Under the slogan of "political regime change", the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won an unprecedented victory in the country's history in the elections to the House of Representatives of the Parliament on August 30, 2009, receiving 308 seats out of 480. In the previous composition of this key legislative body, it had only 115 seats.

The Democrats have made a breakneck leap, effectively swapping places with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in national politics. The Liberal Democrats had been in power since 1955, and the political system created at that time was called the "1955 system", in which the ruling party and the heterogeneous opposition operated.

END OF MONOPOLY

The results of the last election were record-breaking in many respects.

First, the opposition party came to power for the first time with a majority of seats in the lower house.

Secondly, this is the first time that such a large number of seats belongs to a single party.

Third, the defeat of the LDP, which retained just over a third of its previous mandates (119 out of 300), was a real defeat. Some party heavyweights, ex-ministers and even former Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu were left out of the new convocation. Many influential members of the last Liberal Democrat cabinet, including Finance Minister Kaoru Yoshano and Administrative Reform Minister Akira Amari, were defeated in their respective constituencies and were elected to Parliament only on party lists. In single-member districts, the Liberal Democrats held only 62 candidates (the Democrats - 221), but even more alarming for the LDP was the fact that its experienced and elderly politicians, who seemed to have firmly "put down roots" on the ground, lost to newcomers-Democrats, including women.

Japanese experts suggest a possible split in the ranks of the LDP. "Dissidents" of this party, which is going through difficult times, can strengthen the ranks of the Democrats, or they can start building their own party, which will make the political landscape of Japan even more diverse.

The results of the 2009 election campaign showed the effectiveness of the 1994 electoral system, according to which elections are held in single-member districts and party lists. One of the most important tasks of this system was to shift the center of gravity of the political struggle from the personalities of candidates to the parties, to increase their significance and attract the attention of voters to their programs. The reform helped create an effective opposition, which deprived the LDP of a long-standing monopoly on power.

According to the Asahi newspaper, the latest elections " impressively demonstrated the enormous potential of the single-member electoral system, which allowed for a tectonic shift in the national political landscape. A powerful wave of popular expectations has opened a new chapter in the nation's political history, heralding a change of power."¹. The English Economist magazine concluded that "the electorate rejected not only one party, but the entire system in one fell swoop." ²

The fact that serious changes have already taken place is evidenced, first of all, by the scale of the victory of the Democrats and the defeat of their main opponents. When the Liberal Democrats first failed to win a majority in the House of Representatives in 1993, they remained the country's largest party and returned to power 11 months later. The current position of the LDP can be regarded as the culmination of profound changes in political life that have been brewing for decades. At the moment, "the voters went for the DPJ. The large-scale victory of the party reflects the hopes of the population for real changes in politics caused by their dissatisfaction with the current situation"³. According to the famous American political scientist J. Curtis, " the elections turned into a kind of act of political protest. The LDP's rejection was much stronger than the voters 'skepticism about the inexperienced DPJ, and they even forgot that it was a conglomerate of several former parties, ranging from conservative to socialist." ⁴

In the" 1955 system", the ratio of the ruling party and the entire opposition for a long time reflected the real picture of society, in which the LDP represented the interests of the electorate as a whole, and the opposition parties represented relatively small groups of the population.

As the political picture in the country became more complex in the 1970s and 1980s, discussions began almost for the first time about the possible creation of a coalition of opposition parties to force the LDP to share power. The growing complexity of the structure of society, the diversification of national interests, the emergence and strengthening of civil movements, and the growth of the electorate of opposition parties made the ruling elite think about correcting their actions. Back then, when voters cast their votes for the opposition, they knew that until it came to power, it would not be a serious competitor to the LDP. But in this way, they encouraged the Liberal Democrats to seriously address domestic political and intra-party problems. In other words, the society felt the need for political reform.

Despite the serious crisis phenomena in the ruling party since the late 1980s, no other force could compete with it in the struggle for power, because the opposition never offered a positive alternative, but only criticized everything. Until the early 1990s, talk of creating a viable opposition and moving to a two-party system remained a shudder of air. The real possibility of turning discussions on this topic into a practical one was outlined after the 1993 elections, when the sole rule of the LDP ended and new parties began to be created.

