A LOOK FROM SIX DECADES AWAY

On March 12, 1941, Matsuoka left for Europe. Going to Moscow, he had the authority to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet leadership, but on Japanese terms. On February 3, the coordination council of the Government and the Imperial headquarters approved the document "Principles for Conducting negotiations with Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union". The document, in exchange for Japan's agreement to conclude a non-aggression pact, provided for forcing the Soviet leadership to make serious concessions, namely, to sell Northern Sakhalin to Japan and stop helping China ^.55

At the first meeting with Molotov, Matsuoka said that the formal purpose of his trip to Europe was to establish personal contacts with Hitler, Ribbentrop, Mussolini and Ciano. He said he did not want to give the impression that his trip was connected with negotiations with the USSR. At the same time, Matsuoka said that on the way back from Germany, he would definitely stop in Moscow for a few days.

At the end of the conversation, the Japanese minister expressed his wish to meet with Stalin, as he said, "even now." To his surprise, this request was immediately granted. Molotov, in Matsuoka's presence, telephoned Stalin and informed him that " Stalin could be here in ten minutes."

Below is the full text of the recording of Stalin's first conversation with Matsuoka in the form in which it was kept until recently in the "Stalin archive".

Owls. CLASSIFIED

TRANSCRIPT OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN COMRADE STALIN AND JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA

March 24, 1941

At the beginning of the conversation, Matsuoka says that 8 years ago, when he was passing through the USSR to Geneva, he was in Moscow for 5 days, but then he did not have the opportunity to see Comrade. By Stalin. He was then able to see Tov. Stalin only on the podium of the mausoleum, attending the parade on Red Square.

Matsuoka goes on to say that he asked tov. Stalin to receive him in order to pay his respects and converse with Comrade Stalin. Stalin before leaving for Berlin.

Tov. Stalin replies that he is ready for Matsuoka's services.

Matsuoka says that he has already spoken to the Soviet plenipotentiary in Tokyo about the purpose of his visit to Germany and Italy, as well as about his desire to stay in Moscow for a few days. Smetanin, as well as in the conversation that has just taken place with Comrade. Molotov cocktails. Therefore, without wishing to trouble Comrade. Stalin, asks com. Ask Comrade Stalin for details. Molotov cocktail. Matsuoka goes on to say that if tov. If Molotov finds it necessary, Matsuoka will be able to have several meetings with Comrades after his return from a trip to Germany and Italy. Molotov regarding the improvement of Japanese-Soviet relations. Matsuoka immediately points out that his belief in improving relations between Japan and Russia was born 30 years ago, so it is not new, and he personally has a determination to improve Japanese-Soviet relations.

Tov. Stalin replies that Matsuoka's desire to stop in Moscow on the way back will be welcomed, and declares that he considers improving relations between the USSR and Japan not only necessary, but also quite possible, and if a new meeting with Matsuoka is necessary, he will be at Matsuoka's service.

Matsuoka says he shares Tov's opinion. Stalin's comments on improving relations between the two countries, and recalls that before his trip to Geneva in 1932, he had a conversation with the then Minister of War and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who agreed to negotiate a non-aggression pact. However, Japanese public opinion was opposed to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, and therefore his efforts were not crowned with success.

To Comrade's question: When asked whether this was during the period when Yoshizawa was the Foreign Minister, Matsuoka replies that Uchida was the foreign minister at that time.

Matsuoka reiterates that at that time he had a conversation about the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Japan and the USSR with the then Military Minister Araki, the Uchida Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and they agreed that Matsuoka should speak in Moscow about the pact, although the main task, Matsuoka says, was his work as head of the Japanese delegation in Geneva. Since, Matsuoka continues,Araki and Uchida agreed to the pact, they had a moral obligation to support it in this regard, but public opinion was not yet ripe for the pact to be concluded. Matsuoka immediately adds that there is still a group of people who object to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, but he and Konoe are determined to improve relations between the two countries.

Matsuoka then says that since tov. Stalin is very busy, he doesn't want to take up his precious time, but if com. If Stalin could spare him another 20 minutes, he would have time to report to com. Stalin had two questions to think about before he returned from Berlin and Rome.

Tov. Stalin replies that since Matsuoka is a rare guest, he is willing to grant Matsuoka's request.

1. Matsuoka says that, as you know, in Japan, the supreme power is in the hands of Tenno. In a foreign language, Tenno is usually translated as emperor. However, this is not true, because Japan has long had communism, and I would call this communism, says Matsuoka, moral communism. In a Japanese family, what belongs to the eldest son, for example, also belongs to the youngest son. Although there is capitalism in Japan, however, this is why-

Continuation. For the beginning, see "Asia and Africa today", 2001, N 5, 6.

