The bourgeois-liberal trend of modern Japanese historiography dates back to the second half of the 19th century. Representatives of this trend, influenced by European positivism, criticized the prevailing religious, Japanese-centered concepts. Along with their traditional interest in political history, they were the first in Japan to focus on socio-economic issues and cultural history. The defeat of Japanese imperialism in World War II, which led to a certain democratization of public and scientific life in Japan, contributed, in particular, to an increase in interest in the problems of Japan's foreign policy history, due to the desire to understand the causes and consequences of this defeat. The attention paid to the problems of Japanese expansion, especially in China, from the time of the formation of Japanese imperialism at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries to the formation of the Far Eastern hotbed of World War II in the 1930s is quite understandable .1
Over the past two decades, the liberal movement has taken a leading position in Japanese historiography in terms of the number of works, the range of problems considered, and the breadth of dissemination of its concepts. Its representatives, in contrast to conservative historians, refused to unconditionally justify Japan's foreign policy. The main purpose of this article is to analyze the main theoretical and methodological concepts of these authors, which they put as the basis for their interpretation of Japan's policy in the Far East in the late XIX-first third of the XX century.

The most fundamental works of liberal historians were written within the framework of a special development of the liberal movement.

1 The Marxist-Leninist concept of Japan's Far Eastern policy during this period was developed in a number of works by Soviet historians. Imperialism in Manchuria, Moscow, 1931. The struggle for the Pacific Ocean. Japanese-American Contradictions, Moscow, 1947; E. M. Zhukov. History of Japan, Moscow, 1939; A. L. Sidorov. Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Moscow, 1946; B. A. Romanov. Essays on the diplomatic history of the Russo-Japanese War. 1895-1907. Moscow -L. 1947; A. L. Galperin. Anglo-Japanese Union, Moscow, 1947; " International Relations in the Far East (1870-1945)", Moscow, 1951; H. Eidus. Essays on the new and recent history of Japan, Moscow, 1955; A. L. Narochnitsky. Colonial policy of the capitalist Powers in the Far East. 1860-1895. Moscow, 1956; "Essays on the modern history of Japan", Moscow, 1957; "Essays on the new History of Japan", Moscow, 1958; L. N. Kutakov. Portsmouth Peace Treaty, Moscow, 1961; I. Ya. Bednyak. Japan in the Period of Transition to Imperialism. Moscow, 1962; "History of Diplomacy", Vol. 2. Moscow, 1963; vol. 3. Moscow, 1965; S. S. Grigortsevich. Far Eastern policy of the imperialist Powers in 1906-1917. Tomsk, 1965; M. I. Sladkovsky. China and Japan, Moscow, 1971; "Japanese Militarism", Moscow. 1972; "International Relations in the Far East". In 2 books, Moscow, 1973.

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post-World War II bourgeois political science. At this time, organizations that unite Japanese political scientists are being created. The most well-known among them are the Japan Political Science Association (JPAA) and the Japan Society for the Science of International Politics (JNMP). The former is a member of the International Association of Political Sciences, established in 1949 under the auspices of UNESCO. The goals of the IAAPN, according to its charter, are to "encourage research and joint efforts of researchers" in the fields of political science, the history of political doctrines, political history, the history of diplomacy, the science of international politics, and the science of administrative management2 . Although in the subject of research of the YAAPN, judging by the content of its printed organ-the yearbook "Seijigaku" ("Political Sciences"), domestic political problems take precedence, and significant attention is also paid to issues of foreign policy history3 . The attention of the members of the UNN, which unites university historians, international lawyers and employees of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, is entirely focused on the study of foreign policy history. Research activities in the humanities are usually funded by the Ministry of Culture and Education; as for the UNN, it is largely associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which gives its members certain advantages: in particular, unlike other historians, they have access to the Ministry's archives. Since 1957, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has held monthly scientific conferences on the history of Japanese diplomacy, except for July and August, where, as a rule, one report is heard and discussed. A significant part of the reports are then published in the form of articles. The YAONMP press organ is the Kokusai Seiji quarterly (International Politics). Most of its issues are thematic collections of articles devoted to Japan's relations with individual countries, 4 the diplomatic history of wars, 5 and the problems of Japanese diplomacy in certain dynastic periods .6
The printed materials of the members of these societies are not limited to their periodicals: they publish their works in "Scientific Notes" and collections of university articles, numerous historical journals, as well as in the form of collective and individual monographs and generalizing works. At the same time, they widely use a variety of sources - from archival documents to memoirs and the press. Their writings contain a lot of factual material, of course, appropriately dissected and interpreted in the spirit of a pluralistic methodology that eclectically combines elements of a materialistic and idealistic understanding of history.

