get worse, the idea of the" holy state " is strengthened; its supporters, blaming the crisis phenomena in the political course on government circles, defend the authority of the state headed by the emperor as an institution supposedly insured against any mistakes, as a symbol of everything "modern"."and " beautiful". This is how the ideologists of monopolistic circles strive to awaken faith in the infallibility of the bourgeois state, which relies on the authority of the emperor, and to establish his ideal image in the mass consciousness.
The idea of a nation-state with a totalitarian form of government, spread by the ruling circles, is transformed in the works of reactionary social scientists into a nationalist ideology, and becomes a source of militaristic and expansionist views. They find their way out in the theoretical studies of those representatives of bourgeois scientific circles who justify the growth of militarism in the country and the external expansion of Japanese monopolistic capital with their concepts of the essence of the bourgeois state as a supra-class entity protecting supposedly national interests. Some authors try to provide a rational basis for militarism and nationalism, as if justifying it with the idea of protecting state interests.
This is what the conservative historian Eto Jun, one of the ideologues of nationalist circles, says, in particular. It is Jun who is trying to convince Japanese public opinion that in 1945 "only the army and navy accepted unconditional surrender, not the Japanese state" and that the post-war democratic changes in the country allegedly do not follow from the terms of surrender. 21 There is no need to prove the complete baselessness of the statement of Eto Jun, who, in his desire to whitewash the forces responsible for unleashing World War II and revive the idea of a militaristic state, goes to the direct distortion of historical facts related to the end of hostilities in the Far East. The nature of Japan's internal political development was clearly defined by all the fundamental documents of the final stage of the war, in which the will of the peoples of the anti-Hitler war was expressed in a concentrated form.
20 Cm. Uchiyama Hideo. Uk. soch., p. 34.
21 This is Jun. Another post-war story. Tokyo. 1978, p. 475 (in Russian).
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However, they also reflected the aspirations of the Japanese people themselves, who insisted on a radical breakdown of the country's social system.
Along with Eto Jun, the representative of the extremely reactionary trend in Japanese bourgeois social studies is the aforementioned Shimizu Ikutaro , one of the most active proponents of the reactionary idea of "national revival". He calls for a "return to the right path" in determining the place of the bourgeois state, and considers" anachronistic " views that affirm the principle of democratic social relations and deny the class role of State power. Shimizu is one of the authors of the militaristic concept of the essence of state sovereignty. He considers the presence of powerful armed forces to be its main condition. Shimizu advocates that the Japanese population should be constantly educated in the spirit of readiness to participate in the" total defense "of their country and the" defense plans "of the Japanese government based on the" patriotic spirit", meaning" cooperation "and" mutual assistance " within the bourgeois state .22
Standing in the position of militant anti-Sovietism, Shimizu rants about the "Soviet military threat" allegedly hanging over the Japanese islands. Not satisfied with the scope and scope of the Japanese-American military-political alliance, he intimidates the Japanese philistine with the prospect of Washington's refusal to "protect" Japan and calls for a complete release from US military assistance in order to fully take over the "defense" of the country. The most dangerous ideological practice of such reactionary authors as Shimizu, from the point of view of defending peace in the Far East, is the call for the rejection of Article 9 of the Constitution, which prohibits Japan from having armed forces .23 Based on the basic law of the country, the democratic forces fought against the attempts of reaction to revive militarism in the post-war years. It is no accident that the heralds of militaristic ideology in Japan are so vehemently calling for the revision of this article.
Statism in Japan reinforces nationalist aspirations. Japanese literature notes that the rapid pace of economic growth in recent decades has given rise to such a phenomenon as "economic great power" - an imperialist ideology imposed from above.
Trying to prove the inevitability of the growth of the ideology of nationalist statism, Mita Sosuke writes that nationalist views do not arise subjectively in the mind, but are the result of an" objective economic structure "that requires"the sacrifice of other peoples" 24 . These views, according to him, are the result of the existence of Japan as a "historically established state system" with specific features .25 This provision sounds like a justification for Japanese economic expansion, the ideology of" economic great power " in it turns into great Japanese nationalism.
It would be a mistake to deny the objective necessity of establishing broad trade and economic ties for Japan, given, as Mita writes, its " economic structure." But due to the class content of the foreign economic policy of this state, these relations have a pronounced imperialist orientation. Inter-imperialist contradictions permeate Tokyo's trade and economic relations with highly developed capitalist countries,
22 Shimizu Ikutaro. Uk. soch., p. 190-192.
23 Ibid., p. 16.
24 Japanese awareness of Japan, p. 17.
25 Ibid.
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Japan's economic policy towards the developing countries, through the exploitation of the resources of which Japanese monopolistic capital has largely been able to strengthen its position, is openly imperialist in nature. By the way, Japanese bourgeois nationalism is now most clearly manifested in these countries, and attempts to put an "objective" basis for it, in essence, mean justifying the neo-colonialist policy of Japanese monopolies.
