In the last decade of the 20th and early 21st centuries, the export of capital abroad in the form of direct investment significantly increased, which largely determines the nature of the development of the world economy. This process is associated with the strengthening of integration trends, the growth of global financial market operations, the development of the process of internationalization of economic life into the process of economic and financial globalization, and the formation of a global production system.

The dominant position in the world of transnational corporations (TNCs) is occupied by companies of the "triad" - the EU, Japan and the United States, where 85 TNCs are based, which were included in the list of the 100 largest international corporations in the world in 2004. Five countries - the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan-accounted for 73 of the top ¹⁰⁰ companies1. On the basis of foreign direct investment (FDI), carried out mainly by American multinational corporations, international production is increasingly being formed, connecting the US economy with the economies of other countries with closer ties than trade operations. The network of international production created through FDI has led to the formation of an economic space that is referred to in the scientific literature as the "second economy" of the United States or the complex of American enterprises abroad. The" second economy " of the United States occupies a special place in the world economy in terms of its production, scientific, technical and financial potential and significantly exceeds the similar economic spheres of other capital-exporting countries-Western Europe and Japan. More than 20% of the US production capacity is concentrated within its framework.

IT WAS NOT IMMEDIATELY AGREED WITH THE INVESTORS...

Until the end of the 1970s, Japan maintained fairly strict restrictions on foreign investors. Numerous obstacles of economic, procedural, currency and other nature for foreigners-

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large-scale investments were built by state structures. The volume of restrictions on the movement of capital to Japan was the highest among all industrialized countries. Therefore, the presence of American companies in the Japanese economy at the turn of the century continued to be quite modest.

However, as a result of a number of external factors (including political pressure, threats of "retaliatory measures", the entry into force of international obligations under the OECD, IMF, GATT and other international organizations), as well as under the pressure of the country's main trade and economic partners, the Americans managed to get Japan to agree to a gradual but significant, the gradual liberalization of foreign investment policies by the Government since 1967. This pressure was aimed at making Japan open its market more widely to these investments, accelerate the liberalization of the FDI regime, and implement anti-trust legislation more actively.²

As a result of structural economic reforms and the liberalization process, the Japanese Government has eliminated most of the legal restrictions on foreign direct investment. The results of liberalization were reflected in a number of provisions of the "Law on Control over Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade", from the title of which the word "control"was removed in April 1997. This law, first passed in 1949 and radically revised three times (in 1980, 1991, and 1997), contains the basic principles for regulating the activities of foreign capital in Japan.

In March 2003, the Japan Investment Council approved the "Program to Promote FDI in Japan", which contains 74 items divided into 5 sections: dissemination of information, improvement of the business environment, reform of the administrative apparatus, improvement of employment and living conditions, and improvement of forms and methods of supporting the government and local governments.³

In April 2003, the Government Program for the Creation of Special Zones, developed as part of the ongoing structural reform in the Japanese economy, came into effect. The goal of this program is to update the country's regions ^by attracting FDI to these special zons4. All these measures, taken both to liberalize the process of international transactions and to revive the Japanese financial and capital markets, should, according to their initiators, have a stimulating effect on foreign investors.

On July 19, 2006, the Japanese Government announced its intention to increase foreign direct investment through another economic reform, outlined in the "Basic Policy for Economic and Fiscal Management and Structural Reform 2006"document⁵. And in March 2007. it also decided to translate into foreign languages - especially for potential investors - about 200 regulatory documents - laws, regulations and charters.

