B.C. Stuttgart: Steiner, 1997 (Historia -Einzelschriften. Ht 102). 186 p.

It would seem that in the political history of the Greek world of the IV century BC, there are no more "white spots" left. The late classical era, which was sufficiently fully illuminated by sources, has repeatedly become the subject of attention of ancient historians. The main events of the foreign policy life of this time were subjected to both reconstruction and interpretation; it seemed that it was already very difficult to say a new word in this area, for example, to "open" a previously unknown military campaign. And yet, in our case, this is exactly what we are talking about.

Young researcher Julia Heskel devoted her first monograph, published in the appendix to the journal "Historia", to an almost completely unexplored topic - the wars in the Northern Aegis in 360 BC.e. This refers to the many years of futile attempts by the Athenians to restore their dominance in Amphipolis and Thracian Chersonesus, lost during the Peloponnesian War. However, in addition to Athens, a number of other states and political associations were involved in the events in this region during the period under review. It is only necessary to list the main participants in the conflict to see what a complex tangle of contradictions we are dealing with: Athens, the Macedonian Argeades, the Thracian king Kotis I and his rebellious vassal Miltokitos, Thebes, which reached its greatest power during this era, the Chalcedonian alliance led by Olynthos, the Persian satraps of the regions of Western Asia Minor (as they remained loyal to as well as the Greek rulers under their control, who often got out of control of their overlords. The interests of all these forces are intertwined on the northern coast of the Aegean Sea. Sparta, although not directly involved in the war, also contributed to the development of events. We should not forget about the aspirations of the Northern Aegean cities themselves (especially Amphipolis), who did not want to be a passive object of someone else's claims and tried to pursue their own policies to the best of their abilities. Finally, an additional disorganizing factor was the presence in the region of Haredem with a detachment of mercenaries, who repeatedly cheated on their "employers" and switched to new ones: during the conflict in question, he managed to serve almost all of its participants(1).

Theme set by J. R. R. Tolkien Heskel at the forefront, therefore, already a priori promises to be complex, but interesting. However, paradoxically, it has never been the subject of a special study before, let alone a monographic one. Of course, the authors of general works on the history of the second Athenian naval Union, Thebes, Macedonia, and the Chalcedonian Union could not help but touch on these issues in at least one or two paragraphs(2). But as a rule, there were no more cursory remarks. One of the reasons for this is

(1) On the unreliability and uncontrollability of mercenary squad commanders, see Burckhardt L. Soldner und Burger als Soldaten fur Athen // Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr. Stuttgart, 1995. S. 131 f.; Marinovie L.P. La vocation politique des mercenaires // Cahiers des etudes anciennes. 1997. 33. P. 120.

(2) Buckler J. The Theban Hegemony, 371-362 B.C. Cambr. Mass., 1980. P. 121 f., 255 f.; Borza E.N. In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence ofMacedon. Princeton, 1990. P. 182 f.; CargillJ. The Second Athenian League. Berkeley, 1981. P. 34; WestA.B. The History of the Chalcidic League. Madison, 1973. P. 108-114.

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This is due to the low coverage of events in the sources, since the Northern Aegis was undoubtedly not the main theater of military operations at that time. Several speeches of Attic speakers (Aesch. II; Dem. XXIII; [Dem.] L - the speech usually attributed to Apollodorus, the son of Pasion) with their inevitable subjectivity and fragmentary presentation, the XV book of Diodorus, which gives a very concise summary of events, brief references in Xenophon and Isocrates, a series of inscriptions - this, as the author notes (pp. 13-15), is the entire text of the book. material that can be used to reconstruct the course of the conflict.

Hence the widespread opinion that these wars were peripheral and of little importance to the Greek history of the fourth century. Heskel polemics throughout his book), which causes reluctance to dwell on them in any detail. The region of Amphipolis and Chersonesus began to attract serious attention of researchers only from the moment when the famous conflict between the Athenians and Philip II began there, which was really of great importance for the overall balance of power in Hellas. But with such an approach, the background of events that took place on both sides goes into the shadows, and it is not possible to find the roots of the Athenian-Macedonian war. This gap is filled to a certain extent by the reviewed monograph, the author of which was naturally brought to this issue precisely by studying the foreign policy of Philip II (p.11). It was necessary to present in detail how exactly and under what circumstances the situation in the Northern Aegis that Philip found when he came to power developed. The latter explains the fact that the book ends in 360/359 BC, although this date cannot be considered an objective milestone in the development of the conflict. On the contrary, the chronological point at which the study begins (371) seems quite reasonable. It was in this year that the Congress in Athens decided to return Amphipolis, supported by the majority of the poleis and even by Macedonia (Aesch. II. 32-33).

