The problems of diplomatic relations between the Greek poleis and the Achaemenid Persian empire in the late sixth and mid - fourth centuries BC attract the attention of researchers only sporadically, often in connection with the study of the most important events in the political history of classical Greece. 1 Since the middle of the 20th century, the most lively discussion in the literature has unfolded over the Callian Peace, concluded between Athens and Persia in 449 BC. According to I. E. Surikov, works on the Callian Peace appeared with an average frequency of once every two years. 2 The controversial issues of authenticity of this agreement, its main terms, the historical situation associated with its conclusion, and the most important consequences were most thoroughly studied .3 However, with such close attention to the Callian World, other Greco-Persian treaties remain almost out of the field of view of researchers.

The above is primarily true of the Treaty of Epileicus, which falls during the intense struggle between Athens and Sparta for hegemony in Greece during the Peloponnesian War. This agreement is relatively rarely mentioned in modern Russian literature .4 In the works of foreign scientists, it is studied, as a rule, only in comparison with the Callian world, 5 although even R. von Skala in 1898 and G. Bengston in 1962 placed information about it in the well-known publications "Die Staatsvertrage des Altertums" 6. Only W. Thompson and A. Blamayr in small articles specifically consider this is agreement 7 .

The Epilikov Peace Treaty is also superficially covered in the sources. Thucydides makes no mention of it in his work on the history of the Peloponnesian War8, and that is all

1 Specifically on Greek-Persian relations, see Lonis R. Les usages de la guerre entre grecs et barbares. De guerre mediques au milieu du IV sifecle av. J.C. P., 1969; Hegyi D. Die Formen und Auswirkungen der griechisch-persischen Beziehungen im 5. Jahrhundert v.u.Z. // Kultur und Fortschritt in der Blutezeit der griechischer Polis. В., 1985. S.109-118.

2 See Surikov I. E. Rec.: Badian E. From Plataea to Potidea: Studies in the History and Historiography of the Pentakontaetia. Baltimore-London, 1993 / / VDI. 1996. N 3. P. 198.

3 See Strogetsky V. M. Problema Kallieva mira i ego znachenie dlya evolyutsii Athinskogo morskogo soyuza [The problem of the Kallian World and its significance for the evolution of the Athenian Maritime Union]. VDI. 1991. N 2.pp. 158-168. The article also provides an overview of various points of view.

4 The only exception is a brief mention of this agreement in the article by V. M. Strogetsky (Uk. soch. p. 167).

5 Wade-Gery H.T. The Peace of Kallias // Wade-Gery H.T. Essays in Greek History. Oxf., 1958. P. 201 ff.; Stockton D. The Peace of Callias // Historia. Bd VIII. 1959. P. 61 ff.; Andrewes A. Thucydides and the Persians // Historia. 1961. Bd X. Ht 1. P. 3; Mattingly H.B. The Peace of Kallias // Historia. 1965. Bd XIV. Ht 3. P. 273 ff.; Murison C.L. The Peace of Callias: its Historical Context // Phoenix. 1971. V. XXV. N 1. P. 25 f.; Meiggs R. The Athenian Empire. L., 1972. P. 134 f.; Holladay A.J. The Detente of Kallias? // Historia. 1986. Bd XXXV. Ht 4. P. 505 f.; Badian Е. The Peace of Callias // JHS. 1987. CVII. P. 26 ff.

6 Scala R. von. Die Staatsvertrage des Altertums. Bd I. Lpz, 1898. N 80; Bengtson Н. Die Vertrage der griechisch-romischen Welt von 700 bis 338 v. Chr. Berlin - Miinchen, 1962. N 183.

7 Thompson W.E. The Athenian Treaties with Haliai and Dareios the Bastard // Klio. 1971. LIII. P. 119-124; Blamire A. Epilycus' Negotiation with Persia // Phoenix. 1975. XXIX. N 1. P. 21-26.

8 There are several points of view in the literature that explain Thucydides ' silence. In our opinion, Thucydides could not have obtained reliable information about the Epilician peace Treaty, since he was in exile from 424 BC and probably had limited access to some Athenian documents.

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Andocides speaks of this treaty in his speech "On peace with the Lacedaemonians", dated 392 BC. He relates that his uncle Epilicus, the son of Thysander, was sent as an ambassador to Persia... and we agreed to be friends forever. This was negotiated as ambassador by Epilicus, the son of Thysander, our mother's brother. After that, we succumbed to the persuasions of Amorgus, the king's slave and exile, disregarded the power of the king as worthless, and preferred friendship with Amorgus, thinking that it was more profitable. For this, the tsar, angry with us, became an ally of the Lacedaemonians and gave them five thousand talents to wage war until they crushed our power "(Andoc. III. 29, trans.by E. D. Frolov).

Information about the life of the Epilic is very scarce. It is known that he came from the noble Athenian family of Filaides (Marcell. Vit. Thuc. 3). Epilycus 'sister married Pericles' son Xanthippus, who died young during a plague epidemic in Athens around 429 BC (Plut. Per. 36). Epilicus himself, according to Andocides, was killed in Sicily, probably during the Sicilian expedition of the Athenians 415-413 BC, leaving behind two young daughters (Andoc. I.117). These facts show that he belonged to the same generation as the sons of Pericles 9, and most likely the peak of his active political activity occurs in the 420s BC. This is confirmed by the epigraph. In an Athenian inscription dated 424/3 BC, Epilicus is named secretary of the Council in the first Prytania (IG. I (2). 324.27) 10 .