The numbering of links throughout the article is uniform.

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but there is no harm. All the property and lives of the subjects belong to Tenno, and no one regrets it. Then, for example, a relatively poor person, seeing a poor boy, gives him money to study and, thus, provides his possible assistance.

To Comrade's question: Matsuoka says that he would call it moral communism, because Tenno is the state, and everything belongs to it. Anglo-Saxon traditions have damaged Japan, and the industrial revolution has slowed down the development of moral communism. However, now, Matsuoka continues, a group of people has been created, albeit an insignificant one, which seeks to extend its principles to the entire greater Asian space and which calls the principle of its policy the Japanese word Hakkoitsu (Hakko ichi U.-A. K.), which means world peace based on justice. All this, Matsuoka points out, existed before, but was infringed by capitalism and liberalism, so now we put forward the slogan - down with capitalism and individualism. But to do this, it is necessary to destroy the Anglo-Saxons. To this end, Matsuoka adds, the three-power pact was concluded, which did not take into account small interests.

After that, Matsuoka says that if tov. Stalin understands what he wants to say, and if the Soviet side has the appropriate understanding and desire to go together, then we, says Matsuoka, are ready to go hand in hand with you. At the same time, Matsuoka expresses the hope that before his return from Berlin, Tov. Stalin will be able to think about what Matsuoka said.

2. Then, referring to the Sino-Japanese war, Matsuoka says that Japan is not at war with the Chinese people, but with the Anglo-Saxons, i.e., with England and America. Japan, Matsuoka continues, is at war with capitalism and individualism, and Chiang Kai-shek is a servant of the Anglo-Saxon capitalists. Therefore, the Sino-Japanese conflict should be viewed from this point of view. In connection with what he said, Matsuoka asks to take into account Japan's intentions in China.

To Comrade's question: When asked by Stalin whether he should answer now, Matsuoka declares that he has only stated a general idea and would like to see com. Stalin thought about the questions Matsuoka had raised, and would have given an answer after Matsuoka returned from Berlin.

Tov. Stalin says he can answer briefly even now.

Matsuoka says it would be best if tov. Stalin will respond after Matsuoka returns from Berlin.

Tov. Stalin says that if Matsuoka wants it that way, then you can postpone and give an answer after Matsuoka returns. At the same time, tov. Stalin says that whatever the ideology in Japan or even in the USSR, it cannot prevent the practical rapprochement of the two states, if there is a mutual desire on both sides. For his part, com. Stalin points out that he knows that no ideology can prevent us from raising the question of a practical improvement of relations between us. As for the Anglo-Saxons, says com. Stalin, the Russians were never their friends, and now, perhaps, do not really want to be friends with them. Further com. Stalin declares that what Japan wants the state to become the controller of individual capitalists is already being done in Germany and Italy. It's good. The state can only grow stronger if it is the complete controller of the entire people and all classes.

Matsuoka replies that he is deeply convinced that without destroying Anglo-Saxon ideology, it will be impossible to create a new order without taking into account small interests.

In conclusion, Matsuoka thanks tov. Stalin for the reception.

Tov. Stalin says that it is not necessary to thank him, since it is his duty as a host, and Matsuoka is his guest.

To Comrade's question: After asking Stalin how Matsuoka's trip went and whether there were any inconveniences during the trip, Matsuoka declares that his trip went very well, and he thanks the Soviet Government for the reception given to him. At the same time, Matsuoka notes that while traveling on the Siberian Railway, he rested after a lot of work in Tokyo.

In conclusion of the conversation, com. Stalin asks Matsuoka to send a bow to Ribbentrop. Tov. Molotov joins in and also asks Matsuoka to convey a bow to Ribbentrop.

This concludes the conversation.

The conversation was attended by com. Molotov, Tatekawa and Miyakawa.

Recorded Zabrodin ⁵⁶ .

From the content of the conversation, it can be seen that Matsuoka, in the form of transparent hints, tried to probe Stalin's position on the prospect of the USSR joining the "Triple Pact"in one form or another. At the same time, the Japanese minister openly proposed - in the interests of "destroying the Anglo-Saxons" - to "go hand in hand" with the Soviet Union. Developing the idea of involving the USSR in this bloc, Matsuoka relied on information about Molotov's negotiations with Hitler and Ribbentrop held in Berlin in November 1940.

