NOBUO SHIMOTOMAI. KIM IL SUNG AND THE KREMLIN. NORTH KOREA OF THE COLD WAR ERA (1945-1961). Translated from English under the general editorship of D. V. Streltsov. Moscow: MGIMO-University Publishing House, 2010. 332 p.

Everything that is published about North Korea, including the political and economic systems of the DPRK, its leaders, foreign policy, and the line of conduct in inter-Korean relations, is viewed with increased interest in our country and abroad. The issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula has become particularly relevant in recent years. The six-Party talks involving Russia, China, the United States, Japan and the two Koreas have so far failed to produce tangible progress in resolving the Korean nuclear crisis. The negotiation process on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is facing great difficulties, with interruptions and setbacks. Nevertheless, there is currently no other mechanism for resolving the Pyongyang nuclear issue other than the six-party talks.

A deeper understanding of the events taking place in and around North Korea at the present time will undoubtedly be facilitated by reading an interesting study of the political history of North Korea, presented by a well-known Japanese historian and political scientist Prof. Nobuo Shimotomai. The monograph is full of unique documentary sources, Soviet diplomatic documents of the 1940s and early 1960s, which naturally increases the interest in the research of the Japanese scientist.

Many of the events and facts described in the book are well known in the Russian Korean studies community. Nevertheless, the author's assessments of the internal political events in North Korea in the period 1945-1961, the role of the USSR in shaping the North Korean model of government, the causes and consequences of the Korean War, Pyongyang's relations with Moscow and Beijing, etc. are of interest. In this regard, I will say that it is difficult to agree with some of Nobuo Shimotomai's assessments and conclusions. The author's views on a number of events in North Korea resemble propaganda cliches of the era of bipolar confrontation. For example, regarding such an important and relevant issue today as the liberation of Korea, Shimotomai writes: "In August 1945, the Korean peninsula was freed from the yoke of the Japanese Empire" (p. 25). How did you get free? He was released as a result of bloody battles with Japanese troops by the 25th Army under the command of Colonel-General I. M. Chistyakov. The author reports on this below, but immediately notes that "instead of the Japanese control regime, the Soviet occupation regime was introduced" (p. 27). I cannot agree with this interpretation: in August 1945 The Soviet Army liberated the Korean Peninsula, not occupied it. Let me remind you that in 1910, Japan annexed Korea, depriving it of statehood, while the Soviet Union sought to restore Korea's independence and ensure its independent development.

The thesis about the responsibility of the USSR for the split of Korea is consistently carried out in the work, and the actions of the United States and South Korean political forces led by Lee Seung-man aimed at dividing the Korean peninsula are practically ignored. The post-war development of the international situation in general and on the Asian continent in particular followed, as is well known, the "cold war"scenario. The confrontation between the USSR and the United States is the main cause of tension in the world, in Asia, on the Korean Peninsula and in other regions. It was this factor that prevented the implementation of the decisions of the Moscow Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain (December 1945) and lead Korea to independence after a five-year period of trusteeship.

A significant share of responsibility for the split of Korea and the failure to implement the decisions of the Moscow Meeting lies with the political elites of North and South Korea. The leaders of both parts of the Korean peninsula, after the liberation of the country, have shown an inability and unwillingness to rise above their political ambitions in the name of national interests, in the name of peaceful unification of Korea. South Korean leader Lee Seung-man, as is known, did not want to have any relations with representatives of the left forces on the Korean peninsula at all, applying harsh repression to them, and seeking the creation of a separate state in South Korea back in 1947.

Nobuo Shimotomai presented documentary evidence from Soviet archives about the complex twists and turns of the political struggle in North Korea on the eve of the proclamation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The author rightly notes that the formation of the political system of the DPRK was carried out under the direct leadership of the Soviet military and civil administrations. The USSR sought to strengthen the pro-Soviet group in North Korea's ruling camp by sending hundreds of Soviet Koreans to the DPRK, whose task was primarily to help the young North Korean elite in state administration, economic and cultural construction. I note that the same thing was done by the Americans in the South, creating a pro-American regime. These two processes - the formation of a pro-Soviet regime in the North and a pro-American one in the South-went on in parallel, although the US and pro-American forces in South Korea were ahead of North Korean political forces in creating a separate state.