A POLICY OF "OPEN DOORS" AND ... HIGH BARRIERS

To date, thanks to the joint efforts of Japan and the United States, a fairly clear legal framework for investment cooperation between the two countries has been formulated in the Land of the Rising Sun. However, it is not clear that the Japanese government's "open door policy" for American investors in recent decades is completely free of barriers. The Government still maintained a small but significant number of restrictions on the admission of FDI to the country. However, the difficulties faced by American investors-both entering the Japanese market for the first time and seeking to increase the volume of their investments in this country-for the most part are not the result of any legal restrictions on the part of the Japanese government, but arise from the established practice of doing private business here and consist in the following::

- the rather high overall price level in Japan makes it too expensive for foreign investors to both enter the Japanese market and increase their investment in it;

- corporate practices and market principles prohibit foreign companies from acquiring Japanese firms;

- the Japanese accounting system, which is unusual for foreigners, and the secrecy of financial information;

- low share of officially listed ordinary shares in relation to the total capital of many companies;

- traditional antipathy to Western-style mergers and associations;

-the practice of establishing particularly close relationships between the seller and the buyer, which is widespread among Japanese companies that are members of business groups ("keiretsu"), giving both exclusive rights within unions and associations, which makes it difficult for foreign firms, as well as local "newcomers", to enter them;

- the existence of laws that directly or indirectly restrict the conditions for establishing business relationships and create difficulties for foreign products, services and foreign direct investment to enter the Japanese market;

- close ties between the Government and entrepreneurs, which are expressed in the form of informal administrative guidance that ministries provide to Japanese companies;

- relocation of retired officials to Japanese private companies and trade associations;

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- delegation by the government of its representatives to trade associations, which establish their own internal rules that are binding on their members.

There are also some special restrictions for foreign investors. Thus, the legislation regulating the aviation industry and air transportation provides that foreign, including American, entrepreneurs can have at their disposal no more than 1/3 of the shares of the corresponding Japanese companies. The share of foreigners in the management bodies of such companies should also not exceed 1/3.

The law also gives the Government the right to prohibit or restrict investment activities of representatives or companies of those countries that, in accordance with the principle of reciprocity, do not provide similar conditions for the activities of Japanese investors.

In some sectors of the economy, the Government has retained the right to restrict foreign direct investment if it recognizes that this investment may have a serious adverse impact on the overall development of the national economy. Even where direct barriers to FDI have been removed, foreign investors often face a closed system that strongly resists their entry. Many foreign firms are forced to conduct extensive preliminary consultations with various Japanese ministries before investing in any industry in that country.

WHAT PROBLEMS DO FDI SOLVE?

US direct investment helps Japan build new production facilities using Japanese suppliers of raw materials; acquire new technologies and management skills, the latest patents and know-how; bring innovations to its own industries, companies and firms; and improve technological capabilities and infrastructure based on American models. American investors, gaining access to Japanese human resources, contribute to improving the skills of employees and create new jobs (it is interesting that by 2004, about 200 thousand jobs were created in Japan thanks to American companies, while in the United States, about 834 thousand jobs were created thanks to the activities of Japanese corporations) ^.6 Having a strong industrial base, American TNCs pursue a production and trade policy in Japan that ensures highly efficient planning of production and the commodity market; they also implement in this country (primarily in branches of "parent" corporations with headquarters in the United States) an extremely dynamic policy in the field of capital investment and research.

Overall, investment from the United States increases the competitiveness of the Japanese economy and has a positive impact on its recovery.

However, there are a number of negative aspects to bilateral cooperation between these countries. For example, by manipulating prices, subsidiaries of both Japanese and American multinational corporations skilfully circumvent national laws, hide part of their income from taxation by pumping it from industry to industry, from one country to another, or directly to the headquarters of TNCs. As a result, corporate profits grow, but this is achieved, to put it mildly, not always by legal means. In some cases, cooperation between the two countries in the field of FDI, although it helps to expand sales markets, helps to exchange useful commercial information, etc., can still create specific circumstances for entrepreneurs in the United States and Japan in which they may lose their foreign assets.

Since the mid-1990s, the Governments of the United States and Japan have been developing special programs to encourage FDI. One of these programs is specifically dedicated to measures to promote American investment in the Japanese economy.

In March 2000, a representative investment symposium was held in Tokyo, which was attended by over 600 scientists, financiers, entrepreneurs and government officials. It discussed the importance of-

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increasing the inflow of foreign investment into the country, as well as ways to revive the economic situation ⁷.

