As already noted, it was not easy for the Soviet government to decide to conclude a pact with militaristic Japan. The Kremlin well remembered the West's reaction to the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, which was regarded as " a betrayal of the idea of an anti-Hitler coalition." The conclusion of a similar agreement with another member of the "Triple Pact" would inevitably create new problems in relations with Western powers, which could regard the actions of the USSR as provoking Japan to expand its expansion in East Asia and the Pacific. The Soviet leadership continued to worry that by signing the pact with Japan, it risked worsening its relations with China. However, on the other hand, as in the case of Germany, the pact with the Japanese served the state interests of the Soviet Union, because it could create, although unreliable and obviously temporary, guarantees to reduce the danger of a simultaneous attack on the USSR from the west and east...

Returning from Berlin to Moscow, Matsuoka on April 7, in a conversation with Molotov, tried to put forward Japanese conditions for signing a pact with the USSR, in particular, officially offered to sell Northern Sakhalin to Japan. This "proposal," as earlier in Molotov's conversations with the Japanese Ambassadors of Togo and Tatekawa, was strongly rejected. At the same time, the Soviet side continued to insist on the elimination of the Japanese concessions on Northern Sakhalin simultaneously with the signing of the pact. It was clear that the Soviet government would not back down from its positions.

In a rather gloomy mood, Matsuoka visited Leningrad, where he examined the treasures of the Hermitage and attended a ballet performance. When he returned to Moscow on April 12, he telegraphed Tokyo that Molotov "shows no sympathy and the chances of concluding an agreement with Russia are close to zero." ⁷³ Suddenly, in the Japanese minister's hotel room, a telephone call came from Stalin's secretariat. Matsuoka was invited to the Kremlin to talk with the Soviet leader.

For many years, the full text of the April 12, 1941 conversation between Stalin and Matsuoka remained unpublished and was kept in the "Stalin archive". Only recently, this important document marked with the stamp "Sov. secret. Special folder", now available to researchers.

An analysis of the nature of Stalin's diplomatic contacts with foreign politicians shows that he consistently followed the following negotiating tactics that he developed. At the preliminary stage, Molotov was instructed to take a rather tough position, to "squeeze" partners as much as possible, and to get them to take the Soviet position into account as fully as possible. At the last moment, when it seemed that an agreement could no longer be reached, Stalin himself stepped in. Demonstrating in his characteristic manner the breadth of his political positions, he offered a well-thought-out compromise that opened up the possibility of breaking the deadlock in negotiations. In this situation, it was difficult for a foreign politician not to meet the Soviet leader halfway. The same thing happened in this case. Matsuoka, who was already packing his bags, was put in a situation where it was simply tactless not to respond positively to the compromises proposed by Stalin. Moreover, the version of the agreement put forward by Stalin did not require any concessions from Japan, except for agreeing to liquidate the concessions on Northern Sakhalin on the terms that generally suited Japan. In addition, Stalin's frankness and conciliatory friendly tone convinced Matsuoka that the Soviet leader sincerely sought to avoid further conflicts with Japan for a long time.

Matsuoka is the only major Japanese politician with whom Stalin dealt directly. Therefore, I think it is interesting to trace all the nuances of the conversation and the agreement that largely determined the subsequent events in the world.

Owls. CLASSIFIED

Special Folder

RECORDING A CONVERSATION

Comrade STALIN I. V.

with Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

April 12, 1941

Matsuoka thanks Tov. Stalin for the cordial welcome in the Soviet Union and for the assistance rendered to him during his stay in the USSR, and also thanks that com. Stalin agreed to receive him today on a farewell visit.

Tov. Stalin replies that this is his duty.

Matsuoka then says that Molotov, we see, has already reported to him that Matsuoka would like to conclude a neutrality pact during his stay in the USSR, but without any conditions in the future.

Ending. For the beginning, see "Asia and Africa today", 2001, N 5-7.

The numbering of links throughout the article is uniform.

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in the order of a diplomatic blitzkrieg.