In theoretical and methodological terms, there are no fundamental differences between the members of the YAPN and YAPNMP. In general, based on the pr-

2 Politicheskie nauki Publ., 1969. Tokyo. 1970, p. 272 (in Japanese).

3 "Post-war world politics and the USA". Politicheskie nauki Publ., 1954. Tokyo. 1955 (in Japanese); "Discovery of the modern World". Politicheskie nauki Publ., 1961. Tokyo, 1962 (in Japanese). "The political process of easing international tensions." Politicheskie nauki Publ., 1969.

4 " Studies on the history of Japanese diplomacy. Development of Japanese-Chinese relations". Tokyo, 1961 (in Japanese); "Development of Japanese-American Relations". Tokyo, 1961 (in Japanese); "Development of Japanese-Russian and Japanese-Soviet relations". Tokyo, 1966 (in Japanese).

5 "Studies on the history of Japanese diplomacy, the Japanese-Qing and Japanese-Russian War". Tokyo, 1962 (ra yap. yaz.); " Studies on the history of Japanese diplomacy. The First World War". Tokyo, 1963 ("a yapon. yaz.").

6 " Research on the history of Japanese diplomacy. The Meiji Period." Tokyo. 1957 (in Japanese); " Studies on the history of Japanese diplomacy. Taisho Period". Tokyo, 1958 (in Japanese). "Studies on the history of Japanese diplomacy. Sowing Period". Tokyo, 1960 (in Japanese).

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There is a certain school of organizations that unite researchers of foreign policy history, leading a fairly broad study of international relations and Japan's foreign policy over the past century. Representatives of this school criticize the aggressive policy of Japanese imperialism from bourgeois-liberal positions, trying to justify the Japanese diplomatic department and take into account the experience of the past when developing practical recommendations for the Japanese Foreign Ministry. It is precisely for such pragmatic purposes that they interpret history as a process that opens the way to modern knowledge, try to prove that Japan's diplomatic circles have always sought peaceful means of foreign policy, and thereby justify continuity in the policy of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Therefore, history and modernity are connected in their understanding by certain lines of development and represent a complete branched scheme.

Miyazaka Hiroshi concretizes this scheme as follows: after the Russo - Japanese War, international relations in the Far East developed in two main directions: one led to the first and Second World Wars, the other to the "21 demands", the Manchurian incident, and the Sino - Japanese war. From the Second World War, which closed both lines, a thread stretches to modern Sino-Japanese relations. According to Miyazaki, only taking these lines into account can one understand the true meaning of the current Sino-Japanese relations and correctly assess the current real situation .7 In other words, relations between Japan and the other imperialist powers developed in one direction, and between Japan and China in the other, which, according to Miyazaka, determines the nature of today's Sino - Japanese relations. From his point of view, for more effective implementation of Japanese policy, it is necessary to take into account the experience of history.

Note that the knowledge of history is by no means identical with the knowledge of modernity. 8 This latter includes the historical specifics of the present - a point that Japanese liberal historians miss: they either mechanically transfer to the present the trends in the development of Japan's foreign policy in the past 9, or look for precedents and models in history to use them in the practice of modern Japanese diplomacy. Such precedents often turn out to be individually unique phenomena of the past for bourgeois authors. In this case, the only motive for studying history is opportunistic and political interests, and the content of history as a science is emasculated.

This subjectivist approach is clearly found in Kobayashi Tatsuo's article 10 . The author notes that in Japan, foreign policy issues were often used by the opposition to force the cabinet to resign .11 In this regard, the Parliament discussed the creation of a "supra-party" body, which includes the leaders of the ruling and opposition parties and is intended to coordinate decisions on the most important issues of foreign policy. 12]-

7 Miyazaka Hiroshi. Creation of the "YUMZHD Company" - " Research on the history of Japanese Diplomacy. Development of Japanese-Chinese relations", p. 30.

8 See V. V. Ivanov. History and modernity in the works of V. I. Lenin. "History and historians. Historiographical Yearbook, 1970", Moscow, 1972, p. 13; his own. Correlation of history and modernity as a methodological problem, Moscow, 1973, p. 62.

