After the end of the civil war and the imperialist intervention, normalization of relations with Japan was one of the primary tasks of Soviet foreign policy: part of the Soviet territory - Northern Sakhalin-remained under the control of the Japanese military. 1 The strengthening of the internal and international positions of the USSR and the further aggravation of imperialist contradictions in the Pacific also raised the question of relations with the Soviet state with all the urgency of the Japanese ruling circles. The military method of solving the problem of Soviet-Japanese relations proved to be untenable: the Japanese interventionists had to leave the territory of Soviet Russia in disgrace.

The failure of the intervention, the aggravation of class contradictions in the country, and the growth of the democratic and revolutionary movement reflected the internal weakening of Japanese imperialism. All this could not but affect the foreign policy positions of Japan. American imperialism launched a decisive offensive against its rival's positions in China, the South Sea countries, and the CER exclusion zone. The British monopolies were also quick to take advantage of the situation. As a result, Japan's foreign trade volume plummeted. Japanese-American relations were increasingly strained. The Far East has become one of the centers of imperialist confrontation.

Under these circumstances, Japanese business circles are turning their eyes to the Soviet state, where they saw a broad market for goods and raw materials. The Soviet side was also interested in developing economic ties. The most active advocates of normalizing relations with Soviet Russia were Japanese fishermen who were interested in concluding agreements on fishing in Soviet waters. If during the civil War and the existence of the Far Eastern Republic, Japanese fishermen engaged in fishing with impunity in the waters of the Soviet Far East, then after the evacuation of Japanese troops, this situation could not be maintained. The Soviet state took measures to stop predatory fishing in its territorial waters.

Demands for recognition of the USSR were put forward by the general public of Japan (trade unions, student organizations, progressive intelligentsia, individual groups of peasants, etc.). It was becoming clear to far-sighted Japanese politicians that the Soviet Union was a country that had already established relations with a number of capitalist countries.

1 Southern Sakhalin was torn away from Russia in 1905 under the terms of the predatory Treaty of Portsmouth, imposed on Russia after its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

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states (Germany, England, etc.)" is a state to be reckoned with 2 . And Japan, which was interested in resolving a number of political and economic issues that it could not solve without the Soviet Union or in spite of it, was forced to seek peace agreements. However, the negotiations were conducted by her government indecisively, slowly, with various retreats, interruptions and looking back at the positions of various groups of the ruling circles, the military, as well as other powers.

The reason for the start of negotiations was the invitation in December 1922 of the Soviet diplomatic representative in Beijing A. A. Ioffe to Japan for medical treatment. The contacts were initially informal. Relations between the Soviet representative and the Japanese government were carried out through the Mayor of Tokyo, a prominent political figure, Viscount S. Goto, who both before and after the Great October Socialist Revolution was an active supporter of rapprochement with our country .3 Simultaneously with the political negotiations, the Soviet representative, in order to establish contact with circles directly interested in the development of economic relations with our country, began negotiations with Japanese fishermen on fishing in Soviet waters.

During the negotiations, Japanese representatives quite frankly formulated a program aimed at seizing Northern Sakhalin and imposing economic agreements favorable to Japan on the Soviet Union. The Japanese side proposed two options for resolving the Sakhalin issue: either selling the Soviet part of Sakhalin to Japan for 150 million yen, or granting Japan long-term concessions for the exploitation of the oil, coal and forest resources of Northern Sakhalin, as well as railways for a period of 55-99 years .4 There was a demand for granting Japan concessions in other places of the Soviet Far East. The notorious Nikolayev question 5 was not forgotten: according to the Japanese proposals, the Soviet government was to take responsibility for the death of the Japanese consul and Japanese citizens in Nikolaevsk and recognize itself as obligated to compensate for the losses.

In June 1923, informal negotiations on the normalization of relations between the USSR and Japan entered a new stage. After rejecting Goto's mediation services, the Japanese government appointed Envoy Kawakami as its representative in the negotiations. On the part of the USSR, Ioffe continued to conduct negotiations. Japan insisted on the recognition of the treaties concluded by the tsarist government and its debts, as well as the return of private property to Japanese citizens and citizens.-

