There is no doubt that one of the main reasons for the large-scale armed provocation in the area of Lake Khasan was the desire of the Japanese military to "intimidate" the Soviet leadership with the power of the imperial army, to force it to reconsider its policy towards China, and to prevent the USSR from becoming involved in the Sino-Japanese war.

The timing was dictated by the situation on the Sino-Japanese front. In preparing for the Wuhan operation, it was important for Japan to make sure that the Soviet Union did not intend to prevent the expansion of its aggression in China by armed means. The former head of the operational department of the Imperial headquarters, Colonel Inada, spoke shortly before the Khasan events: "Even if an entire division is defeated, it is necessary to find out whether the Soviets are ready to move against Japan." ⁸⁰

On July 15, 1938, the Japanese Ambassador to the USSR, M. Shigemitsu, at the direction of Tokyo, categorically declared that the Soviet military had" violated "the border and presented the Soviet government with a demand from the Government of Japan to "transfer" to it part of the territory of the USSR near Lake Khasan. In response, the Soviet government presented the text of the Hongchun Agreement signed with China in 1886. In the map of the Russian - Chinese border attached to the agreement, it is clearly indicated that the Zaozernaya Hill, to which Japan has put forward claims, lies on Russian territory. However, the Japanese side ignored this document.

On July 29, Japanese troops, taking advantage of the numerical superiority, invaded the territory of the USSR. Soviet border units were forced to withdraw to the east of Lake Khasan. When the Emperor of Japan was informed of these actions by the Japanese army, he "expressed satisfaction".

On August 10, the Soviets delivered an unexpected and powerful blow. The Japanese were driven out of the occupied territory. Fearing complete defeat, the chief of Staff of the 19th Division hastily sent a telegram to the chief of staff of the Japanese "Korean Army" asking for "immediate diplomatic negotiations", stating that the Japanese army had already "demonstrated its strength... and while there was a choice, it was necessary to stop" ⁸¹ . This decision was also supported by the fact that, following orders from Moscow, parts of the Special Far Eastern Army did not develop an offensive deep into Manchuria, demonstrating their desire to avoid an expansion of the conflict.

It was known in Moscow that the Japanese provocation in the area of Lake Khasan was primarily aimed at "intimidating the USSR" and that the Japanese were not ready for a major war with the Soviet Union at the moment. On August 3, 1938, Richard Sorge, a resident of Soviet intelligence in Japan, reported to Moscow:"...The Japanese General Staff is interested in a war with the USSR not now, but later. Active actions on the border were taken by the Japanese to show the Soviet Union that Japan is still capable of displaying its might. " ⁸²

Therefore, when the Japanese government requested a cessation of hostilities through the Embassy in Moscow, agreeing to restore the violated border, the Soviet government considered it appropriate to respond positively.

According to Japanese sources, during the fighting at Lake Khasan, "out of seven thousand Japanese soldiers who took direct part in the battles, 500 were killed and 900 were wounded. The loss was 20 percent. " ⁸³ The Soviet troops also suffered heavy losses - 400 killed and 2,700 wounded ^.84

Having been defeated, the Japanese, however, partially achieved the goals of provocation-they demonstrated to the Western powers their intention to continue confrontation with the USSR and were convinced of the desire of the Soviet government to avoid direct involvement of the Soviet Union in the Sino - Japanese war. However, it was not possible to force the Soviet government to abandon support for China - Soviet active assistance to the Chinese people fighting the invaders continued.

The aggravation of Soviet-Japanese relations was used by the Japanese side in negotiations with Great Britain in order to encourage the British government not to create "difficulties" for Japan in China. On August 20, British Ambassador Craigie telegraphed to London that Japanese Prime Minister Konoe had expressed his willingness to cooperate with Britain in the occupied areas of China. On September 1, the British government agreed to such cooperation ^.85

In the fall of 1938, the Japanese government intensified diplomatic negotiations with Great Britain, seeking its recognition of Japan's occupation of China. This was prompted by the conclusion of the Munich Agreement with nazi Germany and Italy by Great Britain and France on September 29-30, 1938. Tokyo saw the ambivalence of the UK's policy towards China. On the one hand, the British government, protecting its interests, did not want to strengthen Japan in China and tried to resist it, and on the other, it was ready to make a deal with Japan at the expense of China if Japanese aggression was turned around-

Ending. For the beginning, see "Asia and Africa Today", 2001, N 11, 12.