Matsuoka considers the signing of the neutrality pact useful and expedient not only for Japan, but also for the USSR, and believes that it would be effective to sign the pact at this very moment. However, his wish was not successful. Tomorrow he leaves the capital of the USSR, although he is annoyed that the pact has not been signed. Nevertheless, his stay in the USSR gave him a lot. Matsuoka says that since he was in old Russia, as well as in the USSR on his way 8 years ago, he was able to compare what was before and what is now, and notes with satisfaction the extraordinary success in the development of the USSR. Two-time meeting with com. Stalin gave rise to such a feeling in him that he began to consider himself close and familiar to comrades. Of Stalin. Matsuoka says, " He can say the same thing about his relationship with Tov. Molotov, with whom he had several meetings. Matsuoka thinks that such a personal acquaintance can contribute to the further development of relations between Japan and the USSR.

Matsuoka then recalls that just yesterday he said tov. Molotov asked that the latter visit Japan so that he, Matsuoka, could answer him for the warm welcome that was given to him in the USSR. Matsuoka points out that not only the conclusion of contracts or agreements, but also personal visits are an integral part of diplomacy. Personal visits, as well as reciprocal visits, can help bring the two countries closer together, and this could have a positive effect on Japanese-Soviet relations.

Matsuoka then asks permission to comment on the following points.

First. Japan has a treaty of alliance with Germany. However, from the fact that Japan has a treaty of alliance with Germany, it does not follow that Japan needs to link the forces of the USSR. On the contrary, if anything happens between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, he prefers to mediate between the U.S.S.R. and Germany. Japan and the USSR are border states, and he would like to improve relations between Japan and the USSR.

Tov. Stalin throws out a remark - the pact of three will not prevent this?

Matsuoka replies that, on the contrary, the conclusion of a pact with Germany should improve Japanese-Soviet relations, and in this sense he spoke with Ribbentrop in Berlin. Matsuoka says that he always speaks and collaborates openly, not engaging in small things and haggling.

Second. The fundamental resolution of relations between Japan and the USSR must be resolved from the point of view of big problems, taking into account Asia, the whole world, without being limited or carried away by trifles. If we approach the fundamental resolution of Japanese-Soviet relations in this way, then small issues can be resolved over time and small issues can even be sacrificed. If a small island like Sakhalin were to sink into the sea, Matsuoka says, it would not affect Japanese-Soviet relations. Matsuoka further points out that just because he says so, it doesn't mean that he thinks it's unnecessary to resolve minor issues. These issues also need to be resolved, but not now, but later.

If, Matsuoka continues, we approach the case when the USSR seeks to reach the warm waters of the Indian Ocean through India from the point of view of big problems, then he believes that this should be allowed, and if the USSR wants to have the port of Karachi, then Japan will turn a blind eye to this. Matsuoka further points out that while the Stamer (Stamer. - A. K. ) in Japan, Matsuoka told him that Germany should look the same way in the event that the USSR seeks to reach the warm sea through Iran.

Matsuoka says that from a young age he was convinced that the fate of Asia is decided by two forces-Japan and the USSR. He spoke about this in his speeches and books, and therefore is convinced that it is better for Japan and the USSR to go hand in hand than to quarrel.

The third. In order to liberate Asia, it is necessary to get rid of the Anglo-Saxons, and therefore before such a task it is necessary to abandon small issues and cooperate on big issues.

Fourth. Japan is now fighting with China, but not with the Chinese people, with whom Japan does not want to fight. What does Japan want to achieve in China? She wants to get the Anglo - Saxons expelled from China. Chiang Kai-shek is an agent of Anglo-American capital, and for this capital he is fighting Japan. Japan has a firm determination to fight Chiang Kai-shek to the end, and therefore sympathy for Chiang Kai-shek means helping Anglo-American capital. In this regard, Matsuoka points out that, in his opinion, it would be more appropriate to abandon the support of Chiang Kai-shek and make the expulsion of the Anglo-Saxons from China a success.

Fifth. This is a question about so-called moral communism. Matsuoka says that he does not agree with political and social communism, but basically he also adheres to communism and is strongly opposed to Anglo-Saxon capitalism. Matsuoka immediately adds that his proposal is for the USSR and Japan to work together to expel the influence of Anglo-American capital from Asia. As for the question of whose communism is better-yours or ours - we can talk about this later.