2 Goto Simpei. View or opinion on relations between Japan and Russia. Tokyo. 1923, p. 3 (in Russian).

3 Tsuruma Yusuke. Biography of Goto Simpei. Vol. IV. Tokyo, 1931, p. 426 (in Japanese).

4 WUA OF the USSR, f. 146, d. 5, l. 48.

5 The so-called Nikolaev incident was provoked by Japanese military circles in March 1920. Surrounded in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur by partisan detachments, Japanese units capitulated on February 28 (February 1920) and concluded a treaty of peace and friendship with the partisan command. However, on March 11, they treacherously attacked the partisans. The partisans brought up their artillery and increased their fire. The center of the Japanese resistance was the premises of the consulate and barracks. The fire killed Japanese soldiers and officers trapped there, as well as Japanese citizens gathered there by the Japanese consul. This incident served the Japanese military for a number of years as a pretext for various provocations and delaying the evacuation of Northern Sakhalin (see for more details: The October Revolution and the Civil War in the Far East. Chronicle of events. 1917 - 1922. Khabarovsk. 1933, p. 145, 194; Gubelman M. I. The struggle for the Soviet Far East. 1918-1922. M. 1958, p. 179-180; Nikiforov P. M. Notes of the Prime Minister of the Far Eastern Federal District. M. 1962, p. 184-187).

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compensation of losses to owners of nationalized enterprises 6 . The Soviet representative stated that the USSR could not agree to the sale of Northern Sakhalin, the recognition of the obligations and debts of the tsarist government, the return of private property to Japanese subjects, and referred to the principled position taken by the Soviet delegation at the Genoa Conference of 1922. He showed the guilt of the Japanese military in the Nikolaev events. At the same time, Ioffe spoke about the possibility of granting Japan concessions on Sakhalin and in other areas of the Soviet Far East .7 However, the Japanese government agreed to set a deadline for the evacuation of its troops from Northern Sakhalin only if it accepted its demands.

Thus, the Japanese side did not take a constructive position at that time. In July 1923, the negotiations were interrupted. They were resumed only in May 1924. The demands of the fishing industry prompted the Japanese government to seek an agreement on fishing in Soviet waters. The Soviet Government has repeatedly stressed that the final settlement of this issue is possible only if the main political problems are solved simultaneously. Japanese fishermen and related business circles showed the greatest interest in settling relations with the USSR.

Japan's position could not but be affected by the aggravation of Japanese-American and Japanese-British contradictions. In May 1924, a new immigration act was passed in the United States, prohibiting foreigners from entering the United States. This law caused a wave of anti-American protests in Japan, as it was directed primarily against Japanese emigration. The upper and lower houses of the Japanese parliament adopted protest resolutions, numerous organizations launched a broad anti-American campaign in the country, hundreds of rallies were held, and a boycott of American goods and movies was announced. Even greater excitement in Japan was caused by the speech of U.S. Secretary of the Navy Wilbur, who declared in San Francisco on September 5, 1924, that the United States was threatened from the Pacific Ocean by "the aggressiveness of a people influenced by the spirit of the mob and the outbreak of passion" and that "nothing cools a hot temper like a piece of cold steel." 8 Britain in 1923 began construction of the Singapore military base, which posed a threat to Japan.

The aggravation of the situation in the Pacific, the threat of joint actions by Britain and the United States forced the Japanese government to seek support in the international arena. An agreement with the USSR would undoubtedly strengthen Japan's position in the face of British and American imperialism. The difficult internal situation also pushed the Japanese Government to settle relations with the Soviet Union as soon as possible. The spring of 1924 was characterized for Japan by a new upsurge of the democratic movement. The Government could not ignore the scale of popular protests and the broad wave of pacifism that swept through almost all capitalist countries in those years. It was forced to carry out a series of internal reforms, and to maneuver in its foreign policy, to cover its aggressive aspirations with talk of "peace policy", readiness for agreements, etc. By establishing relations with the USSR, the Japanese government hoped to soften the internal political situation, to satisfy the demands of broad strata of working people, as well as certain groups.-

6 WUA OF the USSR, f. 146, d. 5, l. 48.

7 Ibid.

8 Cit. in: World Economy and World Politics, 1926, N 4, pp. 84-85.

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it and the petty bourgeoisie on the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union 9 .

On May 14, 1924, official negotiations began in Beijing between the Japanese envoy K. Yoshizawa and the Soviet envoy L. M. Karakhan10 . By May 23, the basic principles of the treaty were developed, but the positions of the parties remained inconsistent on the issue of Northern Sakhalin. Under the pressure of monopolistic circles interested in the exploitation of oil and coal deposits in Northern Sakhalin, the Japanese delegation, under the pretext of the unresolved Nikolaev incident, still did not want to determine the time frame for the evacuation of Northern Sakhalin. The negotiations have entered a critical situation. Yoshizawa was summoned to Tokyo. As he describes in his memoirs, the government's main focus was on the issue of oil11 . Obtaining oil concessions on Northern Sakhalin was a prerequisite that the Navy command put forward for concluding an agreement.