Of course, the presence of four factions in the North Korean leadership after the proclamation of the DPRK (pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese, partisan, or Kimirsen, and internal) objectively created prerequisites for a tough factional struggle for hegemony. In general, the Korean national character is characterized by such features as "a tendency to discord, squabbles not only between individuals, but also between entire political groups" [History of Korea, 2003, p. 312]. This was noted even before the liberation of Korea in an analytical note prepared by the order of the British Foreign Office by a group of researchers led by A. J. Toynbee.

Shimotomai paid considerable attention to the study of such a hot topic as the Korean War. The main source for writing the section on the Korean conflict of 1950 - 1953 was Soviet archival documents. Let me remind you that Russian Korean studies has published a lot of works on this issue. For example: A.V. Torkunov, E. P. Ufimtseva. Korean Problem: a new view (Moscow, 1995), A.V. Torkunov. The Mysterious War: the Korean Conflict of 1950-1953 (Moscow, 2000). They are based on declassified materials from Soviet archives, diplomatic correspondence between I. Stalin and Kim Il Sung, Filippov (Stalin) and Mao Zedong, and others.

According to Nobuo Shimotomai and most Western historians, the initiators of the Korean War were Kim Il Sung and the top North Korean leadership, and I. Stalin and Mao "gave the go-ahead" to Kim Il Sung for offensive actions against South Korea. The author of the monograph cites relevant Soviet archival documents on this subject. However, when considering this problem, he bypasses the deep origins of the Korean conflict and tries to place all the blame for the Korean tragedy of 1950 - 1953 on Kim Il Sung, I. Stalin and Mao Zedong. An objective researcher of the Korean War certainly understands the responsibility of these political figures for unleashing the conflict in Korea, but it seems that it is necessary to keep in mind the whole gamut of factors: the responsibility of other political figures of that period (Lee Seung-man and his patrons), the general situation on the Korean peninsula by 1950, which was extremely explosive. In fact, by the beginning of the large-scale conflict that broke out on June 25, 1950, there was already a civil war between the North and South in the areas adjacent to the 38th parallel. At the same time, the South Korean side used large units to invade North Korean territory.

A Japanese scholar, analyzing the role of China in the Korean conflict, notes that the intervention of Chinese people's volunteers allowed "the Kimirsen regime to maintain its power" (p. 130). Based on documentary materials, he paints a complex picture in the leadership of the PRC on the issue of sending Chinese units to the Korean front. A number of authoritative leaders of the People's Republic of China, including Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao, opposed sending volunteers to Korea, arguing that the PRC had not yet managed to heal the wounds inflicted by the civil war, the Chinese army was poorly equipped, etc. Only the firm position of Mao Zedong, the insistent persuasions of I. Stalin, as well as the decision of the USSR to deploy inIn eastern China, units of the Soviet air force forced the Chinese leadership to introduce volunteer detachments into the territory of the DPRK and save the North Korean regime from collapse.

The landing of the 50-thousandth American landing force in Incheon in September 1950, as a result of which the North Korean army was almost defeated, caused a sharp aggravation of contradictions in the leadership of the DPRK. Kim Il Sung tried to blame his political opponents, especially the "inner group" led by Park Hong-yong, for the failures at the front.

Relations between Kim Il Sung and the commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, Marshal Peng Dehuai, were very difficult. These relations were further soured after the marshal withdrew Chinese troops from Seoul and insisted on their deployment in the area of the 38th parallel. Peng Dehuai has repeatedly criticized Kim Il Sung for his misguided actions that led to serious setbacks during the Korean War. A Japanese researcher gives a very accurate description of Kim Il Sung's "generalship talent", which was given by a Chinese marshal: "You are trying to win this war by relying on luck... You play with the fate of your people and bring them only new sorrows as a result..." (p.34). With great regret, we have to admit that the game of fate of the people of North Korea continues to this day.