According to historian Kano Masanao, the restoration of the idea of Japanese statehood is accompanied by a revival of pre-war views on the role of Japan in Asia. In the context of the growth of Japanese statism, according to the Japanese researcher, the understanding of this role is approaching that which was widespread in the pre-war period26, characterized by a sharp expansion of Japanese expansion on the Asian mainland. This statement is yet another confirmation of the fact that monopoly capital is now striving to strengthen the ideological basis of its foreign policy, and the task of progressive science is not to simply fix this fact, but to discover the causes that gave rise to it, and to condemn the true source of reactionary ideological practice.
For reactionary bourgeois ideologists, one of the ways to assert the idea of strengthening the role of the bourgeois state is the problem of providing the country with energy resources and the complete dependence of the Japanese economy on export-import opportunities. The crisis phenomena that emerged in the world capitalist economy in the 70s were used by some representatives of the bourgeois professors as proof of the onset of a "critical situation" that would allegedly lead to the "destruction" of Japanese statehood.
Under such conditions, a special formula for "saving Japan"was developed. Reflecting the interests of Japanese "hawks", the most reactionary authors criticize the current domestic political course, considering it a product of the way of thinking that was born under the influence of post-war transformations. They demand a complete rejection of these reforms and insist on tough measures to combat the democratic movement. At the same time, voices are increasingly openly heard in the conservative camp, glorifying the ideal of a "Great Japanese Empire" and calling for the revival of pre-war and wartime order.
Attempts by the reaction to create a crisis awareness in public opinion of the fate of the Japanese state as an "idea" and "symbol of beauty" gave rise to a conviction in the circles of the bourgeois intelligentsia in the need to increase activity in the international arena. While noting the growing interdependence and mutual influence between States in our time, these circles proceed from the premise that the weakening or even collapse of sovereign national states is inevitable. This concept turns out to preach the ideological and political expansion of Japanese monopoly capital, which undermines the independence of developing countries and weakens their national sovereignty. At the same time, it is intended to justify the merger of the political courses of the ruling circles of Japan and the United States, and to provide a theoretical basis for the relations of interdependence between these countries, which are formed under the influence of common imperialist interests.
The current period of Japanese history in bourgeois socio-political literature is often characterized as a transitional period to Shi-
20 Ibid., p. 28.
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international cooperation. But this cooperation translates into an attempt to revive the idea of creating a " sphere of shared prosperity in Greater East Asia." One of the proponents of this idea, Matsumoto Kenichi, in particular, writes: "The Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere, as it was conceived in wartime, has collapsed. However, it can be argued that such an area as a certain economic system led by Japan was fully established in the post-war period. " 27 This recognition is very significant, because it sheds light on the true nature of the policy of the Japanese conservative camp, which has launched a foreign policy expansion in Asia.
Matsumoto completely denies the positive significance of the post-war socio-political renewal of the country. "Post-war democracy," he writes, " turned out to be false, because it could not dialectically remove the ideal for which the war was fought in Greater East Asia. And this ideal was the liberation of the continent from the great imperialist powers of Europe and the United States. Internally, he sought to overcome the doctrine that insisted on borrowing Western institutions of modern times." Taking similar positions, Matsumoto declares that "August 15 (1945-the day of the declaration of the surrender of Japan. - B. P.) did not kill the ideal in the name of which the war was started" 28 . In other words, he insists on the need for continuity of the pre-war and modern foreign policy of Japan.
Matsumoto is not alone in his efforts to whitewash Japan, which launched a war in the Far East. A significant number of Japanese conservative researchers hold similar views. It denies the legitimacy of raising the question of the real instigator of the war, while the responsibility for its occurrence is assigned not only and not so much to Japan, but to the Western powers. This idea, in particular, is attempted by Tanaka Masaaki in his book "Japan is not to Blame" 29 . As you know, the war in the Pacific was caused by the aggravation of inter-imperialist contradictions, but the most aggressive force among the imperialist powers in the Far East was Japan, which directly unleashed the war. Tanaka's point of view is a manifestation of revanchist ideology that serves the interests of militarism.
Views are becoming widespread, whose supporters prove the" historical " rightness of Japan, which embarked on the path of armed expansion. They claim that Japan was forced to start a war out of objective necessity, in the name of protecting its "national interests". The slogan of "national interests" serves here as a justification for the monopolistic zaibatsu associations that pursued their own imperialist goals in the war. The philosopher Ueyama Xumpei, the publicist Hayashi Fusao, and others are ardent defenders of this theory.