Andocides does not mention the name of the Persian king with whom Epilicus negotiated peace. But from the context of the speech fragment, it is clear that it refers to the same monarch with whom the Athenians later soured relations by supporting the rebel Amorgos and who then made an alliance with the Spartans and provided them with financial assistance in the fight against Athens. All these events are well known from the work of Thucydides and show that Andocides is referring to Darius II, who ascended the throne in late 424-early 423 BC. e. Thucydides mentions the rebellion of Amorgus four times in the eighth book (VIII. 5. 5; 19. 1; 28. 2-5; 54. 3) and he gives irrefutable evidence that Amorgus, the illegitimate son of the satrap Sardis Pissufnus, rebelled in Caria against Darius II around 412 BC and enjoyed the military support of Athens (VIII. 28. 3; 54. 3). Thus, the events that took place after the conclusion of the peace treaty and described by Andokides correspond to what is known about them from the text of Thucydides. We can probably agree with the causal link shown by the speaker: the support of Athens for the rebellious Amorgos served as a sufficient reason for the Persian king to violate the peace treaty concluded earlier.

Meanwhile, Theopompus, in his History of Philip, mentions a treaty concluded by the Athenians together with other Greeks with a certain Persian king Darius (Theop. FGrHist. 115. F. 153). In modern literature, this fragment of Theopompus has caused an ambiguous interpretation. The fact is that Theopompus, following the established tradition of his time, hastened to declare the treaty mentioned by him a falsification, thereby leading researchers to believe that the original text of the historian implies the peace of Callia (concluded, as is known, not with Darius, but with King Artaxerxes I) 11 . Similar discrepancy

9 According to J. Hofstetter, Epilicus was born around 454 BC (Hofstetter J. Die Griechen in Persien: Prosopographie der Griechen im Persischen Reich vor Alexander. В., 1978. S. 59. N 101). On Epilik, see also Kirchner J. Epilykos. N 2 // RE. Bd VI. Hibd. 11. 1906. Sp. 158; idem. Prosopographia Attica. Berolini, 1901. N 4925 (hereinafter-PA). In the latest work of I. Kirchner, see also the genealogical tree of the Athenian family to which Andokides belonged (N 828).

10 The inscription is dated by the Archon Isarch; in stk. 27 restored See Wade-Gery. Op. cit. P. 209.

11 In the next two excerpts from the edition of F. Jacobi Theopompus opposes the authenticity of the treaty with the Barbarians on the grounds that the text of the agreement is not written in Attic letters, but in Ionian letters, which came into use in Athens only under the archon Euclid (403/2 BC) (Theop. FGrHist. 115. F. 154-155).

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This has led to a variety of opinions that are very interesting and noteworthy: from the assertion that the copyist Theon was mistaken, 12 to the suggestion that Theopompus used a later copy of the agreement, or even the text of the peace treaty of Epilikos itself, which was a renewal of the terms of the peace of Kalliev .13 In connection with this assumption, it was also suggested that the stele with the original text of the Kallian world by the time of Theopompus (mid-IV century BC) for some reason did not survive. But due to the really difficult interpretation of the Chios historian's fragment, each of the existing opinions of researchers cannot be considered completely excluded.

As evidence of the historicity of the agreement, researchers also draw on the Athenian decree granting honors to a certain Heraclides-declaring him a proxenus and Euergetes of polis, granting him a land plot of a house in Athens and Atelia "like other Proxenes" (IG. I (2). 8 = IG. I (3). 227 = ML. 70). The document mentions Heraclides ' assistance in drafting the treaty to the ambassadors who returned from the Persian king to Athens .14 Historiography has established the view that the Athenian decree in honor of Heraclides is a copy made in the beginning of the IV century BC of the decree adopted in the last third of the V century BC. According to the conclusion of M. Walbank, made by him after studying an additional fragment of the inscription (IG. I (2). 65), the Athenian decree pays tribute to Praise be to Heraclides, a native of the city of Clazomene in Asia Minor , a well-known political figure in Athens in the late fifth and early fourth centuries B.C. 15 He may have been connected with the embassy of Epilicus to Persia. However, the existing data on the life of Heraclides of Clazomenes do not allow us to clarify the date of the decree granting him the above-mentioned honors .16

Plato, as well as the later authors Aelianus and Athenaeus, name him among the foreigners (Xenos) Cyzicenes Apollodorus and Andros Phanophenes, who, thanks to their personal qualities, repeatedly became strategists and held other top positions in Athens (Plat. Ion. 544 c; Aelian. V. H. XIV. 5; Athen. XI. 506 a). Plato shows from their examples that the Athenians often chose Xen as their strategist (Ion. 544c). These reports suggest that Heraclides the Clazomenean began his political activities in Athens as a foreigner, and then, probably, towards the end of the fifth century BC, received civil rights. The terminus ante quern of granting him citizenship is the reform of payment carried out by him

12 See Blamire. Op. cit. P. 21. W. Connor, based on a palaeographic analysis, argues against the possibility of a copyist distorting the meaning of the fragment of Theopompus, which mentions the treaty with Darius (Connor W. R. Theopompus and Fourth Century Athens. Cambr. (Mass.), 1968. P. 78-89).

13 E. Badian, for example, adheres to this point of view (The Peace of Callias. p.28). But even G. B. Mattingly assumed that Theopompus saw a stele with the text of the peace treaty of Epilikov, carved in stone in Ionian letters. According to the researcher, it was not Callius, the son of Hyponicus, who was involved in the conclusion of this agreement, but Callius, the son of Calliades , a member of the Council of 424/423 BC. This was the reason for some confusion in the report of the Chian historian (Mattingly. The Peace of Kallias. P. 275).

14 The inscription appears in a ruined form, but the phrases and (stkk. 14- 16). The generally accepted scientific interpretation of the destroyed places of the inscription is based on the restoration of W. Kohler (Kohler U. Herakleides der Klazomenier // Hermes. 1892. XXVII. S. 68 ff.). The first publisher of the inscription, P. Foucart, believed that the decree mentions Heraclides, a native of Byzantium, and by "treaties" is meant the world of Antalkids (Foucart R. / / VSN. 1888. p. 163-169). Fucar's point of view was accepted by D. Stockton and K. Meister, and D. Stockton expressed the opinion that the" king " in the inscription is not called the Persian king, but the Thracian one-Sevt or Medok (Stockton. Op. cit. P. 74-79; Meister K.L. Die Ungeschichtlichkeit des Kalliasfriedens und deren historischens Folgen. Wiesbaden, 1982. S. 79).