9 Uchi yama Masakuma. The formation of orthodox Kasumiga-seki diplomacy. "Problems of the history of Japanese diplomacy", Vol. 2. Tokyo, 1965, p. 12 (in Japanese).

10 Kobayashi Tatsuo. Creation of an Extraordinary Commission on Foreign Affairs. "Problems of the history of Japanese diplomacy", vol. 2, p. 53,

11 Ibid.

12 "Asahi Shimbun", 7. III., 29. XI. 1964.

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tor explains his interest in the history of the emergence of such a body in the form of the foreign affairs commission by saying that this is the only example of "non-party diplomacy" in the history of Japan, but he does not mention the fact that this kind of "non-party diplomacy", in fact, expresses the interests of the bourgeoisie.

The class positions of liberal-bourgeois historians are clearly shown in their treatment of the problems of imperialism. Researchers from the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug do not deny that at the beginning of the XX century. Japanese capitalism has "reached a monopolistic stage" 14, but at the same time they actually obscure the economic essence of imperialism, separate it from imperialist politics - "the policy of financial plunder, colonial robberies, national oppression, political reaction, and all kinds of aggravation of capitalist exploitation"15 .

It should be noted that Japanese Marxist historians in the 1920s, along with studying the character of the Meiji Isin, 16 turned to the analysis of the course of development of Japanese capitalism, the formation and character of imperialism as a key problem in the history of Japan in the late XIX-early XX centuries as a whole and its international policy. A prominent role in this was played by Noro Eitaro, who was one of the first to expose the foreign policy of Japanese imperialism and showed that Japan was already on the criminal path of aggressive wars at the end of the XIX century, in particular during the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-189517 . Marxist works published after the Second World War, despite differences in the assessment of a number of events, are based on the position of the decisive role of the economy of imperialism in its aggressive foreign policy. 18 Shinobu Seizaburo, the author of the first major work on the political history of Japan at the turn of modern and modern times, devotes a chapter to the analysis of the formation of Japanese imperialism and the development of imperialist contradictions, which is essentially monographic in nature .19 This serves as a basis for the author's consideration of issues of political history, including Japan's aggressive foreign policy.

When liberal historians talk about the relationship between diplomacy and monopolies, they substitute the problem of merging monopolies with the state apparatus by describing the private and accidental personal connections of individual diplomats with the heads of some monopolies. Uchiyama, for example, writes about the relationship of Kato Takaaki and Shidehara Kijuro, who repeatedly served as foreign ministers, with the founder of the Mitsubishi concern Iwasaki Yataro, while keeping silent about the true extent of the influence of monopolies on the country's foreign policy.-

13 An unconstitutional body created in 1916 by the Terauchi Masatake military - bureaucratic cabinet to coordinate foreign policy activities and composed of leading ministers and leaders of bourgeois-landlord parties.

14 For example: Tawaka Naokichi. General outline of Japanese-American diplomatic relations. "The development of Japanese-American relations", p. 10.

15 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 27, p. 286.

16 See P. P. Topekh. To the question of the character of "Meiji Yixing". "Historical and Philological research", Moscow, 1967; N. F. Leshchenko. Progressive Japanese historians on the character of Meiji-yixing. "Modern historiography of the countries of the foreign East", Moscow, 1975.

17 Noro Eitaro. History of the development of Japanese capitalism. Tokyo. 1930 (in Japanese). Noro's opponent, Inomata Tsunao, explained the expansionist policy of the Japanese bourgeoisie by looking for sources of raw materials and sales markets, and interpreted the Sino-Japanese war of the late nineteenth century as both an imperialist and a "capitalist people's war", ostensibly aimed at eliminating unequal treaties (see Inomata Tsunao. Japanese monopoly capitalism. Tokyo, 1931 (in Japanese).

18 See, for example, Hattori Korefusa. A new history of Japanese diplomacy. Tokyo. 1947 (in Japanese); Shinobu Seizaburo. History of Taisho politics. In 4 tt. Tokyo. 1951-1952 (in Japanese); Maejima Shozo. Historical analysis of the rule of political parties in Japan. Kyoto. 1954 (in Japanese).

