The foreign policy goals and state interests of South Korea and Russia in Northeast Asia (NEA) coincide and imply close cooperation not only in the process of the six-party talks on the DPRK's nuclear program, but also in establishing peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula. This article analyzes the results of the six-party talks up to February 13, 2007.

SIX-PARTY TALKS TO RESOLVE THE KOREAN PENINSULA NUCLEAR ISSUE

After the visit of US Special Envoy James Kelly to Pyongyang in October 2002, military tensions between North Korea and the United States rapidly increased over Pyongyang's violation of the Geneva Framework Agreement. The Korean peninsula is once again facing the threat of war, reminiscent of the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994.When the second nuclear crisis broke out, Russia actively pursued "shuttle" diplomacy towards the countries interested in this issue, putting forward its proposal for a "package solution" for a peaceful settlement of the problem.

As a result of such diplomacy, the first round of six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue was held in Beijing from August 27 to 29, 2003, with the participation of the United States, China, North and South Korea, Japan and Russia. The " Six " brought the negotiations to the third stage of the fifth round (February 2007). However, as expected, the DPRK and the United States stood on extremely different positions regarding both the very concept of "nuclear elimination" and the prerequisites for conducting negotiations. As for the conditions for negotiations, the United States insisted on holding negotiations on the principle of "CVID" - "complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling" of nuclear weapons [Baek Hak-sun, 2004], and the DPRK did not want to give up its positions and sought "compensation in exchange for freezing" based on the principle of simultaneous action [Outlook Dim..., 2004].

During the six-party talks, however, certain agreements were reached. Thus, following the results of the second stage of the fourth round, which took place from September 13 to 19, 2005, the participants were able to agree on the principles and goals of negotiations based on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. There was also

"This article was created with the support of the Hanguk University of Foreign Languages (Seoul).

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a joint statement consisting of six articles was signed. It seemed that the solution of the nuclear problem finally found a way out of the impasse.

However, the ink on the joint statement had not yet dried, as serious differences appeared in the positions of the DPRK and the United States regarding the time of transfer of the light water reactor. This happened already at the meetings of the first stage of the fifth round of the "six", held on November 9-11, 2005, for which it was planned to search for detailed ways to implement the joint Statement of September 19 [Joint Statement...]. At the same time, and as part of a policy of pressure on the DPRK, the United States froze its accounts in the Delta Asia Bank in Macau under the pretext of Pyongyang's involvement in the production of counterfeit dollar bills and human rights violations. In response, the DPRK conducted a series of underground nuclear tests. As a result of all these actions, the "six" again found themselves in a dead end. Later, following the results of regular meetings and separate consultations on the settlement of the negotiation agenda, the second stage of the fifth round of the "six"resumed in Beijing on December 18-22, 2006, after a 13 - month break. Finally, on February 13, 2007, as a result of the third stage of the fifth round, a joint document was adopted containing an agreement on initial steps to implement the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005, which opened a new page in solving the Korean problem.

Thus, despite periods of significant stagnation in the six-party talks due to mutual distrust and persistent confrontation between the DPRK and the United States, the momentum for further holding such talks has always been maintained. Not only China, but also Russia played a significant role in maintaining this momentum. Both countries have taken an active and constructive position as mediators in order to avoid a deadlock in the North Korean-American dialogue.

RUSSIA'S POSITION ON RESOLVING THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

First of all, it is necessary to consider what concerns Russia has about the DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons. This will allow us to better understand Russia's position, as well as its proposed strategy and ways to solve the problem. As you know, after Vladimir Putin came to power, Russia began to restore friendly relations with the North (while maintaining relations with the South) in order to restore cooperation in such areas as politics, economy and security, which was interrupted under Boris Yeltsin. However, the escalation of military tension on the Korean Peninsula due to the DPRK's nuclear aspirations is very worrying for Russia. From the security point of view, its concerns are directly related primarily to stability in the Russian Far East region, which borders the DPRK for 17 km.

The DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons is quite capable of triggering a chain reaction of militarization of potential nuclear states, including Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. This, in turn, can lead to a threat to strategic stability in the NEA, to a possible threat to security in the Russian Far East, and serve as a pretext for the United States to create its own missile defense systems in the region, as well as for rearming Japan. Russia cannot ignore the threat of an arms race, changes in security conditions and political instability in the NEA, as well as the consequences caused by the DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons [Hong Wan-seok, 2003, p. 159].

At the same time, in the event of a possible military clash on the Korean Peninsula, Russia may face a strategic dilemma, since it will have to choose whether to intervene in this conflict or not. In these circumstances, until Russia "cools" its relations with the DPRK, its relations with the United States and Japan will inevitably worsen-

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From a geopolitical point of view, this is quite undesirable for Russia. Possible destabilization in the DPRK may cause an influx of refugees to the Russian Far East, which will become a heavy socio-political burden for Russia. Nor should we ignore the possibility of radioactive contamination in the event of limited U.S. strikes on the underground nuclear facilities at Yeonbyeong.

From an economic point of view, a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula can become a serious obstacle to the implementation of two Russian state projects: the development of energy resources in Siberia and the Far East, as well as the connection of Trans - Korean Railways (TCR) with the Trans-Siberian Railway (Nashi otsenki..., 2003). The implementation of the latter project involves receiving $ 1 billion. transit profit per year. Ultimately, for Russia, the collapse of the North Korean regime means the loss of a strategic buffer zone and a retreat from maintaining security in relation to the US-Japanese military alliance. As Deputy Foreign Minister A. Losyukov noted, "a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula never meets Russia's state interests, and a military conflict on the peninsula caused by a nuclear crisis is the worst-case scenario and a disaster for Russia" [MFA of the Russian Federation concerned..., 2003].

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has focused its efforts on transforming the State system and implementing the reforms so necessary during the transition to democracy and a market economy. Taking into account the internal situation - the need to accelerate the development of a market economy and democracy, achieve economic growth, and ensure socio-political stability - the Putin government has set a key foreign policy goal-to create a favorable security climate in the border regions. Based on this, Russia needs to pay special attention to the" hot spot " of Northeast Asia, i.e., the Korean Peninsula, and continue to address the priority task of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue immediately and peacefully.

Russia has various interests on the Korean Peninsula. From a geopolitical point of view, this means preserving the traditional influence on the Korean Peninsula. Geoeconomically , the development of oil and gas pipeline networks from the Angarsk oil fields and Sakhalin gas fields, as well as the connection of Trans-Korean railways with the Trans-Siberian Railway. In terms of security, it is necessary to prevent a military conflict in this region, which may lead to an increase in Russia's defense spending and, accordingly, slow down the country's development. The North Korean nuclear issue forces Russia to directly or indirectly influence the process of solving it and play an active constructive role in this process.

That is why, after the visit of US Special Envoy James Kelly to Pyongyang in October 2002, relations between Washington and Pyongyang once again deteriorated and there was a real threat of a pre-emptive strike by the United States against North Korea, Russia of all the states neighboring the DPRK acted as the most active mediator.

If we consider Russia's domestic and foreign policy and various aspects of its interests on the Korean peninsula in general, it is not difficult to understand Russia's approach to the nuclear issue: maintaining friendly relations with the DPRK in order to gain Russian influence on the Korean peninsula; preventing North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons based on Russia's own security interests; deterring unilateral US policy; ensuring Russia's participation as an interested party in multilateral negotiations on the Korean nuclear issue, as well as emphasizing the importance of maintaining peace on Russia's borders for domestic political reforms and economic development.

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In this regard, Moscow proposes the following five principles for the peaceful settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue [On the North Korean nuclear issue...]. First, reaching agreements only through equal negotiations, subject to compliance with international law, in an atmosphere of goodwill and mutual respect. Secondly, respect for the absolutely justified demands of the DPRK to provide it with firm security guarantees and create normal external conditions for the country's economic development. Third, taking into account the understandable concern of the United States and a number of other countries about Pyongyang's nuclear development, the DPRK's clear refusal to further implement its nuclear program. Fourth, concerted and coordinated action by all stakeholders to address this issue. Fifth, the creation of an expert working group on a permanent basis, within the framework of which specific analytical and preparatory work on resolving the problem would be carried out in the future.