A conference on direct investment in the Japanese economy was held in April 2001 in New York. It was attended by representatives of the official and business circles of the United States and Japan. A number of proposals put forward by the American participants of this meeting have already been implemented.

On June 30, 2001, during a high-level meeting, President George W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister D. Koizumi announced the establishment of the "US-Japan Economic Partnership for Growth", whose main task is to ensure sustainable economic growth of the two countries through coordinated macroeconomic policies, structural and managerial reforms, financial and corporate policies. restructuring, increasing foreign direct investment, opening up markets, cooperation and close cooperation on bilateral, regional and global economic and trade aspects.

As part of the partnership, a US-Japan sub-office for economic dialogue has been established, which includes deputy heads of key economic agencies and ministries of the two countries. On behalf of the American side, a representative of the National Security Council is acting as the chairman of the sub - cabinet, and on behalf of the Japanese side, a representative of the Japanese Foreign Ministry is acting. Business representatives from both countries are also invited to participate in the partnership. For this purpose, a special commission has been organized, which will include representatives of official circles and entrepreneurs. When developing the agenda of annual meetings within the partnership, recommendations of the management of large companies are taken into account.

WHAT DID BUSH AND KOIZUMI AGREE ON?

At the same time, George W. Bush and D. Koizumi approved the so-called "US-Japan Investment Initiative" and simultaneously became its co-founders. This initiative is part of the so-called "US-Japan Economic Partnership for Growth" and is the equivalent of the "Caribbean Initiative" in Latin Caribbean countries8.

Within the framework of the US-Japan Investment Initiative, high - level negotiations were held in November 2003, followed by meetings of working groups of private sector representatives in March and April 2004, as well as in December 2005 and June 2006. The parties discussed issues related to the current state of the investment climate in Japan and the United States. Special joint investment seminars are also held. So, in April 2004, seminars were held in Kitakiotso and Kyoto with the participation of representatives of 20 American companies, where they discussed methods and ways to promote US investment in the Japanese economy. In October of the same year, a symposium on investment in Japan was held in Atlanta and Los Angeles, where the implementation of the "investment initiative"was discussed.

In November 2005, another Japan Investment Symposium and seminars on the same topic were held in Nagoya and Chiba ⁹. A year later, in November 2006, the Japanese Ministry of Economy and the US State Department organized the " Japanese Business Strategy Forum "(the second name is "Absolute Growth Protocol for Your Technology") in Silicon Valley - in Santa Clara, California. Representatives of many leading American firms discussed opportunities to enter Japanese markets and options for cooperation with partners from this country10.

As part of the investment initiative, the US State Department notes, Japan has revised its Corporate Code, which came into force in an updated version in May 2007, which will provide foreign companies operating in Japan with greater flexibility in mergers and acquisitions of assets.

In early 2003, Koizumi stated that one of his country's main goals is to increase the flow of foreign direct investment: "FDI will bring new technologies and innovative management methods to Japan, and it will also lead to greater employment opportunities... We will also take steps to make Japan attractive to foreign firms, with the goal of doubling (emphasis added - E. R.) the total amount of investment over five years."¹¹ Doubling the volume of investment in Japan. -

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By the end of 2006, the total amount of direct foreign direct investment (FDI) was $ 110 billion. ¹²

Of these, accumulated US direct investment (PI) accounted for $ 91.8 billion, while Japanese PI in the US by the end of 2006 amounted to a decent amount - $ 211.0 billion. In other words, the total volume of Japanese PI exported to the United States was more than 2 times higher than the import. This indicates, in our opinion, that Japan is reluctant to allow foreign investments, including American ones, to enter its country, but it is also very active in exporting them.

The new Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, continued the course started by his predecessor to increase the flow of investment to the country. The head of government said that the current share of FDI in Japanese GDP - 2.4% - by 2010 should grow to 5%, or 229.2 billion rubles. $ ¹³ (although it remains relatively small).