19 Shinobu Seizaburo, Edict op. t. I, ch. I

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new products 20 . Japanese historians, on the other hand, who hold Marxist-Leninist positions, assume that the monopolistic bourgeoisie is directly responsible for the expansionist policies and aggressive wars that Japan waged from the end of the 19th century to the end of World War II .21
Many liberal historians are more or less ready to recognize the aggressive nature of Japanese foreign policy. Tomoshima Kenzaburo, for example, believes that Sino-Japanese relations from the Russo-Japanese War to the Pacific War are a history of Japanese aggression in China .22 According to Fujii Shozo, Japan's imperialist diplomacy, under the guise of beautiful phrases about international cooperation and "a policy of non-interference in China's affairs," sought to secure preferential positions and special rights in this country .23 This point of view is actually shared by other liberal authors 24 . But by acknowledging these facts, they avoid revealing their essence and meaning. In the positivist sense, they interpret the causal relationship of events without tracing their socio-economic roots and origins. It is characteristic, for example, that they usually attribute the formation of Japanese imperialism to the period after the Russo-Japanese War. This approach, on the one hand, makes it impossible to identify the roots of Japan's foreign policy, and on the other hand, it separates its aggressive policy from the entire course of the country's socio - economic development, prompting to look for the reasons for this policy in another area. Imai Shoji tries to prove the" necessity "and" necessity " of Japan's foreign policy actions, referring primarily to the international situation, and not to the conditions of domestic development .25 Outside of Japan, Shozo also tries to find reasons for the aggressiveness of Japanese imperialism, explaining it only by the geographical location of Manchuria and Mongolia, because these objects of Japanese expansion were rich in natural resources .26 The author deduces the tasks of Japan's foreign policy from certain "state interests", and not from the interests of the ruling classes, and, thus, these latter interests are presented, in fact, as national ones. In accordance with this, the criterion for periodization of the history of foreign policy is taken not by the socio-economic evolution of the country, but by the vicissitudes of its political history .27
Japanese bourgeois historians do not give an objective interpretation of the imperialist contradictions. Miyazaka Hiroshi confines himself to stating them 28 . Tanaka Naokichi connects the emergence of Japanese-American contradictions exclusively with the measures taken by the United States to limit Japanese emigration to the United States in 1906, and the fear of President T. Roosevelt before the strengthening of Japan, which manifested itself

20 Uchiyamamasakuma. Op. ed., p. 13.

21 For example: Maejima Shozo. Edict op., p. 303; Toyama Shigeki, Imai Seiichi, Fujiwara Akira. History of Sowing. Tokyo. 1955 (in Japanese).

22 Tomoshima Kenzaburo. Sino-Japanese relations and the international situation. "Research on the history of Japanese diplomacy. Development of Japanese-Chinese relations", p. 1.

23 Fujii Shozo. Sun Yat-sen and the problem of Manchuria and Mongolia. "Problems of the history of Japanese diplomacy", Vol. I. Tokyo, 1964, p. 30 (in Japanese).

24 Hosoya Chihiro. Japanese-American relations in connection with the intervention in Siberia. "Development of Japanese-American relations", p. 73; Saito Takashi. The Paris Peace Conference and Japan. "Research on the history of Japanese diplomacy. The Taisho Period", p. 107.

25 Imai Shoji. Japanese demands in the negotiations for the conclusion of a Japanese-British alliance. "Research on the history of Japanese diplomacy. The Meiji Period " (in Japanese); his own. The Japanese-Russian War and the development of politics in China. "Research on the history of Japanese diplomacy. Development of Japanese-Chinese relations", p. 17 (in Japanese).

26 Fujii Shozo. Op. ed., p. 22.

27 See Tanaka Naokichi. Op. ed., p. 1.

28 Miyazaka Hiroshi. Op. ed., p. 29.

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during the Portsmouth Conference 29 . Kobayashi Tatsuo, Saito Takashi, and Sato Seizaburo emphasize the role of Japanese policy in exacerbating international contradictions in the Far East, but avoid explaining the roots and main content of this policy .30 Some liberal historians, such as Saito, go further, and are willing to explain the Japanese-American differences by the difference in U.S. and Japanese policies in China .31 At the same time, Japanese historians reproach the United States for striving for world domination, and at the same time actually justify the policy of Japanese imperialism, its aggressive nature. In fact, the essence of the imperialist policies of Japan and the United States was the same.

