July 16, 1945 in the area of Alamogordo (New Mexico), secretly from the American and world public opinion, the first test of the American atomic bomb was conducted. The press reported at the time that there was an explosion in a warehouse where a large number of explosives were stored. The news of the successful bomb test was enthusiastically received by US President Truman, Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of State Byrnes, who were at that time part of the American delegation to the Potsdam Conference of the three Great Powers.
Nuclear weapons immediately occupied a special, if not central, place in the American arsenal of foreign policy tools. The ruling circles of the United States did not hesitate to turn it into a tool of psychological influence on other countries, believing that it would be crucial in international affairs. In other words, from the second half of July 1945, a new tool of US foreign policy strategy appeared, called "atomic diplomacy" by analogy with "gunboat diplomacy", "dollar diplomacy" and other methods of pressure and blackmail that the United States had resorted to in relation to other states up to that time. This time, American diplomacy tried to use this tool against the USSR from the very beginning.
However, for a number of reasons, and mainly as a result of the US underestimation of the power of the Soviet Union, the advantages of its socialist system, and the success of Soviet science and technology, the possibilities for using nuclear weapons or for threatening to use them as a means of foreign policy pressure from the very first post-war years were very limited. This became especially clear after the end of the temporary (and short-lived) US monopoly on atomic weapons. With the advent and development of Soviet nuclear missile technology and the strengthening of its power, the use of American nuclear weapons against the USSR became impossible without causing serious damage to the United States itself. Attempts to influence the Soviet Union through atomic blackmail also failed. The role of nuclear weapons in post-war American foreign policy began to gradually change. Under the influence of fundamental changes in the balance of power in the international arena in favor of socialism, the US ruling circles were forced to at least externally give the American foreign policy strategy a "defensive character". So, in the early 60s, the United States began to call its nuclear missile power the" shield " of NATO, in contrast to the former name - the "sword" of NATO. This indicated certain difficulties in the use of nuclear weapons as a means of foreign policy, which, in turn, led to certain difficulties in the use of nuclear weapons as a means of foreign policy.-
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this led to the need to review the methods of American nuclear strategy. However, the United States did not abandon this strategy. The Nixon Administration, like its predecessors, continues to rely in its foreign policy on a nuclear missile arsenal, the development and improvement of which it attaches the utmost importance. Only the forms of using the presence of nuclear missiles in foreign policy have changed. This article is devoted to issues related to the evolution of the role of nuclear weapons in post-war American foreign policy.
There are no studies in the Soviet literature that would examine the impact of nuclear weapons on US foreign policy during the entire post-war period. However, a number of books have already covered some aspects of this problem. V. A. Tarasenko's monograph characterizes the place of the atomic problem in American foreign policy during the period of the US monopoly on these weapons (1945-1949). A. I. Ignatov's work analyzes the role of atomic diplomacy in the US foreign policy strategy during 1945-1960, with the main emphasis on revealing the essence of the American atomic program - the so-called nuclear program. the Baruch plan. The collective work "Military Strategy" addresses the issues of the US nuclear strategy in NATO. G. A. Trofimenko's research traces the evolution of the US military strategy and foreign policy practice in the international arena under the influence of the changed balance of forces in the world in favor of socialism. This work also pays great attention to the US nuclear strategy in NATO. V. M. Kulakov's book reveals the American doctrine of total nuclear war. In the monograph of corresponding member. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF the USSR G. A. Arbatov considers the socio-political role of military equipment in general and the new nuclear missile weapons in particular as tools of class violence. However, the analysis of the complex issues related to the impact of modern weapons of mass destruction on international relations goes beyond its scope. 1
The role that nuclear weapons played in American post-war foreign policy was primarily due to the fact that the post-war policy of the United States was always based on the policy of "from a position of strength". This policy at the beginning of the post-war period was based on the belief that the United States, being, as it seemed to them, the most powerful state in the world, would be able to use the "situation of force" to impose its will on other countries of the world. The relative military invulnerability of the United States in the past, due to its favorable geographical position, has given rise to the illusion among the American ruling circles that there are purely military answers to all foreign policy problems. The appearance of thermonuclear weapons reinforced this illusion. American leaders decided that with the help of such weapons, they would be able to create and consolidate for a long time a certain military and political advantage over the Soviet Union. It is not surprising, therefore, that from the first post-war years, the United States, without stopping at expenses, sought to establish the production of these weapons as quickly as possible and improve them.