Such a principled approach of Russia is well described in the "package solution", which was proposed by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation A.V. Losyukov proposed to the interested countries, including the DPRK and the United States, in January 2003, at the very beginning of the crisis [Emissary of the Kremlin..., 2003]. The essence of the "package solution" (or "Losyukov plan") consists of three key elements: a) denuclearization of the Korean peninsula; b) providing security guarantees to the DPRK; and c) providing Pyongyang with economic compensation. In other words, first, the plan provides for ensuring the nuclear-weapon-free status of the Korean peninsula and strict compliance by all parties with their obligations under other international agreements, including the 1994 Framework Agreement.Second, a constructive bilateral or multilateral dialogue between interested parties, one of the results of which should be security guarantees for the DPRK. Third, the resumption of humanitarian and economic programs for North Korea [Moskvarazrabotala plan..., 2003].

In general, the plan for resolving the crisis around the DPRK proposed by Moscow reflects the common positions of the United States and the DPRK and assumes the following:: a) Russia is against North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons and the application of US military sanctions against the DPRK; b) a peaceful settlement of the problem is necessary in a multilateral format, in which Russia also participates; c) compensation for North Korea's renunciation of nuclear weapons must be provided and its understandable concern about its nuclear program must be fully taken into account. security issues.

Russia has consistently maintained a neutral stance on key points of contention between the United States and North Korea that emerged during the Six-party talks. As for the closure of nuclear programs, Russia agrees in principle with the US demands for the "complete, verifiable and irreversible" dismantling of nuclear weapons and the closure of nuclear programs, including those using highly enriched uranium.

At the same time, Russia believes that the North Korean requirement to use nuclear programs for peaceful purposes rather than military purposes is quite acceptable, provided that the DPRK returns to the NPT [1]. In contrast to North Korea's proposals for synchronous actions and America's consistent implementation of commitments, Russia is proposing a comprehensive, "package solution" based on parallel steps. In addition, Russia believes that in the event of a freeze on nuclear weapons programs, it can participate in a joint dialogue under certain conditions.-

1 During a meeting of the working group of the Six-Party talks on the DPRK nuclear issue held in Beijing in May 2004, Deputy Director of the First Asia Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry V. Sukhinin stated that "in accordance with the NPT, any State can have the right to explore nuclear energy for peaceful purposes" and strongly demanded that the DPRK return to the NPT if it wants to have the right to "peaceful nuclear development" [Discussion of conditional compensation..., 2004].

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security guarantees and energy support for North Korea in the framework of the six-party talks.

RUSSIA'S STRATEGY ON THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

A comprehensive analysis of Russia's position and proposed solutions to the North Korean nuclear issue suggests that the Kremlin's strategy in relation to this problem is based on the following four political considerations: creating stable global security; deterring unilateral US policy; maintaining stability on Russia's Far Eastern borders and gaining influence on the Korean Peninsula. Based on Russia's strategy and specific political goals regarding the Korean nuclear issue, the following conclusions can be drawn.

First, limited political engagement with the United States is needed to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula within the framework of a global regime to control the development and proliferation of WMD, including nuclear weapons. Russia, playing one of the key roles in controlling the non-proliferation of WMD, consistently supports compliance with and preservation of the NPT. In 1995, in New York, Russia along with America [Measure for measure... Russia has played a leading role in the process of reaching an agreement on the indefinite extension of the NPT regime. Since the first North Korean nuclear crisis, Russia's position has been limited to the need to preserve the nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the positions of Russia and the United States on the "complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling" of nuclear weapons in North Korea completely coincide.