The numbering of links throughout the article is uniform.

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ta from south to north, against the Soviet Union. Therefore, Japanese leaders continued to convince the British of the possibility of Japanese-British cooperation in the occupied areas of China if Great Britain refused to support the government of Chiang Kai-shek ^.86

In September 1938, Japanese Prime Minister Konoe again issued a call to strengthen the fight against the"communist danger". In London, this was perceived as confirmation of Japanese plans for war against the USSR.

On September 24, China again appealed to the League of Nations for help in the fight against Japan. Once again, he was supported by the Soviet Union, which continued to insist on collective action against Japanese aggression. Britain, on the other hand, having finally embarked on the path of "appeasement", openly sought opportunities for collusion with Japan. On September 27, Craigie wrote to London:" We have long been groping for a basis for cooperation between the British and Japanese authorities in China to protect British interests, and we would be ready to do everything in our power to strengthen cooperation in this area. " ⁸⁷

There were no hopes of diverting Japan's attention towards the Soviet Union in the United States, where the Khasan events were perceived as a prelude to further aggravation of Soviet-Japanese relations.

On August 14, the influential American newspaper New York Times wrote:: "The Khasan incident has not yet been resolved... Incidents can easily occur everywhere... Along the Manchurian border, no doubt, there are places that, according to the Moscow map, may be Russian, but which are occupied by the Japanese. " ⁸⁸ Noting that "Japanese purchases of oil, produced almost entirely in the United States, have increased dramatically," the American press made it clear that in the event of a collision with the USSR, Japan can count on even greater material assistance from overseas ^.89 The Japanese very skillfully used the interest of the Western powers in the aggravation of Soviet-Japanese relations, warming it up in every possible way. At the same time, under the guise of demonstrating readiness for an armed clash with the USSR, they continued to capture the territory of China step by step.

On October 22, 1938, Japanese troops captured Canton (Guangzhou), on October 25 - Wuhan. With the loss of the Canton Port, China was effectively isolated from the outside world. By the end of October 1938, the Japanese had occupied a huge area of China, capturing its main industrial centers.

Thus, the threat of ousting Great Britain from China was created. However, the British, fearing to irritate the Japanese, did not take any steps to help China in its resistance to the interventionists. On the day of the fall of Canton, the Chinese Ambassador to Great Britain, Guo Taiqi, told his Soviet counterpart, M. M. Maisky, that "the British have so far, in fact, not lifted a finger to help China. For the entire duration of the war, the Chinese received from them only 36 airplanes of average quality, and a certain amount of ammunition and chemical products. The Chinese government did not receive a single penny of money in London ... " ⁹⁰ .

The connivance of Japanese aggression in China on the part of Western powers convinced Tokyo of the reality of the plan to take over all of East Asia, replacing "white imperialism" in this vast region of the world with Japanese imperialism.

On November 3, the "Imperial Government Statement" was published, declaring that "the empire aims to build a new order that will ensure stability in East Asia for all time. This is also the ultimate goal of the current military operations... The idea of building a new order in East Asia originated at a time when the foundations of modern (Japanese. - A. K.) of the state. Its implementation is a sacred and glorious duty of the current generation of the Japanese people... The Government declares the firmness of this course of the empire and its determination to implement it."

The Statement expressed confidence that " the great powers will also correctly understand our true intentions and will act accordingly to the new situation in East Asia." In order to explain the "true intentions", the former anti-communist, and essentially anti-Soviet, rhetoric was used. Imperialist aggression in Asia was again disguised under the slogan of "ensuring a joint struggle against communism." ⁹¹

Needless to say, the appearance of this "Statement" was one of the results of the Munich Agreement. It was after the unprincipled compliance shown by Great Britain and France to the aggressors in Europe that Tokyo decided to drop the disguise and openly declare its plans to gain dominance in Asia and the Pacific, ousting other colonial powers from this region. Declaring Japan's intention to " establish a new order in East Asia "was tantamount to announcing the Japanese government's rejection of the American principle of" open doors " in China.

