D. V. STRELTSOV

Doctor of Historical Sciences, MGIMO (U), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia

Key words: Political system of Japan, Democratic Party of Japan, Liberal Democratic Party, Yoshihiko Noda November 16, 2012, the key chamber of the Japanese Parliament, the House of Representatives, was dissolved. Early elections of its new composition will be held on December 16. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, who heads the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), was forced to take this step under pressure from the opposition, primarily the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Japanese observers called his decision "political hara-kiri": the cabinet slid to a record low level of popularity (according to a survey by the Jiji Tsushin agency, it is supported by 17.3% of voters*). The election promises victory for the Liberal Democrats. Thus, the end of the DPJ's generally inglorious three-year rule is coming.

The early dissolution of Parliament was preceded by a long struggle both within the DPJ and LDP, and between the ruling party and the opposition.

At the end of September 2012, Japan held elections for the leadership of both parties.

On September 21, Yoshihiko Noda won a landslide victory at the DPJ 1 congress in the first round, thus retaining the post of Prime Minister of Japan. Three of his rivals, including former Minister of General Affairs and Communications K. Haraguchi, were able to win the support of a total of less than a third of the votes. But this was preceded by a split in the party.

On September 26, a serious struggle for the position of the party chairman unfolded in the internal party elections to the LDP.

For the first time in 40 years, it was not possible to elect a leader on the first attempt.

Five people put forward their candidacies. First, the current head of the party, S. Tanigaki, dropped out of the race: his own faction preferred the LDP General Secretary, N. Tanigaki. Ishiharu. However, the latter was not supported by the "party grassroots": the votes of local organizations for the victory were not enough for him to pass to the next round. As a result, Shinzo Abe, who already headed the party and government in 2006-2007, and former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba reached the final. In the first round, Isiba won more votes, having secured the support of prefectural party organizations. However, in the second round, the outcome of which was determined by the votes of members of parliament, Abe won by a small margin, despite the fact that his debut at the head of the government ended ingloriously (his cabinet was rocked by corruption scandals, and the party lost its majority in the upper house of parliament - the House of councillors).

The elections showed no clear favorites in the LDP, and their winner became one, in the words of the newspaper "Asahi", "in the process of dropping out"¹.

FIGHT OVER TAX INCREASES

The Noda government's reign has already been marked by many significant events that mark the continuation of the transition period in the history of the Japanese political system, which began with the DPJ coming to power after the crushing defeat in the lower house elections in August 2009 of the Liberal Democrats who ruled for more than half a century.

The period of certain consolidation, which excluded serious disputes between opposing political forces in the face of national threats, has ended. Although Japanese politics did not observe a moratorium on criticism of the government, during the first year after the natural and man-made disaster in March 2011, the LDP and other opposition parties still refrained from clearly obstructionist positions, for example, on the allocation of an additional budget and other measures to restore the affected areas.

The LDP's efforts were aimed at securing early snap parliamentary elections and rehabilitating itself for its crushing defeat in 2009 by returning to power. Despite the bellicose rhetoric, the Liberal Democrats demanded mostly partial concessions in exchange for their compliance, primarily the resignation of the failed members of the Democratic government. Thus, as a result of deals reached with the LDP, in August 2011, the head of the cabinet, Naoto Kan, resigned from the post of prime minister, and in January 2012, Noda had to remove two ministers from his government who made ill-considered statements.

The main issue around which there was a struggle in the parliament, -

* The Japan Times online, 16.11.12.

** For more information, see: Molodyakova E. V. Japan: Changing the Political regime / / Asia and Africa Today, 2010, No. 2; Streltsov D. V. Politicheskaya sistema - glassy dom / / Asia and Africa Today, 2010, No. 11 (editor's note).

raising the consumer tax-painfully affects the fundamental interests of the vast majority of Japanese voters.

At a time when the total debt of the state has reached twice the size of GDP, and the social security sector requires more and more funds every year, which together make up more than 40% of the budget expenditure, the search for new additional financial sources has become a categorical imperative for the current government.

