In August 1945, Soviet troops began fighting in Manchuria against the Kwantung Army. The victory of the USSR and the allied coalition in the Far East marked the beginning of a new stage in the history of the Chinese people, during which the two main political forces of the country - the Kuomintang and the Communist Party - continued the struggle for power, interrupted by the Japanese invasion, unleashed a new armed conflict, which ended in 1949 with the proclamation of the PRC. The period under review is well researched in the scientific literature in terms of the emerging confrontation between the great powers involved in the events in China, the programs and slogans proclaimed by the warring parties, the actions taken by them, etc. Until now, however, the prologue of the "Battle for the Middle Kingdom" waged by the CCP in the second half of 1945 has remained on the periphery of attention. It was then that a strategic course was developed for the deployment of the armed forces and the organization of work in the masses, which largely predetermined the collapse of the Chiang Kai-shek regime.

Key words: defeat of the Kwantung Army, CCP, strategic deployment of the PLA, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Mao Zedong.

Despite the fact that in August 1945 a special group of the CPC Central Committee headed by Liu Yalou was located in the headquarters of Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, and there were certainly reliable radio communication channels between the Kremlin and the headquarters of the Chinese Communists in Yan'an, the entry of the USSR into the war with Japan was quite unexpected for Mao Zedong. His attitude towards the Soviet comrades did not change much from this, albeit not openly expressed, resentment, but he did not come out of an unusual state of semi-confusion (which turned into a depression by November) caused by Stalin's subsequent statements about "non-interference in the internal affairs of China" for a long time [Jiefang Zhanzheng..., 2007, p. 12, 23; Liao Shengping, 2009, p. 94]. Perhaps never before had external circumstances had such a depressing effect on him as at that time. It cannot be said that Mao, who had just been nominated by the party forum as the supreme leader of the CCP, had a clear plan of action prepared in advance, taking into account possible scenarios for the development of the situation in the country.

The Seventh Party Congress, held in the spring and summer of 1945, dealt directly and practically with the struggle for the reconstruction of the State, although it was important. The party organizations in the so - called liberated areas remained in captivity of inert calm or outright inactivity, and the basis of their survival-the armed forces, the 8th and New 4th armies (the"movement for promoting production", agricultural procurement, activities in subsidiary crafts, trade, etc., of course, do not count). The sporadic "sparrow war" 1, which they waged almost throughout the war with Japan, made it possible to both preserve and multiply

1 Tactics of attacking Japanese posts and columns in small partisan groups, followed by retreat and dispersal in the mountains.

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the number of troops. In terms of the quality of the soldier's "material", organization, operational-tactical and other parameters, the People's Liberation Army of China( PLA), as the military formations of the Communists 2 soon became known, was very far from the highest combat standard of the Red Army units of the times of Jiangxi and the Great Campaign.

At the end of 1945, a CCP military leader called the PLA the "army of seven no's" (no party, no masses, no power, no food, no money, no medicine, no uniforms and shoes) [Huang Kecheng, 1988, p. 334]. The Communists were not used to the last four or five "no's", but to lose the party's solidity and "the indissoluble connection of the army with the people"-to state this is completely unusual. Then what about the territories dominated by the Kuomintang, where the CCP was known only by hearsay?! The chairman, instilling in his colleagues the need to really get to work, himself answered this question: "Otherwise, we may not be able to resist" [Mao Zedong xuanji, 1991, p. 1179].

Be that as it may, the results of the lightning advance of the Soviet fronts in Dongbei 3 should have been disposed of as soon as possible by all participants in the anti-Japanese resistance and put under their control the maximum number of territories and major transport routes in Northern and Eastern China. The CCP's unwavering commitment to the military element in the political struggle, especially when a mere show of force sometimes removed otherwise unsolvable contradictions, even on a global scale, prompted its leaders to take urgent measures without regard to Moscow and Washington, so as not to miss the chance.

The first clashes of the CCP units with the Kuomintang-due to their counter-movement in order to capture cities and communication hubs-showed that despite a number of tactical successes of the Communists, they were not ready to conduct an offensive on a broad front, to hold down the active enemy, especially at a considerable distance from their deployment sites, and also to build a stable layered defense to hold captured lines.