Only then did London and Washington come to the conclusion that the policy of concessions to Japan requires adjustment. The United States responded negatively to the Japanese probe of the conclusion of a new Japan-US trade treaty and in December 1938, at the same time as the United Kingdom, provided China with insignificant loans. U.S. government officials have threatened Japan that if U.S. interests are violated in China, "further aid to Japan may cease." ⁹²

However, this had no effect. The occupation of Hainan Island in February 1939, and the Spratly Islands in March, which brought the Japanese armed forces directly to the approaches to the possessions of the Western powers in Southeast Asia, testified to Japan's intention not to stop there.

Since further southward movement was fraught with the risk of armed conflicts with European colonial powers, as well as with the United States, Tokyo set out to thwart potential joint countermeasures by Western powers by reaching agreements with Great Britain. This was justified by the position of Chamberlain, who in November 1938 declared his desire to " maintain friendly relations with both countries (Japan and China. - A. K.) in the hope that the moment will come when their differences will be resolved... " ⁹³ .

In order to make the British government more compliant, on July 14, 1939, the Japanese authorities launched a blockade of the British and French concessions in Tientsin. On the other hand, Japan considered it necessary and timely to influence the policy of the United States.-

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co-Britannia by once again intensifying its confrontation with the USSR, whose international situation had by this time worsened due to the failure - through the fault of the Western powers - of the collective security policy in Europe. Tokyo expected that the Soviet Union, left alone with the aggressive states of the world, in the face of the danger of a German attack, would not be able to use large forces in the eastern regions of the country and, in the event of an armed clash with Japan, would be forced to make serious territorial and political concessions. At the same time, the Soviet government's refusal to provide assistance and support to China was always considered the main political concession. For the sake of this, the military and political leadership of Japan was ready to go even at the risk of a big war with the USSR.

After the defeat of the Japanese army in the Soviet Primorye region, in the area of Lake Khasan, the Japanese general Staff from the autumn of 1938 developed a plan for "Operation No. 8", which provided for a strike on the USSR through the MNR in the direction of Lake Baikal ^.94 The General Staff of the army sought a place to strike "where the enemy did not expect an offensive." ⁹⁵ It was believed that an attack on Lake Baikal from the western direction should be undertaken before the Soviet Union significantly strengthened its defense capability here.

In the historical literature, when analyzing the reasons for the outbreak of a major armed conflict by the Japanese military on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic of the Soviet Union in the Khalkhin-Gol River area (in Japan, this area is called Nomonhan), attention is usually paid mainly to the military objectives of this operation. Indeed, when planning another military sortie against the Soviet Union, the Japanese army command aimed to test the effectiveness of the new option and test the defense capability of the Soviet armed forces in the western direction, as well as the readiness of the Soviet government to fulfill its obligations under the military alliance concluded on March 12, 1936 with the MNR. At that time, the Soviet government declared that in the event of a Japanese attack on the MNR, the Soviet Union would help Mongolia defend its independence.

There was a desire among Japanese generals to restore the Imperial army's authority, which was undermined by the inability to quickly end the war in China and the defeat at Lake Hassan. The Japanese Official History of the Great East Asian War admits: "Having lost confidence in victory, the army was in a state of intense irritability and impatience-both with regard to military operations against China and with regard to operations against the USSR." ⁹⁶

However, the real reasons that pushed the Japanese command to unleash military operations on the territory of the MNR were much more complex than just the desire to take revenge for the defeat at Lake Khasan.