In August, Yoshizawa handed over to the Soviet envoy a draft " Convention covering the basic principles of relations between Japan and the USSR." It provided for full recognition of the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth. Other treaties and agreements concluded before November 7, 1917, were to be reviewed at a special conference. Japan also insisted on preserving the 1907 fishing Convention, which was imposed on the tsarist government after its defeat in the 1904-1905 war. It proposed that the USSR grant Japanese industrialists concessions for the exploitation of 60% of the known oil-bearing fields of Northern Sakhalin, as well as coal mining concessions in this area. The question of the evacuation of its armed forces from Northern Sakhalin was linked by the Japanese side to the settlement of the issue of the debts of the tsarist and Provisional governments .12
The military, as well as monopolistic circles closely connected with Anglo - American capital, opposed the agreement with the USSR, insisted on making demands that were unprofitable for the Soviet state, and sought to disrupt the negotiations by organizing various conflicts. Mitsubishi intervened in the negotiations: a relative of the owner of the Sawada concern was sent to Beijing in order to monitor Yoshizawa, as if he did not make too big concessions on the issue of oil concessions. By delaying the negotiations, the Japanese ruling circles hoped that the foreign policy situation of the Soviet Union would be complicated by the attempts of the United States and France to disrupt the Soviet-Chinese agreement "On General Principles for the settlement of issues between the USSR and the Republic of China" of May 31, 1924 and take control of the management of the CER. Soon, however, the baselessness of Japan's calculations became clear. The development of the national liberation struggle in China and the proclamation of the Mongolian People's Republic in 1924 dealt a serious blow to the plans of the Japanese ruling circles.

Japan's position was also strongly influenced by the flexible Soviet policy, which skillfully exploited inter-imperialist contradictions. Back in 1920, the American company Sinclair Oil Corporation offered the RSFSR to conclude an agreement with it on an oil concession in Northern Sakhalin. Contract (for a period of 36 years) It was approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR in early 1923. Under the terms of the agreement, the company was obliged to start IP research within a year-

9 A brief history of Japanese diplomacy over 100 years. Tokyo. 1958, p. 94 (in Russian).

10 Izvestiya, 22. V. 1924.

11 Yoshizawa K. 60 years of diplomatic work. Tokyo. 1958, p. 74 (in Russian).

12 WUA of the USSR, f. 146, d. 61, ll. 66-68.

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within a year, submit to the Soviet Government a map of the explored areas. The Japanese authorities did not allow an American geological exploration expedition to the Japanese-occupied Northern Sakhalin. On May 21, 1924, the Supreme Economic Council warned Sinclair's company that it was granting it six grace months to fulfill its obligations. The company applied to the US State Department with a demand that the US government force the Japanese authorities to allow representatives of the company to visit North Sakhalin 13 . The Japanese government feared that Sinclair would be able to get official support from the Washington authorities and Japan would have to cede oil-bearing areas to American concessionaires. Fishing companies insisted on the conclusion of a general political agreement between Japan and the Soviet Union, on the basis of which a stable settlement of the problem of fishing would be possible.

All these circumstances, as well as the firmness of Soviet diplomacy, forced Japan to make concessions. The negotiations ended with the signing of the Soviet-Japanese Convention on Basic Principles of Mutual Relations on January 20, 192514 . The process of ratification of the convention was completed on February 25, 1925: from that day on, diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and Japan. Under the terms of the convention, both sides were supposed to proceed from the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and refrain from any open or covert hostile activity against each other. The Japanese government pledged to withdraw its troops from Northern Sakhalin by May 15, 1925. The Convention specifically referred to the revision of the 1907 Fishing Convention in the future. The 1925 Convention provided for the conclusion of a treaty on trade and navigation.

Not being able at that time to eliminate the consequences of the defeat of tsarist Russia in the Russo-Japanese war, the Soviet government was forced to recognize the validity of the unfair Portsmouth Treaty, in particular the articles that left the original Russian land of South Sakhalin to Japan. At the signing of the convention, a special declaration was announced. "Recognition... the validity of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905 does not in any way imply that the Union Government shares with the former Tsarist Government the political responsibility for concluding the treaty in question."15 This declaration showed that the recognition of the Treaty of Portsmouth was only temporary, and that the Soviet people hoped that its harsh and unjust conditions would be lifted in the future.

The Government of the USSR declared its readiness to grant Japanese subjects concessions for the exploitation of mineral, forest and other natural resources, including 50% of the oil fields known to Japan on Northern Sakhalin. In favor of the USSR, from 5 to 8% of gross coal production and from 5 to 15% of gross oil production were to be deducted. Attracting Japanese capital allowed the USSR to accelerate the restoration of the economy of the Far East, destroyed by the interventionists and White Guards. All questions about government debt

13 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1924. Vol. II Washington. 1939, pp. 678 - 679.