15 Walhank M.B. Herakleides of Klazomenai: A New Join at the Epigraphical Museum // ZPE. 1983. LI. P. 183 f. The researcher restored an ethnicon next to the name that could not be read in the main part of the document: W. Koehler suggested that the inscription refers to Heraclides from Clazomenes (see note 14).

16 According to I. Kirchner, Heraclides received Proxenia around 423 BC, and Athenian citizenship - "after the archonship of Euclid", i.e. 404/3 BC (post Euclidem archonten civitate Attica donatur) (PA. N 6489).

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for visiting the ecclesia-increase its size from one to two obols. Aristotle attributes this reform to the period after the restoration of democracy in Athens in 403 BC (Ath. Pol. 41. 3).

When and how often Heraclides was elected Athenian strategist, it is difficult to say. The preserved information about the Athenian strategists of the last third of the fifth and beginning of the fourth century BC does not say anything about Clazomenes. U. Karstedt suggests that Heraclides was still in the Persian service at the time of the conclusion of the peace treaty of Epilikovo 17 . This opinion, however, is difficult to agree with. Based on the content of the decree, it seems likely that he was already in Athens advising the ambassadors who returned from the Persian king with a draft peace treaty. It is possible that it was the knowledge of Persian traditions that he acquired during his stay in Clazomenes that gave special value to his advice .18 An echo of Heraclides ' connection with Persia is the nickname "king"mentioned by Aristotle

A more accurate dating of the decree in honor of Heraclides is possible by studying the prosopography of the Athenian officials mentioned in it. For the first time, such a study was undertaken by G. Wade-Gehry. He rightly pointed out that the Athenian inscription of 424/3 BC, naming Epilicus as secretary of the Council in the first Prytania, mentions a certain Thucydides as treasurer (IG. I (2). 324. 25-7). The researcher suggested that this person could be Thucydides, who, judging by the text of the decree, amended the decree on awarding honors to Heraclides of Clazomenes (IG. I (3). 227. 14) 19 . In addition, in some Athenian decrees of the late 420s BC (including the Athenian psephism on union with the Galii) A Neoclide is mentioned as Secretary of the Council (IG. I (2). 25, 2-3; 87; 145, 5-6); According to Wade-Gehry, he was acting as an epistat at the time of the adoption of the decree in honor of Heraclides (IG. I (3). 227. 7). These parallels are sufficient to show that to establish that all the mentioned documents belong to the same time - to the end of the 420s BC. 20 Therefore, the term in the decree in honor of Heraclides can be referred to specifically as the Epilician peace Treaty. But it is hardly possible, following G. Wade-Gehry, to determine the exact year of the decree's adoption, and even more so to judge on this basis the time of Epilicus ' trip to Persia as an ambassador .21

However, most historians, based mainly on this reconstruction of Wade-Gehry, date the peace treaty of Epilycus to the year of the accession of Darius II - 424/3 BC. 22 A. Raubicek has a different opinion, who suggests that the Treaty of Epilycus should be considered as the year of Darius II's accession to the throne.

17 Kahrstedt U. Herakleides //RE. Bd VIII. Hibd 15. 1912. Sp. 458.

18 For the origin of Heraclides, see Rung E. V. K istokam sovremennykh mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy (Na primere greko-persiskikh otnosheniy V-IV vv. B.C.) [To the origins of modern International relations (On the example of Greek-Persian relations of the V-IV centuries BC)]. Dokl. konf. Moscow, 1996, p. 37.

19 Wade-Gery. Op. cit. P. 209; Blamire. Op. cit. P. 25; Hegyi D. Athen und die Achameniden in der zweiten Halfte des 5 Jahrhunderts v. u. Z // Oikumene. 1983. IV. S. 58.

20 However, this interpretation leaves some questions unresolved. One of them was pointed out by G. B. Mattingly. Thus, the phrase in the decree in honor of Heraclides is a formula for awarding a land plot, which became widespread only in the IV century BC. According to the researcher, in the only inscription of the end of the V century BC (410 BC), containing a mention of awarding a land plot, a different wording is given (Mattingly NV Athens and Persia: Two Key Documents / / Philologus. 1975. Bd CXIX. Ht 1. P. 48-51).

21 Wade-Gehry's reconstruction was taken as a basis in their studies of the Epilikov Peace Treaty by A. Blamire and D. Hedi (Blamire. Op. cit. p. 24-25; Hegyi. Athen... S. 57). W. Thompson, while supporting Wade-Gehry's view that the Athenian decree on union with the Galii belongs to the same year as the decree in honor of Heraclides, expressed doubts about the traditional date of the decree - 424/3 BC (Op. cit. p.119-123).

22 Schaefer Н. Tissaphernes // RE. Suppl. IV. 1940. Sp. 1581; Olmstead A.T. The History of the Persian Empire (Achaemenid Period). Chicago, 1948. P. 357; Wade-Gery. Op. cit. P. 207-211; Andrewes. Op. cit. P. 3; Mattingly. The Peace of Kallias. P. 273 ff.; Will Е. Le monde grec et l'Orient. Paris - Nancy, 1972. P. 363; Meiggs. Op. cit. P. 134 f.; Eddy S.K. The Cold War between Athens and Persia ca 44812 B.C. // CIPh. LXVIII. N 3. 1973. P. 257; Hofstetter. Op. cit. S. 59. N 101; Zahrnt М. Hellas unter Persischen Druck? // AKG. 1983. Bd LXV. Ht 2. P. 287;