Matsuoka goes on to say that he wants to mark the next point so that there won't be any misunderstandings. When he spoke of moral communism, it did not mean that all Japanese people and all Japanese people are followers of moral communism. Many of the ills of capitalism that came to Japan more than half a century ago were reflected in the spread of individualism and capitalism among the Japanese people. In Japan, there is a subtle but fierce struggle between capitalism and moral communism, and he is confident that Japan will be able to return to moral communism.

Tov. Stalin says that the U.S.S.R. considers cooperation with Japan, Germany, and Italy on major issues to be permissible in principle. About this com. Molotov stated to Hitler and Ribbentrop when he was in Berlin and when

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there was a question of making the pact of three a pact of four. Hitler then declared to com. Molotov said that he does not need military assistance yet. But the pact of four is a mutual aid pact. If Germany does not need help, it means that the pact of four is not yet ripe. If Matsuoka noticed it from the print, tov adds. Stalin, then and now Hitler declares that he does not need the military assistance of other states. Tov. Stalin therefore believes that only if things go badly for Germany and Japan can the question of the pact of four and of cooperation between the U.S.S.R. on major issues arise. Therefore, Tov points out. Stalin, we are now confining ourselves to the question of the neutrality pact with Japan. This issue is definitely overdue. This will be the first step, and a serious step towards future cooperation on big issues. This is the question, says Tov. Stalin, in his opinion, is already ripe. For 30 years, Russia and Japan have been looking at each other as enemies. There was a war between Russia and Japan. Peace was made, but peace did not bring friendship. Therefore, he agrees with Matsuoka's view that if the neutrality pact is concluded, it will really be a turn from hostility to friendship.

Further com. Stalin passes on to the question of the neutrality pact and says that, as Comrade Stalin has already informed him, Molotov, Matsuoka has no objections to the text of the pact, and only one point about Manchukuo and the MNR raises doubts. Stalin says that he does not object to this place being excluded from the pact, but then it may turn out that there will be a pact between Japan and the USSR, and the field for conflicts between Mongolia and Manchukuo will remain. Is this advisable? Comrade asks. Stalin. He says that it is also necessary to say something about the MNR and Manchukuo in one form or another, because otherwise it turns out that Japan can attack the MNR, and the USSR can attack Manchukuo, which will result in a war between the USSR and Japan.

Matsuoka said that he did not object to the merits of the case, and that he had referred the Soviet Government's proposal to the Japanese Government. Since, Matsuoka points out, Japan does not have allied relations with Manchukuo, he believes that it is better to mention Manchukuo and the MNR in the declaration.

Tov. Stalin says that this is all the same, which means that there are no disagreements between the two sides here either, and therefore there are only disagreements about the protocol on the liquidation of the concessions.

Matsuoka states that he has no objections to the pact, except for the editorial amendments. As for the protocol on the elimination of concessions, since a trade treaty and a fishing convention would soon be concluded, a good atmosphere would be created for resolving the issue of concessions, and for the time being he would like to limit himself to the transfer of goods. A confidential letter to Molotov and now sign the neutrality pact, without protocol.

Tov. Stalin says that all the conversations Matsuoka had with com. Molotov, and today's second conversation with Matsuoka convinced him that there is no diplomatic game in the pact negotiations, but that Japan really wants to seriously and honestly improve relations with the USSR. He'd doubted that before, and he had to admit it honestly. Now these doubts have disappeared from him and now we really have real aspirations to improve relations, and not a game.

Tov. Molotov adds that he has the same impression from the negotiations with Matsuoka as Comrade Matsuoka. Of Stalin.

Further com. Stalin says he enjoyed listening to Matsuoka speak honestly and directly about what he wants. I listened with pleasure because in our time, and not only in our time, you don't often meet a diplomat who would openly say what is in his heart. As you know, even Talleyrand said under Napoleon that the language is given to a diplomat in order to hide his thoughts. We, the Russian Bolsheviks, have a different view and think that even in the diplomatic arena we can be sincere and honest. Tov. Stalin says that he does not want to complicate the situation of Matsuoka, who is forced to complete the struggle with his opponents in Japan,and is ready to ease his situation so that he, Matsuoka, can achieve a diplomatic blitzkrieg here.