Industry structure of US direct investment in Japan in the 1990s It coincided with the structure of American investment in other industrialized countries, which, however, cannot be said about the structure of commodity exports. In the mid-1990s, manufacturing accounted for about 40% of total U.S. direct investment in Japan, while oil and refining accounted for about 17% ^.14

By the end of the 1990s, the industry structure of American investment in Japan, typical for the period from 1985 to 1997, is changing. So, for example, if the most promising investments for American PI from 1990 to 1998 were in the manufacturing industry, then by 1999-2000 their share in the total investment volume is decreasing. By 2002, investment in the oil sector was virtually nonexistent. Americans have reduced their investment in the energy sector to a minimum, including in the construction of gas and electricity distribution networks, as well as in public utilities.

However, at the same time, or rather, in the late 90's, there was an increase in the scale of American capital investments in the Japanese service sector. Especially for high-tech services, which reflects the fact that services are becoming more and more important in production today. From 1995 to 2006, US direct investment in this sector ranked first (approximately 60 to 70%), while the manufacturing sector was in second place (approximately 20 to 30%). The increased interest of American corporations in this sector of the economy can be explained by the general trend of reorientation of global TNCs to invest in the service sector. This process developed particularly intensively in 2002-2004. ¹⁵

Nowadays, the export of goods generally requires a developed network of services. Hence the growth of investments in the financial sector, insurance, real estate, information, professional and scientific and technical services (the latter, approximately since 2002, have received the greatest development), banking services and computer science.

By the end of 2006, according to the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the accumulated US PI in Japan's manufacturing industry amounted to $ 17.3 billion, and in the service sector - $ 65.5 billion. USD ¹⁶

Between 2002 and 2005, new investment from the United States was particularly strong in Japan's financial services, Internet services, and software industries, including computer manufacturing. In 2002, they amounted to $ 2.5 billion; in 2003, $ 3.4 billion; in 2004, $ 3 billion; and in 2005, $ 3 billion.¹⁷ Investments in computer science and electronics were significant in terms of volume. Americans invested $ 2.9 billion in computer science in 2002, $ 3.2 billion in 2003, $ 3.7 billion in 2004, $ 2.7 billion in 2005, and $ 2.3 billion in 2006. ¹⁸ In 2005 and 2006, Americans invested a large sum of $ 3.3 billion for the first time. to holding (non-bank) companies in Japan ¹⁹.

The presence of American companies in the Japanese economy at the turn of the century remains rather modest due to the difficulties of the initial stage of entry into the market, the high cost of land, the fierce internal competition, and the preference that the Japanese give to their products. It is also possible that entrepreneurs of the Land of the Rising Sun do not want to transfer their property rights to foreigners, trying to preserve the identity of the culture of national producers. It is also likely that this form of cooperation is not yet relevant enough for the Japanese (as entrepreneurs, for example, in Latin-Caribbean countries or in Russia, believe). In Japan, too, there is clearly insufficient research on the profitability of such cooperation. It can be assumed that the Japanese authorities believe that it makes sense to cooperate with the United States only where you can count on real benefits, based primarily on long-term cooperation.

US INVESTORS ARE HOPEFUL... AND THEY ARE AFRAID

The uneven and unmotivated jumps and declines in US investment in various sectors of the Japanese economy indicate that American investors are still wary and even somewhat wary of investing in even the most promising industries and companies in Japan.

Despite a significant increase in US corporate investment in a number of leading sectors of the Japanese economy, the position of the United States in this country in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s was significantly more modest than in most other industrialized countries.