BLUFF, HYPOCRISY AND SMILES

As you know, the decision to attack Germany on the Soviet Union was made by Hitler at the end of July 1940. "Russia must be eliminated. The deadline is spring 1941, " ⁵⁷ Hitler said on July 31 at a meeting of the leadership of the German armed forces. Therefore, the German proposal to the Soviet government to join the "Triple Pact" can only be considered as a disinformation operation designed to lull Stalin's vigilance, to give him an idea that Germany has no aggressive intentions towards the USSR. Hence Ribbentrop's suggestion, already in his first conversation with Molotov in Berlin on 12 November 1940, "to think of a form in which three states, i.e. Germany, Italy and Japan, could come to an agreement with the USSR." ⁵⁸

During Molotov's conversations with Hitler, the latter bluntly stated that "he offers the Soviet Union to participate as a fourth partner in this ("Triple". - A. K.) of the pact". At the same time, the Fuhrer did not hide the fact that we are talking about joining forces in the fight against Great Britain and the United States, saying: "...We are all continental states, although each country has its own interests. America and England are not continental states, they only seek to pit European states against each other, and we want to exclude them from Europe. I believe that our success will be greater if we stand back to back and fight against external forces than if we stand chest to chest and fight against each other. " ⁵⁹

The day before, Ribbentrop outlined the German vision of the geopolitical interests of the participants in the projected alliance as follows: "Germany's interests go to East and West Africa, Italy-to North-East Africa, Japan-to the south, and the USSR-in the same place in the south - to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea

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"..."Ribbentrop invited the USSR, Germany, Italy and Japan to issue a declaration against the expansion of the war, as well as on the desirability of a compromise between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek.

Responding to this information, Stalin gave Molotov the following instructions in Berlin: "If the results of further conversation show that you can basically negotiate with the Germans, and for Moscow it remains the completion and completion of the case, then so much the better... As for the declaration, give your consent in principle without turning points " ⁶⁰ .

According to recent research by Russian historians, the German initiative to join the USSR in the "Triple Pact" was a bluff designed to convince Stalin that Germany had no intention of worsening relations with the Soviet Union. At the same time, it is recognized that, in turn, the Soviet leadership bluffed in order not to give Berlin a reason to accuse it of unwillingness to maintain good-neighborly relations with Germany. So, in one of the works we read:

"On November 25, 1940, Molotov made a statement to the German Ambassador in Moscow, according to which the Soviet Government was ready to accept the "Draft Four-Power pact on political cooperation and mutual economic assistance" outlined by Ribbentrop on November 13, provided that "German troops immediately leave Finland", if the Soviet Union manages to guarantee its security from abroad in the coming months. the Black Sea Straits ... if the" center of territorial aspirations " of the USSR is recognized as "the zone south of Batumi and Baku in the general direction towards the Persian Gulf", if Japan renounces its rights to coal and oil concessions in Northern Sakhalin.

It is quite clear that the conditions put forward by the USSR were obviously unacceptable for Germany and its allies... It is no coincidence that there was no response from Berlin to the Soviet conditions, which Moscow, however, did not particularly insist on. " ⁶¹

As for Matsuoka, when he went to Europe, he believed that the idea of connecting the USSR to the "Triple Pact" was still alive and could be used for a Japanese-Soviet political settlement on Japanese terms. The main purpose of Matsuoka's meetings with German leaders was to find out whether Germany was really preparing for an attack on the USSR and, if so, when it might occur. However, Berlin considered it inappropriate to inform its Far Eastern ally about specific German plans.

In preparation for the reception of the Japanese minister, Hitler issued Directive No. 24 "On Cooperation with Japan" on March 5, 1941, which defined the goal: to involve Japan in the war against Great Britain as soon as possible and thus link up significant British forces in the Pacific. As a result, the Americans will also have to shift their attention to the Far East, refraining from actively participating in the war in Europe. Japan, however, must avoid a war with the United States. The directive forbade informing the Japanese of the existence of the German Barbarossa Plan of War against the USSR ^.62

In Japan, they could not help but understand that in strategic terms, Germany assigns its Far Eastern ally the role of a junior partner who must drag chestnuts out of the fire for it. Japanese suspicions of the sincerity of the German ally would have been immeasurably increased if they had known about Hitler's true assessment of the Japanese leaders. And it was deadly. So, on August 22, 1939, on the eve of the signing of the German-Soviet non-aggression treaty, the Fuhrer, having gathered close generals in his country residence, broke out in a tirade: "The Emperor (of Japan-AK) is akin to the Russian tsars. Weak, cowardly, indecisive, he can easily be swept away by a revolution... We should see ourselves as masters and treat these people at best as varnished half-apes who should know the whip. " ⁶³