The appearance of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 1996 did not become a sensation, as something similar had been expected for a long time. Its core is made up of people from the Party of Democratic Socialism( PDS), the Initiative Party (Sakigake), which broke away from the LDP in 1993, and some parliamentarians from the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SPD). The DPJ has positioned itself as a party close to the people, a party of the urban population, and relying on the citizens is a sure path for a political force that looks forward to the long term and strives to act in accordance with the socio-economic situation that has developed in Japan by the beginning of the new century. Unlike others, this party was built not on the principle of a" pyramid", but on the principle of "horizontal", relying on local branches. The initiators of its creation were Yukio Hatoyama and Naoto Kan, the current top officials of the DPJ.

After experiencing various organizational upheavals and setbacks, the DPJ in September 2003 merged with the small Liberal Party of Ichiro Ozawa, who, after leaving the LDP, took a group of his supporters with him. The Democrats reasoned that a charismatic, experienced politician, formerly one of the most effective leaders of the LDP party apparatus, combining populism with behind - the-scenes fighting skills, would help raise the party's credibility, even despite the image of a "right-wing" or even a "hawk".

The alliance objectively increased the chances of the Democrats to increase their representation in parliament, as it was previously at the expense of the SDP electorate, and this time-among conservative voters thanks to Ozawa's authority. The unification of the two parties was seen by their leaders as a step towards creating a "two-party system that will ensure the turnover of government."

The goal, which seemed difficult to achieve, became a reality only 6 years later, in 2009.

Ozawa became chairman of the DPJ, but was forced to resign due to allegations of receiving illegal political donations almost on the eve of the fateful 2009 elections. However, he did not leave the political arena, as Democrats still counted on his ability to conduct election campaigns. The August 30 elections confirmed the correctness of this decision. At one time in the LDP, Ozawa was called the" king " of election campaigns. In September, he became the DPJ's new general secretary, who was specifically assigned by his successor as party chairman, Yukio Hatoyama, to take care of preparations for the 2010 upper house elections, in which the Democrats now lack a majority.

It was Hatoyama, representing the 4th generation of a well-known political dynasty, who led the party to victory and became the new Prime Minister of Japan. Ironically, his grandson crushed the nearly half-century-long rule of the Liberal Democratic Party established by his grandfather, Ichiro Hatoyama, who served as Prime Minister from 1954 to 1956. This event effectively ended the dominance of the so-called iron triangle in the country's life, which united politicians (mainly liberal Democrats), the bureaucracy and big business.

When creating the DPJ, some analysts expressed the opinion that such an association was not viable due to the heterogeneity of its composition and the threat of centrifugal forces. But these predictions did not materialize. At first, the DPJ, which in general can be considered as a kind of analogue of the Democratic Party of the United States, forced to speak about itself as a real force in the modern political process. And now it has become the ruling party and formed a government.

If the democratic party manages to lead the country as successfully as the LDP has done for more than half a century, then there will be a prospect of forming a stable and effective, really working two-party system in Japan, which can be called the "system of 2009".

This system is similar in many ways to the American one. But the confrontation between the Liberal Democrats and the Democrats is not as fundamental as their leaders, who periodically exchange harsh statements, try to imagine. In short, there is much more that unites them than separates them. Almost all of the DPJ's top leadership, with the exception of Naoto Kan, is from the LDP. All of them share common political and social roots, similar worldviews and views.