J. Heskel is a student of Ernst Badian, to whom she expresses her gratitude at the beginning of her work (p. 11). Characteristic features of the research method of this most prominent American antiquarian are the breadth of scientific interests (it is no coincidence that his name speaks a lot to specialists in both ancient Greek and Roman history)(3), meticulous attention to details, especially chronological ones, combined with an excellent ability to fit individual analyzed events into the widest possible historical context, a critical, creative approach to both sources and historiography of the issue, which allows him to offer new, sometimes unexpected conclusions in almost all cases. As we will see, in a number of ways, Badian's school is also noticeable in the work of the author of the book under review.

In the introduction (p. 13-17), the researcher first focuses on the poorly studied topic and the state of the source base, then gives a brief sketch of the Athenian activity in the North Aegean region from its beginning (dating from the second half of the VI century BC(4)) to the end of the 370s. The main text of the monograph is divided into two parts, devoted respectively to the War for Amphipolis (part 1, p. 19-52) and the War for Chersonesos (part 2, p.53-153). This division is due more to the convenience of presentation than to the actual independence of these wars from each other. In fact, military operations in both regions were closely intertwined, took place at the same time and were conducted by the same methods. Even the characters in both campaigns are often the same (Iphicrates, Timothy, Haredem, etc.). In order to draw as complete a picture as possible and at the same time follow the events of both wars, the author has to resort to cross-references very often. This is not to say that it makes working with the book any easier.

In turn, each of the two parts includes, firstly, a detailed analysis of all the difficulties and ambiguities associated with the chronology of conflicts, in order to establish as complete and consistent a sequence of events as possible (ch. 1, p. 19-37; ch. 3, p. 53-122) and, secondly, the actual reconstruction of the course of military operations in Afghanistan. in both regions (ch. 2, pp. 38-52; ch. 4, pp. 123-153). We will discuss the chronological excursions in more detail below. In the meantime, it is necessary to briefly reproduce the results of historical reconstruction. In general, it is undoubtedly successful, especially if you take into account,

(3) His recent work, Badian E. The Ghost of Empire: Reflections on Athenian Foreign Policy in the Fourth Century BC, is devoted specifically to the foreign policy of Athens in the fourth century BC // Die athenische Demokratie ... pp. 79-106.

(4) It is possible that the Athenian interest in the north-east of the Aegis can be traced back to the end of the seventh century BC, when the Athenians founded a colony in Eleuntes (on the Thracian Chersonesus); see Jeffery L. H. Archaic Greece. L., 1978. P.89.

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that the author, in view of the circumstances outlined above, had to start from scratch in many ways, and even without a solid foundation in the sources.

The author takes the Amphipolian campaign as a starting point, as already mentioned, in 371 BC. Afterlearning about the Athenians ' determination to regain control of their city, the Amphipolites entered into an alliance with Olynthus, who expanded his influence in Northern Aegis during this period and even intervened in the struggle for the throne in Macedonia in 368, supporting one of the contenders "Pausanias." By this time, the Athenian strategist Iphicrates was already in the area of Amphipolis, arriving there with a small contingent and hiring a detachment of Haridem. At the request of the then ruling Macedonian king (Ptolemy) Iphicrates gave him military aid and defeated Pausanias, naturally counting on the return support. However, in the same year, Pelopidas, arriving with an army in Macedonia, forced Ptolemy to conclude an alliance with Thebes and break with Athens. The siege of Amphipolis dragged on and began to bear tangible fruit only three years later. The Amphipolites, aware of the weakness of their position, entered into a new alliance, this time with Ptolemy (which, however, remained without serious consequences). In 365. Iphicrates was dismissed from his command and retired to the court of Cotys of Thrace; the conduct of military operations was entrusted to Timothy, who had just completed the brilliant conquest of Samos. Around the same time, the Amphipolites requested a garrison from Olynthus, which was brought into the city.