The shift of the center of gravity of competition in the 1990s to the sphere of high technologies, the accelerated process of structural modernization of the Japanese economy, the improvement of its state due to further liberalization, the legal reform carried out in the country-

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ai, as well as the acceleration of integration processes and the growing interdependence of the two countries ' economies, suggest that the mutual migration of direct investment between the United States and Japan will be more balanced in volume while maintaining structural diversification. This assumption can be proved by the increase in the inflow of American capital into the Japanese economy in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

At the same time, as practice shows, market penetration is often not a mutual process. While the American and, to a lesser extent, European economies represent relatively open markets for trade and foreign direct investment, the Japanese, Chinese, Taiwanese, Indian, or Russian economies have adopted strict protectionist policies. These "exceptions" to the US-European rules are very significant for the formation of the world market, since the markets of the same Asian countries account for more than 1/5 of the world market.

At present, it can be stated that the two-way movement of capital between the United States and Japan is viewed to a lesser extent than before by the participants through the prism of trade and economic rivalry, but it takes on the character of a contradictory partnership in the context of the growing interdependence of national production complexes. It is no coincidence that the governments of the two countries are discussing the development of a holistic bilateral strategy for creating complementary integration-type structures in the context of the global economy's globalization.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

The world experience in general and the Asia-Pacific countries in particular shows that the investment boom in many countries ' economies is largely due to the arrival of foreign capital, which is also necessary for Russia. This capital could bring new technologies and modern management methods to our country and contribute to the development of certain sectors of the national economy, of course, provided that a favorable investment climate is created.

Let us formulate a number of conclusions from the above in relation to Russia.

The first. Currently, countries with economies in transition, including Russia, occupy a very modest place in the international investment process of the United States. So, as of March 2007, the accumulated US PI in Russia amounted to only 3.6 billion rubles. USD, or 2.3% of the total volume of FDI invested in the Russian economy ²⁰. Compared to, for example, Japan and a number of other Asian or Latin-Caribbean countries, this is just a tiny amount. The most priority areas of US FDI investments in the Russian economy are primarily the fuel and food industry, to some extent the financial sector, the aviation, aerospace and automotive industries, the tobacco market, the public catering sector and the high-tech sector. Other areas are unlikely to attract the attention of American investors in the foreseeable future.

Second. Russia needs to conduct a thorough and critical study of the Western model of attracting FDI in the service sector and research and development (R & D), as these investments can help it connect to global production chains and international trade in services. Such chains consist of international networks for the production of services, which are becoming increasingly important for providing access to international markets. Russia's use of the Latin Caribbean and Asian countries ' model, especially Japan, to modernize the service sector and scientific and technical base would attract much more direct US investment to our country. Of course, you should first carefully study this model, weigh all the pros and cons, and only then make practical decisions taking into account the specifics of the domestic economy and even the Russian mentality. Simply copying foreign experience can lead to the fact that mechanisms that have proven themselves well in the West may not be effective in our country.

Third. The Russian economy is seriously hindered by the insufficiently active role of the state in attracting foreign investment.-

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titium. Let's say we don't have a government agency regulating these investments. And in many foreign countries, they exist; their functions include the development and adoption of legal norms aimed at facilitating the attraction of foreign investment. The issue of improving the legal framework for FDI is long overdue. In addition, most American investors complain about the underdevelopment of our transport and telecommunications infrastructure, the penetration of criminal elements into the business environment, the low level of management and organizational technologies, and bureaucracy. It is clear why American companies are more attracted to the markets of other countries, including some of Russia's closest neighbors.

Fourth. In Russia, it is not easy to make large-scale investments in the modernization of production. A foreign company that has decided to invest in our company often has to work with factories that do not have normal financial service systems and modern sales structures, qualified managers, and do not conduct marketing research. All this, in addition to investing in the modernization of production, a foreign company must create independently. Meanwhile, in the same Japan, such cases are rare. If the Americans are starting to invest there "from scratch", then at least they are working in conditions of legal protection and are fully confident in their Japanese partners. The risk of corruption in Japan is excluded, which cannot be said about Russia. In our country, unfortunately, business is mostly short-term in nature. Long-term business relationships with partners are not particularly welcome. The main emphasis in entrepreneurship is placed on the so-called "fast money", and a significant part of the money earned is spent in the pockets of officials. There are many examples where Russian-American joint ventures either collapsed or were bought up for a song by Russian businessmen, often with a dubious reputation.