The consumer tax is also considered as such a source, since it equally falls on all residents of the country, and its increase is considered the most socially just form of tightening the tax burden. The Government has put forward a draft tax reform that provides for a specific time frame for raising tax rates: up to 8% from April 2014 and up to 10% from October 2015. The tax increase was linked to the reform of the social security system within the framework of the "single reform" package plan, which provides for a simultaneous increase in the consumer tax and ensuring a minimum level of pensions and social benefits at its expense.

The prospect of an increase in the consumer tax causes a mixed reaction in Japanese society. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper at the end of January 2012, 61% consider it "necessary" to raise the consumer tax in order to maintain the social security ^system2. However, only 16% of respondents supported the government's strict time schedule, while the majority supported the gradual introduction of higher rates for a long time. At the same time, most Japanese people tend to believe that the government itself is to blame for the poor state of public finances, so the first step should be to improve the financial health of the public sector, reduce the state apparatus, reduce the salaries of civil servants, etc.Responding to these public sentiments, the Noda government passed a law in January 2012 that cuts the salaries of civil servants by 8%.

Thus, it became clear that holding early parliamentary elections immediately after the adoption of the tax bill would lead to significant losses for the Democrats in the lower house, and in the worst case - to the loss of power.

At the same time, in 2011 and the first half of 2012, the Noda government had almost no chance of passing the bill before the end of the parliamentary session without serious concessions to the opposition. A big problem for the DPJ was the precarious position of the head of the cabinet in his own party, which was divided into his supporters and opponents-followers of Ichiro Ozawa, an influential rival of the prime minister. Noda had to reckon with the fact that the group of this politician was irreconcilably opposed to the tax increase. Ozawa could have organized a "shipboard mutiny" if necessary: the missing votes of dozens of his supporters would have been enough to bury the bill. Back in January 2012, a group of deputies who did not agree with the tax increase line broke away from the DPJ and founded their own Kizuna party.

In April 2012, Noda was forced to announce an intra-party "discussion" on the issue of raising the tax in order to develop a common party opinion. At the same time, he stated that he did not intend to expel dissenters from the party.

At the same time, Noda tried to enlist the support of the key party of the parliamentary opposition - the LDP. On February 25, he secretly met in a Tokyo hotel with the chairman of the LDP. Tanigaki. The main topic of conversation was the fate of the tax bill.

THE LDP'S DEEP CRISIS

However, confidence in the successful outcome of the early elections was absent not only in the DPJ, but also in the ranks of the LDP.

The Liberal Democrats are still struggling to get out of the deepest political crisis associated with the inability to ensure effective generational change in the party leadership. The LDP also failed to offer a constructive political program that would be a viable alternative to the Democrats ' platform. Both the LDP's strategy and tactics have been based solely on criticizing the government, calculating its mistakes, and accusing the DPJ of failing to fulfill its pre-election obligations in the two and a half years since it left office.

The systemic crisis experienced by the LDP was confirmed by the data of sociological surveys. So, despite a significant decline in the ratings of both the government (from 37% of voter support to 30%) and the DPJ (from 25% to 16%), the rating is liberal-demo-

In the first half of 2012, Kratov stood at 17%, registered at the time of the reformation of the Noda cabinet in January 2012.3 In other words, the Liberal Democrats failed to take advantage of the discontent of their constituents with the current government, especially the progress of reconstruction work after the Fukushima-¹ nuclear power plant tragedy. In February 2012, only 9% of respondents supported the formation of a new cabinet based solely on the LDP, while 5% supported the formation of a government by Democrats alone. 23% of respondents supported a government based on a" grand coalition " of the LDP and DPJ, but more than half (53%) of respondents supported the formation of a government based on a new configuration of political forces.⁴ In other words, the Japanese expressed extreme frustration with both system parties.

AN UNEXPECTED GIFT FROM FATE

By the end of May 2012, the huge efforts made by the Noda led to the LDP agreeing to support an increase in the consumer tax to 10%, provided that the provisions linking the increase in tax rates to the reform of the social security system would be removed from the bill.

The Komeito Party also joined the agreement to support the bill on increasing the consumer tax. In exchange for promising to support this bill, the opposition managed to extract from the head of the cabinet a commitment to "ask the people's opinion in the near future", i.e. to dissolve parliament and call early elections to the lower house. However, Ioda did not announce a specific date for the dissolution. As a result, there was not quite the usual design of three parties located on different sides of the barricades, but united by tactical goals.