Being interested in distracting the British in the Far East by the Japanese, Hitler ordered an emphatic welcome to the Japanese minister, negotiating with him "on an equal footing". From March 27 to 29, Matsuoka held three rounds of negotiations with Ribbentrop and was received twice by Hitler. According to Hitler's directives, Ribbentrop urged the Japanese minister to attack Singapore. He said: "If the Soviet Union acts against Japan, Germany will immediately strike at the USSR. We promise that. Therefore, Japan can move south to Singapore without fear of war with the Soviet Union." ⁶⁴

Responding to Matsuoka's question about the state of German-Soviet relations, Ribbentrop said:"...The conflict with Russia is still within the limits of possibility. In any case, after his return, Matsuoka cannot report to the Japanese emperor that the possibility of a conflict between Russia and Germany is excluded. On the contrary, the situation is such that such a conflict should be considered possible, but not probable. As for Russia's entry into the Triple Alliance, which was proposed by Germany to Molotov, the Reich Minister noted that this is not just about Russia joining the pact itself, but rather about another combination. As already reported, the Russians have put forward conditions for their accession to the pact that ^Germany cannot accept, " Ribbentrop said.

Without disclosing the contents of the Barbarossa plan or mentioning it, Ribbentrop nevertheless considered it possible to inform the interlocutor that "the majority of the German army is already concentrated on the eastern borders of the state." Convincing his colleague of the transience of the German-Soviet war, he said:: "At present, we will be able to crush the Soviet Union within three to four months... I believe that after the defeat, the Soviet Union will fall apart. If Japan tries to take Singapore, it will no longer have to worry about the north." ⁶⁶

Hitler also urged Matsuoka that an attack on Singapore would be beneficial for Japan, saying: "Never in the human imagination will a nation have a more favorable opportunity. This moment will never happen again. This is a unique situation in history." Regarding German-Soviet relations, the Fuehrer limited himself to saying that the Reich has over 160 divisions concentrated on the Soviet borders.

"IF I'D KNOWN..."

Following the instructions given to him, Matsuoka, contrary to his usual routine, listened more than talked. He knew that Colonel Y. Nagai, an intelligence officer of the General Staff of the Army, who was specially assigned to accompany him, was transmitting the contents of the Berlin conversations to Tokyo through his own channels. Nevertheless, Matsuoka assured his interlocutors that " Japan will always be a loyal ally that will devote itself to common efforts and will not take a passive position."

Matsuoka made it clear to the Germans that without the consent of the Japanese army, he could not make any decisions.

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there were obligations. In this regard, such an episode is significant. Accepting a gift from Matsuoka - a scroll painting (kakejiku) depicting Mount Fuji-Reichmarschall G. Goering, as if in jest, promised to visit Japan in order to admire this sacred mountain for the Japanese, but only after "Japan takes Singapore". Matsuoka nodded towards Nagai and said, "You'll have to ask him about that." ⁶⁷

Matsuoka spoke more openly about Japan's relations with the Soviet Union, explicitly stating that he was instructed to conclude a Japanese-Soviet non-aggression or neutrality pact. The reaction of the Germans to this report was intended to show how far Germany's preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union had gone. If the leaders of the Reich strongly opposed such a pact, it would be a signal that the decision on the war in the east has been made definitively. However, Hitler and Ribbentrop reacted rather coolly. Ribbentrop only warned Matsuoka "not to go too far in rapprochement with Russia." Hitler later claimed that the Japanese had entered into a pact with the USSR "with the approval of Germany." ⁶⁸ The reasons for this position of the Germans can only be guessed. Most likely, they were counting on the fact that, having a pact with Stalin, the Japanese would rather decide to seize Singapore. On the other hand, they may have been impressed by Matsuoka's important statement to Ribbentrop that "no Japanese prime minister or foreign minister can force Japan to remain neutral if there is a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union. In this case, Japan will be forced, of course, to attack Russia on the side of Germany. No neutrality pact will help here. " ⁶⁹

Leaving Germany, Matsuoka understood that the leaders of the Reich were clearly not telling the truth, they did not want to reveal their cards to the Japanese, they were actually disorienting them. How else could one interpret Hitler's words that " despite the delay in the implementation of the German plan to land on the British Isles, the surrender of Great Britain is only a matter of time. Great Britain must be broken up"? How to explain the concentration of German troops in the eastern regions of the Reich, which Matsuoka saw with his own eyes when crossing the German-Soviet border? Did Germany decide to fight simultaneously in the West and east?