The military theorist H. Kissinger (now Special Assistant to the President of the United States on national Security Issues) noted in 1967 that the function of nuclear weapons is mainly psychological.-
1 V. A. Tarasenko. Atomnaya problema v vneshnoi politike SSHA [The Atomic Problem in US Foreign Policy]. Moscow, 1958; A. I. Ignatov. Atomnaya problema i politika SSHA [The Atomic Problem and US Policy], Moscow, 1960; Voennaya strategiya (Military Strategy). Edited by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovsky, Moscow, 1963; G. A. Trofimenko. Strategiya global'noi voyni [Strategy of Global War], Moscow, 1968; G. A. Arbatov. Ideological Struggle in Modern International Relations, Moscow, 1970; Kulakov V. M. (in Russian). Ideology of Aggression, Moscow, 1970.
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social character. Clarifying these words, he explained: a threat that is actually a bluff, but taken seriously, is more useful than a serious threat that is ignored, like bluff 2. G. Morgenthau in 1969 also emphasized "the clear and simple psychological function of nuclear power." The main function of nuclear weapons, he wrote, is to make their use unnecessary by deterring a possible enemy from using them. The latter, in his opinion, is achieved by constantly notifying a possible enemy of the inevitability of its own destruction if it resorts to nuclear weapons. For mutual deterrence to succeed, Morgenthau continued, the parties only need mutual confidence that they have the will and ability to destroy each other in a nuclear war. As long as there is such certainty, it does not matter whether it is true or not. In other words, Morgenthau explicitly emphasized that the policy of deterrence, or deterrence, "involves an element of bluff."3 According to some American authors, the psychological impact of nuclear weapons on the relations of states is especially effective in cases where there is a dispute between them or any protracted negotiations are underway. Professor S. Appleton of the University of Oakland, Michigan, writes that the key to a successful political deal in the age of nuclear missiles is often the ability of one side to make the other believe that you can and will actually carry out your threats .4
For a long time, US military leaders deliberately did not specify where, when, and under what circumstances they would be prepared to use nuclear weapons.5 This technique is known as a" calculated policy of uncertainty", supported by the ability to implement the use of military force, including nuclear weapons. This policy was convenient, since it could be given any cover that allowed it to hide from the public the fact that in fact such a policy was atomic blackmail. The US leaders also pursue political goals in the nuclear missile arms race, wanting to take advantage of the possible, even temporary, superiority in the creation and production of a new type of nuclear missile weapons to exert pressure on opponents "from a position of strength". Much attention paid to the psychological impact of American nuclear weapons on the policies of other countries, which in the West was called psychological diplomacy, did not mean, however, that the US government did not have plans for the actual use of nuclear weapons. But the Soviet Union's scientific and technological successes always made such plans meaningless, since their implementation would, in turn, cause enormous damage to the United States itself. Nevertheless, nuclear blackmail continues to be in service with the leaders of US foreign policy even today. Here are just a few concrete examples of the United States ' use of nuclear diplomacy against the USSR
2 See U. Schwarz. American Strategy. Preface by Henry Kissinger. N. Y. 1987, p. XII.
3 H. Morgenthau. A New Foreign Policy for the United States. N. Y. 1969, p. 211.
4 S. Appleton. United States Foreign Policy. Boston. 1968, p. 496.
5 Only in recent years have NATO leaders shed some light on this issue. The NATO Council, at its session in Brussels from 3 to 5 December 1969, approved the main policy provisions for the tactical use of nuclear weapons in Europe, specifying the circumstances under which these weapons can be used and the geographical areas of their use. This document, in particular, states that the use of tactical nuclear weapons is almost inevitable already at the first stage of an armed conflict in Europe. As reported in the American press, it is planned to use tactical nuclear weapons against such facilities in the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, such as airfields, supply bases and communication centers.