All right, Comrade continues. Stalin, let us assume that we will replace the protocol on the liquidation of the concessions with a letter from Matsuoka, to which, obviously, a reply will be given to Comrade. Molotov cocktail. Matsuoka's letter will have to be attached to the contract as not subject to publication. If so, perhaps some editorial changes could be made to this letter.

Matsuoka declares that he does not want to say at all that he cannot fulfill his promise, and therefore he gives his letter and asks to be answered by the letter of Comrade. Molotov cocktail. Matsuoka points out that, as he already told Molotov, the best and most radical way to resolve the issue would be to sell the northern part of Sakhalin to Japan, but since the Soviet side does not accept this proposal, it is necessary to find another way to resolve the issue of concessions.

Tov. Stalin asks - liquidation of the concessions?

Matsuoka replies, "Yes," and adds that he won't put it off too long.

Then com. Stalin transmits to Matsuoka the text of Matsuoka's letter with editorial amendments.

Matsuoka says that he cannot commit to liquidating the concessions in 2-3 months, as he needs to return to Japan and work there so that the government and people understand the need for this, and if he could agree to liquidate the concessions, it would not be difficult for him to do so now.

Tov. Stalin asks, " What, then, is the meaning of Matsuoka's letter reduced to without correction?"

Matsuoka says that in the conversations between him and Tov. Molotov made both sides ' points of view very clear. He raised the question of selling Northern Sakhalin to Japan, which would be a radical solution to the issue, but since the Soviet side does not accept it

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If there is no such suggestion, then you need to find another way out and follow the protocol line. Matsuoka says that he will try to work in this direction, and there will be good will, not a game. Matsuoka asks him to believe him and be content with his original letter, and points out that it would be better if he returned to Japan free and unbound. Matsuoka claims that he had instructions for the sale of Northern Sakhalin, but since the USSR does not agree, there is nothing to be done.

Tov. Stalin goes to the map and, pointing to Primorye and its outlets to the ocean, says: Japan holds in its hands all the outlets of Soviet Primorye to the ocean - the Kuril Strait near the Southern Cape of Kamchatka, the La Perouse Strait south of Sakhalin, the Tsushima Strait near Korea. Now you want to take Northern Sakhalin and completely block up the Soviet Union. What are you talking about, Comrade? Stalin, smiling, do you want to strangle us? What kind of friendship is this?

Matsuoka says this would be necessary to create a new order in Asia. In addition, Matsuoka says, Japan does not object to the fact that the USSR went through India to the warm sea. In India, Matsuoka adds, there are Hindus that Japan can guide so that they don't interfere. In conclusion, Matsuoka says, pointing to the USSR on the map, that he does not understand why the USSR, which has a huge territory, does not want to cede a small territory in such a cold place.

Tov. Stalin asks: why do you need the cold regions of Sakhalin?

Matsuoka replies that this will create peace in the area, and in addition, Japan agrees to the USSR's access to the warm sea.

Tov. Stalin replies that this gives Japan peace of mind, and the USSR will have to fight a war here (points to India). That won't do.

Matsuoka goes on to point to the South Sea and Indonesian regions, and says that if the USSR needs anything in this area, Japan can supply the USSR with rubber and other products. Matsuoka says that Japan wants to help the USSR, not hinder it.

Tov. Stalin replies that to take Northern Sakhalin means to prevent the Soviet Union from living.

Further, returning to the amendments in the text of the letter, Matsuoka says that he does not object to the fact that instead of the words: "within 2-3 months", specify: "within a few months".

Tov. Stalin agrees with this.