Matsuoka later admits that after visiting Berlin, he estimated the probability of the outbreak of the German-Soviet war as "50-50". "If I had known that they would enter the war, I would have preferred to take a more friendly position towards Germany and would not have entered into a neutrality pact (with the USSR - A. K.)," he said on June ²⁵, 1941, at a meeting of the coordination council of the government and the imperial headquarters. But that will be later. In the meantime, negotiations were to be held in Moscow.

Although the leaders of the Reich did not insist on the participation of Japanese armed forces in the war against the USSR, but sought to direct them against Great Britain, such a war could create a situation where the German government would demand that its ally fulfill its obligations under the "Triple Pact". In this case, Japan's action against the USSR would have to take place not when the Japanese government and command consider the moment most favorable, but when it will be necessary for Germany. This did not suit Japan, which did not want to play a subordinate role in the German war against the USSR, performing auxiliary tasks. On the other hand, the Japanese leadership could not help but worry that as a result of the rapid defeat of the Soviet Union by Germany, Japan would not be allowed to share the "Russian pie" or receive only small pieces. Therefore, to ensure the Empire's freedom of action in both the southern and northern directions, it was considered appropriate to have a non-aggression or neutrality pact with the Soviet Union. In addition, such a pact could become a cover for Japan's preparations for an attack on the USSR. The main goals of the pact for Japan remained the same - to get the USSR to refuse to help China and provide a strong rear in the north in case of war against the United States and Great Britain in the Pacific and in Southeast Asia.

According to the Japanese, the pact with the USSR was intended - among other things - to make it difficult to form an alliance between Washington, London and Moscow. Japanese Minister of the Navy K Oikawa spoke with undisguised concern: "The Navy is confident of its own capabilities in the event of war only with the United States and Britain, but expresses concern about a collision simultaneously with the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union." ⁷¹

Matsuoka couldn't ignore these concerns. In addition, the failure of the negotiations entrusted to him by the emperor himself in Moscow would seriously undermine the authority of the Japanese foreign Minister, raising the question of his future tenure. Therefore, he decided to continue negotiations with the Soviet leadership on signing an agreement with the USSR.

While preparing for the meeting with Matsuoka, the leadership in Moscow knew from the reports of the head of the Soviet military intelligence station in Japan "Ramsay" Richard Sorge that the emperor and the closest entourage of the Japanese Prime Minister F. Konoe wanted to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. On March 10, 1941, Sorge reported to Moscow:"...As for the USSR, Matsuoka has more authority to act independently. Konoe does not believe that Matsuoka can conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, but he still hopes that Matsuoka can do something in this direction. Konoe also hopes to get permission from the Soviet government to allow German military supplies ordered by Japan to pass through Siberia. Finally, he hopes to reach an agreement with the USSR to end cooperation with the Chongqing government. " ⁷²

(The ending follows)

⁵⁵ Nihon gaiko nempe narabi shue bunsho (Chronology of Japanese Diplomacy and basic documents). Vol. 2. Tokyo, 1965, p. 481.

⁵⁶ Diplomatic Bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, No. 23-24, December, 1994, pp. 72-74.

^{F. Halder} 57 Military Diary, vol. 2, Moscow, 1969, p. 80 (translated from German).

⁵⁸ DVP. T. XXIII. Book two, p. 36.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 46, 65.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 61-62.

^{Kulkov E. N.} 61 Block of aggressors: myths and reality. In the book " The Second World War. Actual problems". Moscow, 1995, pp. 238-239; see also: War and Politics 1939-1941. Moscow, 1999, pp. 384-393.

⁶² The Nuremberg Trials. Collection of Materials, vol. 3. Moscow, 1989, p. 630; Presseisen E. L. Germany and Japan: A Study of Totalitarian Diplomacy, 1933-1941. The Hague, 1958, p. 287.

^{Ikle F.W.} 63 German-Japanese Relations 1936 - 1940. New York, 1956, p. 133.

⁶⁴ Taisen no hiroku, p. 393.

⁶⁵ The Nuremberg Trial, vol. 3, p. 635.

⁶⁶ Japan's Decision for War. Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences. Stanford. California, 1967 p. 22.

^{Toland J.} 67 The Rising Sun. The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936 - 1945. New York, 1970, p. 66.

⁶⁸ Fuhrer Conferences on matters dealing with German Navy, 1941. Vol. 1. Washington, 1947 p.53.

⁶⁹ GARF. Fund 7876, inventory 2, case 272, sheet 12-14.

⁷⁰ Japan's Decision for War, p. 58.

⁷¹ Ibid, p.59.

⁷² Russian Archive, vol. 18, p. 173.

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