As noted above, the main one was to force the Soviet Union to withdraw its aid to China, or at least significantly weaken it, by threatening war. In this case, according to Japanese calculations. Chiang Kai-shek should have come to ^the conclusion that "his bet on Soviet aid is groundless" and that it would be better to settle the Sino-Japanese conflict peacefully, of course, on Japanese terms .97

Secondly, the upcoming events at Khalkhin Gol were considered by the Japanese leadership as an important trump card in the diplomatic game with the West. This is confirmed by Japanese documents. So, in the "Secret operational diary of the Kwantung Army" in connection with the beginning of the Khalkhingol events, the following entry was made: "There is confidence in the consistent defeat of the Soviet army... This is the only way to create a favorable environment for Japan in negotiations with the United Kingdom. " ⁹⁸

It was about negotiations on the conclusion of the so - called "Arita-Craigie agreement" between Japan and the United Kingdom, which went down in history as the Far Eastern version of the "Munich agreement". In essence, by capitulating to Japan, the British government agreed to recognize the Japanese occupation of China. To a large extent, this decision of the United Kingdom was accelerated by the events on Khalkhin Gol. Counting on the expansion of the Khalkhingol events to the scale of war, the British government pledged not to create problems for Japan in the rear - in China. This was clearly stipulated in the Japanese-English agreement, which, inter alia, stated: "The Government of the United Kingdom fully recognizes the actual situation in China,

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in which large-scale operations are being conducted, and notes that as long as this situation persists, the Japanese army in China has special rights to ensure its own security and maintain public order in areas under its control. It is recognized that it (the Japanese army) is forced to suppress and eliminate actions that will benefit its opponent.

His Majesty's Government does not intend to take any actions or measures that are detrimental to the implementation of the above-mentioned tasks of the Japanese army ... " ⁹⁹ .

Concluded on July 22, 1939, at the height of the Khalkhingol events, this agreement encouraged Japan to expand military operations against the USSR.

Third, the Japanese government sought to use military actions against the MNR and the USSR as a deterrent to the United States from applying economic sanctions to Japan. On July 10, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Horinouchi, convinced Secretary of State Cordell Hull that all Japan's actions were dictated by the struggle against the Soviet Union. In the course of subsequent conversations, he repeatedly raised the topic of "the threat of Bolshevism". K. Hall agreed with this, pointing out that the United States also opposes the strengthening of the Soviet Union. ¹⁰⁰

As a result, although the US government did announce the denunciation of the trade agreement with Japan on July 26, the practical implementation of this decision was postponed for six months. There is ample reason to believe that the fact that fierce fighting between Japanese and Soviet troops on Khalkhin Gol played a significant role in this process. The denunciation of the trade agreement under these conditions did not result in any damage to Japan. Moreover, ^the US position allowed Japan to buy 10 times more American iron and steel scrap in 1939 than in 1938,101 . Trade in other strategic goods vital to Japan also continued unabated.

Fourthly, the sharp aggravation of Soviet-Japanese relations and direct armed conflict with the USSR corresponded to the goals of Japan pursued at the negotiations held in Berlin in 1939 on the foundations of the military - political alliance of Germany, Japan and Italy (which eventually led to the signing of the Berlin or Triple Pact by these countries on September 27, 1940). Tokyo persistently sought a military alliance directed mainly against the USSR, seeking to refrain from committing to joint participation with Germany and Italy in the war with Great Britain and France, which the European fascist powers insisted on.

In his reports from Tokyo in the spring of 1939, R. Sorge assessed the situation as follows:"...Information about the anti-Comintern military pact: if Germany and Italy go to war with the USSR, Japan will join them at any time, without setting any conditions. But if a war is started with democratic countries, then Japan will join only if the Far East is attacked or if the USSR joins the democratic countries in the war. " ¹⁰²

According to the calculations of the Japanese leadership, the beginning of hostilities between Japan and the Soviet Union should have pushed Germany to agree with the Japanese position. The Japanese government was aware of "doubts in Germany about Japan's ability to fulfill the global tasks of establishing a 'new order' in Asia, to contribute to the struggle both against the USSR and especially against the United States and Great Britain." ¹⁰³