Russia, like the USSR in the past, directly links the nuclear-free situation on its borders with the interests of its own security. It particularly supports the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which contributes to ensuring the security of the Russian Far East and preventing the spatial proliferation of nuclear weapons. Apparently, the presence of nuclear weapons in the DPRK can encourage South Korea, Japan and Taiwan to develop them. Russia considers such a situation unacceptable in the interests of security. It is in this context that its leadership consistently opposes North Korea's nuclear development, supports the approval of the IAEA inspection, and supports compliance with the NPT regime. At the same time, Russia has consistently strengthened friendly ties and cooperation with Pyongyang.

Second, a peaceful and multilateral settlement of the Korean nuclear issue within the framework of deterring the US hegemonic policy. As noted above, Russia considers North Korea's nuclear development to be a serious threat to its security in the NEA. Therefore, it has always supported the US position against the existence of nuclear weapons in North Korea. Unlike in 1992, when the North Korean nuclear issue became international, Russia's current approach to North Korea has changed. It no longer consists in putting direct and active pressure on it, but in encouraging it to give up its nuclear weapons by diplomatic means on its own. 2 Russia seeks a policy of peaceful cessation of North Korea's nuclear development through diplomatic maneuvering and in a multilateral format, but without provoking the DPRK.

2 A. Vorontsov, Head of the Korea and Mongolia Department at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, claims that "South Africa and Ukraine independently renounced nuclear weapons in response to the acquisition of the world community's reward" and that "political pressure or military threat will not help this" [Need to provide..., 2003].

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In principle, Russia, which stands for global strategic stability, agrees with the US position on strengthening international norms of nuclear non-proliferation. However, Russia and the United States have different views on ways and means of implementing such non-proliferation. While the Kremlin prefers institutional international bodies and agreements, starting with the IAEA and the Missile Technology Control Regime, the White House prefers an active rather than passive nonproliferation strategy and emphasizes the need for a preemptive preemptive strike [Pak Chin, 2002].

This difference stems from the peculiarities of the world strategies of Russia and the United States. As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States, which no longer had a rival country, significantly strengthened measures on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and under a new security strategy, identified states with the ability to conduct nuclear development or become a source of WMD proliferation as "rogue states" or" axis of evil countries " [So Bo Heck, 2003]. The United States identifies hostile States with terrorist groups or " rogue States, "because the" rogue state threat " theory justifies a preemptive strike through an active nonproliferation policy and at the same time provides the United States with a good political excuse to strengthen its global hegemony.

At the same time, the "rogue states" or" axis of evil countries " are very important for Russia's national interests and, paradoxically, friendly states with Russia and become its potential ally group, which brings certain benefits to Russia in relations with the United States [The Moscow-Tehran axis..., 2003]. It has important economic interests in these countries in such areas as arms exports, nuclear power plants, and joint development of hydrocarbons. In a political sense, they are a useful strategic lever to contain the global hegemonic dominance of the United States and build the multipolar world order that Russia seeks. The latter believes that the United States deliberately creates the image of an enemy and applies nonproliferation norms without clear evidence, using this circumstance as a pretext for expanding its hegemony. This is also evidenced by the fact that no evidence of the presence of WMD in Iraq has been found.

Therefore, there is no need for Russia to blindly follow the nonproliferation regime in the format imposed by the United States, and to be hostile or spoil ties with "rogue states". Given Russia's priority relationship with the United States, the best choice would be to emphasize the need to strengthen the nonproliferation regime fundamentally only at the diplomatic level.

Third: objection to the isolation of the DPRK and the military solution of the North Korean nuclear issue in order to preserve stability in the Russian Far East region. Russia selectively cooperates with the United States to limit North Korean nuclear development, but it also opposes isolation and the use of force. There may be different reasons for this. Economic sanctions and isolation of North Korea, including a naval blockade, which the United States insists, will push the DPRK to "tactics on the edge", which, in turn, will justify the construction of a missile defense system in the NEA under the leadership of the United States. In a situation of military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, a preemptive, albeit limited, US strike on the DPRK can lead to an all-out war, and its consequences will affect Russia much more than the United States.