The Korean War ended on July 27, 1953 with the signing of an Armistice Agreement, but the peace treaty has not yet been signed. Today, it has become one of the most important aspects of resolving the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula.

A Japanese historian examines in detail the situation in the DPRK after the end of the Korean War. The country was completely destroyed, the people were starving. Major economic assistance from the USSR, China, and other socialist bloc states allowed North Korea to survive. Among the leadership of the Workers ' Party of Korea and between its four groups, the struggle for power has flared up with renewed vigor, for choosing the path of further development of the country. Kim Il Sung and his guerrilla faction, which showed assertiveness, firmness, and deftly used the contradictions between groups, eventually managed to defeat first the internal faction of Park Hong Yong, and then the pro-Soviet one led by Ho Ga Yi and Park Chang Ok, and the pro-Chinese one led by Choi Chang Ik.

The main" battle " for power in North Korea took place in 1956 at the August Plenum of the WPK Central Committee, which resulted in the exclusion from the top leadership of the most active figures of the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions, who tried to remove Kim Il Sung from power, accusing him of creating his own personality cult, lack of democratic principles in the activities of the party and state apparatus The "August incident" strengthened the position of Kim Il Sung and his group in the leadership of the party and the country, created prerequisites for the approval of a new course to build a "Juche state" (Juche is "its own master"), the formation of a totalitarian political system.

Attempts by the CPSU and CCP leaders to resolve differences within the North Korean political elite were unsuccessful. Kim Il Sung deftly "beat" A. Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai, who were sent to Pyongyang to normalize the situation in the top leadership of the DPRK. When Kim Il Sung promised Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai to restore the former leaders of the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions to their former top posts, he did not keep his word.

Large-scale purges, arrests, and reprisals began in the party and state apparatus against those who were even to some extent suspected of sympathizing with" counter-revolutionaries and revisionists " who criticized the policies and actions of the Kimirsenists. In May 1957, the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the WPK adopted a decision "On turning the struggle against counter-revolutionary elements into a nationwide, all-party movement." Under the leadership of Kim Il Sung's own brother, Kim Yong Du, a special body is being created under the WPK Central Committee to " identify the enemies of the people." Similar structures were formed under provincial, city, and county party committees. These bodies "identified" 10,000 members of the WPK who were involved in counterrevolutionary activities (p. 291).

Summing up the results of the guerrilla group's struggle with its political opponents in 1956, Nobuo Shimotomai notes that "the system of suppression created by Kim Il Sung" was not able to correct the situation in the country. The economy of the DPRK, despite the help of the USSR and other socialist states, experienced enormous difficulties, the welfare of people did not reach the pre-war level, and there was an acute shortage of food and essential goods. The massive crackdown on Kim Il Sung's opponents has led to a deterioration in relations with the Soviet Union and China.

The last section of the monograph is devoted to the DPRK's relations with the USSR and the PRC in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as well as Pyongyang's policy in the context of the growing confrontation between Moscow and Beijing.

The decisions of the XX Congress of the CPSU, the struggle against the cult of personality and socialism. Stalin's words were received with great concern by the North Korean leadership. The guerrilla group managed to reduce the entire struggle against the cult of personality in the WPK to "accusing two anti - party members" - Park Hong Yong and Ho Ga - of trying to create their cult.

In February 1958, Zhou Enlai visited Pyongyang, with whom an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of a 300,000-strong contingent of Chinese volunteers from the DPRK. At the end of this year, the withdrawal of Chinese troops was completed. Zhou's talks with Korean leaders have contributed to some improvement in bilateral relations. Pyongyang was satisfied with Mao Zedong's personal apology for" interfering in the internal affairs of the WPK", which was made by the Chinese leader during a personal meeting with Kim Il Sung in Moscow in November 1957.