Tokyo was also aware that the German leadership was trying to subordinate the policy and actions of Japan, as a weaker ally, to the plans and actions of Germany. This strengthened the position of Japanese supporters of armed confrontation with the USSR, who explicitly stated that the most important thing to prove the strength and combat capability of the Japanese armed forces not only to the German ally, but also to the leaders of the United States and Great Britain, would be a serious military action against the Soviet Union ^.104

When deciding in the spring of 1939 to organize a major military provocation in the MNR, the Japanese military and political leadership believed that the international situation made it possible to count on success even if the conflict escalated into war. Representatives of the supreme military command of Japan recognized after the Second World War: "In Europe, during this period, the power of Germany increased, it annexed Austria, occupied Czechoslovakia. The situation in Europe gave reason to believe that in the foreseeable future Germany could begin to resolve its problems with the USSR. On the other hand, in the Far East, Japanese forces, having captured Hankou and Canton, completed the operational phase in the Chinese incident, after which Japan intended to start a new stage of conflict resolution, mainly by political methods, although continuing military operations. The Japanese General Staff hoped to meet the future by preparing a decisive war against the Soviet Union. In this case, it was planned to quickly transfer most of the Japanese army to Manchuria, without creating difficulties for resolving the Chinese incident. " ¹⁰⁵

Although official Japanese historiography still claims that the events on Khalkhin Gol were not planned by the central military and political leadership of Japan, but were originally just one of the many border incidents, in reality this is not the case.

Moscow knew about the upcoming next armed provocation against the USSR in advance. On March 3, 1939, the Red Army intelligence directorate informed the country's leadership:

"1. British circles in China consider it very likely that the Japanese will soon undertake a new invasion of Soviet territory, and they assume that the scale of this provocation will be larger than it was in the Lake district. Hassan in July-August 1938. However, given that the purpose of the upcoming invasion of the USSR is to raise patriotic sentiments in the Japanese army and people, this invasion will not be deep and the Japanese will try to quickly settle this "incident".

2. In Japanese military circles in Shanghai, rumors are being spread that in May 1939 a major action against the USSR should be expected, and, according to rumors, this action may lead to war.

3. According to information that requires verification, Lieutenant General Ishihara is currently making a detour to border units and fortified areas on the Manchurian-Soviet border, where he conducts instructional meetings with co-

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rolling stock. Japanese military circles in Shanghai view Ishihara's trip as part of a plan to prepare for a new attack on the USSR. " ¹⁰⁶

Colonel Terada and Lieutenant Colonel Hattori, who were sent to the Kwantung Army from the operational department of the General Staff in March 1939, were directly preparing an armed provocation. In the area of the planned military operations, the 23rd Division was concentrated, whose staff officers were considered "specialists in the Soviet Union and the Red Army." ¹⁰⁷ The commander of the 23rd Division, Lieutenant General Komatsu-bara, was known as an expert in the "psychology of the Reds", as he had previously been a military attache in Moscow.

By the end of April, preparations for the operation were completed. All that remained was to provoke the outbreak of hostilities. And this was also thought out. On April 25, the commander of the Kwantung Army, General Ueda, sent the commanders of the border units "Instructions for resolving conflicts on the border of Manchukuo and the USSR." According to this document, the commanders of advanced units and subunits had to "independently determine the line of border passage and indicate it to the units of the first echelon." In armed conflicts, it was necessary "in any case, regardless of the scale of the conflict and its location, to achieve victory", for which "resolutely attack and force the Red Army to surrender." However, it was allowed to

invade Soviet territory or consciously involve Soviet troops in the territory of Manchukuo. " ¹⁰⁸ The instruction stated that "all previous instructions are canceled" ¹⁰⁹ . It is obvious that the commander of the Kwantung Army could not issue such an instruction - provoking a war with the USSR - without coordination with the center. Rather, on the contrary, instructions for issuing such instructions were received from Tokyo.

On May 12, the commander of the 23rd division, Komatsubara, personally conducted a reconnaissance and necessary preparations, sent a two-company reinforced reconnaissance group of the division under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Azuma to the border with the task of " pushing the security units of the Mongolian army across the river (Khalkhin-Gol)." The Mongol border units resisted, which was used by the Japanese as an excuse to expand the provoked conflict to the scale of a local war.