This trend is typical for historians from the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. While recognizing the crucial role of the Japanese-American contradictions in the emergence of the war in the Pacific, 32 they do their best to play down the role of Japanese imperialism, disguise its claims to world domination, and thereby whitewash Japan's aggressive policy. Various myths gleaned from diplomatic archives are used for this purpose. Uchiyama Masakuma, for example, claims that some prominent leaders of Japanese diplomacy, such as Hara Takashi, insisted on a policy of "non-interference in China's internal affairs." 33 Other authors write about the" threat " that Japan was allegedly exposed to from abroad. In other words, attempts are being made to justify Japan's aggressive policy as an "external threat" - first from the United States and Britain, then from Russia, or to present it as a fatally inevitable response to the" challenge " of China .34 Another way of justifying the expansionist course of imperialist Japan is to try to prove that in its Pacific policy it was only imitating other capitalist Powers that had already imposed unequal treaties on the Asian countries. Usui Katsumi, for example, uses this technique, which is not new to bourgeois historiography .35 The same is true for Ishida Shigeo, who tries to convince the reader that the presence of Japanese troops in foreign territories ensured "calm" in these areas. But, as is generally typical of representatives of liberal historiography, which presents the apologetics of Japan's imperialist policy in disguise, Ishida immediately makes a reservation that he himself does not "support Japanese militarism at all." 36
Even more characteristic of this trend is the desire to shift responsibility for Japan's aggressive policy exclusively to the military, 37 which (in particular, the General Staff) is charged not only with war crimes, but also with expansionist projects, although diplomatic circles also took part in their specific development. This is very convenient for the current Japanese rematch-

29 Tanaka Naokichi. Op. ed., p. 8.

30 Kobayashi Tatsuo. Edict op., p. 55; Saito Takashi. Edict op., p. 107; Sato Seizaburo. The Formation of the Washington System - A historical analysis of easing tensions: between Cooperation and Self-reliance-Japan. Politicheskie nauki, 1969, pp. 119-120.

31 Saito Takashi. Op. ed., p. 108.

32 Hosoya Chihiro. Op. ed., p. 89.

33 Uchiyama Masakuma. Op. ed., p. 14.

34 Somura Yasunobu. The Xinhai Revolution and Japan. "Research on the history of Japanese diplomacy. Development of Japanese-Chinese relations", pp. 43, 45; Sato Seizaburo. Op. ed., pp. 100, 144; Tanaka Naokichi. Op. ed., p. 6.

35 Usui Katsumi. The war in Europe and Japanese politics in Manchuria. "Research on the history of Japanese diplomacy. The First World War", pp. 16-17.

36 Ishida Shigeo. Problem 21 demands and counteraction of powers. "Research on the history of Japanese diplomacy. The Taisho Period", pp. 47-48.

37 Miyazaka Hiroshi. Op. ed., p. 38; Hosoya Chihiro. Historical studies of intervention in Siberia. Tokyo. 1955 (in Japanese).

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The main reason for this is that the General Staff was eliminated after the Second World War, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was preserved intact, even down to career diplomats. However, it cannot be said that the attempt to whitewash the Foreign Ministry by criticizing the General Staff is characteristic of absolutely all liberal historians. But only some of them approach this issue more objectively. Fujii Shozo shows that the "bourgeois strata" are responsible for expansion, and, as noted above, criticizes Japanese diplomacy for interfering in China's affairs , 38 while condemning not the very fact of expansion, but, in fact, only its crude methods.

Liberal historians are trying to prove that the Foreign Ministry sought "peaceful means" of foreign policy and, in particular, "diplomacy of cooperation" between Japan and Western powers. Uchiyama Masakuma directly links these attempts to the current orientation of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. He considers" cooperation diplomacy "with Britain and the United States as one of the components of"orthodox diplomacy". The second part of this latter is Shidehara's "peaceful" diplomacy (1920s)39, contrasted with Tanaka's" active"," militaristic " diplomacy and based on "international cooperation" 40 (of course, in the above sense). The desire to dissociate itself from Tanaka's diplomacy with its pronounced aggressive methods and show that throughout its history the Japanese Foreign Ministry has sought "peaceful" expansion is a kind of general idea of liberal historians. Its proponents disguise the common imperialist goals advanced by various groups of the Japanese ruling classes, and portray different methods of the same policy as fundamental differences in foreign policy views.