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terminus ante quern Epilicus ' travels to Persia 415 BC - the year of the beginning of the Sicilian expedition of the Athenians 23. A. Blamair speaks in favor of 422/1 BC as the time of the final conclusion of the treaty. He believes that the accession of Darius II, the trip of Epilicus to Susa, the negotiations themselves, the return of Epilicus to Athens, and finally the discussion of the treaty in the Council and its ratification by the ecclesia cannot fit into the single year 424/3 BC. Thompson considers it unlikely that the Athenians could have negotiated with the newly ascended Darius in a hurry; even so, Darius II should have sought to secure the best possible terms for himself and agreed to peace only when the peace of Nicaea in 421 BC between Athens and Sparta ended the war in Greece itself. He also gave free rein to the Athenians in the East. On this basis, the researcher places the treaty between Athens and Persia in the range 424-418 BC. 25 In my opinion, it makes sense to agree with A. Blamire is that the negotiations lasted several years, and accept his opinion: 424/3 BC should be considered the terminus post quern of the beginning of diplomatic negotiations with Persia. It is well known how long the stay of Greek ambassadors in Persia might have been on occasion .26

Thucydides does not report any Athenian embassy to Darius II. Nevertheless, he tells about events that could have directly preceded the conclusion of the Epilikov peace treaty. According to the historian, back in the winter of 425/4 BC, the Athenian strategist Aristides, son of Archippus, sent to collect tribute to the allies, captured a certain Persian Artaphernes in the city of Aion on the Strymon River, who was heading from the Persian king to Sparta. He sent Artaphernes to Athens, where the royal letters were translated and read. In particular, they spoke about the attitude of the Persian king to the embassies from Sparta and suggested that the Spartans together with Artaphernes send their ambassadors to Persia. Alarmed by the news, the Athenians themselves sent an embassy to Ephesus in the spring of 424 BC, together with Artaphernes on the Trier, apparently intending to travel from there to the court of the Persian king. At Ephesus, however, the news of the death of Artaxerxes I reached them, and the Athenian envoys returned (Thuc. IV. 50. 1-3).

On the eve of negotiations with the new king Darius II, the Athenians had to take into account the dynastic struggle in Persia, as a result of which two rulers were replaced on the Persian throne almost within a year: Xerxes II, who ruled for only two months, and Sekudian, who was killed by Ox after seven months of reign. When he ascended the throne, he assumed the throne name Darius (Diod. XII. 64. 1; 71. 1; Ktesias, fr. 47- 49) 27 .

Walser G. Hellas und Iran. Studien zu den griechisch-persischen Beziehungen vor Alexander. Darmstadt, 1984. S. 67; Holladay. Op. cit. P. 505.

23 Raiihitchek A. E. The Treaties between Persia nad Athens / / GRBS. 1964. V. P. 156 f.; For objections, see Blamire. Op. cit. P. 25. Not. 22.

24 Blamire. Op. cit. P. 25.

25 Thompson. Op. cit. P. 123 f.

26 A typical situation related to the duration of the Athenian mission to Persia was described by Aristophanes in his comedy Acharnians, when he timed the departure of the embassy from Athens to the year of the Archon Euthymenos-437 BC.

The messengers returned from the king.

You sent us to the great king,

In order to pay us 2 drachmas per diem each,

In the archonship of Euthymenos (Ar. Ach. 61 ff., translated by V. N. Yarkho).

According to Aristophanes, the envoys spent a total of twelve years in Persia, of which they spent four years traveling only as far as Susa, and eight months seeking the king's reception. The ambassadors were instructed to bring Persian gold to Athens (Ach. 103 ff.), but in the end, the mission was unsuccessful. Judging by the ironic story of Aristophanes, the king refused the Athenians ' request.

27 For the political situation in Persia before and during the first years of the reign of Darius II, see Olmsfead. Op. cit. p. 356; Lewis O. M. Sparta and Persia. Leiden, 1977. P. 79-81; Cook J.M. The Persian Empire. L? 1983. P. 129; Briant P. Histoire de l'Empire perse. De Cyrus a Alexandre. P., 1996. P. 608 f.; Dandamaev M. A. Political history of the Achaemenid Empire. p. 195.

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Unfortunately, it remains unclear whether the Athenians were waiting for the political situation in Persia to stabilize, or whether they sent an embassy with instructions to negotiate with any successor of Artaxerxes I. In any case, soon after the return of their ambassadors from Ephesus, they decided to repeat the embassy, setting before him the task of concluding a peace treaty with the new Persian king. Given the official purpose of the embassy of Epilicus to Persia, it can be assumed that during the negotiations with King Darius II, the Athenian ambassadors were talking about confirming the basic conditions of the Callian peace. This view is most often found in modern literature. 28 G. Wade-Gehry suggests that the treaty may have been a verbatim renewal of the previous peace agreement between Athens and Persia (verbatim renewal) .29 The validity of this judgment will be discussed below. It should also be noted here that it was the political situation associated with the change of rulers in Persia that contributed to the fact that Athenian-Persian relations required mutual settlement.

The renewal of previously concluded peace treaties was quite common both in inter-city relations in Greece and in Greek-Persian relations of the V-IV centuries BC.The first news about the desire of the Greeks to confirm the terms of the previous treaty with Persia dates back to the history of Argos. According to Herodotus, an embassy from Argos, which arrived in Susa in the middle of the fifth century BC, sought to preserve the friendship and alliance with King Artaxerxes I, established by the Argosites with King Xerxes on the eve of the Greco-Persian wars (Herod. VII. 151). The Peace of Callia also repeated the terms of an earlier treaty, concluded around 465 BC after the Battle of Eurymedon and Cimon's military actions against the Persians .30

The widespread practice of renewing treaties is also evidenced by examples from the history of the fourth century BC. In 344/3 BC, King Artaxerxes III sent his ambassadors to Athens, wishing to preserve the friendship of his father with the Athenians (Philoch. FGrH. 328 F. 157) 31 . According to this episode, the Persian king was not completely sure of the reliability of the treaty concluded with the Greeks by his predecessor. In his letter to Alexander the Great (as narrated by Arrian) Darius III Codomanes reproached the Macedonian king for ravaging his possessions instead of sending envoys to confirm the friendship and alliance that Philip II had already concluded with King Artaxerxes III (Hagg. n. 14.2) .32

All these facts confirm the view that the Greeks and the Persian king had a mutual interest in maintaining stable relations, especially after the war ended. However, it is difficult to assume that there was a literal renewal of the conditions of the Callian world, as G. Wade-Gehry believes. The peace of Callia, which had ended the state of war between Athens and Persia, now that the Peloponnesian War was in full swing in Greece, could no longer suit Athens. It did not contain any conditions that would prevent Sparta and Persia from conducting mutual negotiations aimed at concluding an anti-Athenian alliance during the Archidamic War (431-421 BC) .33 About attempts

28 Schaefer. Tissaphernes. Sp. 1581; Wade-Gery Op. cit. P. 211; Andrewes. Op. cit. P. 5; Will. Op. cit. P. 363; Eddy. Op. cit. P. 257; Hofstetter. Op. cit. S. 59. N 101; Badian. The Peace of Callias. P. 27.