On May 19, 1939, the Soviet government protested to Japan in connection with the gross violation of the border of the allied MNR and demanded an end to military operations. Soviet troops, including the 11th Tank Brigade, were hurrying to the border. However, the Japanese command continued to implement the plan of the planned operation.

On May 28, units of the 23rd Japanese Division launched an offensive after air strikes. Having suffered losses, the Soviet-Mongolian troops were forced to withdraw to the Khalkhin-Gol River. On May 30, the Japanese general staff sent the following telegram to the Kwantung Army Command: "Congratulations on your army's brilliant military success in the No-Monhan area." ¹¹⁰ On the same day, the General Staff ordered the inclusion of the 1st aviation unit (180 aircraft) in the Kwantung Army and requested additional needs for the army to increase the number of troops and military materials.

For the Soviet government, there was an alarming situation that required immediate and responsible decisions. Although an analysis of the situation in the Far East indicated that at the moment the Japanese leadership was hardly ready to unleash a major war against the USSR, according to intelligence, Tokyo sent new instructions to the Kwantung Army command, requiring "to continue military operations on an expanded scale in Buin Nur (MNR)" ¹¹¹ .

It was decided in the Kremlin to prevent the Khalkhingol events from escalating into war, while at the same time teaching the Japanese a sensitive lesson. On June 1, the deputy commander of the Belarusian Military District, G. K. Zhukov, was urgently summoned to Moscow and asked to immediately fly to the Khalkhin Gol area. G. K. Zhukov described how the Soviet command evaluated the clashes with the Japanese in his memoirs "Memories and Reflections":

"When I entered the office, I reported-

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K. E. Voroshilov, having inquired about his health, told the People's Commissar about his arrival. :

- Japanese troops suddenly invaded the borders of friendly Mongolia, which the Soviet government pledged to protect from any external aggression by the treaty of March 12, 1936. Here is a map of the invasion area with the situation on May 30.

I went to the map.

- Here,- the People's Commissar pointed out, - for a long time small provocative raids were carried out on the Mongolian border guards, and here Japanese troops as part of the Hailar garrison group invaded the territory of the MNR and attacked the Mongolian border units covering the area east of the Khalkhin-Gol River.

"I think," the commissar continued, " that this is a serious military adventure. In any case, this is not the end of the matter... Can you fly there immediately and, if necessary, assume command of the troops?

"Ready to leave this minute." ¹¹²

The subsequent events are well known. After bloody battles in June and July, Soviet and Mongolian units under the command of G. K. Zhukov launched an offensive and delivered a crushing blow to the Japanese troops in August. By August 31, the elimination of the Japanese invasion group was complete, and the Japanese adventure ended in complete collapse. In total, during the fighting on Khalkhin Gol, the Japanese lost more than 61 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners. The losses of the Soviet-Mongolian troops from May to September 1939 amounted to about 18,5 thousand people wounded and killed ¹¹³ .

Japan's military defeat was accompanied by a political defeat. The announcement of the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact received during the days of the powerful counteroffensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops led the Japanese leadership into great confusion. R. Sorge described the situation in Tokyo as follows::

"The negotiations to conclude a non-aggression treaty with Germany caused a huge sensation and opposition to Germany.

The resignation of the government is possible after the details of the conclusion of the contract are established. German Ambassador Ott is also surprised by the incident.

Most members of the Government are thinking of ending the anti-Mintern pact with Germany.

The trade and finance groups have almost reached an agreement with Britain and America.

Other groups aligned with Colonel Hashimoto and General Ugaki are in favor of concluding a non-aggression pact with the USSR and expelling Britain from China.

The domestic political crisis is growing.

Ramsay" ¹¹⁴ .

The charge d'affaires of the USSR in Japan reported the same thing to Moscow on August 24: "The news of the conclusion of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany made a stunning impression here, leading to confusion especially among the military and the fascist camp..." ¹¹⁵

The unexpected political maneuver of Germany was perceived in Tokyo as treachery and a violation of the provisions of the "Anti-Comintern Pact" directed against the USSR.