As a rule, these historians associate the possibility of conducting " cooperative diplomacy "with"objective historical conditions." Uchiyama and Tanaka, for example, derive this possibility from the relative stabilization of capitalism in the 1920s .41 In fact, liberal historians cannot find any other examples of "cooperation" between imperialist powers in the late nineteenth and first third of the twentieth centuries, although they persistently emphasize the "peace - loving" aspirations of certain prominent representatives of Japanese diplomacy, their attempts to protect it from the "interference" of the military. Such figures include Komura Jutaro, Abe Moritaro (head of the Foreign Ministry's political department, who was killed by extremists for opposing the plan of intervention in China during the Xinhai Revolution), Kato Takaaki, Hara Takashi, and Shidehara Kijuro .42 But it is common knowledge that the name Komura is associated with the Russo-Japanese War, and the name Hara is associated with the intervention in the Soviet Far East. Bourgeois historians avoid analyzing the class positions of these and other statesmen and consider their foreign policy ideas out of touch with the politics of the ruling circles and the interests of the ruling classes of Japan.

Some liberal authors recognize the temporary nature of "cooperation", referring it only to years of partial stabilization

38 Fujii Shozo. Op. ed., p. 30.

39 Most Japanese Marxist historians believe that Shidehara's" peaceful " diplomacy was essentially aggressive. This point of view is clearly expressed, for example, in the mentioned work of Toyama Shigeki, Imai Seiichi and Fujiwara Akira.

40 Uchiyama Masakuma. Op. ed., pp. 3, 14.

41 Ibid., p. 14; Tanaka Naokichi. Op. ed., p. 10.

42 Uchiyama Masakuma. Op. edict; Kurihara Takeshi. The assassination of the head of the political department of the Foreign Ministry Abe and the problem of relations with China (Manchuria and Mongolia). "Kokusaiho gaiko zassi", 1956, No. 5 (in Japanese).

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of capitalism 43 . Sato Seizaburo considers" cooperative diplomacy " to be the only possible and necessary post-World War I approach, given Japan's economic and financial dependence on the United States and Britain and the new alignment of international forces .44 Of course, these arguments have their own reasons. However, the sharpness of the imperialist contradictions in the Far East, especially in the Japanese-American countries, and the steady striving of the ruling classes of Japan to take a dominant position in the Pacific basin precluded the possibility of any lasting "international cooperation". Therefore, the attempt of bourgeois-liberal historians to present "cooperative diplomacy" as the dominant trend in the policy of the Japanese Foreign Ministry is untenable. In reality, the course of "cooperation" prevailed only when the common class interests of the international bourgeoisie were brought to the fore. An example is the active participation of Japan, the United States, and other imperialist states in the anti-Soviet intervention in the Far East, which in itself did not eliminate the contradictions between these states.

Liberal historians try to justify the thesis of Japan's desire for "cooperation" by saying that its alternative, in their view, was the international isolation of Japanese diplomacy .45 One of the reasons for the latter, Sato Seizaburo considers economic crises, the way out of which he sees in external aggression. In his opinion, the possibility of conflicts increased due to the dissimilarity of social traditions, systems and the level of development of neighboring States .46 This point of view is again aimed at justifying the aggressive policy of Japanese imperialism.

Members of the UNN have an unequal assessment of the factors influencing the determination of the country's foreign policy. A number of authors recognize the uneven nature of capitalist development (in the era of imperialism )and show its impact on foreign policy. 47 Tomoshima and Somura connect the desire of the imperialist powers to expand in the Far East precisely with capitalist interests, the needs for the development of capitalism in concrete historical conditions .48 But even these realistic confessions are necessary for bourgeois authors only to shield the imperialist policy of Japan. Somura, in particular, draws the same conclusion from these correct premises as his colleague Sato, who claims that imperialist aggression is explained by the search for a way out of the economic depression. 49 Some liberal historians recognize the connection between domestic and foreign policy, but they do not go so far as to suggest that the nature of foreign policy is ultimately determined by a country's domestic policy. Nomura Konchi emphasizes the need to study domestic political developments in order to properly understand foreign policy .50 Tomoshima Kenzaburo believes that the revolutionary movement-

43 Tomoshima Kenzaburo. Edict op., p. 9; Sato Seizaburo. Op. ed., pp. 111-112.

44 Sato Seizaburo. Op. ed., pp. 112-113.

45 Somura Yasunobu. Op. ed., p. 54; Sato Seizaburo. Op. ed., p. 136.

46 Sato Seizaburo. Op. ed., p. 99.

47 Tomoshima Kenzaburo. Op. ed., p. 2.

48 Ibid., p. 7; Somura Yasunobu. Op. ed., p. 45.

49 Somura Yasunobu. Changes in the perception of mainland politics - followers of Fukuzawa Yukichi and figures of the mainland group. "Political leadership of Japan in the new era. Studies of Political figures", Vol. 2. Tokyo, 1965, section 4 (in Japanese).