14 For the text, see: Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR, vol. VIII, Moscow, 1963, pp. 70-80. In 1959, the author of these lines had several conversations with Yoshizawa. After describing some unknown details of the negotiations, Yoshizawa noted that the Soviet representative conducted the negotiations very energetically and persistently and, apparently, had an intention to complete the negotiations by a certain date. Putting forward unacceptable demands for the USSR, the Japanese delayed negotiations. Nevertheless, the Soviet diplomat managed to complete the negotiations by the scheduled date.

15 Ibid., p. 77.

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loans to the tsarist and Provisional Governments were deferred for resolution in subsequent negotiations. The conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Convention completed an important stage in the USSR's struggle to normalize relations with the major capitalist countries.

The Soviet-Japanese Convention regulated relations between the two countries for 20 years. It opened up opportunities for the broad development of economic, cultural and political ties between the two countries. In the first years after its conclusion, Soviet-Japanese relations developed successfully. In 1926, the Soviet government put forward the idea of a joint action by the USSR, Japan and China in defense of peace in the Far East. At the initiative of the Soviet representatives, informal negotiations were held in Tokyo with Japan on the conclusion of a corresponding triple agreement. However, Japanese aggressive elements, as well as circles focused on Britain and the United States, thwarted the possibility of an agreement that could seriously change the situation in the Far East. In 1926, the Soviet government proposed that Japan conclude a non-aggression pact. These proposals were repeated in 1927, 1928, and 1931. Negotiations continued until 1933, when Japan rejected the Soviet proposals.

The Soviet Union sought to develop the broadest political, economic, and cultural ties with Japan. In 1928, a new fishing convention was signed, preserving a number of privileges for Japanese fishermen. Economic relations were successfully developed on the basis of concession agreements. There were exchanges of delegations of economic and political figures. In 1927, Moscow was visited by Goto, the prominent industrialist T. Kukhara, and others.

But in the 1930s, Japan embarked on a path of aggression, concluding military agreements with nazi Germany and Italy. It made an open attack on Soviet territory in the area of Lake Baikal in 1938. Khasan, and in 1939 - to the MNR allied to our country. In 1940-1941, when the Soviet - Japanese negotiations on the conclusion of a neutrality pact were underway, Japan again raised the issue of Northern Sakhalin. In the context of the outbreak of World War II, she wanted to get Northern Sakhalin for neutrality and thereby secure control over navigation in the Amur estuary and exit from the Sea of Okhotsk. From the rostrum of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Japanese leaders were called lovers of buying what is not for sale 16 . Despite the neutrality pact signed in April 1941, the Japanese rulers prepared an attack on the Soviet Union, helped nazi Germany wage war against the USSR, turned the pact into a scrap of paper, and virtually eliminated it.

In August 1945, fulfilling its allied duty, as well as in order to quickly end the Second World War and eliminate the constant threat to its borders in the Far East, the USSR entered the war against Japan. The military defeat buried the delusional plans of Japanese imperialist circles to subjugate Asia, including the Soviet Far East. The historical rights of the USSR to the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin were restored, which was secured by international agreements of the war and post-war period.

At the initiative of the USSR, negotiations were initiated in 1955 with Japan on the restoration of diplomatic relations interrupted on August 9, 1945 and the conclusion of a peace treaty. Constructive position

16 Sixth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. March 22-April 4, 1940 Stenogr. otch. M. 1940, p. 40.

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The Soviet Union led to the signing of the joint declaration of the USSR and Japan on October 19, 1956. It provided for the end of the state of war and the restoration of diplomatic relations. The Declaration laid the foundation for establishing good-neighborly relations between the Soviet Union and Japan. It showed that there are no disputed issues between the two countries that cannot be resolved through negotiations. During the negotiations, the Soviet Union always proceeded from the task of ensuring peace in the Far East, considering friendly relations with Japan as an important factor in improving the international situation, ensuring peace and security in the Pacific Ocean and the Far East. At the same time, the Soviet government proceeded from the principles of peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems, and from the tasks of developing business cooperation with all countries.