The fifth is the unmotivated obstacles that American capital faces when it wants to direct funds, often very large, to the development of Russian minerals. The main obstacle is the lack of clarity and lack of development of ownership rights to land and mineral resources.

The sixth is that most Russian industrial enterprises have an unstable financial situation and outdated administrative structure. American entrepreneurs are not used to working with companies whose unstable financial situation does not allow them to use many financial instruments. Russian enterprises, in turn, often benefit from having the image of financially insolvent firms, as this allows them to avoid paying taxes to the budget and receive state support. Investing in a Russian enterprise involves establishing (to varying degrees) the investor's control over it. However, any control in the conditions of corruption of the entire society, from bottom to top, often turns out to be unacceptable for the company's management and often leads to conflicts with foreign investors. In addition, the ownership of shares in an enterprise (even a controlling stake) in Russian conditions does not always mean the ability to control the actions of its management. However, at least in part, these problems can be avoided by creating a joint venture with the rights and obligations of the parties very clearly spelled out in the statutory documents.

Seventh. Foreign entrepreneurs are concerned about the close connection of Russian business with political problems, for example, the existence of territorial disputes in which the state takes part (Abkhazia, North Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transdniestria). Economic instability (relatively high inflation rates, dependence of the economy on the "oil and gas needle", imperfect business legislation) also hinders, although its impact on the business climate has recently decreased. Nevertheless, Western business circles take all this into account and therefore are afraid to invest heavily in Russian facilities.

THE PROBLEMS ARE NOT VERY BIG, BUT THEY ARE VERY IMPORTANT

There are many other problems, which may be less significant for us, but are certainly taken into account by our foreign partners. They rightly point out the lack of reliable statistical information on the activities of enterprises with foreign investment. The relevant data should probably be included in regularly published State statistical reports on the socio-economic situation of the country. And reviews on the state of affairs "on the investment front", including data on FDI, given the interest in these issues in Russia and abroad, it is advisable to compile and publish separately.

We have long been talking about the feasibility of creating a coherent system of state support for domestic businesses, but such a system has never existed in Russia. This system should include ensuring the reliability and stability of foreign investors ' business conditions, providing them with certain guarantees, including the return of funds invested in Russia if necessary. The lack of such guarantees, of course, hinders the flow of foreign investment in our country, in particular, in the implementation of large investment projects based on production sharing agreements (PSAs).

Some of our citizens have a certain psychological barrier in their perception of reality-

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capital formation. An example is the fact that foreign investment is hindered by the position of managers of many enterprises who do not want to lose control of "their own economy" and are afraid that foreign owners will invite more qualified managers to take their place. As a result, many companies that could attract investment and operate efficiently prefer to degrade and eke out a truly miserable existence. As an example, we can mention the Baltic Shipping Company, which has excellent modern sea ferries, but loses them due to unsatisfactory management and, as a result, insolvency. It is not uncommon for the administration of enterprises to prevent foreign companies from participating in investment competitions, and in the case of selling shares to them (or their partners), it refuses to make appropriate changes to the register of shareholders.

It is also impossible to keep silent about the extremely low culture of doing business with foreign partners in Russia. Our entrepreneurs do not have the skills to defend their interests and the ability to tolerate and respect the opinion of their interlocutor. I can't help but refer here to the tradition of Japanese entrepreneurs-to listen carefully and to the end to the point of view of the interlocutor, without interrupting him or making any comments. The Japanese generally try not to engage in an open confrontation with the other person. So, a Japanese businessman will most likely replace the sharp "no" that is generally accepted in Russia with "it's difficult", so as not to upset the partner with his negative answer.