50 Nomura Cum shots. Problems of the three eastern provinces on the eve of the Manchurian incident. "Research on the history of Japanese diplomacy. Development of Japanese-Chinese relations", p. 71.

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The situation in the country forces the ruling circles to seek agreements with their rivals in the struggle for imperialist interests, that is, it weakens the country's expansion. On the other hand, he writes about the restraining influence of the national liberation movement in China on Japanese aggression .51
According to Hada Ikuhiko, the continental direction of expansion of Japanese imperialism was determined by the wars-the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Russo-Japanese War . Of course, Japan's victories in these wars were an incentive for further expansion, but its origins go much deeper, especially since the specific directions of Japan's imperialist expansion were developed even before the Sino-Japanese war. Somura claims that Japan's foreign policy was determined by the" ideas about the mainland " formed by various groups of its leading figures. It is on this basis that differences in the ruling circles on foreign policy issues have emerged .53 In other words, the political course, according to Somura, is developed on the basis of subjective views and ideas of individuals. Somura pays more attention to the psychological aspects of history than any other liberal historian. He refers to certain "psychological periods" in Japan's history that affected not only its foreign policy, but also its economy, culture, and other areas. So, after the Russo-Japanese war, the country, according to Somura, entered a "period of loss of confidence "associated with the" unfriendly attitude of foreigners " to Japan's openly expansionist actions on the Asian mainland. This gave rise to a "sense of isolation and decline" among the Japanese, which, according to the author, left its mark on Japanese diplomacy .54 The psychological complex of the ruling circles is presented here as a psychological characteristic of the entire people. On this "basis," Somura further attempts to justify the intervention of Japanese imperialism in Chinese affairs during the Xinhai Revolution by saying that Japan was at a "disadvantage" during this period, and that its Government was left "alone" and "surrounded by hostility." 55
Sato Seizaburo considers racial, cultural, and linguistic differences to be among the factors influencing foreign policy. He believes that with some distrust between countries, these differences make mutual understanding "unstable" and deepen misunderstandings between states .56 The author is silent, however, about what this "distrust" and "misunderstanding" depends on, and what factors play a decisive role. It is not differences in the level of cultural development or language barriers that actually lead to "conflict situations", but the struggle of the imperialist powers for dominance in the world, which is ultimately determined by the economic interests of the monopolistic bourgeoisie. Saito Takashi writes about the use by "backward imperialist countries" (including Japan) of the" special opportunities " in foreign policy created by such major international events as, for example, the First World War - for Japan to seize German possessions in the Far East .57 This view is essentially shared by other liberal historians .58 From to-

61 Tomoshima Kenzaburo. Op. ed., pp. 2, 9.

52 Hada Ikuhiko. Changing Japanese-American Pacific strategy after the Meiji era. "Problems of the history of Japanese diplomacy", Vol. 3. Tokyo, 1968, p. 97 (in Japanese).

53 Somura Yasunobu. Changes in perceptions of mainland politics, p. 263.

54 Somura Yasunobu. The Xinhai Revolution and Japan, p. 44.

55 Ibid., p. 46.

56 Sato Seizaburo. Op. ed., p. 121.67 Website about Takashi. Op. ed., p. 105.

58 _cm. Tomoshima Kenzaburo. Op. ed., p. 7,

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By using references to the international situation, they try to conceal the aggressive nature of Japanese imperialism's foreign policy.

Fundamentally different positions are taken by Japanese historians, who generally share the Marxist-Leninist historical concept. The authors of the aforementioned "History of Showa" Toyama Shigeki, Imai Seiichi and Fujiwara Akira investigated in their work the responsibility of the monarchy, monopoly capital, and landlords for unleashing the wars that Japan has waged in recent times. They focus on studying the struggles of the ruling classes that led the country to World War II, and the progressive forces that tried to prevent the fascization of the country. Shinobu Seizaburo considers it necessary to take into account the influence of not only the liberal movement, but also the masses of the people, the proletariat, on the foreign policy steps of the government 59 . This approach opens up the possibility of a more in-depth and objective study of foreign policy and consistent criticism of the expansionist actions of Japanese imperialism.