Fourth: strengthening Russia's political role and curbing the dominance of the United States and China through Russia's active participation in the Six-Party talks to gain influence on the Korean peninsula. The United States, which usually prefers to solve international problems in a single or bilateral format, emphasizes the need for a multilateral solution only to the Korean problem.

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nuclear problems. In this regard, Russia has some doubts for the following reasons: the Bush administration does not stop looking for arguments for carrying out military sanctions against the DPRK. At the same time, it wants to attract Russia and China, which also support the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, to put pressure on North Korea and thereby help cool the DPRK's friendly ties with Russia and China. The United States intends to share responsibility for economic assistance and compensation to the North with Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea (Analiz..., 2004).

Russia, unlike its policy in the era of the first nuclear crisis, now seeks to play a leading role as a real intermediary, and not as a" best man " of the United States, while fully agreeing with the US strategy on the North Korean nuclear program. Russia has no reason to risk intervening in the North Korean-American acute conflict and weaken its position. For it, it is more appropriate to persuade the United States and the DPRK, which are parties to the nuclear crisis, to reach an agreement, and in case of stagnation in the North Korean-American dialogue, to put forward balanced proposals as a mediator and thus retain the initiative in the negotiation process of the "six". In addition, by participating in the six-party talks, Russia is moving closer to implementing its plan to participate in the Organization for the Development of Energy on the Korean Peninsula (KEDO), as well as to create a multilateral security system, the prototype of which is the "six".

RUSSIAN-SOUTH KOREAN COOPERATION AIMED AT PEACE AND PROSPERITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND IN THE NEA

Russia's principled position on the North Korean nuclear issue is based on the fact that security on the Korean peninsula and on Russia's borders is important for Russia's socio-political stability and economic development. The establishment of peaceful relations between the South and the North is a prerequisite for the implementation of economic cooperation projects in NEA. The" soft landing " of the DPRK with the help of reforms and a gradual exit from the closed regime meet the geopolitical interests of Russia. Analyzing Russia's national interests on the Korean Peninsula and in the NEA, the author came to the conclusion that strategic cooperation between Russia and South Korea is now more necessary and possible than ever in the process of peaceful settlement of the nuclear problem, creation of a peaceful regime on the Korean peninsula and a multilateral security system.

First, Russia does not threaten the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula, and Russia and South Korea have similar strategic positions on key issues related to the Korean Peninsula and the NEA. As for the North Korean nuclear issue, Russia traditionally supports the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the DPRK's compliance with the norms of the international non-proliferation regime and the 1994 Framework Agreement, for a peaceful settlement of the problem and against a preemptive US strike on the North; moreover, the Russian "package plan" almost coincides with the "road map" proposed by South Korea. Russia stands for easing tensions and maintaining the current ceasefire on the Korean peninsula, for deepening inter-Korean dialogue, and supports the principle of directly concluding a peace agreement between the South and the North, which exactly coincides with the position of the South Korean government. It is also possible that the positions of both countries may coincide on the creation of the Eurasian transport corridor linking the Trans-Siberian Railway and the TCR, on the establishment of a mechanism for energy cooperation in the NEA and the CIS.

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multilateral security system of the NEA, strengthening the international role of the UN, etc.

Second, the world game on the Korean Peninsula is not a bilateral one (the US and the DPRK) or a trilateral one (the ROK, the DPRK and the US), but a multilateral one - involving six parties, including Russia; this game is complex and multi-level, involving players from different forces and representing different interests. It is known that South Korea, which is at the lowest level in the hierarchical structure of the Korean-American union, has more advantages in the position of a participant in multilateral negotiations involving many parties representing different and asymmetric interests. In this multilateral framework, Korea can profitably use the political orientations and strategies of strong players whose interests collide (Kang Bong-gu, 2004). In addition, for Seoul, cooperation with Moscow, which has a similar strategic view on major Korean issues, would mean gaining a strong supporter.