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And other states since 1945. The fact that the United States from the very beginning considered nuclear weapons as one of the most important tools of its post-war foreign policy was recognized even then by US officials, including President Truman and members of his cabinet. While attending the Potsdam conference in July 1945, Truman was very much looking forward to hearing about the first atomic bomb test. "If it explodes, which I think it will," Truman said, "then I will certainly have something to hit this country (the USSR-L. I.). 6 We can also recall the statements of Truman's then colleagues, Stimson and Byrnes. As soon as the atomic bomb was created, Stimson proposed to use it as an" arbiter of force", or lever of pressure on the USSR in order to" liberalize " the Soviet political system, that is, to restore the capitalist order in our country. Byrnes also advised the president, relying on atomic weapons, to "dictate to the world his conditions for the end of World War II." 7 It seemed to the masterminds of American politics that a monopoly on atomic weapons would allow them to change the political map of the world in the right direction for them.
The very fact of the use of atomic weapons against Japan in August 1945 marked the policy of atomic blackmail in action. This is evidenced by the fact that the atomic bombing of Japanese cities was not militarily necessary. The use of atomic bombs was conceived and carried out in order to have a psychological impact on the world and, above all, on the USSR. This conclusion is also confirmed by the fact that in August 1945, the United States used up all the atomic bombs at its disposal. It would take a certain amount of time to produce subsequent copies of them. Consequently, it was not yet a weapon in the full sense of the word, but only its first samples, blown up for the purpose of intimidation, in order to further, referring to this bombing and the colossal victims and destruction caused by it, implement the policy of atomic blackmail. The fact that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was precisely such blackmail, directed primarily against the Soviet Union, is eloquently evidenced by the following frank confession of W. Bush, who at that time held the post of Chief Assistant for atomic Affairs to the US Secretary of War: "The atomic bomb was created on time... it was also dropped in time to avoid making any concessions to Russia at the end of the war. " 8
The next characteristic fact that shows how the US president tried to use atomic diplomacy at the initial stage of his post-war foreign policy was his desire to influence the USSR during the Potsdam Conference immediately after the first test of atomic weapons, and then after the atomic bombing of Japanese cities. To do this, Truman turned to a "hard" policy towards the USSR, trying to force the Soviet Union to agree with the post-war American plans to enslave Europe. According to the American historian R. Rovere, Truman and Byrnes "wanted to force the Russians to fulfill the Yalta agreements in the sense that the United States understood them." 9 A detailed description of this failed attempt by the president is contained in the book "Atomic Diplomacy" by the American researcher G. Alperowitz, which was criticized in the United States for the fact that its author formulated a point of view sharply different from the official one. Alperowitz rejected the version that the United States at the time of-
6 W. Williams. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. Cleveland and N. Y. 1959, p. 169.
7 H. S. Truman. Year of Decisions. N. Y. 1955, p. 87.
8 G. Alperovitz. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam. N. Y. 1965, p. 240.
9 "The Atomic Bomb. The Great Decision". N. Y. 1968, p. 90.
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they changed nuclear weapons in Japan solely in order to save the lives of American soldiers who could have died if they landed on Japanese territory. For the first time in American literature, he showed that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a political act designed to demonstrate force, directed primarily against the Soviet Union.
In the following years, senior U.S. officials, including President D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State D. F. Dulles, continued to resort to nuclear diplomacy. During the Korean War, Eisenhower threatened to use atomic weapons on the Korean front, as well as against industrial centers in Manchuria, if the Chinese side increased its active participation in the conflict. The policy of" balancing on the brink of war " pursued by Dulles, in fact, also represented a kind of atomic diplomacy. Such examples could be counted quite a few in the post-war history of the United States. Although no American atomic weapons have been used since 1945, "not a day has passed that they have not been used for some political purpose - as a threat to the enemy, to reassure the allies, or to draw the world's attention to these weapons." 10
All attempts by the United States to use nuclear power for anti-Soviet purposes failed due to the firm position of the USSR on the most important international issues. The Soviet Union's achievements in science and technology destroyed the American leaders 'plans to achieve military superiority. H. Kissinger, in his book" Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy", many of the provisions of which are still relevant today (despite its more than a decade ago), admits that the United States "has never succeeded in turning the world around... military advantage into political advantage " 11 . Indeed, we can recall a number of feverish attempts by the United States to achieve a certain military superiority over the USSR after the loss of the nuclear monopoly. The strengthening of the USSR's defense capability, the creation and expansion of its nuclear missile arsenal doomed these attempts to failure. Although the US nuclear monopoly lasted only until 1949, the political and military leaders of this country failed to draw appropriate conclusions from the rapid scientific and technological progress of the USSR in the field of nuclear weapons. G. Kissinger wrote, emphasizing the significance of the fact that the Americans lost the atomic monopoly: "No acquisition of territory by the Soviet Union-up to the occupation of the entire Western Europe - It could affect the strategic balance with such force as the success of the Soviet Union in eliminating our nuclear monopoly. " 12
The United States did not stop improving its nuclear deterrent capabilities, despite the continued failures of its nuclear policy. Throughout the 50s, they tried to achieve a military advantage by creating a large number of strategic bombers. Not only the military, but also the foreign policy thought of the United States was mobilized to fulfill this task. To this end, in January 1954, the doctrine of "massive retaliation" was officially proclaimed, replacing the failed "policy of deterrence" proclaimed by Truman in 1947. The mastermind behind the new doctrine was Dulles, then Secretary of State. This doctrine, by putting nuclear and air power at the forefront as a deterrent, allowed the United States to put itself at the center of its influence-
10 "Arms Control for the Late Sixties". N. Y. 1967, p. 15. .