Timothy, who had not easily won over Haredem (the latter was originally going to join the Olynthians) and enlisted the support of the new Macedonian king Perdiccas III, changed his strategy, moving to a broad offensive on Chalkidiki itself. The operation continued with great success until 362 and led to the capture of a number of Chalcedonian cities (Toroni, Potidaea, etc.). This forced Olynthus to withdraw the garrison from Amphipolis, but it was soon replaced by the garrison of Perdiccas sent at the request of the Amphipolites. Timothy attacked Macedonia, but after several months of victories was forced to leave for the Thracian Chersonesus. Thus, all attempts by Athens to seize Amphipolis were unsuccessful.

An even more complex tangle of contradictions is entwined around Chersonesos. The complexity of the situation in this region is compounded by its close connection and interweaving with the "Great Satrap Revolt", the chronology of which is not sufficiently clear in itself. Under the terms of the Peace of Antalkida, the cities of Chersonesos were considered autonomous. But in 368, Philiscus, an envoy of Ariobarzanes, satrap of Hellespont Phrygia, conveyed to the Athenians the promise of Artaxerxes II to recognize their claim to Chersonesus. In 367, an Athenian embassy was sent to Susa; at the same time, the embassies of Sparta and Thebes (led by Pelopidas) arrived there. The latter managed to achieve favorable peace terms for the Thebans during the negotiations. But in the following year, at a new congress in Susa, the treaty was revised and all articles that did not satisfy the Athenians were eliminated; the Persian king agreed to return to Athens not only Chersonesus, but also Amphipolis. Timothy was appointed commander in the war for Chersonesos, but he did not arrive at his destination soon. Ariobarzanes, who supported him, soon openly rebelled against the king. Timothy was distracted first by the siege of Samos, which took almost a year, and then by the Amphipolis campaign, which lasted several more years (as mentioned above).

In 363, the Thracian king Kotis I claimed Chersonesos. The general Miltokitus sent by him, despite the resistance of the Athenians, besieged and took a number of important cities of the peninsula (Ceetes, Critota), but soon rebelled against Kotis. Both Thracians asked Athens for support: the Athenians, being in some confusion, helped one or the other (in one of the naval battles, Iphicrates, who was at that time an adviser to Cotys, fought against the Athenian strategists who supported Miltokites - Dem. XXIII. 130). After the defeat of Miltokite, the Chersonese cities fell into the hands of his ally Ariobarzanes. Cotys, in alliance with Artaxerxes ' loyal Lydian satrap Autofradates, launched an offensive against them. Timothy, who finally arrived in the Straits zone, supported Ariobarzanes, took possession of Sest, Critota, and Eleunt. However, in 360, almost all of Chersonesos was again under the control of Kotis. In his service at this time was Haridem, in the previous years actively participated in the internecine wars of the Asia Minor satraps. After the death of Kotis (September 360), the leader of the mercenaries managed to defend Chersonesos from the Athenians.

In conclusion (pp. 155-157), the results of the study are summarized. It is emphasized that the most important reason for the final failure of the Athenians both on the Amphipolis and Chersonesus fronts was the appearance of their competitors in this region, interference in the events

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a number of other States(5). The role of some participants in the conflict (for example, individual Persian satraps) still cannot be adequately assessed. The wars in the Northern Aegean in the 360s were characterized by precisely this versatility, which forced the Athenians to develop a number of new political techniques: maneuvering between rivals, exploiting contradictions in their environment, striving to realize any opportunity to achieve the desired goal, and conclude an alliance with anyone who even promises to help in this matter, regardless of their true motives and the degree of reliability of such a potential ally. As an appendix, the book provides a detailed synchronistic table (pp. 160-181) summarizing all the events not only in the Northern Aegis, but also in other regions of the world at that time that were relevant to the wars under consideration.

It is necessary to point out some points that made the reviewed monograph less successful than it could have been. In our opinion, chronological excursions occupy an excessively large place in the work. They are much larger than the actual content chapters. Of course, finding out with the greatest possible accuracy the dates of events that have not yet been practically investigated is necessary, but it should not overshadow the main problem of the book, which, by no means, is not stated as a purely chronological study.

