To mark the 80th anniversary of the Battle of Tsushima (May 1905), one of the culminating events of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, various materials designed to demonstrate the power of Japanese weapons were published in Japan; thematic excursions to Yasukuni (the temple of remembrance of those who died in the wars) are organized there, initiated by the ruling circles and the military; trips are organized to places connected with the mobilization and dispatch in 1904 of ground troops to the front in Manchuria, and ships of the Navy to the waters of the Yellow Sea. In May 1984, an official reception and naval parade were held in Kagoshima with the participation of the warships Haruna, Amatsukaze and aircraft, as well as ships of the US Navy's 7th Fleet, British patrol ships and a French destroyer in connection with the upcoming anniversary of the Battle of Tsushima and the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Tsushima.

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the day of Admiral X's death. The one who commanded the Japanese Navy at the time.

The leading circles and propaganda apparatus of the Liberal Democratic Party, their ideological allies from the Party of Democratic Socialism, etc. use such events to raise the" patriotic spirit " of young people and to inspire hope in the ability of the Japanese armed forces to win victories over powerful opponents, to inspire them with a sense of admiration for the samurai combat past. In Japan, "chauvinistic, revanchist sentiments are being instilled, active preparations are being made for the militarization of the country, and feelings of hostility towards Russia, the Soviet Union, and its people are being cultivated," the USSR Foreign Ministry said in a statement published in the Pravda newspaper on May 26, 1984.

The Battle of Tsushima took place on May 27-28 (new style), 1905. The death of the 2nd Pacific Squadron in it was the result, on the one hand, of the weakness and unpreparedness of the fleet, generated by the economic backwardness of tsarist Russia, the rottenness of its political system and the shortcomings of its military organization, on the other hand, by the presence of a strong, combat - ready fleet in Japan, which surpassed the Russian in basic technical indicators. Japan owed the creation of such a fleet primarily to England, from which it received great technical, economic and military assistance. By helping Japan, Britain counted on weakening Russia. Britain and the United States were then the main suppliers of strategic raw materials, artillery and ammunition to Japan, without which it would not have been able to withstand a long war. As you know, on January 30, 1902, the Anglo - Japanese military alliance was concluded. Almost all Japanese battleships and large destroyers, which were superior to the corresponding Russian ships in terms of armor, speed and armament, were built in English shipyards .1 Their crews were trained and trained by British specialists.

Describing individual ships of the Tsarist Navy of that time, the famous Russian shipbuilder Academician A. N. Krylov wrote that in fact it was a collection of a large number of ships, and not a fleet: the armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov "was a strong, but unique ship of its kind. "Memory of Azov" is a weak cruiser, both in terms of armament and armor... "Petropavlovsk", "Sevastopol" and "Poltava" were the first battleships of the same type... "Peresvet", "Oslyabya" and "Victory", although they were of the same type, but in relation to the previous ones they were both they would have been bastards (either cruisers or battleships, with the main artillery of four 10-inch guns, while all battleships had four 12-inch ones). Built on a special allocation (90 million) for the fleet, the battleships of the Tsesarevich type turned out to be... by themselves... Vessels up to the Tsesarevich type were usually imitating English battleships with a delay of 6-7 years " 2 .

After the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war, subscriptions were opened in London and New York for the first Japanese war loan of $ 50 million, in November 1904 a second Anglo-American loan of $ 60 million was issued, in March 1905 a third loan of $ 150 million, and in July 1905 - the fourth is $ 150 million 3 . These loans covered about half of Japan's war expenses against Russia4 . Britain and the United States did everything possible to isolate Russia in the international arena. As soon as Japan attacked Russia, Britain reminded other states that under the terms of the agreement with Japan, it would take its side if any of the states showed hostile actions towards Japan. The same line in foreign policy was taken by the government of T. Roosevelt, who stated that if a coalition of states was formed against Japan, the United States would "immediately take the side of the latter." 5 At the same time, Britain and the United States announced anti-Russian neutrality rules prohibiting foreign military vessels from using their naval bases and ports. The Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden and Norway have declared the same neutrality . 6-

1 See Military Fleets for 1904. Spravochnik. SPb. 1904.

2 Krylov A. N. My memoirs, L. 1979, pp. 142-143.

3 Dobroe A. Dalnevostochnaya politika SSHA v periodom russko-yaponskoy voyny [Far Eastern policy of the United States during the Russo-Japanese war]. Moscow, 1952, pp. 146-149.