Third, it is impossible not to take into account the important role of Russia on the Korean peninsula as a balancer that restrains the dominance of the United States. The United States considers the nuclear crisis to be a foreign policy issue that needs to be addressed immediately, rather than a reason for strategic consolidation of its hegemony and national interests in the NEA.

Antagonistic relations with North Korea provide the United States with other strategic benefits, 3 and therefore their line on the North Korean issue differs from its actions in relation to Iraq. As you know, the United States attacked Iraq not because North Korea was inferior to Iraq in the number of weapons of mass destruction, but because its national interests (oil, changing the order in the Middle East, military-industrial complex, etc.) were of priority for the United States and they were confident of a relatively easy victory over Iraq. Unlike the Iraq crisis, the unresolved North Korean crisis is in the national interest of the United States. In other words, if Saddam Hussein's regime was part of the "axis of evil" that needed to be eliminated urgently from the point of view of American interests, then Kim Jong Il's regime is part of the "axis of evil" that must be "preserved" [Axis of Evil..., 2003].

In the US strategic calculations in the NEA, North Korean nuclear weapons are a factor of high political value, not a threat. In this regard, the American policy of eliminating North Korea's nuclear weapons is an ideal way for the United States to introduce an imbalance in international politics. It was developed and updated within the framework of the task of global dominance of the United States (Lee Chang-joo, 2001). This approach affects the policy of the South Korean government in relation to the nuclear issue, threatens the peaceful situation on the Korean peninsula and South Korean-American relations [Seo Bo Hyuk, 2003]. Only Russia can contain the military hegemony and dominance of the United States, and it naturally plays an important role in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. It follows that South Korea, of course, should "take advantage" of Russia.

In addition, there are other arguments that point to the need for Russian-Korean strategic cooperation in the process of resolving many issues related to the Korean Peninsula and the NEA. Russia stands for conservation

3 After George W. Bush came to power in the United States, approaches to a number of political decisions regarding the DPRK became more pronounced. New issues in the North Korean-American dialogue include the reduction of conventional weapons, the demand for the preliminary and unconditional elimination of the nuclear program, the cessation of fuel oil supplies to the North under KEDO, the arrest of the Sosanho ship, the activation of the US RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft over the territory of the DPRK, the definition of the DPRK as a state supporting terrorism, the freezing of North Korean accounts with Delta Asia Bank, etc.

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peace, stability and security on the Korean Peninsula and in the NEA. This is an important condition for the economic development of the regions of Eastern Siberia and the Far East, which should become sources of resources and an industrial base for the overall prosperity of NEA. The world's only Eurasian country wants to be reborn as a" great Russia " connecting East Asia and Europe. This is the main strategy for its development.

This vision of Russia is similar to the" policy of peace and prosperity " of South Korea. The goal of this policy is to preserve the peaceful situation on the Korean peninsula through the peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue, strengthen military confidence between the South and the North, normalize relations with neighboring countries, strive for common Korean prosperity and create the basis for turning the country into an economic power in the NEA [Peace and Prosperity Policy..., 2003]. If Russia is going to become a bridge connecting the West and the East, then its first pillar should be South Korea, and the second - North. The South is ready to become the first link of the modern "Silk Road", but the North is not ready yet. It is Russia and South Korea that are seriously interested in the DPRK's active participation in this project, as well as in its long-term implementation. This also explains the need for strategic cooperation between Russia and South Korea in the 21st century. [Kang Bong-gu, 2004, pp. 255-258].

As mentioned above, the foreign policy goals and state interests of South Korea and Russia on the Korean peninsula and in the NEA coincide and imply close cooperation. For this reason, Russia's role in the implementation of the state and strategic idea focused on peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula and in the NEA is extremely important, and in proportion to this, the need to deepen strategic cooperation between the Russian Federation and South Korea increases. In conclusion, it should be noted that due to the commonality or proximity of political positions and congruence of interests of Russia and the Republic of Korea on North Korean and key international issues, there is a need to develop a new paradigm of bilateral relations in the XXI century.

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