It is interesting to see what methods the author uses in this area. J. Heskel tries to set the most specific date for each event, even a minor one, up to several days. But at the same time, arguments are often used that, frankly, are simply incomprehensible. A few typical examples. Aeschines (II. 29) reports that Iphicrates expelled the usurper Pausanias from Macedonia. J. Heskel writes (p. 24):

"It probably didn't take Iphicrates very long... The expulsion of Pausanias from Macedonia. If we allow three weeks for Pausanias ' capture of Antemuntus, Strepsa, and Thermae, and another two or three weeks for his encounter with Iphicrates, we can date his exile to the end of the summer of 366." Where do these numbers come from? Why should we accept them? No explanation is given, and the date of the event hangs in the air.

Another example. Demosthenes (XXIII. 149) writes the following: "This man (Haridem. - I. S.) first of all returned the hostages (which Iphicrates, having received from Harpalus, handed over to him for protection) to the inhabitants of Amphipolis" (translated by V. G. Borukhovich). We know absolutely nothing more about these hostages, and the Harpalus mentioned here is not identified in any way. Heskel draws far-reaching conclusions from this brief report (p. 28). It turns out that the hostages were taken from the Amphipolites by the Macedonians (after all, the name "Harpalus" is typically Macedonian!) under the terms of the union treaty, the existence of which, therefore, has to be postulated. "Since Iphicrates received hostages in the spring of 365, the Macedonians should have received them shortly before" (?). Therefore, the treaty with Amphipolis was concluded by Ptolemy. In addition, it is concluded (p. 25) that Iphicrates was removed from command at Amphipolis precisely because he handed over the hostages to Haredem (a characteristic logical error: post hoc ergo propter hoc).

Of course, not in all cases the author's arguments are so unconvincing. But in general, these examples are typical of the method of J. R. R. Tolkien. Heskel. An unprovable assumption is made, then it is used as a basis for putting forward another one, and so whole chains of hypotheses are built up, on which the entire chronology of events is based. Wouldn't it be better in some cases to simply admit that we are not yet able to establish with absolute accuracy the date of a particular episode?

In general, chronological excursions produce a rather confused impression (this is especially true for Chapter 3). Facts are not considered in chronological order, which significantly complicates the perception of their reconstruction. The reader is overwhelmed by a whole stream of little-known events, which are not easy to understand even for an expert. We have before us some raw material, preparatory developments that belong in drafts rather than in the final text of the monograph.

In our opinion, chronological excursions could be much shorter, which, by the way, would give them additional harmony and make the author's judgments more reliable. It might be better to include them in the app. Such a reduction would allow us to expand the actual content of the study. The extension is

(5) It has already been noted that in the fourth century other states caught up with Athens, nullifying its former military and administrative advantage: Davies J.K. The Fourth Century Crisis: What Crisis? // Die athenische Demokratie... S. 35.

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it could go in two directions. First, by describing in more detail the general political context of that time in the Hellenic world. This context is often given in dotted lines, almost in passing. As a result, one gets the false impression that the interests of all the "great powers" of the fourth century were concentrated almost exclusively on Amphipolis and Chersonesos. Secondly, it would be possible to significantly deepen the conclusions of the work. In their current form, they look quite banal. It was worth thinking, for example, about other reasons for Athens ' failures, in addition to the presence of numerous competitors. So, it is obvious that during the period under review, the Athenians excessively dispersed their own forces, tried to catch up literally everywhere, no longer having the necessary forces for this and not taking into account the complicated situation. We must also take into account the negative consequences of too frequent changes of command. At least ten Athenian strategists conducted military operations in the Northern Aegis in different periods of the 360s. They were constantly under the threat of early removal, trial, and even execution (which happened more than once in practice), operated in conditions of acute shortage of both human strength and financial resources; at the same time, the requirements for them were exorbitant, and the demos did not forgive the slightest mistake(6). It seems that it is not by chance that the only Athenian general who managed to maintain a more or less stable presence in the region for several years, Timothy, achieved the greatest success.

These and many other questions could be raised and considered with full justification by the author based on the material of the analyzed events. Unfortunately, J. Heskel chose to take a different path, opening up her research "kitchen" to the reader, which, in general, is not so interesting for him to be in. Nevertheless, the beginning has been made, and an important and almost unexplored topic has become an object of study. Let us hope that the following works by J. Heskel herself and other authors will bring more clarity about the essence of the events under consideration and their place in Greek history.

(6) It is from the beginning of the 360's that the position of strategists in Athenian political life has been deteriorating: Mosse С. La classe politique b Athenes au iv(61)"(0) siecle // Die athenische Demokratie... S. 72.

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