Matsuoka further states that since the USSR does not want to sell Northern Sakhalin to Japan (at this point, com. Molotov throws a line:

"It's impossible," and Comrade. Stalin says, smiling: "Japan wants to strangle us, what kind of friendship is this"), then there is another way out along the protocol line. As for the question of how much oil the USSR will supply to Japan-100 thousand tons or slightly more, we need to talk about this later. In short, Matsuoka says, he will make every effort to resolve the issue of concessions.

Tov. Stalin suggests that the text of Matsuoka's letter be amended:

instead of "...question concerning concessions...", write "... question concerning the liquidation of concessions".

Matsuoka agrees to this and goes on to say that he will now have to ask for the emperor's authority to sign the neutrality pact, and asks tov. Molotov to order the Central Telegraph Office not to delay a telegram from Tokyo for a single minute.

Tov. Molotov says he will do it.

In conclusion of the conversation, com. Stalin, com. Molotov and Matsuoka agree on the allocation of representatives of both sides to clarify the text of the pact, draw up a joint declaration on the MNR and Manchukuo, etc.

On the Japanese side, Nishi,Miyakawa, Sakamoto, Saito, and Hiraoka were singled out.

From the Soviet side, T. T. Vyshinsky, Lozovsky, A. P. Pavlov and Zarapkin were singled out.

The conversation was attended by com. Molotov, Japanese Ambassador Tatekawa and advisor to Miyakawa.

The conversation lasted about two hours.

Recorded Zabrodin ⁷⁴ .

During this conversation, Stalin laid out a draft of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact. Article 1 provided for the obligation of both parties to maintain peaceful and friendly relations among themselves and to mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other Contracting Party. Article 2 stated that in the event that one of the Contracting Parties should be the object of hostilities by another or several third Powers, the other Contracting Party would remain neutral for the duration of the conflict. Article 3 provided that the Covenant remained in force for a period of five years.

The proposed text of the pact did not contain any conditions and obligations on other issues. This made it easier to conclude a contract.

After contacting Tokyo, Matsuoka agreed to sign the document proposed by the Soviet side. At the same time, the Japanese government's instructions stressed that "the Triple Pact must not be weakened."

* * *

On April 13, 1941, the "Neutrality Pact" between Japan and the Soviet Union was signed in the Kremlin. At the same time, the "Declaration on Mutual Respect for the Territorial Integrity and Inviolability of the Borders of the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo"was signed. An agreement was also reached to resolve the issue of liquidating Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin within a few months. However, at the request of the Japanese side, this agreement was not reported in the press.

At the subsequent banquet in the Kremlin, an atmosphere of satisfaction reigned over the successful completion of the"diplomatic blitzkrieg". According to eyewitnesses, in an effort to emphasize his hospitality, Stalin personally moved plates of food to the guests and poured wine. However, the abundance of compliments could not hide from the attentive observer-

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It should be noted that opponents, not friends, were sitting at the table.

Participants of the banquet from the Japanese side, in particular Matsuoka's personal secretary T. Kase, spoke about the dialogue that took place at the table:

Raising his glass, Matsuoka said: "The agreement has been signed. I'm not lying. If I lie, my head will be yours. If you are lying, I will come for your head."

Stalin grimaced, then said in all seriousness, " My head is important to my country. Just like yours for your country. Let's make sure that our heads stay on our shoulders."

After offering a toast to the Japanese delegation, Stalin noted the contribution of its military members to the conclusion of the agreement.

"These people representing the army and navy have made a neutrality pact based on the overall situation," Matsuoka said in response. "In fact, they are always thinking about how to crush the Soviet Union." ⁷⁵ Stalin immediately retorted: "I would like to remind all Japanese military personnel that today's Soviet Russia is not the rotten tsarist Russian Empire that you once defeated." ⁷⁶

Although Stalin said goodbye to the Japanese minister in the Kremlin, he unexpectedly showed up at the train station to personally see Matsuoka off. This was an unprecedented and unique case when the Soviet leader considered it necessary to emphasize the importance of the Soviet-Japanese agreement with such an unusual gesture. And to emphasize not only the Japanese, but also the Germans.