29 Wade-Gery. Op. cit. P. 211.

30 For this point of view, see Badian. From Plataea to Potidea... P. 1-72.

31 This fragment of Philochorus probably refers to the desire of Artaxerxes III Ox to secure the renewal of the terms of the Peace of Antalkida; the text of the agreement contained, judging from the inscriptions, a reference to the "friendship" that the Persian king, the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians, and other Hellenes swore (see, for example, the Athenian decree of alliance with Chios, dated the period after 386 BC, - Ditt. Syll (2). 75. 5- 7).

32 This episode is discussed in detail, in particular in: Bloedow E. F. Diplomatic Negotiations between Darius and Alexander: Historical Implications of the First Phase at Marathus in Phoenicia in 333/332 B.C. / / AHB. 1995. IX. N 3-4. P. 93-110.

33 Blamire. Op. cit. P. 22.

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Thucydides ' data clearly shows that such negotiations can be conducted. As early as the summer of 430 BC, the Spartans sent envoys to Susa, Aneristus, Nicholas, and Stratodemus, to encourage the Persian king to help the Peloponnesians with money and participation in the war. The ambassadors were to proceed through Thrace to the Hellespont and persuade the Daskilian satrap Pharnaces, son of Pharnabazus, to conduct them into the interior of Asia to the king (Thuc. II, 67. 1-4; cf. Herod. VII. 137). Together with the representatives of Sparta, the ambassadors of the Spartan allies also intended to travel to Persia: Aristaeus, a Corinthian, and Timagoras, a Tegean. And although this embassy ended in failure (the arrest and execution of the ambassadors in Athens), the Spartans did not stop trying to establish diplomatic contacts with Persia: This conclusion can be drawn from the contents of the letter of Artaxerxes I to the Spartans, described by Thucydides (IV. 50. 2). The already mentioned trip of Artaphernes to Sparta may indicate the interest of the Persian king in closer relations with the opponents of Athens.

Thus, the Athenians could be afraid of a conflict with the Persians in unfavorable political conditions .34 Their state was depleted after the plague. Since the beginning of the war, the territory of Attica was periodically devastated by Spartan troops under the leadership of King Archidamus. In 424 BC, the Boeotians defeated the Athenians at Delia (Thuc. IV. 89-96). At the same time, the Spartan general Brasidus threatened the Athenian possessions in Thrace (Thuc. IV. 78), and two years later defeated the Athenian forces at Amphipolis (Thuc. V. 16). It was in this situation that Athens could have decided to equip an embassy in Susa. Therefore, the peace treaty of Epilicia was supposed to reflect the changed realities of the international situation in the Eastern Mediterranean since 449 BC.

It was also highly advantageous for Darius II to secure peace with Athens .35 Having removed his predecessor Secudianus and assumed the throne, Darius found himself facing a difficult internal political situation. For a number of years he was forced to fight rebels in the satrapies: with his own brother Arsitus, with Artifius, the son of Megabyzus, and finally with the satrap Sardissufnus 36 . Artiphius, having won two battles, was only defeated in the third by the forces of the royal general Artaserus, which forced him to end his resistance by concluding an agreement with Darius (Ktesias, fr. 50). Following this, Pissuthnus, son of Hystaspes, raised a revolt against the king, 37 enlisting the support of Hellenic mercenaries under the command of the Athenian Lycon .38 The threat posed by Pissufn was so great that

34 Hegyi. Athen... S. 58.

35 Lewis. Op. cit. P. 77.

36 On Pissufna, see also Balcer J. M. A Prosopographical Study of the Ancient Persians Royal and Noble ca. 550-450 B.C. Lewison, 1993. P. 105. N 80; Rung E. V. Ancient historians on the origin and kinship relations of Tissaphernes // Antiquity: Events and Researchers. Kazan, 1999, pp. 62-63.

37 Some scholars attribute the revolt of Pissufnus to the first years of the reign of Darius II-421 or 420 BC (Beloch K. J. Griechische Geschichte. Bd II. Abt. 1. B.-Lpz, 1927. S. 377; Schaefer. Tissaphernes. Sp. 1580; idem. Pissuthnes // RE. Hibd. 40. 1950. Sp. 1808; Wade-Gery. Op. cit. P. 222; Westlake H.D. Athens and Amorges // Phoenix. 1977. V. 31. N 3. P. 321; Lewis. Op. cit. P. 80-81). Other researchers date this event to a later date, trying to link it to the Amorgian revolt in Cary (Olmstead. Op. cit. p. 358 p.; Eddy. Op. cit. P. 257). However, according to S. Ruzicka, Pissufn rebelled soon after the beginning of the reign of Darius, and Amorgus then continued the rebellion of his father (Ruzicka S. Politics of a Persian Dynasty. Norman -London, 1992. P. 9- 10). In 413 BC, Tissaphernes, who had received the satrapy of Sardis (Ktesias, fr. 52) for his part in suppressing the rebellion of Pissufnus, had a royal order to bring Amorgus alive or kill him (Thuc. V. 5. 5).