As a result of the maneuvers undertaken by the DPJ head, the bill on raising the consumer tax approved by the lower house on June 26 was supported by the upper house on August 10.

However, 57 DPJ deputies voted against the bill in the House of Representatives. Since July, 37 deputies of the lower house and 12 - the upper-headed by I. After leaving the DPJ, the Ozawoi founded the People's Life First Party (Kokumin no sei-katsu ga daiichi). The newly formed party took its name from the DPJ: it was its popular slogan in the 2009 elections. In terms of the total number of deputies in both chambers, Ozawa's party became the third after the DPJ and LDP.

Ozawa sharply criticized the cooperation agreement reached between the DPJ and the opposition parties-the LDP and Komeito-on tax reform. According to him, the purpose of creating a new party is "to fulfill the plans outlined during the change of power (after the defeat of the LDP in 2009)"^.5 Among the promises made by him are the revival of the local economy, especially in the regions affected by the tsunami in March 2011, the reform of the financial system, and the fight against inflation. To solve the problem of public finance deficit, Ozawa's party proposed curbing unproductive budget spending, reducing public administration costs, and reducing public works. It also promised to end the country's dependence on nuclear power.

Ozawa tried to strengthen the new party's position in parliament. However, the forces were only enough to create a united faction with a small new Kizuna party. Other parties reacted to the" Life of the People " with great caution.

After the DPJ split, many Japanese believed that the Noda cabinet had only a few days to live and the inevitable dissolution of Parliament would take place before the end of the current session on September 8, 2012.The DPJ leader's position was complicated by the fact that in mid-August, i.e. after the adoption of the tax bill, members of parliament continued to leave the party. Meanwhile, the loss of even two seats in the House of Councillors would make the Democrats second in number after the LDP.

However, paradoxically, the DPJ split turned out to be a kind of godsend for Noda. The departure of Ozawa's supporters from the party allowed the DPJ leader to extend the life of the cabinet, which many have already written off.

First, the "schismatics" who left the party with Ozawa turned out to be significantly fewer than expected, and the DPJ retained an absolute majority of votes in the lower house. Moreover, for the first time, "young" deputies left the party, who had nothing to lose, since the inevitable situation on the territory of the former Soviet Union was already over.

In the upcoming elections, the DPJ's parliamentary representation was to be reduced mainly at their expense. Among other Democrats-parliamentarians who are opposed to Noda and his tax bill, there were not so many who wanted to lose their party ticket, and in the future-their parliamentary mandate, because of ideological differences.

Second, Ozawa's departure has deprived the opposition of a strong bargaining chip - the ability to accuse the DPJ of failing to deal with internal divisions and disagreements on crucial political issues. But the entire political strategy of the LDP after its departure to the opposition was based on exposing the government of mistakes and miscalculations.

Third, with the departure of Ozawa's group, the party "naturally" rallied. "Renegades", including the former head of the DPJ, who opposed the bill, Yu. It was decided not to expel Hatoyama from the party, but to limit himself to various kinds of disciplinary sanctions, including temporary suspension of membership.

Finally getting rid of Ozawa, Noda solved another problem. The fact is that this politician began to harm the DPJ's image. The public is tired of the negativity associated with Ozawa, which is associated with the worst aspects of factional politics during the one-party rule of the LDP, where he was general secretary at the turn of the 1990s. The Ozawa case, which was accused of violating the law on political donations, has been on the front pages of newspapers for several years. This politician did not behave in the best way during the natural and man-made disaster of March 11, 2011. Because of him, the DPJ became in the eyes of many voters not much different from the LDP, whose victory over which three years ago they considered an "epochal event".

A number of experts reasonably noted that the criticism of this person was largely related to the parliamentary success in the 2010 elections. The Party of All, which positioned itself as a "Ozawa-free" political force ⁶. Ozawa's rejection by many voters is often attributed to the unprecedented popularity of the Osaka Isin no kai regional party (Osaka Modernization Society).

THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATS ARE CONFUSED

However, not having managed to solve the problems with the internal opposition, the ruling party faced a new parliamentary crisis caused by the actions of the external opposition.