The Joint Declaration is an example of consistent implementation of the principle of equality of the Contracting Parties. By agreeing to normalize relations with the defeated enemy, the Soviet Union not only did not seek any advantages for itself or demand concessions from Japan, nor did it try to bind it with any obligations, as was done, for example, in the Japanese-American agreements (the 1951 security Treaty, which granted the United States the right to maintain its own territory). any armed forces on Japanese territory and use them at its own discretion; the 1952 administrative agreement obliging Japan to provide military bases, means of communication, public utilities, etc., free of charge at the disposal of American troops; the 1954 mutual defense Assistance Agreement, which effectively obliges Japan to re-establish its armed forces, etc.) On the contrary, he showed exceptional generosity: he refused reparations demands; agreed to release Japanese war criminals ahead of schedule, and pledged to support Japan's request for admission to the UN.

In the nearly 30 years that have passed since the restoration of diplomatic relations, Soviet-Japanese relations, along with progressive, positive processes, have experienced periods of recessions and even exacerbations. They were negatively affected by the actions of external forces interested in violating good-neighborly relations between the USSR and Japan. The more it succumbed to Washington's pressure and influence, the more negative things were introduced into its policy towards the USSR.

In February 1957, the government of N. Kishi came to power in Japan, which took a course to strengthen political and military ties with American imperialism. It began negotiations with the United States to revise the security treaty imposed on Japan by the Americans in 1951. Its ruling circles sought to create the impression that they were supposedly concerned about strengthening the country's sovereignty and ensuring its security. In fact, the Japanese government wanted to strengthen military and economic ties with the United States, seeking recognition of equal rights in the treaty, minor concessions, mainly of an economic nature, the exclusion of the most odious provisions of the 1952 administrative agreement, which caused indignation not only among the masses, but also among the bourgeoisie (in particular, the import of goods by US military personnel without customs duties, the right of extraterritoriality Under these conditions, the idea of moving to a policy of neutrality, non-participation in military alliances, and the elimination of foreign military bases on Japanese territory has become increasingly widespread in Japan.

In connection with the US-Japanese negotiations on the revision of the security treaty, the Soviet Government issued a statement on December 2, 1958, indicating that the conclusion of a new US-Japanese military agreement on the revision of the security Treaty was a matter of mutual interest.-

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This treaty can only further complicate the situation in the Far East and increase the risk of conflict in this area. It would be in the interests of peace consolidation and in the interests of the Japanese nation itself that Japan renounces the bonded military obligations imposed on it, abolishes foreign military bases, and withdraws all foreign troops from its territory. The Soviet government declared that it was "ready to undertake the solemn obligation to respect the neutrality of Japan"17 . Later, the USSR declared its readiness to take part in collective guarantees of Japan's neutrality with the participation of the United States and China, as well as the possibility of guaranteeing neutrality by the UN18.

However, the Japanese government categorically rejected the idea of neutrality as completely unacceptable to Japan .19 In January 1960, Japan signed a treaty on mutual cooperation and security with the United States. It not only preserved American military bases in Japan, but also provided for closer military cooperation between Japan and the United States, highlighting the mutual obligations of both sides in the military field. Explaining the provisions of the treaty in parliament, Japanese Foreign Minister Akara Fujiyama said that under the new treaty, the United States will "have the right" to use its armed forces located in Japan in any area of the Far East, if it deems it necessary. He explained that the name "Far East" in the draft treaty refers to "the area north of the Philippines, including the coast of mainland China, Primorsky Krai and other territories around Japan" 20 .

Fujiyama's statement revealed the aggressive nature of the treaty, directed against Japan's neighboring states, and primarily against the Soviet Union. Haruhiko Nishi, Japan's former deputy Foreign Minister and then ambassador to the United Kingdom, wrote indignantly: "I have never heard the foreign minister of any state negotiating a military treaty simultaneously make such a blatant statement, which almost implies that the territory of the third World state is occupied by the United States. the state becomes an object of military operations"21 . Kishi and Fujiyama, in their speeches in parliament and in the press, confirmed that if American troops or American bases in Japan are attacked, Japan will have to take measures for self-defense, i.e. enter the war on the side of the United States .22 This commitment by Japan under the new treaty practically meant that it would support American forces in the event of any conflict, although it could be caused by provocative actions of American forces outside the Japanese Islands.