11 g. Kissinger. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Moscow, 1959, p. 55.
12 Ibid., p. 52.
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a non-political course to prepare for a nuclear war against the Soviet Union. It was a "borderline war" policy. The ruling circles of the United States at that time believed that they had a significant advantage over the USSR in nuclear weapons, and especially in strategic aviation, which would allow them to win a nuclear war. However, the strategy of "massive retaliation" was even less durable than the previous ones. Its failure was demonstrated by such an outstanding achievement of the USSR as the launch of the world's first artificial Earth satellite with a ballistic missile on October 4, 1957. With its appearance, the vulnerability of the US territory from a military point of view became indisputable. Thus, strategic and foreign policy concepts based on the geographical invulnerability of the United States have become obsolete. Thus, the creation of nuclear weapons in the USSR, and then the appearance of the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile, led to fundamental changes in the strategic balance of forces in the world, to profound changes in international relations. The times when the United States, being overseas, could hope for invulnerability and at the same time surround the USSR with its bases, which, by the way, also began to lose their former significance, are irrevocably gone.
The failure of the doctrine of "massive retaliation" was not only due to the military-technical successes of the USSR, although they were the main reason. From the very beginning, some senior US officials did not believe in its effectiveness. Even President Eisenhower didn't think much of her. "It was Eisenhower," writes the American military publicist D. Lowe, "who torpedoed the strategy of' massive retaliation ' in April 1954 in connection with the events in Indochina, in September of the same year in connection with the events on Kuemoy Island, and in January 1955 in connection with the events on Dachen Island." 13 In all three cases, Lowe explains, Eisenhower rejected the insistence of members of his cabinet and senior military leaders to intervene more actively in the conflict and use atomic weapons. In September 1954, Dulles and most of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff demanded an atomic bombardment of the Chinese artillery positions in the area of Kuemoy Island. Eisenhower did not dare to take such a step. These events practically showed the impracticability of the strategy of "massive retaliation". It turned out as the well-known American physicist and publicist R. Lapp foresaw, who wrote that this doctrine would either "keep the United States constantly on the brink of disaster, or it could turn into an extraordinary farce that would greatly weaken the influence and prestige of the United States in the world" 14 .
So, by the end of the 50s, with the creation of the Soviet arsenal of intercontinental missiles, the US calculations for air superiority collapsed. Since the early 1960s, the United States has undertaken accelerated construction of submarines with Polaris missiles on board, combined with land-based intercontinental missiles. However, with the increase in the number and power of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles and the introduction of nuclear submarines armed with missiles in the USSR, even these American hopes were dashed. The same failure has befallen the United States in its attempt to achieve a military advantage by equipping NATO troops stationed near the borders of European socialist states with tactical atomic weapons, including
13 D. Low. The Age of Deterrence, M. 1966, p. 62. In April 1954, the Vietnamese People's Army launched a decisive attack on the most powerful fortified area of the French interventionists in Indochina - Dien Bien Phu. The events on the islands of Kuemoy in September 1954 and Dachen in January 1955 were related to the military conflict between the PRC and Chiang Kai-shek, which arose over the islands.