38 According to some scholars, Pissufnus enjoyed the support of Athens. As a confirmation of this, the fact of the Athenian origin of Lycon is given. For example, S. K. Eddy sees the Hellenes led by Lycon as an Athenian contingent, and Lycon himself as an Athenian strategist who responded to Amorgus ' appeal for help to Athens (Eddy. Op. cit. P. 257). Eddy's assumption is not confirmed in the sources (for the Athenian origin of Lycon, see Andrewes. Op. cit. P. 4. Not. 10; Westtlake. Op. cit. P. 321. Not. 8). In addition, Lycon's actions were more typical for a mercenary than for an Athenian strategist. He, according to Ctesias, went over to the side of the opponents of Pissufn and

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the Persian king sent three of his generals against this satrap: Tissaphernes, Spifridates, and Parmis (Ktesias, fr. 52). It is possible that military operations during these events took place near the cities of Asia Minor, which were part of the Athenian Maritime Union. Therefore, Darius II should have tried to avoid a conflict with Athens by using the treaty. There have already been isolated incidents that show that even after the Peace of Callias, relations between the Athenians and the Persians were far from stable. An episode that occurred in 430 BC and was associated with the capture of Colophon (an Ionian city) by the Persian governor Itaman, who had been regularly contributing phoros to the Athenian union treasury for several decades (Thuc. III. 34. I) 39 . Ways to settle the Athenian-Persian relations reveal the main conditions of the Peace Treaty Epilogue set forth by Andokides.

According to the speaker, the Athenians with the Great King "made a treaty and established friendship for all time"

In classical Greece, the term usually referred to a peace treaty. It comes from the verb in its original meaning - "to make a libation", "to offer a sacrifice". As is well known, the process of concluding contracts since ancient times was religious in nature and was a kind of ritual, when taking oaths was accompanied by sacrifices. M. Amit and E. Levy rightly believe that in the sources it is most often used to refer to a contract that stopped military operations between the parties for a certain period40 . On the other hand, the term in the period under review also served as the equivalent of the one most often used in interstate agreements in Greece in the IV century BC, especially in connection with the development of the concept of "common peace" As Thucydides defines the five-year peace between Athens and Sparta in 453. the thirty-year peace between Sparta and Argos 451 BC (V. 14. 4), the thirty-year peace between Athens and Sparta 446 BC (I. 115. 1), the fifty-year peace of Nicaea 421 BC (V. 18. 1) The interchangeability of the two terms is also reflected in Andokid's vocabulary. In the same speech "On peace with the Lacedaemonians", in which he mentions the embassy of Epilicus and the treaty with the Persian king, the Athenian orator uses both terms when describing the five-year peace between Athens and Sparta (Andoc. III. 3) 42 . At the same time, Andokides attempts to somehow distinguish the concepts of "peace treaty" and "peace" itself by contrasting one with the other: "After all, peace and a peace treaty are by no means the same thing; peace is concluded on equal terms by those who have come to an agreement on the subject of the dispute; a peace treaty is dictated after the victory in the war winners to the vanquished" (Andoc. III. 11, translated by E. D. Frolov). However, this juxtaposition is directly linked to the specific historical situation in which the treaty of 404 BC was concluded, which fixed the terms of the capitulation of Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War (Andoc. I.80).

The phrase used by Andokides to describe the Peace Treaty of Epilikos was also a very stable phrase in Greek international legal terminology .43 Particularly noteworthy is the proclamation

He received cities and lands in Asia for his "betrayal" (Ktesias, fr. 52).

39 See, for example: Descat R. Colophon et la pax d'epilykos / / Erol Atalay Memorial / Ed. by N. Malay. Izmir, 1990. P. 33-39.

40 Amit M. Le traite de Chalcedoine entre Phamabaze et les strategies atheniens / / AC. 1973. XLI1. P. 442; Levy E. Les trois traites entre Sparte et le Roi // BCH. 1983. CVII. N 1. P. 228-229.

41 For more information about this concept, see: Payrau S. EIPHNIKA. Considerations sur l'echec de quelques tentatives panhellenique au IVe siecle avant Jesus-Christ // REA. 1971. LXXIII. N 1. P. 24-79.

42 This term refers to the thirty-year peace between Athens and Sparta and the Peace of Nicaea (Andoc. III. 6. 8), i.e. those contracts that Thucydides refers to as

43 For more information, see Kashcheev V. I. Hellenistic World and Rome: war, Peace and Diplomacy in 220-146 BC

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in the treaty of friendship "for all eternity", this gave new features to the agreement between the Athenians and Darius II, distinguishing it from the Peace of Callia in 449 BC, so A. Blamayr thinks .44 E. Badian 45 believes otherwise: there is no reason to doubt that the "friendship" between the Persian king and Athens was a feature of the original conditions agreed upon by Callius. However, Badian's point of view is not convincing enough. It is difficult to imagine that friendship "for all eternity" was possible in conditions when the peace treaty was concluded with the aim of ending hostilities: the peace of Callia, according to Diodorus, contained an article on the withdrawal of Athenian troops from Cyprus (Diod. XII. 4. 5.). In addition, Badian seems to be wrong in thinking that the official name of the Kallian world has been preserved. Aristodemus and Sudas refer to the treaty of 449 BC as a term, but they do not say anything about the establishment of friendship between the Persian king Artaxerxes I and Athens. "46 It is appropriate to assume that the point of friendship for all eternity was introduced in the text of the new agreement only during the negotiations of Epilic. If both sides fulfilled this point, the Athenian-Persian relations were to be significantly strengthened .47

Some researchers see in the Epilic peace Treaty all the elements of the alliance of Athens and Persia: This opinion is shared by M. Amit, W. Thompson and D. Lewis 48 . It should be noted, however, that in this passage Andokides does not have the defining term used in Greece to denote treaties of alliance. For example, one of the first alliance agreements in Greek history, the treaty between Elida and Herea in the mid - sixth century BC, preserved in the inscription, proclaimed a "union for one hundred years" Syll (3). 9 = ML. 17.2). Mention of the conclusion of the Symmachus and the taking of the oath is found in the treaties of Athens with Regius and the Leontines of 433/2 BC (IG. I (2). 51-52). In narrative sources, in particular in Thucydides, union treaties are most often also called symmachia (see Thuc. I 102. 4; V. 23: 1). As is well known, simmachia were typically military agreements concluded by states to fight a common enemy. The Spartans ' treaties with the satrap Tissaphernes and the Persian king Darius II in 412-411 BC were directed against Athens (Thuc. VIII. 18. 1-3; 37. 1-5; 58. 1-7). This is why the first treaty concluded by the Spartan Chalcidaeus at Miletus in the autumn of 412 BC, Thucydides rightly calls (VIII. 18.1). However, the available data on the Epilician Peace Treaty do not allow us to conclude that it was generally directed against Sparta; although some articles of it may have been anti-Spartan in nature.