The Soviet government considered the conclusion of a new Japan-US security treaty as an expression of the conscious course of the ruling circles of Japan aimed at strengthening military ties with the United States and worsening relations with the USSR, which contradicted the spirit and letter of the joint declaration of the USSR and Japan of October 19, 1956. By criticizing the dangerous course of policy of the Japanese ruling circles and pointing out that it has no future, the Soviet government did not close the way for the development of relations between the two countries. His statement of 30 June 1960 stated: "The Soviet people have no other aspirations for a close Japanese co-operation-

17 Pravda, 3. XII. 1958.

18 Ibid., 6. III. 1959.

19 Mainichi, 27. I. 1959; Asahi, 20. V. 1959.

20 Asahi, 18. XI. 1959.

21 Nisi H. Concerns about Japan's foreign policy. - Chuo Koron, 1960, N 2.

22 Mainity, 27. X. 1959.

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seda, how to live with him in peace and friendship, cooperate with him on the basis of equality, mutual respect, independence and sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs. The establishment of truly good-neighborly relations would undoubtedly be in the interests of the peoples of both countries, as well as in the interests of consolidating world peace."23
The Soviet Government fulfilled all its obligations under the joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration of 1956. Despite all the positive significance that this declaration had, the full normalization of Soviet - Japanese relations was possible only by laying a solid contractual foundation for them. However, the Soviet government's desire to conclude a peace treaty or any other agreement defining the basic principles of relations between the two countries was met with stubborn resistance from the Japanese government. The signing of such a treaty is hindered by the unrealistic position of the Japanese ruling circles, which put forward unfounded, revanchist claims to the Soviet territories - the Lesser Kuril Ridge and the islands of Iturup and Kunashir.

The Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXIV Party Congress emphasized the importance of full normalization of relations between the USSR and Japan on an appropriate contractual basis. 24
The process of detente, which began in Europe in the early 70s, did not bypass Japan. The cessation of US aggression against Vietnam, the easing of tensions on the Indian Subcontinent and Korean Peninsulas, etc. favored the development of the detente process. In October 1973, high-level negotiations were held in Moscow between the USSR and Japan. The joint Soviet-Japanese statement, signed on October 10, 1973, following the negotiations, emphasized the determination of both sides to make efforts for the further development of relations between the two countries. The path to achieving this goal was outlined through the expansion of Soviet-Japanese cooperation in order to create favorable conditions for increasingly intensive exchanges in various spheres and at various levels, and to combine efforts to strengthen good-neighborly relations and promote peace and stability in the Far East and around the world. A number of agreements were signed covering the fields of science, technology and culture, some areas of nature protection and environmental protection, the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy, etc. 25 .

The material basis on which the building of bilateral interstate relations is built is, as you know, economic cooperation. During the talks in Moscow, a thorough exchange of views took place on ways to expand economic ties between the USSR and Japan. The joint statement formulated a broad program of activities in the economic field and recorded the corresponding obligations of the Governments of the USSR and Japan to promote its implementation. To this end, the parties agreed to practice conducting intergovernmental consultations. This agreement paved the way for raising the level of Soviet-Japanese economic relations. The statement also noted that the settlement of outstanding issues left over from World War II and the conclusion of a peace treaty would contribute to the establishment of peaceful, good-neighborly and friendly Soviet-Japanese relations. 26 The USSR considered a number of problems to be unsolved, the discussion of which-

23 Pravda, 1. VII. 1960.

24 See Materials of the XXIV Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1974, p. 27.

25 Pravda, 11. X. 1973.

26 Ibid.

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This could create more favorable conditions for the conclusion of a peace treaty.

The 1973 negotiations showed that there were favorable opportunities for developing cooperation between the USSR and Japan not only in the sphere of their direct bilateral relations, but also in the international sphere. The statement pointed out some areas in which cooperation could be particularly relevant: strengthening the effectiveness of the UN, achieving disarmament under effective international control, and early implementation of nuclear disarmament. Japan, as well as the USSR, in particular, advocated that the problems of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea should be solved by the peoples of these countries without any outside interference.

As a result of the Moscow meeting in Japan, sentiments began to grow in favor of more active participation of the country in the policy of defusing tensions, in favor of further improving relations with the Soviet Union. The regular consultations of foreign ministers that took place after 1973 discussed a wide range of issues of Soviet-Japanese relations, as well as the most important international issues of mutual interest. Holding consultations on a wide range of issues testified to a fairly high level of relations between the two countries. However, the problem of establishing a solid contractual basis for these relations has not been solved. The ruling circles of Japan tried to reduce the issue of a peace treaty only to the solution of the so-called territorial issue. Putting forward unilateral claims as a condition for concluding a peace treaty did not indicate a constructive and realistic position of the Japanese side.

Looking for ways to strengthen relations and resolve the issue of a peace treaty, the Soviet side in 1975 proposed to discuss the possibility of concluding a treaty on good-neighborliness and cooperation, which would strengthen the contractual basis of relations between the two countries. In 1978, the Japanese side was given a draft of such a treaty, 27 which covered those areas of Soviet-Japanese relations that were ripe for putting them on a solid contractual basis. According to this draft, the treaty should have established the following main obligations of the parties: to resolve disputes exclusively by peaceful means and refrain from the threat or use of force; to prevent the use of their territory for actions that could harm the security of the other party; to refrain from any actions that encourage any third party to take aggressive actions against any of the of the two Contracting Parties; to hold regular political consultations, including when a situation arises that threatens the maintenance of peace; to continue efforts to put an end to the arms race, both nuclear and conventional, and to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control; to promote greater mutual cooperation in the fields of economy, science, technology, culture, rational use of biological resources of the World Ocean, etc. The Japanese side has actually avoided discussing the Soviet project and has not yet given an official response to this specific proposal.