COALITION GOVERNMENT

The Democrats won a landslide victory, but an opinion poll conducted by the Asahi newspaper immediately after the election showed that popular support is not as unconditional as DPJ leaders believed. According to the newspaper, public expectations are closely intertwined with anxiety. In particular, 74% of respondents have high hopes for the new administration of the Democrats, but only 32% expect radical changes in the country's politics. Voters generally welcome the changes in the political scene, but many were not enticed by the DPJ's populist pre-election promises and are not confident that the party will deliver on them. When asked whether the desire for changes in the government was the main reason for the DPJ's victory, 81% of respondents answered in the affirmative. But 37% of those who have high hopes for the new administration and 31% of those who voted for the Democrats do not expect radical changes in politics.⁵

The result obtained in the elections to the House of Representatives allowed the Democrats to form a one-party cabinet. However, the new government of the hundred-

lo is a coalition, since the support of junior partners provides the DPJ with a majority in the House of Councillors, which is necessary for the smooth passage of bills in both houses of Parliament. The DPJ's partners in forming the government were the Social Democratic Party of Japan and the small New People's Party (BNP), created by "dissidents" from the LDP. The DPJ entered into an electoral alliance with them, as it alone did not expect to win the necessary majority in the House of Representatives. The main focus of the election campaign was on the consolidation of the opposition forces.

The inclusion of the leaders of the partner parties in the government is also an attempt by the Democrats to avoid additional consultations at the level of the heads of the parties of the ruling coalition, at which the SPD and the NNP actually claimed equal status with them. However, DPJ Secretary General Katsuya Okada, who headed the Foreign Ministry in the new government, said immediately after the election that decisions will be made by the Cabinet of Ministers. Thus, he made it clear that the last word on all the most important issues remains with his party, which won such an unprecedented victory.

NNP chairman Shizuka Kamei-a native of the LDP, in which he headed a small faction, and in 2005 left its ranks-applied for the post of Minister of Administrative Affairs and Communications, but received the portfolio of state Minister created specifically for him to review the privatization of the postal service, as well as for the financial system. SPD leader Mizuho Fukushima said that she would like to get the post of Minister of Employment or Environmental Protection. These problems, which are easy to earn political capital on, have long been the focus of attention of the Social Democrats, who wanted to improve their noticeably shaky position on the political Olympus. However, the new prime Minister himself pays special attention to them, and therefore left both portfolios to his party. As a result, Fukushima had to settle for the traditionally "female" post of State Minister for Consumer Affairs, Gender Equality, Demographic Policy, and Food Security.

PAYMENT OF ELECTION BILLS

In his first official statement after the parliamentary election results were announced, Hatoyama said that his " party takes the election results with exceptional seriousness and is determined to live up to the trust placed in it... I believe that the result of the election means more than just the victory of the Democratic Party. The result of the vote showed our people's distrust of the existing policy, rejection of the bankrupt political and economic system, and deep dissatisfaction with the current situation. " ⁶

At the time of his election as Prime Minister in 2001. Junichiro Koizumi proclaimed the slogan: "Let's change the LDP. Let's change Japan." In the same spirit, Hatoyama proclaimed "three changes": a change of power, a change of the old policy to a new one, a change of management, i.e. curbing the omnipotence of the bureaucracy.

After the victory in 2001, the leader of the LDP Dz. Koizumi immediately unveiled a program for transforming public administration through privatization and deregulation, introducing a new tax system, addressing bad bank debts, controlling budget deficits, freeing the center from petty guardianship of local governments, reducing public works, and shaking up the sector of special public corporations. Thus, he proclaimed a course of structural reforms, the main goal of which is to reduce government spending and liberalize business and economic relations "in accordance with neoliberalism and American-style globalism."

This course was opposed by all subsequent prime ministers, including the current Democrat Yukio Hatoyama.

However, Japan, having survived the "lost decade" of the 1990s, has managed to accumulate experience that helps it, according to economist E. L. Leontieva, "to get out of the global crisis with relatively small losses." "The bottom of the crisis," she writes, " was passed due to the revival of demand in the Chinese market and the reduction of inventory in Japan, as well as - not least-due to budget programs to stimulate domestic demand."⁷. These programs were adopted by the last Liberal Democrat government.

Now it is the turn of the Democrats to offer their own effective economic and political program that meets the challenges of the global financial and economic crisis.

According to former Vice Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Shinji Fukukawa, " the performance of the Hatoyama administration will be tested by the results of its political and development policies."⁸. In other words, it raises the question of whether Democrats will be able to-

The communist party should realize its potential to govern the country in the broadest sense of the term.