Knowing that the German Ambassador to Moscow, Von Schulenburg, was also among Matsuoka's mourners, Stalin demonstratively hugged the Japanese minister on the platform, declaring: "You're Asian and I'm Asian... If we work together, all of Asia's problems can be solved." Matsuoka replied: "The problems of the whole world can be solved." ⁷⁷

In general, Japan's military circles, unlike politicians, did not attach much importance to the neutrality pact, which had a negative attitude towards any agreements with the Soviet Union. In the "Secret Diary" of the Japanese Army General Staff on April 14, 1941, the following entry was made: "The significance of this treaty is not to ensure armed action in the south. Nor is the treaty a means of avoiding war with the United States. It only gives additional time to make an independent decision about starting a war against the Soviets. " ⁷⁸ Even more definitely expressed in April 1941, the Minister of War X. Tojo: "Regardless of the pact, we will actively carry out military preparations against the USSR." ⁷⁹

The fact that the most anti-Soviet Japanese generals considered the neutrality pact only as a cover for completing preparations for an offensive operation is evidenced by the statement made on April 26 by the Chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, Kimura, at a meeting of the commanders of its formations. "It is necessary," he said, "on the one hand, to strengthen and expand preparations for war against the U.S.S.R. more and more, and on the other, to maintain friendly relations with the U.S.S.R., striving to preserve armed peace and at the same time to prepare for operations against the Soviet Union, which at the decisive moment will bring a sure victory to Japan." ⁸⁰

Soviet intelligence promptly and objectively informed Moscow about these sentiments in the Japanese army. On April 18, Richard Sorge - Ramsay reported that " Otto "(Hozumi Ozaki. - A. K.) visited Konoe just at the moment when Konoe received a telegram from Matsuoka about the conclusion of the neutrality pact. Konoe and everyone present were extremely happy about the pact. Konoe immediately called Defense Minister Tojo about this, who expressed no surprise, anger, or joy, but agreed with Konoe's opinion that neither the army, navy, or Kwantung Army should publish any statement regarding this pact. During the discussion on the implications of the pact, the issue of Singapore was not raised. The main attention of all present was focused on the issue of using the pact to eliminate the war with China ... " ⁸¹ .

On April 28, the Soviet military attache in Korea telegraphed: "On April 22, the chief of the army staff (of the Japanese Army in Korea. - A. K.) Takahashi told reporters: "The USSR, recognizing the power of Japan, concluded a neutrality pact with it in order to concentrate its troops in the west. Only military force can ensure the effectiveness of the pact, and therefore the new formation of neither the Kwantung nor Korean army will be weakened, and they will not leave their positions." Takahashi gave historical examples when China, being militarily weaker than Japan, went to the conclusion of favorable agreements for Japan. Now the main task of Japan, as he said, is to end the Chinese war. " ⁸²

Having such information, Stalin understood that, despite the signing of the neutrality pact, the Japanese would not weaken their combat readiness on the borders with the USSR. Nevertheless, he believed that with a non-aggression pact with Germany and a neutrality pact with Japan, the USSR could gain some time and remain out of the war for a certain period. However, Stalin underestimated the cunning of the aggressor states, their sophisticated methods of disinformation of the enemy. The German treacherous attack on the USSR and Japan's willingness to join in this attack from the east meant a serious weakening of the diplomatic structure built by Stalin in the international arena. As subsequent events showed, Japan's "armed neutrality" did not guarantee the security of the USSR in the Far East and Siberia.

^{Bergamini D.} 73 Japan's Imperial Conspiracy. London, 1971, p. 748.

⁷⁴ DVP. T. XXIII. Book 2, pp. 560-565.

⁷⁵ Matsuoka Yosuke-sono hito to shogai (Matsuoka Yosuke-the man and his career). Tokyo, 1974, pp. 879-881.

^{Bergamini D.} 76 Op. cit., p. 749.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Taiheye sensho-e no michi, vol. 5, Tokyo, 1963, p. 300.

⁷⁹ Taiheye sensho shih, vol. 4. Tokyo, 1972, p. 66.

⁸⁰ GARF. Fund 7876, inventory 1, case 275, sheet 62.

⁸¹ Russian Archive, vol. 18, p. 176.

⁸² Ibid., p. 177.

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