On August 29, 2012, the Upper house considered another vote of no confidence in Prime Minister Noda. In addition to the six opposition parties, the vote was unexpectedly supported by the Liberal Democratic Party and as a result received the approval of the House of Councillors ⁷. The support of the vote of no confidence by the party that recently entered into a package deal with the government has led to criticism for its inconsistency. Some political observers called this step a "shot in the back" of the prime minister, thus emphasizing the treacherous nature of the deed. As an example, Komeito was put forward, which, like the LDP, was a participant in this transaction, but was demonstratively absent from the meeting of the chamber, where the issue of a vote of no confidence was considered.

After expressing no confidence, the united opposition, including the LDP, decided to boycott all parliamentary events attended by representatives of the ruling party, including meetings of chambers and parliamentary commissions. As a result, the legislative process has reached yet another impasse.

Meanwhile, the DPJ also launched a demarche in Parliament. In early September 2012, a draft amendment to the electoral law initiated by the ruling party was hastily passed through the lower house of Parliament, where the Democrats still had a majority, allowing, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court, to eliminate the disparity between the number of votes and deputy mandates in a number of districts. The amendments, which involve the reduction of 40 seats in the lower house and a number of other innovations, were not agreed with the opposition and were discussed at parliamentary sessions in its absence.

The passage of the bill in the House of Representatives, which had no chance of being approved by the upper house, was purely tactical. Having thus buried the draft amendments, the DPJ received a "legal" postponement of the elections due to the failure to comply with the Supreme Court's ruling, which made it possible to challenge the election results. There was also an opportunity to justify ourselves to the voters: we did everything possible to bring the elections closer, but the" unconstructive and obstructionist " opposition ruined this work.

However, such a tactic by the DPJ caused a mixed reaction in society. Many criticized the Democrats for their unwillingness to find a common language with the opposition and their desire to put narrow-party interests above national ones. Pushing a raw bill through the lower house that has not received the approval of the country's main political forces contradicts one of the basic principles of Japanese democracy - consensus in decision-making.

However, despite criticism and a difficult internal party environment, Noda's own party did not have any worthy competitors in the election of the chairman. All of his potential rivals, who had previously announced their intention to run for office, repeatedly refused to be nominated. As a result, Noda almost secured re-election.

The situation in the LDP is more complicated. After an ambiguous maneuver with a vote of no confidence, which severely affected the prestige of the LDP, the status of the favorite of the race was lost by its chairman S. Tanigaki. In the run-up to the election, the party needed a new leader who had a certain charisma and was able to impose his own line in the political competition.

The fact that the LDP's ratings were still low, and the main goal-to force the Noda to hold early parliamentary elections - was not achieved also played against the current chairman.

at the same time, despite the weakening of government support, time is not working for the Liberal Democrats, but for the All Party and the Osaka Modernization Society regional party.

Even the leader of Tanigaki's faction, M. Koga, who is considered one of the architects of the three-party deal on the tax increase law, refused to support Tanigaki.

All this paved the way for the victory of Shinzo Abe in the struggle for leadership in September 2012.

UNDER THE SLOGAN OF MODERNIZATION

Against this background, the political forces that positioned themselves as the "third pole" in Japanese politics confidently gained points. Almost no one doubted that the foundation of the "third pole" would be the Osaka Isin-no kai regional party ("Osaka Modernization Society"), founded by the young and ambitious Mayor of Osaka, Toru Hashi-moto. This party, which had no representation in Parliament, actively positioned itself as a fresh political force capable of forming an effective alternative to the" systemic " parties represented by the DPJ and LDP. Following the wave of sentiments of a part of the radical electorate dissatisfied with the established mechanisms of political power, Isin no kai put forward a populist political platform called Isin Hassaku ("Eight Directions of Modernization"), designed to give voters simple answers to complex questions facing the state power.⁸

The platform, in particular, provides for a radical reform of the public administration system in the country. Referring to foreign experience, the party proposes to halve the House of Representatives - from 480 to 240 deputies, as well as to introduce direct general elections for the head of government. The Cabinet of Ministers, according to the authors of the platform, should be given the authority to freely reorganize the internal structure of the government, which requires the creation of a new government.-

the current time of strict legislative registration (to create any new body in the government, you need to adopt a special law). Such a system did not allow the DPJ to implement an ambitious reform of the budget planning system after coming to power. It is also proposed to cancel the qualified majority in Parliament to amend the Constitution.