This was not news to the PLA's top commanders. Having been cut off from direct front-line duties for the last two years of the war with Japan (the absolute majority of commanders and political commissars of the" old " divisions and military districts of the 8th Army, including Commander Zhu De and his deputy Peng Dehuai, were constantly in Yan'an from the autumn of 1943 and left for their formations only with the entry of the Red Army into Dongbei), the Communist military elite continued to be the most competent and professionally trained part of the CCP leadership. As at the beginning of the war with Japan, military leaders, with rare exceptions, were determined not to "sit forever" in the rear, but to take an active part in the fight not only against the invaders, but also against the "class enemy".

Understanding the vital importance of moving the army from a partisan state to a base of "regularity" as soon as possible prompted the General Command to raise this issue in the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee a year ago. On July 1, 1944, a directive signed by Mao Zedong "On the ordering and training of troops"was published. The Directive provided for: a) increase the number of the armed forces in the future by two or more times based on the existing material base and taking into account the possibilities of military production; b) improve the training of army and people's militia personnel

2 Russian historians have variously dated the renaming of the 8th Army to the PLA, but none of these chronological marks correspond to reality. The CCP's armed forces became officially known as the People's Liberation Army of China only on October 1, 1949, according to the "General Program of the CPPCC" adopted at that time. In fact, the new name was first used by the CPC Central Committee in June 1946 [Zhao Jianli, 2009, p. 75]. In this article, we will not change the established tradition inherent, by the way, in the literature of the PRC.

3 Dongbei, Three Eastern Provinces, and Guangdong are Chinese names for Manchuria.

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[Chen And zhuan, 1993, p. 315]. Judging by the tasks outlined, the document, unlike the promising comments around it, did not provide for the main thing, namely, cardinal changes in the structure of the army, which in its existing form could not ensure the preservation of the CCP's power even in the existing enclaves, not to mention the expansion of controlled territories. For this reason, the directive should be considered no more than a party declaration of general intentions to increase the combat capability of the troops.

But how to really improve the military organization and adapt it to the conditions of a large-scale internal war-this problem became the subject of discussion at an expanded meeting of the Military Council a year later, i.e. at the end of June 1945, official decisions were either not made at it, or they - like many other documents of that time-remain in the archives. It is known, however, that the council was held in "sharp controversy". Peng Dehuai, who presented the report, suggested that the PLA's reorganization should be based on the experience of military construction in the USSR and the operational and strategic developments of the Red Army General Staff, turning the newly created "field" formations into the main strike force, partisan formations of constant readiness into "local" troops for solving tasks in areas and bases, and small partisan detachments and make the peasant self-defense forces a mobilization reserve [Sapozhnikov, 1984, p. 38]. The argument between the proponents of change and those who did not want to abandon the obsolete, but "glorious traditions" of the past, in fact, ended in vain. It was only after the outbreak of hostilities in Manchuria that things got off the ground, and in the following days of August, Zhu Te and Peng Dehuai repeatedly informed the Military Council about the measures they were taking to transfer troops to a new organizational and staff structure, rearmament, redeploy, train command personnel, etc. [Zhu De niangpu, 1986, p. 274-277; Peng Dehuai zhuan, 1997, p. 292]. It seems to us extremely important to emphasize this idea, since the reorganization of the PLA and its role in the CPC's military victory, which was left without proper attention in our literature, have not gained any substantive analysis, and according to the time frame, the beginning of army reforms roams within the limits of 1948-early 1949 [Sapozhnikov, 1984, pp. 38-39; Yuriev, 1983, p. 282].

It is also impossible to agree with the statements of domestic and some Western authors about the persistent rejection of the" regularization "of the troops by Mao Zedong, who was supposedly the most ardent supporter of "partisanship", and, on the contrary, about the highest command staff of the PLA as an unconditional carrier of advanced military science, who led the CCP to victory in 1949 "not thanks to, but in spite of Mao Zedong". For at least the past seven years, no one in the party has been able to take a step without his approval, and therefore the statements that the military leaders took some steps to improve the army structure without the knowledge of the Chairman and contrary to his views seem implausible [Sapozhnikov, 1984, p. 43, 45; Whitson, Cheng Hsiahuang, 1973, p. 82-92]. Of course, his then statements on the combat use of troops often caused, to put it mildly, bewilderment among career commanders ("make the enemy spin and push around", "win as many battles as possible", "do not start battles without preparation", etc.), but in general and in particular, his intuition about the military rarely failed him questions.