The considered school of bourgeois-liberal historiography is closely associated with the current, whose representatives, as a rule, strive to take into account contradictory sources and facts, state the presence of different points of view on controversial issues, often refraining from their own clear assessments. Historians of this trend, which can be characterized as objectivist, are distinguished by a broader approach to studying the history of international relations and Japan's foreign policy in the context of the country's history as a whole. Mitani Taichiro sees the peculiarity of the new history of Japan (after the bourgeois "Meiji Revolution" (1867-1868)). in the "modernization" of the country "on the basis of conscious efforts" of the ruling classes, in contrast to the European powers and the United States, where, according to him, "modernization" was carried out with the help of "unconscious efforts", then there is spontaneously, due to the objective course of history. The author seeks to prove that the main force behind Japan's "modernization" was the "political elite", which played a crucial role in the country's progress .60 To this end, Mitani exaggerates the impact of politics on the country's economic development.

Okubo Toshiaki speaks more definitely about the character of the same era and the problem of imperialism in Japan. However, in keeping with his goal of writing political history, he pays relatively little attention to the conditions of transition to the imperialist stage in Japan. He shares the opinion of most Japanese bourgeois historians that the emergence of imperialism in Japan began after the Russo-Japanese War. Monopoly capital, in his opinion, was finally established in Japan due to the influence of the First World War. 61 Okubo proceeds from the fact that the main feature of imperialism is the export of capital, the opportunities for which, as he believes, were created largely by Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese war .62 Thus, Okubo deduces the development of imperialism not from the internal laws of capitalist evolution, but from arbitrarily chosen aspects of international development. Recognition of the role of capital exports is again necessary to justify Japan's active expansion in the Far East .63 Similar in terms of-

59 Shinobu Seizaburo. The main problems of the history of diplomacy in the Taisho period. "Research on the history of Japanese diplomacy. Taisho Period".

60 Mita ni Taichiro. Preface to the book: "Political Leadership of Japan in Modern Times", vol. 2, p. 1.

61 Okubo Toshiaki. History of Japan, vol. 3. Novoe vremya. Tokyo, 1964, pp. 3, 10 (in Japanese).

62 Ibid., p. 5.

83 Ibid., pp. 13-14.

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Ziziya is occupied by Oka Yoshitake 64 . Masumi Junnosuke, who deduces Japanese expansionist policy from the bourgeois reforms in Japan in the late 60s and early 70s of the XIX century, also shares a similar point of view .65 However, Masumi, tracing the process of "strengthening" the state, does not take into account the qualitative changes in the socio - economic structure of Japan that occurred in the last third of the XIX century.

Objectivists are characterized by a tendency to economic determinism. Oka, for example , explains specific foreign policy steps by a particular economic situation, 66 Mitani-by the degree of development of capitalism in certain historical conditions .67 The latter also sees a certain connection between foreign and domestic policies, the need to" adapt " the former to the latter, and emphasizes that the foreign policy course is formed in close connection with the internal situation of the country . However, while recognizing the economic conditionality of individual concrete events, these historians nevertheless assign a decisive role to political factors in the historical process, consider political changes as a criterion for determining the boundaries of historical epochs, denying the importance of such a criterion as a change in socio-economic formations .69
Japanese bourgeois-liberal historians refrain from class characterization of the bourgeois-landlord parties and their imperialist policies. Although, on the whole, objectivists make a step forward in comparison with pragmatists, both remain exponents of bourgeois ideas in the field of historical science.

64 Oka Yoshitake. Taisho - the period of change. 1914-1924. "New History of Japan". Vol. 5. Tokyo. 1969, p. 21 (in Japanese).

65 Masumi Junnosuke. History of Japanese political parties. In 4 vols. Vol. 3. Tokyo, 1967, pp. 129, 147 (in Japanese).

66 Oka Yoshitake. Op. ed., pp. 169-170.

67 Mitani Taichiro. Leadership of Diplomacy during the Years of Change (1918-1921) - Hara Takashi and Tanaka Giichi. "Political leadership of Japan in modern times", vol. 2, p. 360.

68 Ibid., pp. 296-297.

69 Okubo Toshiaki. Op. ed., pp. 1-2; Oka Yoshitake. Edict. op., pp. I-iii; Mitanitaichiro. Guide to Diplomacy in the Years of Change, p. 296.

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