In the area of local self-government, the Isin no kai platform provides for a large-scale consolidation of the country's territorial and administrative management units by introducing provinces, each of which will include several existing prefectures. It is assumed that the provincial leaders will form a new upper house of parliament, whose rights will be significantly curtailed compared to the current House of Councillors. It is also proposed to radically change the tax system in the direction of reducing subventions to local authorities and ensuring their greater independence by keeping the lion's share of taxes collected in the region in their hands.

In the economic field, proposals based on neoliberal ideas are not very original, providing for strengthening economic freedom, increasing the international competitiveness of the economy and strengthening its innovative component, developing infrastructure, deregulating the economy, etc. Isin-no kai suggests following the course of connecting to "free trade zones" and forcibly joining the Trans - Pacific Partnership, a Washington-backed project to create a free trade zone in East Asia and the Pacific countries of the Western hemisphere. The promise to abandon nuclear power in favor of alternative sources is noteworthy.

Many experts have expressed strong doubts about the realism of many of the Modernization Society's proposals, which are currently being implemented in Russia.,

undoubtedly, they are frankly populist in nature. Thus, a radical reform of the parliament and the introduction of direct elections for the prime minister would undoubtedly jeopardize the entire system of checks and balances developed by Japanese parliamentary democracy over a century and a half, and is fraught with the threat of the collapse of the entire state administration. In addition, the experience of Israel, a country with a similar model of cabinet-parliamentary system, which decided to introduce direct elections of the head of government, does not belong to the category of positive innovations in Japan and therefore cannot serve as an example.

As for the abolition of subventions, it is fraught with aggravating the problem of regional development imbalances: many prefectures with depressed economies, depending on support from the center, would be unable to meet national standards in the social and cultural spheres on their own. It is difficult to call constructive for Japan and the idea of complete abandonment of nuclear power, the implementation of which would severely hit the national industry and would lead to an increase in the process of its exsanguination, i.e. the transfer of industrial enterprises abroad.

Nevertheless, the Modernization Society program enjoys considerable public support. Many voters are tired of the endless political infighting in the "twisted parliament", where the majority in the House of Representatives belongs to the Democrats, and the LDP controls the House of Councillors. This balance of power does not allow the Government to implement its legislative initiatives. It seems to many that simplifying the system of public administration and strengthening the mechanisms of direct democracy will help to end the situation of political stalemate, which is inappropriate in the context of the country's socio-economic crisis.

Based on these public sentiments, Isin no kai began to show support ratings in its region, reaching, according to various estimates, from 65 to 80%. Its leader is T. Hasimo-

then he announced his intention to "overthrow the government FOR". In February 2012, this party organized a "political school" to train candidates for the upcoming elections, which was attended by more than 3 thousand people. The party's stated goal was to nominate 300 candidates and win at least 200 seats in the lower house.

The potential of this party, which had no parliamentary representation, was demonstrated by the fact that it could no longer be ignored by virtually any of the political forces represented in the country's parliament. Thus, the Komeito Party began to attempt to coordinate its electoral policy with Isin no kai. One of the problems of this party is the low chances of winning in "small districts" built on the majority principle. During the period of its participation in the coalition government with the LDP, Komeito, which has a rather small but rather disciplined electorate from among the adherents of the Soka Gakkai sect, was forced to make a deal with a senior partner according to the scheme: the votes of its supporters in" small districts " were given in favor of the LDP in exchange for the support of the latter's supporters in "districts of proportional representation".

Apparently, a similar model was discussed by Komeito in behind-the-scenes negotiations with the Modernization Society. It was reported in the press that the head of the Komeito upper house parliamentary faction, K. Shirahama, held secret talks with Hashimoto in mid-February 2012 about cooperation during the upcoming elections in the Kansai region, of which Osaka is the "capital". This means that Yishin no kai will refuse to run candidates in the six" small districts " where Komeito expects to win, and in exchange for this, Hashimoto's party will receive her support in the other 25 districts of region ⁹.