14 R. Lepp. Murder and super-murder, Moscow, 1964, p. 84.
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the USSR. Although this weapon continues to be the main one for the US armed forces that are members of NATO, Western military experts are increasingly questioning the correctness of this provision. They believe that American nuclear weapons no longer provide a military advantage for the NATO armed forces over the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, which also have such weapons. According to former Special Assistant to President Johnson for National Security Affairs M. Bundy, nuclear weapons have never played a decisive role in protecting Europe .15 And the fact that the United States ' European allies continue to cling to these weapons is explained quite simply: they do not want to shoulder the burden of conventional weapons, which would greatly increase if NATO countries abandoned their adopted nuclear strategy in Europe. 16
Due to circumstances that prevent the United States from gaining a military advantage over the USSR, the American ruling circles, still considering war as an instrument of policy, sought to pursue a course that would combine two elements: a guarantee of American security and free hands for aggressive actions. Not surprisingly, in the late 1950s, the United States seized on the idea of a "limited nuclear war." It emerged after the emergence of super-destructive nuclear weapons, which made the use of such weapons incompatible with the usual goals of war. In modern conditions, the United States cannot actually use its nuclear missile power in the event of a military conflict with the USSR without the risk of suicide, including tactical nuclear weapons, the use of which will inevitably lead to an all-out war, when strategic nuclear weapons will certainly be used. This is confirmed by H. Kissinger, who defended the strategy of "limited nuclear war"with great zeal. "Rarely have great powers had so little in common," he writes, " but never has the use of force been more unacceptable." 17 In other words, the super-destructive nature of nuclear weapons itself sets certain limits to their use. This explains, to a certain extent, why since 1945 atomic weapons have not been used in local wars, including the Vietnam War, although no one can give guarantees against such use in the future. Consequently, the strategy of" limited nuclear war "has proved difficult to implement in practice, and "limited" has proved illusory, because it attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable and find a way to conduct a nuclear war whose consequences would be similar to those of a war with conventional means. But, as G. Morgenthau writes, the super-destructive properties of nuclear weapons "make such a rationalization of nuclear war, no matter how hard we try, a hopeless enterprise" 18 . It is difficult to disagree with this characterization of the "limited nuclear war" doctrine.
Thus, the hopes that the United States had placed on nuclear weapons were not fulfilled. The United States failed to achieve military superiority over the USSR primarily because the very idea of achieving superiority in the field of nuclear weapons in modern conditions has lost, according to a number of authoritative figures in the Western world, crucial importance for the conduct and outcome of a nuclear missile war. The two powers - the USSR and the United States-have absolute nuclear missile capabilities, sufficient to expose each other to a powerful strike, which will result in huge losses.
15 "Foreign Affairs", 1969, N 6.
16 "Newsweeb, 29.XII. 1969.
17 G. Kissinger. Decree, op., pp. 289-290.
18 N. Morgenthau. Op. cit, p. 215.
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losses in people and material values. In these circumstances, the quantitative side of nuclear weapons loses its former significance, because regardless of the superiority in this area, both sides are vulnerable to these weapons. Even H. Kissinger had to agree that if the United States sought security in numerical superiority, or even in superiority in the destructive power of new nuclear weapons, it would probably become like those who, building the Maginot Line, sought to compensate for the lack of a correct concept by a one-sided build-up of forces." 19
In the post-war conditions, psychological influence in the form of atomic blackmail proved ineffective. It became clear that the atomic bomb could not be used to solve political problems. As the historian F. Miksche writes, " atomic weapons are not suitable as a means of exerting political pressure; they are absolute in their destructive effect and do not make it possible to conduct a flexible policy."20 In 1969, G. Morgenthau recognized that atomic blackmail as a deterrent loses its effect or deterrent effect as a result of repeated use. Therefore, the policy of Nuclear deterrence ""is approaching its bankruptcy" 21 . There remain, in his opinion, three possibilities for the United States: to go to a nuclear war, to abandon it, or to wage war by conventional means. In this regard, it becomes clear the recognition that some US congressmen are forced to make: judging by what the US nuclear strategy has led to, it is currently impossible to rely on nuclear weapons. The fact that the Soviet Union is superior in some areas of armament, they argue, forces the United States, in search of other means, to consider using economic and diplomatic pressure as an alternative to the use of atomic weapons .22
There is a clear discrepancy between the foreign policy goals that the United States is trying to achieve with the help of a nuclear strategy, and the actual state of power in the world, which is increasingly developing in favor of capitalism. It is no accident that G. Morgenthau, first in 1965 and then in 1969, noted four paradoxes of the American nuclear strategy: a commitment to the use of nuclear force, combined with the fear of having to resort to it; attempts to develop a nuclear strategy that would avoid the likely consequences of nuclear war; and the implementation of a policy based on military alliances, in an environment where the presence of nuclear weapons has made this policy obsolete; the continuation of the nuclear arms race along with attempts to stop it. The first three paradoxes of the nuclear strategy clearly illustrate the need for its revision. As for the fourth, the United States has not yet made any serious attempts to stop the nuclear arms race.