4 Sorokin A. I. Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Moscow, 1956, p. 41.

5 Yaroslavsky E. Russko-yaponskaya voina i otnoshenie k ney bolshevikov [The Russian-Japanese War and the attitude of the Bolsheviks to it]. Moscow, 1939, p. 12.

6 In accordance with the notes, the "Collection of Regulations and Rules issued by the Russian Government and Foreign Organizations" was published.-

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However, France, which was in alliance with Russia, did not allow Russian ships to enter its bases and ports .7
The course of the war from the very beginning was unfavorable for Russia. Already in its first hours, when the Japanese fleet treacherously attacked Russian ships in Port Arthur and Chemulpo, the cruiser Varyag and the gunboat Koreyets were heroically killed. Having abandoned active operations at sea after the death of the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral S. O. Makarov, the tsarist command gave the enemy the opportunity to land in Korea. Taking advantage of this, the 1st Japanese Army defeated the Russian Eastern Detachment, ensuring the advance of its troops into Manchuria, as well as the landing of the 2nd army on the Liaodong Peninsula and its advance to Port Arthur. The decision of the tsarist government in April 1904 to maneuver the fleet from the Baltic to the Far East was doomed to failure. However, as V. I. Lenin emphasized, " the autocracy saw that the unfortunate outcome of the war was tantamount to the victory of the "internal enemy", i.e., the victory of the revolution. So everything was at stake. Hundreds of millions of rubles were spent on the hasty dispatch of the Baltic squadron. " 8
The formation of the 2nd Pacific Squadron and its command was entrusted to the Chief of the Main Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky, an ardent monarchist and incompetent naval commander. The preparation of the ships was delayed for almost six months, but then their low readiness for a long campaign was revealed.

The basis of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was the new squadron battleships "Emperor Alexander III", "Prince Suvorov", "Borodino"and " Eagle". The first of these was tested in the summer of 1903; they proved in many respects unsatisfactory. The others started the tests right before the hike and didn't complete them. The other half of the squadron consisted of old battleships and armored cruisers with short-range guns. The crews of the ships were mostly completed just before departure. Many command posts were held by officers called up from the reserve and left behind, and the number of reserve lower ranks exceeded a third of the total number of crew on ships. In connection with repairs and other work, combat training of personnel was almost not carried out. Before leaving, only one practical firing was made, during which the new battleships fired two or three shots from the main caliber 9 artillery .

The squadron left Libava on October 15, without completing the work related to the transition. All ships were overloaded due to the installation of auxiliary devices and loading materials for a long hike , which reduced their stability, as a result of which they turned over and sank in battle with holes at the waterline. Most of the ships were slow-moving, and their crews had no experience sailing together as part of a large squadron. It was a Great Armada, "huge, cumbersome, absurd, impotent, monstrous." 11
The route of the main part of the squadron lay around Africa, because of the heavy draft, large ships could not follow the Suez Canal. It was necessary to go 18 thousand miles 12 in 90 running days and spend another 60 days loading 240 thousand tons of coal on the way, i.e. the entire trip was designed for five months. The squadron had no plan in case of meeting the Japanese fleet on the way. The transition was complicated by the fact that Russia had no naval bases or ports all the way from Libava to the Far East. The transition was not hidden. It was carried out under the supervision of British cruisers. Hostile England tried in every possible way to disrupt or delay the transition of the Russian squadron. Already on the seventh day of the journey, the Gulla incident occurred in the North Sea. At night, flotillas of British fishermen were deployed along the course of the Russian ships, which, as the organizers of the provocation expected, were mistaken for Japanese destroyers. They were fired upon. The London government has demanded compensation for damages, threatening to develop-

strange states on the occasion of the war between Russia and Japan" (St. Petersburg, 1904).

7 History of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Moscow, 1977, p. 326.

8 Lenin V. And PSS. Vol. 10, p. 251.

9 Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 Book 6: The Campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron to the Far East. The work of the historical commission describing the actions of the Fleet in the war of 1904-1905 at the Naval General Staff. Pg. 1917, pp. 7-9.

10 Ibid., pp. 8, 25.

11 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 10, p. 251.

The 12 nautical mile is about 1,853 meters.

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pto of diplomatic relations. The incident was settled after England was paid 500 thousand rubles in gold 13 .

