Many contradictory (and even mutually exclusive) assessments of the history of relations between Japan and Russia (USSR) have accumulated over the past century and remain in the arsenal of representatives of their political elite and scientific circles, which largely prevents the final normalization of relations between the two countries. In this regard, the latest work of the Orientalist, a well-known expert in the field of Russian-Japanese relations A. Koshkin - " Marshal Stalin's Japanese Front. Russia and Japan: a century-long shadow of Tsushima. "(Moscow, OLMA-PRESS, 2004, 480 p.) Noting that, perhaps, "there has never been a war in history about which both the victors and the defeated would have coincided judgments and assessments," the author advocates that "still ... we should move away from the deliberate ideologization and politicization of history inherent in the Cold War period, and strive to develop objective and balanced assessments of past events" (p.5).

Following this line, the author of the monograph bases his judgments and conclusions on numerous scientific studies of domestic and foreign authors, as well as on Soviet, American, English and Japanese archival documents, including those declassified only in recent years.

Many of these documents not only dispassionately cover certain historical events, but, as if transferring the reader to another historical time, arouse his keen interest. As an example, we can mention the section "Diplomatic blitzkrieg" in the Kremlin", which contains recordings of conversations between I. Stalin in March and April 1941 with Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka (p. 89-111).

By the way, it was Matsuoka who signed the neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan on behalf of Tokyo on April 13, 1941. Its leadership for several decades, with a tenacity worthy of better application, has accused Moscow of violating this pact and of the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan, which, de facto, has been observing it faithfully. But here is only a small fraction of the facts that refute this version.

The very next day after the signing of the pact, the following entry was made in the" Secret War Diary "of the General Staff of the Japanese Army:"It only gives additional time for making an independent decision on starting a war against the Soviets." Even more definitely, A. Koshkin emphasizes, was expressed in the same April by the Minister of War X. Tojo: "Regardless of the pact, we will actively carry out military preparations against the USSR" (p.109). And Matsuoka, having received on June 22, 1941, a message about the beginning of the German invasion of the USSR, " hurriedly arrived at the imperial palace, where he very energetically began to persuade the Japanese monarch to strike the Soviet Union from the east as soon as possible... Matsuoka also defended this position at meetings of the coordination council of the government and the Imperial headquarters" (p. 116). Here is one of his arguments in support of his position (from the transcript of the 32nd meeting of the specified council of June 25, 1941): "Matsuoka: ... I believe that we should hurry up and make a decision based on the principles of national policy. If Germany gains the upper hand and takes over the Soviet Union, we will not be able to enjoy the fruits of victory without doing something about it. We will either have to shed blood or resort to diplomacy. It is better to shed blood. The question is what Japan will want when the Soviet Union is finished" (p. 118).

So the Imperial Japanese army did not attack the USSR not because its ruling elite did not want to violate the neutrality pact, but for completely different reasons, which the author cites in the section "Why Japan did not attack the USSR" (pp. 143-148).

A. Koshkin in his research draws attention to the fact that the complex of Moscow's allied relations covered not only military, but also political problems, including the post-war structure of the world and, first of all, the creation of the UN. And the Soviet Union's failure to fulfill its allied obligations to enter the war against Japan could jeopardize the implementation of plans to ensure international security in the post-war world.

Considering the long-standing issue of Japanese territorial claims to Russia, the author points out that " the Japanese government's unwillingness to seek mutually acceptable solutions to the Kuril knot, the deliberate escalation of rigidity in making unfounded demands on Russia, and the refusal to take into account the position of the other side give reason to believe that the situation when the state of war has long been, will persist indefinitely " (p. 325). The validity of this not very optimistic conclusion is confirmed by the statements made by the Japanese Prime Minister on the problem of the Kuril Islands in the beginning and spring of this year.

A. Koshkin's monograph contains a lot of documentary materials, rare photo illustrations, which may be of interest to both specialist historians and a wide range of readers.

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