Objective economic interests, of course, guide Japan to the development of broad economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. The 1973 negotiations and agreements signed in Moscow gave a new impetus to economic ties between the two countries. That-

27 For its text, see Pravda, 24. II. 1978.

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The exchange of goods under the second five-year trade agreement (1971-1975) increased on average by 26.6% per year, during these years the total amount of trade turnover amounted to about 6.1 billion rubles, which is 2.3 times higher than the volume of trade in the previous five years .28 The dynamic growth of the Soviet-Japanese trade exchange is explained by the well-known complementarity of the economies of both countries, as well as their geographical proximity. Of course, the share of Soviet-Japanese trade in Japan's foreign trade is not as large as with the United States and Australia, but some Soviet goods occupy a prominent place in the Japanese market (business wood, cotton, potash salts, asbestos, nickel, aluminum, platinum, etc.). a sales market for Japanese exports. Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation has become large-scale, long-term, with the involvement of Japanese state loans in its implementation.

The Soviet Union stands for developing economic ties with Japan on a long-term basis and creating the most favorable conditions for this, including signing an intergovernmental agreement on economic cooperation for 10 to 15 years. The implementation of large projects for the development of coking coal, timber, oil and coal deposits contributed to the development of productive forces in the Far Eastern regions of the USSR and at the same time provided Japan with large orders for its industry and reliable supplies of raw materials. The volume of mutual supplies of goods between our countries in 1976-1980 almost doubled compared to the previous five years, amounting to 12.1 billion rubles. 29
The achievements in the development of Soviet-Japanese business ties would undoubtedly have been even more tangible if it had not been for the obstacles put up by the United States and Japan's anti-Soviet circles. They are trying in every possible way to slow down and discredit the development of Soviet-Japanese economic ties. In recent years, through the efforts of reactionary circles in Japan, many positive elements that have been created over the years have been dismantled in relations between our countries. The negative impact of this policy on Japan's trade relations with the Soviet Union is significant: it was relegated from the first to the fifth place in terms of trade with the USSR among capitalist countries. Japanese businessmen lost very lucrative large-scale contracts worth over $ 5 billion .30 In 1983, the volume of trade with the USSR declined by 18.5%, which is the most serious decline since the restoration of diplomatic relations .31 The decline in trade volume continued in 1984.

In Japan, they are trying to blame the USSR for the stagnation in Soviet-Japanese relations, for the aggravation of the international situation. In recent years, myths about the "Soviet threat"have been exaggerated. Japanese scholar Nakamura Shintaro, in a recent book on Russian relations with the Japanese, 32 claims that the myth of the Japanese ruling circles about the eternal "threat from the north" dates back over 200 years. It was fabricated in 1772 by the Dutch, who during the period of self-isolation

28 Calculated according to the statistical surveys "Foreign Trade of the USSR" for the corresponding years.

29 Foreign trade of the USSR. Statistical collections for the corresponding years.

30 Guzhenko T. B. Soviet-Japanese relations. - Problems of the Far East, 1982, N 3, p. 18.

31 Problems of the Far East, 1984, No. 2, p. 16. (according to Japanese trade circles, the reduction was 23%).

32 Nakamura Shintaro. Russians and Japanese. Istoriya kontakty [History of contacts], Moscow, 1983, p. 56, 121.

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Japan (mid-XVII-mid-XIX centuries) had monopoly rights to trade with the Japanese, fearing the appearance of Russian traders off the coast of Japan. This myth was taken up by Japanese chauvinists and nationalists in the late 18th century.