On January 5, 1905, when the squadron reached Madagascar, news came of the fall of Port Arthur. Petersburg hastily sent the 1st detachment of the 3rd Pacific Squadron 14 to help Rozhestvensky . After two months of sailing, Rear Admiral N. I. Nebogatov's detachment and the 2nd Squadron joined forces and headed for the Korean Strait. Nebogatov's detachment, consisting of old ships, was more of a burden than a reinforcement of the squadron. Hastily formed, he didn't have time for combat training either. "Just before the departure from Libava, almost all the ships were replaced by commanders who knew how to control their artillery." 15 The combined squadron now had as many armored ships as the enemy, but the technical equipment of the Russian ships was much weaker.

Having decided to break through to Vladivostok by the shortest route, through the Korean Strait, Rozhestvensky provided the Japanese Fleet with the most favorable conditions for deploying its forces and, moreover, sent most of the transports to Shanghai, unmasking the direction of the breakthrough .16
The Battle of Tsushima was accompanied by miscalculations on both sides in maneuvering and organizing tactical reconnaissance. In the daytime battle, the Russian squadron lost four battleships and one auxiliary cruiser, while the remaining ships were damaged. Serious damage was also inflicted on the Japanese Fleet: its battleships were hit by many large-caliber Russian shells, but these vessels still remained afloat 17 . At nightfall, the commander of the Japanese Fleet, Vice Admiral Togo, threw up to 60 destroyers into battle. A number of other Russian battleships were sunk or damaged. Their crews behaved heroically. Here is how the Japanese described the last hours of one of the battleships: "The ship "Suvorov", all burned and still burning, suffered so many blows, shot by the entire (in the full sense of the word) squadron, which had only one accidentally surviving gun in the stern, still opened fire from it, showing determination to defend itself to the last from the moment of its existence... Finally, at 7.20 p.m., after two attacks by our destroyers, it sank. " 18 Not wanting to surrender, the crews of the battleship Admiral Ushakov, the destroyer Gromky and others opened Kingston and sank their ships. "We must do justice," Togo wrote in a report to the emperor, " to the fact that the enemy's officers and crews fought with the greatest energy for their fatherland."19
By 28 May, the 2nd Pacific Squadron had ceased to exist as an organized combat force. Only the cruisers Almaz and Izumrud (which ran aground in St. Vladimir's Bay and was blown up by the crew) and the destroyers Brave and Grozny made it to Vladivostok. The cruisers Aurora, Zhemchug, and Oleg made their way to Manila, while the destroyer Bodry and the transports Svir and Korea made their way to Shanghai, where they were interned.

Japan won then-a victory on land and at sea in a war that was inherently unjust and imperialist. Its aims were hostile to the fundamental interests of the working masses. This is understood by a number of modern Japanese progressive historians, who seek to reveal the true nature of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, as aggressive 20 . However, the Japanese officially documented history of the war of 1904-1905, as well as the work of a conservative group of Japanese historians, glorify in pompous tones Japan's determination to "cross swords" with the Russian colossus. "This decision was bold and responsible, because the Russian army and navy had world-famous victories at Poltava, Sevastopol, Plevna, and Napoleon's army, and therefore it was about Russia, which tasted the joy and pride of victory over strong opponents." 21
13 Sorokin A. I. Uk. soch., p. 291.

14 Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Book 6, p. 138.

15 Ibid., p. 220.

16 Istoriya voenno-morskoy iskusstva [History of Naval Art], vol. 3, Moscow, 1953, p. 93.

17 Sorokin A. I. Uk. soch., pp. 302-303.

18 Semenov V. Rasplata, vol. 1, St. Petersburg, 1907, pp. 145-146.

19 Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Fleet actions. The dock. Otd. IV. SPb. 1907, p. 648.

20 Nakamura S. Japanese and Russian: from the history of contacts, Moscow, 1983.

21 Authentic stories of the Japanese people. Tokyo. 1951, pp. 614-617 (in Japanese); see also: Yoshida S. Northern Territories. Tokyo. 1976, pp. 138-159 (in Russian); Our Northern Territories. Tokyo 1977.

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Today, when the danger of a nuclear war has sharply increased, and Japan is increasingly drawn into the orbit of the aggressive strategy of American imperialism, the working masses of this country, some students, and progressive intellectuals are beginning to understand that the excitement surrounding the Battle of Tsushima and other events, playing on the patriotic feelings of the Japanese and the growth of revanchist sentiments among them to aggravate Japanese-Soviet relations, to increase international tension in general, and this is not in the interests of Japan itself.

p. 2 (in Japanese); Shimizu T. Four ways to solve the problem of the northern territories. Tokyo. 1977, p. VII (in Russian). Japanese historians drew much information about the events of 1904-1905 from Western works.

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