At the same time, the old imperialist theory of the right of nations to "survive" is being galvanized, which justifies the aggression of the Japanese military in the 30s and 40s. Moreover, some authors try to find similarities in the domestic and international situation of Japan at the present time and on the eve of the preparation and outbreak of war. On this basis, they are inclined to once again bring to light the thesis of the "right of nations to survive" and use it to justify Japan's foreign policy expansion in our days30 . They undertake-
27 See. Uchiyama Hideo. Uk. soch., p. 37.
28 Ibid.
29 Tanaka Masaaki. Uk. op.
30 See, for example, Tanaka Masaaki. Uk. op.
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There are attempts to deny the legitimacy of the Tokyo Trial of 1946-1948, which convicted the main Japanese war criminals. For this purpose, both military-political arguments and Buddhist religious and philosophical doctrines are used, according to which the question of the causes of wars and responsibility for them cannot be resolved at all. 31
Finally, the foreign policy of the USSR and the motivations for its entry into the war against Japan are falsified. The Soviet Union is accused of "aggressive" designs on Asian countries. The author distorts the position of the USSR in relation to Japan at the final stage of the war in the Pacific and during the period of political and administrative transformations in the country. These and other attempts to falsify the history of the Second World War serve to spread militaristic, nationalist views in Japan, and make it easier for them to pursue a course of rearmament and prepare for a new war.
The progressive public of Japan strongly opposes the attempts of reaction to belittle the significance of post-war transformations, which became the basis of the process of updating the state-political structure, and the revival of reactionary theories and nationalist concepts. The Communist and Socialist Parties of Japan are actively working in this direction, considering the defense of democratic gains as one of their main class tasks. On the pages of party and other progressive publications, analytical articles and materials are constantly published that reveal the content of the post-war reforms and the political and ideological processes that were caused by them. Noting the class limitations and inconsistency of these reforms, the authors also emphasize the positive role that post-war reforms played in the country's public life, and oppose attempts by the reaction to convince public opinion that they are unacceptable for Japan as a country with a supposedly unique social structure that has no analogues in world history. As a warning against the increased machinations of reactionary forces to revise the constitution and the threat of militarization hanging over the country, a book by one of Japan's major political figures, the chairman of the Central Election Commission of Japan, Ishibashi Masashi, was published in several editions .32
The broad publicistic activity of representatives of advanced Japanese science is of great importance in countering the plans of reaction. For example, Hiroshima University professors Kitanishi Makoto and Yamada Hiroshi express their deep concern about the development of conservative tendencies in the country's ideological life and the dangerous consequences of further political reaction .33 The ideological basis of the reactionary aspirations of the ruling class in the political sphere is analyzed by the well-known Japanese sociologist Kawamura Nozomu .34 The forms and methods of the offensive of reactionary forces in the ideological and political sphere are described in a book published under the editorship of Professor Masujima Koji of Hosei University in Tokyo . For an objective assessment of the impact of post-war reforms, against attempts to deny their positive impact on social development, and for supporting the development of the country's economy.-
31 Kitanishi Makoto, Yamada Hiroshi. Politics in modern Japan. Tokyo. 1983 (in English).
32 Masashi Ishibashi. Unarmed Neutrality, Moscow, 1984.
33 Kitanishi Makoto, Yamada Hiroshi. Uk. op.
34 Kawamura Nozomu. Around the theory of Japanese culture. Tokyo, 1982 (in Japanese).
35 Masujima Co. Ideological structure of modern Japan. Tokyo, 1982 (in Japanese).
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Keio University professor Uchiyama Hideo opposes the promotion of revanchism and nationalism.
An integral part of the progressive literature, which reveals the essence of the political and ideological processes that developed in Japan, are studies on the history of the Second World War and the period of post-war transformations. At one time , the book of the outstanding progressive historian Ienaga Saburo 36, which exposes the crimes of the Japanese military against the peoples of Asia, became widely known. The multi-volume collective work on the history of World War II, published by the Japanese Society for the Study of Historical Science, is of great scientific and political significance 37 . Shinobu Shinzaburo, a well - known academic professor at Nagoya University, spoke out for an objective study of the history of World War II and against attempts to distort it .38 The article by Yamaguchi Yasushi, a professor at Osaka University, 39 is filled with deep reflections on the lack of knowledge of some issues of the history of the war in Japanese scientific circles and alarming symptoms of the revival of nationalist tendencies in historical and political research . These and other studies by Japanese progressive scholars are increasingly playing the role of an ideological counterweight to reactionary historical literature, which justifies the attempts of the ruling circles to reverse the development of political and ideological processes in the country.
The forces that oppose political reaction in Japan are increasingly resisting the attempts of the ruling class to deprive the people of that country of the democratic freedoms they have won in their stubborn struggle against the power of capital. Nevertheless, the threat of a reaction is growing. The ruling class of Japan openly seeks to create a situation in the country conducive to the implementation of plans that undermine the cause of peace and democracy. The growth of militaristic and revanchist tendencies and the growing convergence with the aggressive course of American imperialism point to the dangerous direction that Japan's ideological and political development is taking.
36 Yenaga Saburo. The war in the Pacific. Tokyo. 1974 (in English).
37 History of the Pacific War. Tt. I-IV. Tokyo. 1970 (in English).
38 Shinobu Shinzaburo. The War in the Pacific and the War in Greater East Asia. - Chuo Koron, 1982, N 8.
39 Yamaguchi Yasushi. Historical consciousness in the political transition period. - Sekai, 1982, N 10.
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