What specific proposals for the reorganization of the armed forces were made by Zhu De and Peng Dehuai in August 1945 and subsequently implemented? First of all, it was about the concentration of regular troops dispersed over the vast territory of the liberated areas, the formation of several mobile groups from the best units capable of operating outside the borders of the former anti-Japanese support bases. To solve the problem, it was proposed to create a centrally managed unified rear service, as well as provide the PLA with a sufficient amount of artillery. Field troops, deprived of the burden of mobilization, professions-

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As the military leaders hoped, they would acquire relatively high maneuverability and combat capability, completely losing the features of a partisan army. In the future, the field operational association (field army) was supposed to correspond to the Red Army front, which consisted of tank, mechanized, artillery and engineer-sapper units, which made it possible to conduct deep operations to encircle and destroy large enemy military groups in well-fortified defensive areas. The creation of field armies was planned to be carried out gradually, as the troops were saturated with modern heavy weapons, increasing the level of combat and operational-tactical training of personnel, commanders and staffs at all levels, improving the combat control system, as well as in those areas where the enemy was most likely to capture and could lead to negative consequences for the PLA positions in the theater Zhu De xuanji, 1983, pp. 173-174, 178-181; Jiang Tejun, 2007, pp. 4-5].

It was necessary to implement the planned plan in the conditions of the civil war that had actually begun, which, in particular, caused the process of creating field armies to be somewhat delayed. It mostly ended in the summer of 1947, and the final form and combat coherence of the army did not acquire until the spring of 1949. The PLA field group certainly played a role in the CPC's last battle for power in the country, which is difficult to overestimate. However, the field forces themselves would remain only a powerful deterrent in the absence of a correct strategic course of deployment of the armed forces and the main organizational and political efforts of the party in connection with the transition to Soviet control of most of Northeastern China.

Meanwhile, the party and the military continued to be dominated by the mood in favor of restoring the CCP's lost positions in Southern China in the mid-1930s, whose natives absolutely dominated its cadre core. As in the case of the radical restructuring of the army, the initiators of the new direction of action were representatives of the military command headed by Zhu De and Liu Shaoqi, who by that time occupied the second line in the hierarchy of the highest party leaders. Regarding this, in our opinion, the most important problem of the Chinese civil war, the literature of the PRC has only recently been replenished with significant works that allow us to see it without excessive bias and too obvious distortions of the historical truth. As for the national historiography, the topic related to the" change of course " of the CCP in August-September and the struggle over its implementation during the autumn-winter of 1945 has not yet been touched upon.

New military and political guidelines after the Soviet Union entered the war with Japan are reflected in the instructions of the CPC Central Committee (prepared by Mao Zedong) and the orders of Zhu De (draft orders were developed with the participation of Zhou Enlai 4 [Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1989, p. 613]) from August 10-14, 1945. Their content is well known. The range of designated settings in both document series is approximately the same. However, they have different priorities for goals and locations. So, the first directive of the Central Committee went to Zheng Weisan, Chen Shaohai and Li Xiannian, respectively, party leaders and commander of the 15th division of the New 4th Army, operating in Southern China. Next, the task of advancing to the outer lines was given to Wang Zhen and Wang Shoudao, who led the 1st column of the 8th Army, also operating in the south. And only three days later, Mao Zedong's order to move to join up with the Soviet Army units was sent to the troops of the border regions of Shanxi-Suiyuan, Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei and Shandong [Mao Zedong nianpu, 1993, pp. 1-3].

4 Zhou Enlai was in charge of the day-to-day operations of the Military Council at this time, and apparently somehow carried out the orders without Mao Zedong's prior editing.

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In Zhu De's orders, the armed forces were primarily assigned the general task of ensuring conditions for advancing into Manchuria and capturing the provinces of Liaoning and Jilin (Zhu De nianpu, 1986, p.274). It was about a change of direction in the PLA's strategic deployment from south to north, which began in the second half of September 1945. Today, historians of the PRC emphasize that the course of "development to the north, defense to the south" is the fruit of the collective mind of the CPC Central Committee, but at the same time evidence of the depth and breadth of thinking of the commander-in-chief, who played among others an exceptional role" [Jiang Tejun, 2007, p. 4].