The terms of the treaty mentioned by Andocides in his account of the peace Treaty of Epilicia were probably derived by the speaker from the text of the agreement that has not survived to our time. In particular, the speaker may have used some documents from the family archive in his speech. In the same speech, "On Peace with the Lacedaemonians", he tells about the conclusion of a thirty-year peace between Athens and Sparta in 446 BC, which was negotiated by his grandfather Andocides (Andoc. III. 6) as part of ten autocratic ambassadors. which was attended by his relatives. It should also be noted:

Moscow, 1993, p. 214 pp. Similarly, the second treaty between Sparta and Darius II of Persia, concluded in the autumn of 412 BC, proclaims (Thuc. VIII. 37. 1).

44 Blamire. Op. cit. P. 22. Not. 7.

45 Badian. The peace of Callias. P. 26: "we certainly have no good reason to believe Andocides, but neither is there any good reason to doubt that 'friendship' was a feature of the original terms negotiated by Callias".

46 Cf., for example: Aristodem. FGrHist. 104. F. 1. 13. 2: Diodorus calls the Callian world (Diod. XII. 4. 5).

47 Specifically considered the use of the word D. Constant (Konstan D. Greek Friendship / / AJPh. 1996. CXVII. N 1. P. 71-94), but did not touch on the problems of interstate relations.

48 Amit М. Peace Treaty between Sparta and Persia // RSA. 1974. IV. P. 60; Thompson. Op. cit. P. 124; Lewis. Op. cit. P. 77.

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The prevailing view in historiography that Andocides was very careless about the presentation of historical facts in his speeches [49] cannot be a strong argument against the authenticity of his account of the Epilician Treaty. Even if he was poorly informed about the general development of events in Hellas, the speaker could have reliable information about the history of his family, especially since Andokides himself was obviously a witness to the conclusion of this agreement.

Other terms of the peace treaty of Epilikos, which define in more detail the principles on which relations between Athens and Persia were built, are not known to us50. Probably, the articles stating that the Asian Greek cities were autonomous remained valid, and the Persians confirmed their obligations not to approach the coast of Asia Minor and not to enter their warships into the Aegean Sea beyond the Helidon Islands and Phaselida in Pamphylia and the Kyanean rocks at the entrance to the Bosporus .51 In turn, the Athenians pledged not to march on the lands subject to the Persian king. However, in comparison with the Kallium Peace, some additional conditions in the new agreement are not excluded, which were determined by its specifics as a treaty of friendship. Perhaps the Athenians demanded that the Persian king not enter into negotiations and not provide assistance to Sparta, in return for which they pledged not to support the rebels against him. The Spartans also pledged themselves not to help the rebellious satraps in their treaty of alliance with the Persian king Darius II, concluded at Miletus in the autumn of 412 BC (Thuc. VIII. 18. 3).

Now let's consider the situation related to the denunciation of the Epilikov Peace Treaty. This is also stated by Andokides, who cites the main reason why the Persian king turned against Athens, the military support of the Athenians for the rebel Amorgos. As already mentioned, this opinion should be recognized as correct. In addition to Andokides, Thucydides also attests to the existence of a formal agreement between the Athenians and Amorgos. It shows that in 412 BC the Athenian strategos Phrynichus, who was entrusted with the care of Amorgus ' safety, was dismissed from office on the charge that he had betrayed Ias to the enemy and deceived Amorgus (Thuc. VIII. 54. 3). There is no doubt that the strategist Phrynichus, when he provided armed assistance to Amorgus, was acting on behalf of the Athenian government. 52

The Athenians ' decision to give direct support to Amorgus was intertwined by a variety of factors. In particular, after the Peace of Nicaea in 421 BC and up to the Sicilian expedition, the Athenians were not involved in any large-scale hostilities and could have a very real opportunity to reconsider their policy towards Persia.

49 See, for example: Albini U. Andocide. De Pace. Firenze, 1964. P. 17. K. Murison, G. Westlake and D. Kagan also show a skeptical attitude to the information of Andokid (Murison. Op. cit. p. 24; Westlake. Op. cit. p. 325-326; Kagan D. The Fall of the Athenian Empire. N.Y., 1987. P. 30-31). However, if Murizon denies the historicity of the peace treaty of Epilikov at all, then Westlake notes that some of the facts recorded by Andokid seem quite authentic. These include the Treaty of Epiliki, the Athenian cooperation with Amorgos, the Persian alliance with Sparta, the payment of Persian subsidies, and their role in the defeat of Athens in the war. For Andokis specifically, see Missiou A. The Subversive Oratory of Andokides. Politics, Ideology and Decision-Making in Democratic Athens. Cambr., 1992.

50 G. B. Mattingly, proving that in 424/3 BC Athens was able to negotiate with Persia from a position of strength, refers all the restrictions imposed on Persia under the terms of the Peace of Kallias to the Peace of Kallias (The Peace of Kallias. p. 273 ff.). A. J. Holladay believes that since the peace treaty declared eternal friendship in the most general terms, it was quite inappropriate to impose restrictions on the Persian king (Op. cit. p. 506).

51 The fact that this article was preserved is shown by the peace negotiations between the Athenian ambassadors headed by Pisander and the satrap Tissaphernes in 411 BC. Alcibiades ' attempts, on behalf of Tissaphernes, to obtain from the Athenians permission for the Persian king to build ships and sail along his land wherever he wished and with any number of ships, met with strong resistance. resistance of the Athenian ambassadors (Thuc. VIII. 56. 4).