Despite all the moral and political costs of the Soviet-German agreement, it objectively weakened the "Anti-Comintern Pact" and sowed serious doubts in Tokyo about Germany's policy as an ally of Japan. There is every reason to believe that the rift that emerged in the Tokyo-Berlin "axis" subsequently led to the fact that Japan did not want to recklessly follow Germany in aggression against the Soviet Union.

Events in the Far East on the eve of World War II had a direct - and generally negative - impact on the international situation. Militaristic Japan, without abandoning plans for war against the USSR, at the same time prepared to seize the colonial possessions of the Western powers in the Pacific Ocean, to occupy the entire East Asia. Her choice will be made in 1941.

^{Fujiwara Akira.} 80 Taiheye sensoshi ron (Discourses on the History of the Pacific War). Tokyo, 1982, p. 74.

^{Fujiwara Akira.} 81 Nittu zammen senso. (General Sino-Japanese War). Tokyo, 1982, pp. 154-155.

⁸² Russian Archive, vol. 18, p. 147.

⁸³ Seva-no rekishi, vol. 5, p. 154.

⁸⁴ Central State Archive of the Soviet Army, fund 31983, inventory 3, case 152, sheet 154.

⁸⁵ Documents on British Foreign Policy. 1919-1939 (hereinafter: DBFP). Vol. VIII. London, 1955, p. 34, 46.

⁸⁶ DBFP. Vol. VIII, p. 74-75, 89.

^{Sevastyanov G. N.} 87 Edict. soch., p. 329.

⁸⁸ "New York Times". 14.VIII.1938.

^{Bednyak I. Ya} 89 Edict. soch., pp. 130-131.

⁹⁰ Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR, vol. XXI, p. 602.

⁹¹ History of the Pacific War, vol. 2, pp. 355-356.

⁹² FRUS. Japan. 1931-1941, p. 813.

⁹³ British Far Eastern Policy. Information Department Papers. 1938. July, N 24, p. 36.

⁹⁴ Taiheye senso si. Vol. 3, p. 242.

⁹⁵ Daihonei rikugun bu. Part 1, p. 584.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 585.

^{Tsuji Masanobu.} 97 Nomonhan jihen no boppatsu. (Beginning of the Nomonhan events). Changchun, 1941, pp. 85-86.

⁹⁸ Seva-no rekishi, vol. 5, p. 200.

⁹⁹ DBFP. Vol. IX, p. 313.

^{Sevastyanov G. N.} 100 Edict. soch., p. 486.

¹⁰¹ History of the Second World War 1939-1945. Vol. 2, p. 42.

¹⁰² Russian Archive, vol. 18, p. 156.

^{Sapozhnikov B. G.} 103 China in the fire of war. 1931-1950. Moscow, 1977, p. 126.

^{Tsuji Masanobu.} 104 Edict op., p. 63.

¹⁰⁵ War in Asia and the Pacific 1937 - 1949. A fifteen volume collection. Vol. 10. Japan and the Soviet Union. New York - London, 1980, p. 105-106.

¹⁰⁶ Russian Archive, vol. 18, p. 114.

¹⁰⁷ Taiheye senso si. Vol. 3, p. 241.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 243.

^{Shimada Toshihiko.} 109 Kantogun. (Kwantung Army). Tokyo, 1982, p. 135.

¹¹⁰ Daihonei rikugun bu. Part 1, p. 593.

¹¹¹ Russkiy archiv [Russian Archive], vol. 18, p. 158.

^{Zhukov G. K.} 112 Memoirs and reflections. Volume 1. Moscow, 1974, pp. 163-164.

¹¹³ History of the Second World War 1939-1945. Vol. 2, p. 219.

¹¹⁴ Russian Archive, vol. 18, p. 158.

^The role of the USSR in the struggle for peace on the eve of World War II. Documents and materials, Moscow, 1971, p. 637.

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