The idea of moving the center of gravity of the party's work to Dongbei as soon as possible was expressed by Zhu De at an expanded meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee on August 23, 1945 (in private conversations with colleagues, the commander-in-chief shared it in early August [Jiang Tejun, 2007, p.4]). Not much was known about this "very important meeting in the history of the CCP", and only recently fragments of the transcript were introduced into scientific circulation, indicating that the discussion that unfolded among the members of the Politburo was characterized by "great intensity and a clash of different views" [Jiefang Zhanzheng..., 2007, pp. 25-26]. We will select only what concerns our story from what has been published.

Mao Zedong's personal involvement in the peace talks with Chiang Kai-shek in Chongqing kicked off the debate. Zhou Enlai, who was the first to speak, almost persuaded those present to decide against the trip, in his opinion, " useless and dangerous." Zhu De, who took the floor next, did not support Zhou and the majority that immediately agreed with him (Chen Yun, Zhang Wentian, Peng Zhen, Peng Dehuai, etc.), saying that "Chairman Mao's trip to the negotiations [is] beneficial for us." "Security guarantees," he argued, " are greater than in the past. We will prepare our troops, prepare our people for the fruits of victory. We should definitely move to the Three eastern provinces and send a large group of cadres to work there..."[Jiefang zhanzheng..., 2007, p. 25].

Further, the commander - in - chief-unlike his hesitant colleagues-offered no alternative to choosing a war to "achieve a peaceful future for China," saying literally the following:: "We must also prepare to make the main task of conducting military operations." For comparison, let's "listen" to what Mao Zedong said on this topic: "China has two opportunities to come to peace, the first is that we capture some of the major cities, and the second is that we don't capture them. The first one is not feasible. We will not capture it for two reasons: the USSR, for the sake of preserving international peace and due to restrictions under the Soviet-Chinese treaty, will not be able to help us; Chang, using the legitimacy of his position, will force the Japanese to capitulate exclusively to him. We have only to admit this fact. In a situation where the capture of large cities is unrealistic, we can only move on to the peaceful stage" [Jiefang Zhanzheng..., 2007, p. 25].

Completely discouraged by Stalin's insistent wishes to transform himself from a belligerent hawk into a peacekeeper dove, 5 the Chairman did not respond to Zhu De's quite logical suggestion not to even seize and thereby start a war, but to take over what he considered an "ownerless" territory with a large number of cities, both large and small, but, most importantly, in every sense the most important in that situation. Zhu De's Dongbei plan was wholeheartedly supported by Liu Shaoqi, who remained acting chairman of the party's Central Committee after leaving

5 Mao Zedong was extremely dissatisfied with Stalin's telegrams advising him not to drag the nation into a disastrous civil war. He kept repeating the same phrase: "I simply do not believe that the people, having risen up to fight for liberation, will doom themselves to death." Other senior management members were also nervous. The reasons for this were added: following the sudden silence of the Kremlin, information began to arrive from Manchuria about" outrages "committed by Soviet soldiers against the civilian population, the export of material wealth of the region to the USSR as "war trophies", an incident with the command of the 6th Guards Tank Army, etc. (see: [Jiefang Zhanzheng..., 2007, p. 23, 52]).

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Mao to negotiate. He gave the plan a go and actually retroactively secured the approval of its leader.

It is very interesting that the idea of creating a new revolutionary base in the Northeast-independently of Zhu De and Liu Shaoqi - was made by a prominent later military commander of the PRC, and then one of the many division commanders of the New 4th Army - Huang Kecheng. On September 14, he sent a telegram to the Central Committee, in which he proposed to leave some areas of the PLA base in Northern, Central and Southern China and send the main forces to Manchuria. The telegram outlined not only the general idea, but also a specific plan for concentrating forces in the region and minimizing territorial losses in other operational areas [Zhonggong zhongyang..., 1992, pp. 283-285].