The voters gave great confidence to the Democratic Party of Japan in advance. Democrats promise to radically improve the process of making political decisions, change the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. Hatoyama expressed his determination to implement a policy of independence from bureaucracy. ⁹

The dual system of government and party governance created under the Liberal Democrats perverted a system in which the main role should have belonged to the Cabinet of Ministers, and deep-rooted distrust between politicians and bureaucrats seriously hindered the effectiveness of decision-making and their implementation. Therefore, the Hatoyama Government, which includes leading party functionaries and representatives of coalition partners, is tasked with strengthening and expanding the Cabinet's decision-making functions and encouraging civil servants to carry out their administrative tasks in accordance with the Cabinet's policy decisions. At the same time, according to the Iomiuri newspaper, responding to the aspirations of the population to change the political style of the Liberal Democrats, "the new cabinet should be sufficiently prudent to preserve the fundamental policies that were quite successful in the past and could serve as a blueprint for the future." ¹⁰

In order to combat the "domination of officials" in the management of the state, the new government has taken a course to increase the importance and role of political figures. To this end, the Cabinet of Ministers has established a National Strategy Office, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Naoto Kan. One of the most important functions of this body is to develop the main parameters of the state budget, on the basis of which the Ministry of Finance will draft the annual budget. When the LDP was in power, this function was performed by the Ministry of Finance itself, through numerous agreements with line ministries and individual lobbying groups of parliamentarians, which provided it with great influence in public administration. Now the initiative in the budget process passes into the hands of the government.

A new government body, the Administrative Reform Council, headed by the Prime Minister, has been created to identify hidden financial reserves in numerous public administration structures. A group of politicians, mainly parliamentarians, is sent to the ministries. Each ministry will have 4 - 5 representatives of the party - a minister, 1 - 2 first deputy ministers and 1 - 3 parliamentary deputy ministers. In fact, this means an audit of all programs, projects, funds and structures. After it is held, the National Strategy Office will decide whether to reduce allocations for a particular project or even close inefficient projects altogether.¹¹

This area of government activity is extremely important and relevant, since the question of where to get funds to fulfill promises to voters during the election campaign is acute. This means paying an allowance for each child under the age of 15 at the rate of approximately $270 per month, eliminating tolls on expressways, reducing the gasoline tax rate, subsidizing farms, and postponing the increase in the consumer tax until at least the next general election. These measures, in a country with a population of about 127 million, will require huge cash injections, which is much more difficult in a financial crisis than in a favorable economic environment.¹²

According to the Yomiuri newspaper, two new government bodies hold the keys to successful implementation of policies independent of bureaucracy, which will ensure the recovery of the economy and finances, strengthen political leadership, and overcome the resistance of the bureaucracy and its affiliated organizations.

In support of the Democrats, the head of the country's leading business community organization, President of the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren), Fujio Mitarai, spoke out. He called the results of the elections to the House of Representatives a historic event: "We have reached an era when, for the first time since the war, a real transfer of power became possible." ¹³

However, large Japanese businesses are concerned that the new government's plans could slow the country's economic recovery. In particular, the Japanese Business Federation criticizes the widely advertised-

The government's goal is to reduce "unnecessary expenses" and save some of the funds that the Liberal Democrat government allocated to stimulate the economy.

Democrats are also in favor of raising the minimum wage for employees, seriously reducing carbon dioxide emissions at enterprises, and plan to increase domestic demand that has fallen to a record low by maintaining a strong yen exchange rate. All of these measures can damage the competitiveness of Japanese firms in global markets.

Business circles believe that such measures will not help the country to get out of the crisis in the shortest possible time. "Environmental issues and social protection of workers are extremely important," says Mitsuo Ohashi, who is responsible for political relations in Keidanren. "However, Democrats should not forget the problems of Japanese companies, on which the future of the Japanese economy largely depends." ¹⁴

Hatoyama's government initially enjoyed strong popular support: its popularity rating reached 71% against 21% who expressed distrust.