The aggravation of Soviet-Chinese relations, the events in European social countries in the second half of the 1950s were used by Kim Il Sung and the ruling group to strengthen the course of "independence and independence" of the DPRK, the establishment of" Juche " as the state ideology of the WPK and North Korean society. Kim Il Sung proclaims the slogan " Know no other ideas than Juche!" The process of all-encompassing indoctrination of party members and the entire population of the DPRK begins. Kim Il Sung's attitude to the Sino-Soviet differences was fairly neutral at the first stage, but his ideological and political affinity for Mao Zedong China eventually prevailed. At the initiative of Kim Il Sung, the "Cheonlim movement" (the legendary horse that runs one thousand li - 250 km per day) is being developed in the country, which has become the Korean equivalent of the "big jump" in China.

In the late 1950s, the leadership of the DPRK persistently sought to conclude a union treaty with the USSR, as Shimotomai writes in detail. On July 6, 1961, during Kim Il Sung's visit to Moscow, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance is signed. According to a Japanese researcher, this was a "fake union treaty" (p. 30). I think that this formulation is inherently incorrect and indicates that the author has not elaborated enough on this issue. Of course, there were many problems in these relations, including at the stage of preparing for the conclusion of the agreement. The author of the monograph, for example, distorts the words of N. Khrushchev, who allegedly stated that "if we agree with America, such an agreement may be invalid" (p. 311). In fact, the Soviet leader said the following:: "If we can reach an agreement with the United States, then it will be possible to cancel these treaties" [Tkachenko, 2000, p. 2 ]( meaning the US-ROK and USSR-DPRK treaties), i.e. N. Khrushchev believed that the Soviet-American agreements would lead to the simultaneous denunciation of both treaties. By the way, when signing the Soviet-North Korean treaty, the DPRK government made a statement that "all military-political treaties and agreements concluded by both South and North Korea before the unification of the country lose their force when Korea is united on a peaceful and democratic basis "[Relations..., 1981, p. 195]. On July 11, 1961, a similar treaty was signed in Beijing between Pyongyang and Beijing, where Kim Il Sung arrived without informing the Soviet leadership about it. This behavior of the North Korean leader was alarming, as, indeed, many of his other actions after the conclusion of the treaty.

The Soviet-North Korean Alliance Treaty played an important role in maintaining peace and stability on and around the Korean peninsula during its 35 years of operation. This document repeatedly restrained the" revolutionary impulses " of North Korean leaders towards South Korea, and served as an effective mechanism for the political settlement of crisis situations that constantly arose on the Korean Peninsula. (For example, the crisis of 1968, when the North Koreans seized the American reconnaissance ship Pueblo and the world was on the verge of a nuclear-missile conflict between the USSR and the United States.) The Soviet leadership, during consultations with representatives of the North Korean government, made a fundamentally important statement about the defensive nature of the 1961 treaty. As L. Brezhnev emphasized, it is intended to serve as an instrument of peace in the Far East " [Tkachenko, 2000, p. 40]. The principled approach to the 1961 treaty outlined by the Soviet side cooled the" revolutionary heads " of Pyongyang's leaders, who apparently had plans to use a military-political alliance with Moscow to solve the problem of Korean unification.

In this context, I would like to emphasize once again that, despite all the nuances of Soviet-Korean relations in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the 1961 Treaty was crucial for maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula.

Nobuo Shimotomai has written a comprehensive book about the political history of the North Korean state. The work uses a large layer of archival documents, which undoubtedly causes additional interest in it. Although the views of the Japanese historian on the events of the internal life of the DPRK, its foreign policy, and his interpretation of some documents on the Soviet-American relations with North Korea are not clear.-

This does not in any way detract from the merits of his deep research work.

list of literature

The History of Korea (New reading) / Edited by A.V. Torkunov, Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003. Tkachenko V. P. Koreyskiy peninsulov i interesy Rossii [Korean Peninsula and Interests of Russia]. Moscow: Vostochny Lit., 2000.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Korea. 1945 - 1980. Dokumenty i materialy [Documents and materials]. 1981.

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