On September 8, 2012, the leaders of the Modernization Society announced their intention to attract at least five current members of Parliament and create a national political party by the end of the month, which will be called Nihon isin-no kai ("Japan Modernization Society"). Hashimoto declared the goal of winning a parliamentary majority in the upcoming elections, for the implementation of which it was decided to nominate 300 candidates from the party.¹⁰ As such, it is proposed to attract graduates of the" political school " of the party, deputies of regional legislative assemblies, experienced civil servants, etc. At the same time, T. Hashimoto himself, as well as the general secretary of the new party, the governor of Osaka Prefecture Ichiro Matsui, who previously promised not to leave their posts before the expiration of their term of office, refused to stand in the general elections. your candidacies ¹¹.

Public opinion polls show the strength of the "Modernization Society". According to one survey conducted in early September 2012, 16% of Japanese voters were ready to vote for the new party -just under 21% of the support received by the main opposition party, the Liberal Democratic Party.¹² According to some experts, it is quite feasible for the Third Pole parties - Isin no Kai and the All Party-to win at least 100 seats in the upcoming elections.¹³ However, many Japanese experts believe that the "Modernization Society" is currently at the peak of its popularity, which will inevitably be followed by a decline. Much will depend on the development of the economic situation in the country, which has recently shown relatively positive dynamics (Japan's GDP growth in 2012 is projected by the International Monetary Fund at 2.4% ¹⁴), which in turn strengthens the position of the current government. However, the forecast for 2013 pleases less than -1.5% ¹⁵.

CAUTION TACTICS

Even before the election, the biggest problem for Noda was the danger of the DPJ losing its majority in the lower house due to the continued flight of current deputies from it. Many "young" parliamentarians felt extremely uncomfortable, anticipating an inevitable failure in the upcoming elections - they associated the DPJ's losing popularity with a"sinking ship". Meanwhile, it was enough for ten more deputies to leave the DPJ, and it lost the right to form the government on its own.

Under these circumstances, Noda was extremely cautious in his pre-election speeches, fearing to provoke new cases of desertion. On the politically sensitive issue of participation in the Washington-promoted Trans-Pacific Partnership* Noda avoided explicitly articulating his position. Nor did he speak categorically about the prospects for the development of nuclear energy. In other words, the task of preserving the internal party balance of power largely deprived the election campaign of an important function related to identifying the ideological and political preferences of candidates.

The desire to preserve party unity, even if ostentatiously, also left its mark on Noda's personnel policy after his re-election. Akira Koshiishi retained the post of DPJ Secretary General, although he is considered a political opponent of Noda. Kosiisi has repeatedly stated the need to preserve party unity and reconcile opposing groups. According to the apt expression of the Mainiti newspaper, A. Kosiisi is nothing more than a "bracket" that holds the party together and thus prevents an internal party split. ¹⁶ However, many expressed doubts about this personnel decision: Kosiishi, having a close relationship with Ozawa, could not, however, prevent him from leaving the party with a group of his supporters.

The task of maintaining the balance of power was also subordinated to reorgani-

* For more information, see: Semin A.V. Triangle of the USA, China, Japan and the Asia-Pacific Region // Asia and Africa Today, 2012, No. 9; Luzyanin S. G. Measurements of the APEC Summit in Vladivostok / / Asia and Africa Today, 2012, No. 11 (editor's note).

A cabinet meeting initiated by Noda on October 1. The DPJ leader has replaced more than half of the Cabinet, leaving only those ministers who were first appointed in June 2012 or who deal with the most important issues of state policy that require a certain continuity (foreign policy, defense and macroeconomics).

However, several appointments to the new cabinet immediately attracted increased attention. First of all, the candidacy of Makiko Tanaka, appointed to the post of Minister of Education and Science, caused some surprise. The daughter of one of the most famous post-war prime ministers, Tanaka became infamous when, as Foreign Minister in the first Dz Cabinet. Koizumi, she got into a public conflict with her subordinates and lost her position as a result. In 2009 Tanaka joined the Democratic Party and headed several relevant parliamentary commissions, including the Commission on Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, after the DPJ came to power.