Both the language problems of Russians (including a poor command of the language of the interlocutor) and the complete ignorance of cultural features, in particular the traditions of conducting discussions, of their business partner make themselves felt. The inability to perceive the problem through the eyes of a partner, the substitution of objective information in negotiations with their own subjective views, is often perceived by foreign interlocutors of our entrepreneurs as their complete professional incompetence.²¹

Such a characteristic desire for domestic business to solve problems "quickly" and" in cash " often simply offends foreign partners. Russian business circles are generally reluctant to compromise. In addition, in Russia it is customary to set common goals, but little attention is paid to how to achieve them. It's different with the Japanese and the Americans.

The Japanese person will think about it first, and only then formulate their answer. In addition, "Japanese morality" considers the bonds of mutual dependence to be the basis of relations between people. The business culture of a Japanese businessman comes from within, it is based on education and is manifested, first of all, in the art of communication built on mutual respect and based on the honesty of doing business with a business partner.

The high professionalism and pragmatism of an American businessman, combined with a clear delegation of authority and the ability to make mutual concessions and critically assess a particular situation, help him to successfully conduct business. The annual improvement of cooperation with the partner and confidence in the long-term nature of this cooperation allow Japanese and American investors to open up new horizons for investing in different countries on different continents of the world.

* * *

Summing up all the above, it should be noted that Russia's economic revival should be the result, first of all, of its own people's efforts, their active support for the course of reforms, and the government's consistency in their implementation. At the same time, it is necessary not only to take into account and carefully study foreign experience, but also to learn how to apply it in practice. This would help Russia to cope with a number of problems and attract much more foreign direct investment in the economy, of course, not to the detriment of domestic manufacturing companies.

¹ See World Investment Report 2006. FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: Implications for Development), p. XVIII; Review of the World Investment Report 2006. UN, New York and Geneva, 2006, p. 8.

² Источники: The 2000 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program. Wash. (D. C.), 2000, p. 166; Collection "Japan: with what in the third millennium?" Moscow, Vostochnaya literatura, Russian Academy of Sciences, 1999.

³ FDI policies for Development: National and International Dimensions (World Investment Report. 2003). Moscow, Vse mir Publ., 2004, p. 78.

⁴ U.S.-Japan Economic Partnership for Growth: U.S. -Japan Investment Initiative 2004 Report. June 2004, p. 3.

⁵ JETRO Press-Information - www.jetro.go.jp

⁶ U.S. -Japan Economic Partnership for Growth.., 2004 Report.., p. 2.

⁷ See: American-Japanese Investment Symposium / / BIKI, 2000, N 42 (8086), pp. 5, 16; U.S.-Japan Economic Partnership for Growth.., 2002, Report, June, 2002, p. 15.

⁸ Ibidem, p. 2.

⁹ Source: Database of UNCTAD, Ministry of Economy and Industry, Ministry of Finance of Japan, and U.S. Japan Economic Partnership for Growth., 2006 Report.., June 2006, p. 4.

¹⁰ For key discussion questions, see: JETRO Events. "Japan Business Strategy Forum 2006" in Santa Clara CA, USA -www.Jetro.go,jp./en/invest/investmentservices/event/sevinars/2006/usa/?print-l

¹¹ World Investment Report 2003. FDI Policies for Development: National and International Perspectives, p. 77.

¹² U.S. -Japan Economic Partnership for Growth... 2007 Report. June 2007 p. 7 - 8.

¹³ Ibidem.

¹⁴ Calculated from: Survey of Current Business for the corresponding years.

¹⁵ Подр. см.: World Investment Report 2004: The Shift Towards Services. New York and Geneva, 2005, p. 1 - 436.

¹⁶ Survey of Current Business 2007, July 2007, p. 34.

¹⁷ http://www.state.gov/p/eap/ci/ja/

¹⁸ Calculated from: Survey of Current Business for the corresponding years.

¹⁹ Survey of Current Business. September 2006, p. 106; July 2007, p. 34.

²⁰ Goskomstat data - www.gks.ru

^{Romanova E. M.} 21 New trends in US direct investment exports at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries. Abstract for the degree of Candidate of Economic Sciences, Moscow, ISKRAN 2006, pp. 5-6.

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