According to an October 2009 survey by the Yomiuri newspaper, support was expressed for such government measures as paying monthly allowances to families with children - 57%, ending the activities of the self - defense forces in the Indian Ocean - 48%, and committing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 25% by 2020 compared to 1990-75%.

Experts of the "political cuisine" were waiting with interest for the first results of the work of the new parliament and government, which are primarily related to the formation of the budget for the new fiscal year, which begins in Japan on April 1.

At the end of December 2009, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the draft budget for 2010 - 2011 fin. g. This record-breaking budget of $1 trillion (92.3 trillion yen) provides for the largest public spending in Japan's history. It is planned to cover the budget deficit by issuing new debt obligations in the amount of $484 billion (44.3 trillion yen), which is also a record for the government's budget projects. This measure is necessary to fill the deficit of tax revenues, which are estimated at a little less than half of the budget. The budget document must be approved by the Parliament at the next session in January of this year. Discussion of the budget will undoubtedly provoke fierce criticism, since with its adoption by the end of the new fiscal year, Japan's total public debt will reach, according to the Japanese Ministry of Finance, 180% of GDP.

IN SEARCH OF A NEW FOREIGN POLICY

The Democratic government took care to raise the international status of Japan, to activate diplomacy and national security policy.

Even during the election campaign, Hatoyama promised to establish more equal and independent relations with Washington, first of all, he meant changing the conditions for the deployment of American bases on Japanese territory. We've been talking about this for more than 10 years.

To date, the most painful issue is the fate of the US Marine Corps Futemma air base on Okinawa Island, an agreement to move it from the city of Ginowan to the city of Nago on the same island by 2014 was concluded in 2006. The majority of Okinawans support the complete withdrawal of the base from the island, in which they are supported by the SPD and a significant part of Democrats. A high-level bilateral working group was set up to address this issue, but the United States took a tough stance, demanding strict compliance with previously reached agreements and resolving the problem by the end of 2009. Prime Minister Hatoyama, despite direct pressure from Washington, said that he would personally make the final decision, taking into account the" long-term suffering of Okinawans from the proximity to the base " at the beginning current year ¹⁵.

During President Barack Obama's visit to Tokyo in November 2009, the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to a "renewed, constructive Japan-US alliance." The US President stressed that their partnership is "important for the United States, important for Japan, and important for the entire Asia-Pacific region." ¹⁶ Despite some recent spats, there is no doubt that the Japanese-American military-political alliance remains the main factor in the US Asian strategy.

And the American president also welcomed Tokyo's decision to provide $⁵ billion in economic assistance to Afghanistan, which is seen as a kind of payback for Japan's refusal to refuel ships serving the NATO contingent in Afghanistan in the Indian Ocean17.

The new program of assistance to this country provides for the adaptation of the Taliban fighters to civilian life, the implementation of a number of infrastructure projects, including the construction of a nuclear power plant.-

cities north of Kabul and other activities that have exclusively peaceful purposes.

The topic of Japanese-Russian relations can be called family for the Hatoyama political clan. The grandfather of the current Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama normalized Japan's diplomatic relations with the USSR by signing a Joint Declaration in 1956, which in its content is equivalent to a peace treaty. However, the parties have different interpretations of this document, and the Japanese side emphasizes the problem of the lack of a peace treaty and territorial separation between the two countries. And the signing of the peace treaty made Tokyo dependent on resolving the territorial dispute.

As you know, Japan claims 4 islands of the Southern Kuril Islands-Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai, referring to the Treatise on Trade and Borders of 1855, according to which the border was defined between the islands of Urup and Iturup and the now disputed islands were recognized as Japanese. Moscow's principled position is that the southern Kuril Islands became part of the USSR, of which Russia is the legal successor, following the Second World War, and Russian sovereignty over these territories, which has a corresponding international legal form, is beyond doubt. President Dmitry Medvedev acknowledged that "there are difficult issues." "These are well - known issues-territorial, the positions of the parties on this issue are very clearly formulated, and now the main task is to bring these positions closer together. This is the only way to achieve success. This is called the "move away from the extreme position" method, which we have always offered to our Japanese partners, and I am ready to offer this to the new Prime Minister. " ¹⁸

President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev and Yu. Hatoyama confirmed their intention to build new Japanese-Russian relations in the Asia-Pacific region. The Russian president expressed his intention to make efforts to find a new path in bilateral relations, including on the territorial issue, and the Japanese Prime Minister believes that it is possible to move forward various issues, including political and economic, like "two wheels of one cart", achieving their positive mutual influence.