Many observers view this assignment as a signal directed, rather, to the outside world. We are talking about the aggravation of the territorial dispute with China over the ownership of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu). It is believed that M. Tanaka retained good informal ties with the Chinese leadership, inherited from his father Kakuei Tanaka, who restored diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1972, having made a visit to Beijing for this purpose.

Although Tanaka was not entrusted with the foreign policy department, in her new role she oversaw cultural, educational and scientific ties with China, which were expected to create a friendly atmosphere in bilateral relations. It is also important that the Ministry of Education and Science is responsible for certifying school textbooks, which have become a stumbling block in relations with Japan's East Asian neighbors, who are dissatisfied with Tokyo's attempts to silence the crimes of Japanese militarists during World War II.

Another high-profile appointment concerns the post of Finance Minister. It went to the personally dedicated Noda Koriki Jojima, who has nothing to do with financial matters in his record. In addition to strengthening the government with his own people, this appointment also demonstrated Noda's unwillingness to see a politician at the head of the department who would interfere in the work of the bureaucracy (and Noda, himself a native of the "financial clan", fully trusts her). According to Japanese experts, Jojima's ability to negotiate with the opposition, which he demonstrated as chairman of the DPJ parliamentary affairs Committee, also played an important role: after all, the Ministry of Finance is responsible for tax policy, which has become one of the central issues in domestic politics.

Political heavyweight Seiji Maehara, who previously served as chairman of the party's Political affairs council, was appointed to the post of minister responsible for state strategy. In his new role, Maehara will be responsible for implementing social security and tax reform, which Noda's cabinet intends to prioritize. The head of the Political Affairs Council is now the newly appointed Minister of Ecology, Goshi Hosono, who represents a new generation of politicians and is popular among young DPJ deputies.

However, by and large, the new cabinet was never able to expand its activities.

* * *

The Liberal Democrats ' tactics were more effective. The opposition seems to have made concessions, supporting the government's proposed bills on the additional issue of government bonds, allowing the cabinet to make ends meet, avoiding bankruptcy, as well as on the adjustment of electoral districts. Thus, the path to early elections to the lower house was cleared, and Noda had no other choice but to make such a decision.

However, it is already clear that the elections are unlikely to provide a key to breaking the stalemate in the current parliament. Japanese experts believe that, most likely, none of the parties will be able to get a workable majority in both chambers, and a sharp jump in parliamentary representation of the "third force"will only complicate the already complicated balance of power.

There are no signs of a way out of the political stalemate ¹⁷ yet. This also hinders the Government's sensible approach to territorial disputes, in particular over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu), which were the subject of another noisy conflict with China in September 2012.

-----

¹ Asahi Shimbun, 27.09.2012.

² Yomiuri Shimbun, 29.01.2012.

3 Yomiuri Shimbun, 14.02.2012.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Mainichi Shimbun, 12.07.2012.

⁶ Asahi Shimbun, 02.09.2010.

⁷ Asahi shimbun, 30.08.2012.

⁸ For the full text of the platform, see: Nihon Keizai, 01.09.2012.

^{Akasaka Tara.} 9 Hashimoto-ga nerai shusho-no za (Hashimoto takes aim at the prime minister's chair) / / Bungei shunju 10.03.2012 - http://gekkan.bunshun.Jp/articles/-/304

¹⁰ http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/ 20120908/к 10014884901000.html

¹¹ http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/ 20120908/к 10014886291000.html

¹² Yomiuri Shimbun, 04.09.2012.

^{Tahara Soshpiro.} 13 Jiminto no rikai funona kyoko shisei, honne wa "Tagikaki oroshi" (The LDP's inexplicably tough stance: they actually want to expel Tanigaki) - http://www.nikkeibp.co.jp/article/column/20120808/319175/?ST=business&P=3

¹⁴ World Economic Outlook. July 16, 2012. New Setbacks, Further Policy Action Needed. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC - http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/update/02/index .htm

¹⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁶ Mainichi Shimbun, 25.09.2012.

¹⁷ For more information, see: Rusakov EM. In the captivity of patriarchy and provincialism / / Asia and Africa Today, 2010, N 12 (ed.).

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