In view of the difficulties that the United States has encountered in the use of nuclear weapons, the proposals put forward here in recent years that aim to debunk the role of nuclear weapons up to and including their cancellation and the implementation of de-atomization of the means of foreign policy strategy are gaining interest. The historian R. Beaumont in his article" Prospects for Nuclear Annulment " emphasizes that until very recently it was impossible to talk about such annulment,
19. Kissinger Edict op., p. 112.
20 F. Miksche The failure of the Atomic Strategy. M 1959, p. 103.
21 N. Morgenthau Op. cit, p 213.
22 "Investigating of the Preparedness Programm". Report by Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Arm Services US Senate, 190th Congress, 2nd Session. On Status of the US Strategic Power. 27.IX.1967. Washington. 1968.
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since 1945, the atomic bomb in the West was considered as the "eternal main weapon". But over the years and with the decreasing probability of a thermonuclear conflict, the role of the nuclear bomb in the world has also changed. Perhaps, Beaumont suggests, a world without nuclear bombs is just around the corner and humanity will be able to return to the concept of waging war by conventional means.23 All this, in turn, leads to the idea that there are fewer and fewer supporters of the nuclear arms race in the United States. The American sociologist G. Kahn in the collection "Arms Control in the late 60s" sets out a whole program in the field of de-atomization of the US military and political strategy. As a first step, he suggests creating a global system in which States will commit themselves not to use nuclear weapons, except in cases where a direct retaliatory act of retaliation is required. The system should also cover non-nuclear-weapon States and provide for a mechanism for such countries to protect themselves from nuclear attack. Such a system, according to Kahn, will be reliable and will free countries from the threat of a nuclear attack. In addition to such a system, Kan believes that it is necessary, firstly, to limit the possession of nuclear weapons in the world by law, transferring the right to continue owning them exclusively to international organizations; secondly, to encourage the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The author suggests combining all these areas of deatomization with a common long-term "anti-nuclear" program, which includes: : 1) the agreement of States to adhere to the tit-for-tat formula of retaliation and no more; 2) the creation of a European nuclear retaliation force operating in accordance with the above-mentioned formula of retaliation; 3) the formation of a defense organization in Asia; 4) the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the world; 5) the provision of guarantees to nuclear-weapon-free zones nuclear retaliation; 6) the formation of independent nuclear defense organizations for each nuclear-weapon-free zone; 7) the creation of a world agency to replace various regional or national forces 24 .
Kahn's proposals are a tribute to the zeitgeist, evidence of discrediting American politics "from a position of strength" and atomic blackmail. They reflect the position of those circles that, given the weakening role of nuclear weapons in American foreign policy, draw the right conclusions about the futility of continuing the nuclear arms race for the United States. In fact, a whole "battle" broke out in the United States, as W. Reston writes, against the arms race. According to him, there are "powerful people and forces" working in the country, determined to ensure that a significant part of national resources is withdrawn from the defense sector and allocated to solving urgent internal problems .25
Thus, the great importance attached to nuclear weapons in the implementation of post-war American foreign policy turned out to be at least exaggerated. The idea of using nuclear weapons as a means of psychological influence on opponents, similar to the previously widespread usual methods of American diplomacy in the form of threats and pressure, also failed to meet the expectations of the US ruling circles.: "The emphasis on nuclear weapons has halved our foreign policy." 26 Indeed, the possession of nuclear weapons has not brought the United States any closer to achieving a number of its political goals in the international arena, including:
23 "Military Review", October 1969, pp. 29 - 33.
24 "Arms Control for the Late Sixties", pp. 167 - 168.
25 "The New York Times", 5.IV.1969.