But it seems that the practical activity of the Democratic government in the South Kuril direction is not much different from the policy of the previous Liberal Democrat governments. In October 2009, Seiji Maehara, the Minister of State Lands and Transport, who is also responsible for the so-called "northern territories" problem in the cabinet, stated that the Southern Kuril Islands are under "illegal Russian occupation". Then, on November 20, the government, in response to a request from the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives of the Parliament, Muneo Suzuki, confirmed that "the Russian Federation illegally occupies the four northern islands." This is nothing new, and this formulation has been repeated for decades.

However, in a situation when the government of the new party that came to power was formed, when hopes for mutual rapprochement increased, such statements caused the expected reaction.

The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying that "...The southern Kuril Islands are an integral part of the territory of the Russian Federation legally based on the results of World War II in accordance with the legally binding agreements and agreements between the allied Powers for Tokyo, as well as the UN Charter, which was ratified by Japan. The Japanese Government's approval of a document reproducing the above wording cannot be regarded as anything other than unacceptable." At the same time, it was noted that Tokyo's current steps contradict the mutual understanding of the need to create a normal, mutually respectful atmosphere of bilateral cooperation, including dialogue on the issue of a peace treaty and border demarcation, recorded by the leaders of the Russian Federation and Japan, and expressed their commitment to " ... developing relations with Japan in the constructive spirit that characterizes contacts between the President of the Russian Federation and the Prime Minister of Japan. " ¹⁹

Starting with a record support rating, Hatoyama's cabinet began to lose its supporters in the first hundred days of its traditional term in office. According to an opinion poll conducted by the Asahi newspaper on December 21, 2009, the level of support for the Democratic government fell to 48% from 62% in November. 34% of respondents said they do not support the Hatoyama government, which is 13% more than in the same November survey. 74% of respondents believe that Hatoyama did not show leadership qualities, did not take a clear position on many issues of domestic and foreign policy. ²⁰ And this is despite the fact that the government has not yet allowed any serious failures either in politics or in the economy. Perhaps such survey results indicate a certain disappointment of the electorate in the widely advertised rapid changes for the better, which were associated with a change in the political regime.

¹ Asahi. 01.09.2009.

² www.economist.com/printedition/dis-playstory.cfin?story_id=...

³ Asahi. 01.09.2009.

⁴ www.economist.com/printedition/dis-playstory.cfin?story_id=...

⁵ Asahi. 03.09.2009.

⁶ Asahi. 01.09.2009.

^{Leontieva E. L.} 7 Mirovoi ekonomicheskii krizis i finansovogo sektora Jap'i [The Global Economic Crisis and the financial sector of Japan].

⁸ The Japan Times. 03.10.2009.

⁹ Asahi. 17.09.2009.

¹⁰ Yomiuri. 17.09.2009.

¹¹ www.eri21.or.jp/russia/opinion/press/index/shtml

¹² NHK world. 07.10.2009.

¹³ Kyodotsushin. 31.08.2009.

¹⁴ Kyodo tsushin. 12.09.2009.

¹⁵ Kyodo tsushin. 17.12.2009.

¹⁶ Asahi. 15.11.2009.

¹⁷ New York Times, 14.11.2009.

¹⁸ www.rian.ru/politics/20090915/185172043.html

¹⁹ Statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry in connection with media reports on the approval by the Government of Japan of a document prepared by the Japanese Foreign Ministry containing the wording "illegal occupation by Russia" of the southern Kuril Islands. 24.11.2009 -www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/94FC13FF347C0191C3257678005AAC64

²⁰ Asahi. 22.12.2009.

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