Japanese officials talk about the "Soviet threat", and meanwhile Japan is rapidly turning into an" unsinkable aircraft carrier " of the United States with nuclear weapons on board. According to US military experts, the ships of the US 7th Fleet, based in Japan, have about 700 nuclear weapons carriers capable of lifting more than 2 thousand nuclear charges in one launch flight. There are well-known plans to equip the US 7th Fleet with Tomahawk cruise missiles, which would immediately double its nuclear offensive power; 33 the deployment of F-16 fighter-bombers capable of delivering nuclear strikes on Soviet Primorye began with Tokyo's consent .34
Japan is also rapidly building up its own armed forces. The five-year military program for 1983-1987 provides for the allocation of about 20 trillion yen (over $ 60 billion) for military needs. As a result, in 1988, Japan will be second only to the United States in terms of conventional weapons and will be closer to Great Britain and France. The ambition of the Japanese militarists 'military plans is indicated by the intention to revise the "Basic Principles of the defense Plan", approved in 1978, and include in it the "protection" of maritime communications in the thousand-mile zone and the use of artificial satellites for military purposes. The country's economy is also rapidly being drawn into plans to "build up military muscle": if in the past five years Japanese companies produced 500 billion yen worth of weapons and military equipment annually, then in 1984 the orders of the National Defense Administration were already 870 billion yen .
The growing involvement of Japan in the US global strategy, the militarization of the country's economy, the increasing role of Japan in the US-Japan alliance directed against the USSR and other socialist countries, the fanning of propaganda hype around the events in Afghanistan and Kampuchea, territorial claims to the Soviet Union-all this testified to the strengthening of negative trends in Japan's policy.

In recent years, the Soviet Union has launched a number of new initiatives aimed at developing Soviet-Japanese relations. Among them - in addition to those mentioned above-is a proposal to hold concrete negotiations on confidence-building measures in the Far East. In 1982, the Soviet side clarified that this proposal does not necessarily involve all countries in the region. It is possible to start moving along this path on a bilateral basis, for example, with the participation of the USSR and Japan .36 Since 1982, the Soviet government has repeatedly invited Japan to exchange views on the conclusion of a bilateral safeguards agreement, meaning to fix the USSR's obligation not to use nuclear weapons against Japan; the Japanese side, in turn, would confirm the obligation to respect the nuclear-weapon-free status and not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons or allow their deployment on Japanese territory. as well as in the air and sea space of the country. The interests of Japan, as well as other countries of the world, are met by the unilateral commitment of the USSR not to accept the following conditions:-

33 Naumov P. Cold spring of Japan. - Izvestiya, 27. IV. 1984.

34 Izvestiya, 7. IV. 1985.

35 Ibid.

36 Pravda, 24. III. 1982.

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to be the first to change nuclear weapons, as well as the norms of relations between nuclear powers put forward by the Soviet Union, the adoption of which would make a huge contribution to reducing the threat of a nuclear catastrophe .37 None of the Soviet proposals contradicts the fundamental national interests of Japan, the principles of its constitution, or can harm its relations with third countries. Japanese leaders talk a lot about "dialogue" with the USSR, but do not give a positive answer to any of the Soviet specific proposals.

Japanese business circles are interested in developing Soviet-Japanese economic ties and scientific exchanges. Japanese interest in the creative achievements and culture of the peoples of the USSR continues unabated. The fourth Round table conference of representatives of the Soviet and Japanese public, held in Moscow in October 1984, showed that broad circles of the Japanese public and business world are concerned about the current state of Soviet-Japanese relations. During the conference, and later in a conversation with a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR G. A. Aliyev, Japanese representatives expressed the desire of Japanese organizations to make consistent efforts to achieve tangible progress in relations between the two countries, to establish a spirit of genuine good neighborliness in them38 . The dialogue between the parliamentarians of the two countries, which was interrupted in 1980, was resumed. In October 1984, a representative delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR headed by a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR D. A. Kunaev visited Japan. In December 1984, a joint meeting of the Soviet - Japanese and Japanese-Soviet committees on economic cooperation was held. The work of these committees has been frozen since 1979 due to the fault of the Japanese side.

As the Soviet leaders have repeatedly stated, practical steps on both sides are needed to overcome the cooling in Soviet-Japanese relations. As for the Soviet Union, it is ready to develop mutually beneficial relations with Japan in various fields and is in favor of making relations between the two countries good-neighborly. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev in conversation with Japanese Prime Minister Ya. Nakasone stressed the importance of eliminating the difficulties and restrictions artificially created by the Japanese side on the development of relations between the two countries. Japan's practical implementation of a peace-loving policy would certainly help improve relations and good-neighborliness .39
The history of relations between the two countries shows that truly good-neighborly relations between them are dictated by objective necessity. In our era, without the Soviet Union - a great Pacific power - the cardinal problems of ensuring peace and security in Asia cannot be solved. Truly good-neighborly, full-blooded ties between the U.S.S.R. and Japan are necessary for the vital interests of the Soviet and Japanese peoples, for the sake of peace in Asia and throughout the world.

37 Ibid., 10. III. 1984.

38 Ibid., 13. X. 1984.

39 Ibid., 15. III. 1985.

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