52 Wade-Gery. Op. cit. P. 223; Andrewes. Op. cit. P. 5; Westlake. Op. cit. P. 323; Holladay. Op. cit. P. 505.

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The memory of the destruction of Athens by the Persians during the Greco-Persian wars was so strong in Athenian society that, according to Isocrates, even in the fourth century BC, it was customary to pronounce a curse on anyone who offered to negotiate with the Persians before discussing any matter in the national assembly (Isocr. IV. 57).. Therefore, anti-Persian sentiment may have had a very strong influence on the decision of the Athenian national assembly to establish friendly and allied relations with the enemies of the Persian king. On the other hand, the strategic considerations of the Athenians were also not insignificant. Ionia and Caria, the main hotbeds of the Amorgian revolt, were important tax districts of the Athenian maritime power, but the irregular flow of phoros to the treasury caused serious concern to the Athenians. An indicator of this was the repeated Athenian expeditions to the coast of Asia Minor, aimed at collecting taxes. In 430 BC Melesander sailed with a squadron of six ships to the coasts of Caria and Lycia (Thuc. n. 69. 1-2; Paus. I. 29. 7; TAM. I. 44a, 45), and in 428 BC Lysicles also led an Athenian expedition to the area of Caria (Thuc. III. 19. 1-2) 53 . In March 414 BC, the Athenian strategos collected taxes at Ephesus (IG. I (2). 302 = Tod. 75). Support for Amorgus was provided by the possibility of an Athenian military presence in Asia Minor and the regular supply of Phorosus .54 In addition, the Athenians at this time were taking measures to build a number of fortifications in Asia Minor, in particular, the fortifications of Theos (Thuc. VIII. 16. 3; 20. 2) 55 . All these factors might have been sufficient reasons in the eyes of the Athenian people's assembly and officials to ignore the treaty with the king and help Amorgus. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that the policy of supporting the opponents of the Persian king in the fifth century BC was, in principle, traditional for Athens. It was especially pronounced in the relations between Athens and Egypt during the Inar revolt in 459-454 BC. 56

In turn, the Persians were objectively interested in weakening Athenian influence in Asia Minor and in fully restoring their control over the Asia Minor and island Greeks. The means to this end was to form an alliance with Sparta, which was favored by the defeat of Athens at Silicia. It was the Sicilian disaster of the Athenians that led to significant changes in the alignment of political forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. With the outbreak of the Ionian War, Athens and Persia were once again at loggerheads .57 But, unlike during the Greco-Persian wars, during the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians did not abandon attempts to end mutual confrontation by concluding peace and even an alliance.

In general, describing the Epiliki peace Treaty, it should be noted that it represented a certain stage in the development of Greek-Persian treaty relations

53 For more information about these expeditions, see Eddy. Op. cit. P. 254 f.; Keen A.G. Athenian Campaigns in Karia and Lykia during the Peloponnesian War // JHS. 1993. CXIII. P. 152-156.

54 S. Ruzicka believes that the maintenance of Athenian detachments and strategos in Western Anatolia was caused by the concern of the Athenians that while most of their fleet and many Hoplites are participating far to the west in the Sicilian expedition, anti-Athenian groups in Anatolian Greek cities may have the opportunity to overthrow local democracies and break with Athens. Amorgus, however, aware of Athenian concerns, probably proposed a mutual aid agreement in which he would help Athens eliminate any threat to its control of Anatolian cities in exchange for helping it fight the Persian satrap Tissaphernes (Ruzicka. Op. cit. p.10-11).

55 Wade-Gery. Op. cit. P. 223. Later, the fortifications of Theos were destroyed by the Spartans and Tissaphernes.

56 On Athenian-Egyptian relations in the fifth century BC, see Salmon P. La politique Egyptienne d'athenes (Vie et Ve siecles avant J.-C.). Bruxelles, 1965.

57 Scholars disagree on the extent to which the disaster of Athens in Sicily influenced the king's decision to enter the war on the side of Sparta. If D. Kagan explicitly states that the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily predetermined the king's decision to enter the war on the side of Sparta, then D. Lewis admits the possibility that the choice of the king was made not so much under the influence of the news of the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily, but in rage at the Athenian support for Amorgus and the belief that Athens in Sicily (cf. Lewis. Op. cit. p. 87. Not. 25; Kagan. Op. cit. P-31).

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In the fifth century BC, as a result of its new article on peace and friendship "in perpetuity", it helped establish closer diplomatic contacts than before between the leading state of Greece and the Persian power.

EPILYCUS' PEACE TREATY

E.V. Rung

This article is devoted to the peace treaty of Epilycus signed between Athens and Persia during the Peloponnesian War. This war had a great impact on the development of relations between Greece and Persia. On the one hand, it activated diplomatic contacts between Greek poleis and the Achaemenid Empire. On the other hand, the state of Greek theatre of operations throughout the Archidamean War (431-421 B.C.) forced the hostile poleis, Athens and Sparta, to appeal for help of Persia. A certain step in their rivalry for Persian military and financial help was the treaty named after Epilycus, Athenian ambassador to Persia. Thucydides does not mention this treaty in his History of the Peloponnesian War. It is only Andocides who throws some light on this treaty in his speach On Peace with the Lacedaimonians. Athenian honour decree for Herakleides of Klazomenai gives a contemporary evidence.

The actual reason for signing this treaty was the death of Persian King Artaxerxes I in 424 B.C. It was he who negotiated peace with Callias in 449 B.C. The analysis of Ancient Greek diplomatic practice shows that the treaty of Epilycus confirmed formally the main clauses of the Peace of Callias. But as Andocides says, it also had a new feature: the declaration of eternal friendship between Athenians and new Persian King Dareios II. The treaty of Epilycus marked strengthening of diplomatic contacts between Athens and Persia.

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