26 D. Low. Decree, op., p. 40.
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attempts to prevent the growth of the revolutionary process in the world, to restore capitalism in socialist countries, etc. US foreign policy is highly dependent on military doctrine and military strategy, while weapons development issues should be subordinated to the country's foreign policy goals. It is not surprising that the most sober-minded bourgeois leaders are calling on the US government to resolutely abandon the use of these weapons as a policy tool .27
The Nixon administration, at least in name, acknowledged the failures of post-war American foreign policy strategy. Such confessions are contained, in particular, in Nixon's message to Congress of February 18, 1970 and his speech to the UN General Assembly on October 23, 1970. The American government seems to have realized the unreality of previous attempts by the United States to play the role of a world gendarme. Life convinces him that it is no longer possible to ignore the country's top-priority internal tasks when developing a military-political strategy on the world stage. However, the Nixon administration did not draw the right conclusions from all this. Relying on the "Nixon doctrine", which found its vivid expression in the aggression in Cambodia, it proclaimed a course to implement its previous foreign policy goals. The only difference is that to do this, the United States wants to attract more allies to its actions in the international arena and mobilize their resources on the basis of "partnership". The US government has not moved away from the desire to consider military force in the form of nuclear missiles as the basis of American foreign policy. This fact makes even the American press come to the conclusion that the Nixon government will adhere no less strongly than its predecessors to a military-political strategy based on nuclear missile capabilities. As early as 1960, President John F. Kennedy emphasized that nuclear power is the foundation of U.S. military and diplomatic strategy .28 The same idea was confirmed by H. Kissinger in 1967. He clarified that, although American nuclear missile power is not a guarantee of a constructive foreign policy, "no constructive US foreign policy is possible without such power." 29
In other words, the United States is not going to abandon the use of nuclear weapons as a means of its global foreign policy strategy and continues to reject the proposal to ban nuclear weapons put forward by the Soviet Union 25 years ago and repeatedly renewed by it. At the same time, in the current context of the growing influence of the popular masses on foreign policy, the US government is experiencing increasing pressure from opponents of the ongoing arms race, which is placing a heavy burden on the shoulders of workers and on the country's economy. As noted by the Soviet scientist G. A. Arbatov, " the emergence of modern weapons of mass destruction has greatly strengthened all those aspects related to wars that, since the beginning of this century, have made the issues of war and peace, foreign policy issues so important for the broadest masses of working people, in fact, put these issues in the center of vital interests, and therefore, and to the center of the struggle of the masses of the people."30
The active influence of peace-loving forces on the foreign policy of the American government is already yielding certain results. A step towards disarmament is, inter alia, the ongoing efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament.
27 N. Morgenthau. Op cit., p. 13.
28 J. F. Kennedy. The Strategy of Peace. N. Y. I960, p. 33.
29 Cit. by: U. Schwarz. Op. cit, p. XI.
30 G. A. Arbatov. Decree, op., p. 80.
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Currently, the USSR and the United States are negotiating on the limitation of strategic weapons. "Their favorable outcome," L. I. Brezhnev said in the Report of the Central Committee to the XXIV Congress of the CPSU, " would allow avoiding a new round in the missile arms race, freeing up significant funds for creative purposes. We strive to ensure that they bring positive results. " 31 Former special assistant to President Johnson on national security issues M. Bundy in the fall of 1969 asked Nixon to consider the possibility of unilateral reduction of the program for the development of atomic weapons. He also spoke in favor of bilateral negotiations with the USSR on strategic arms limitation .32 A well-known expert in the field of weapons, Senator J. Symington on February 20, 1970, in an interview with a TASS correspondent, said that negotiations on the limitation of strategic weapons would provide a great opportunity to finally address the problem on which the fate of all mankind largely depends. During the talks between the two countries, a wide range of issues related to the issue of strategic arms limitation were considered. Global public opinion is closely following the progress of these negotiations, as an increasing number of people, including those in the United States itself, realize the failure of the US nuclear strategy and prefer the American policy of atomic blackmail to an agreement between the two great powers on the limitation of strategic weapons and the use of huge atomic energy only for peaceful purposes.
31 L. I. Brezhnev. Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXIV Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on March 30, 1971, Moscow, 1971, p. 32.
32 "Foreign Affairs", October 1969.
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