One of the proofs that Mao Zedong, unlike Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi and Huang Kecheng, did not put Dongbei at that time (after the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the USSR and the Republic of China on August 14, 1945) on a priority place among other areas in which the CCP was to increase its presence, is shown by his directive To He Long, Commander of the Combined Forces of the Northern Shaanxi Military Region, dated August 19, 1945. She ordered to send the political commissar of the district Lin Feng to work in Manchuria with a group of personnel workers (about a thousand people). At the same time, Mao Zedong reminded He Long that "his task in the north is still to block the road to Fu Zuoyi" [Mao Zedong nianpu, 1993, p. 8]. Lin Feng was not a leader of the same level as, say, Peng Zhen or Lin Biao, who were later seconded there by the Politburo already with a well-defined goal of "gaining a foothold in Manchuria", and a thousand political commissars would not be enough to organize party work even in one Dongbei county, comparable in territory to a small state.

There is also one more evidence of the Chairman's unwillingness to address the problem of the North-East. In the last document he prepared just before leaving for Chongqing, the " Internal Party Communication of the CPC Central Committee on the upcoming peace talks with the Kuomintang "(August 26, 1945), it was noted: "Regarding the three provinces of Dongbei, this is the area stipulated by the Soviet - Chinese treaty, the power there is in the hands of the Kuomintang; can our country control the situation in Dongbei? why to send troops there is not yet decided. However, there is no question of sending personnel to work... " [Mao Zedong nianpu, 1993, p. 15].

We have no desire to challenge the arguments of a number of Chinese historians who continue to appeal to the sacramental " Mao Zedong was the first." But in what way? That he spoke earlier than others about the extreme importance of Manchuria in the victory of the Chinese Revolution? This can be accepted with a certain assumption 7. Back at the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of China, he said: "Dongbei, being a very important area, may fall under our control in the future. If Dongbei is placed under our leadership, what significance will it have for the Chinese revolution? I think this way: our victory will have a basis, and we can also say that this will determine our victory "[Mao Zedong wenji, 1996, pp. 410-411]. We can cite other statements of the head of the party on this subject. Not just about the necessity of mastering northeast China, said Ren Bysshe, and Peng Zhen and Liu Shaoqi Stefan of janjan..., 2007, pp. 58 - 59]. However, none of them, including Mao, tried to put the problem into practice.

Returning to Mao Zedong, it should be noted that his published statements about the plan of "development to the north, defense to the south" do not mention anything until September 17, 1945, when he, together with the Soviet Union, was able to make a decision.

6 General Fu Zuoyi - Commander of the Kuomintang army group in Northern China.

7 To be precise, Lin Biao came up with the idea of creating a CCP base in Dongbei earlier than anyone else. In 1941, he wrote to G. Dimitrov that "the main direction of movement of the 8th Army should be the road to Manchuria" [CPSU (b), Comintern..., 2007, p. 492].

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Zhou Enlai "fully agreed with the policy of conquering Dongbei", which was outlined by Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De in their telegrams to Chongqing, where he, we recall, negotiated with Chiang Kai-shek (Mao Zedong nianpu, 1993, p. 26).

Arrangements for the transfer of troops and party cadres to Manchuria actually began the day after Mao Zedong's departure to the provisional Kuomintang capital. On August 29, the commander-in-chief and Liu Shaoqi spoke to the party assets that were going to the north-eastern provinces. Zhu Dae described the situation and the resulting tasks as follows: "We must actively advance to Dongbei. Dongbei deserves it in many ways. Most of Chiang Kai-shek's troops are in the south. ...They will appear in Dongbei, immediately capture the big cities, we will capture the village. Some comrades these days, looking at the treaty of the Soviet Union with Chiang Kai-shek, lost heart: in the past, the Soviet Union provided us with great help, but now there is nothing to hope for. That's because the hopes were too high. You should know that although there is a contract, there is a lot of work in Dongbei. The Soviet Union will withdraw its troops in three months... Dongbei will return to Chinese sovereignty. After all, there is no indication in the contract that we should not go there. We need to send a 50,000-strong army and 10,000 cadres, and we will send even more in the future. In Dongbei, we will have to work hard with the masses, not official work, but real work-we will have to win over 30 million people to our side" [Jiefang zhanzheng..., 2007, p. 63]. Highly experienced and endowed with a rare gift of foresight, Zhu De consistently advocated a forced build-up of forces in Manchuria, believing that it was necessary "without delay" to bring the PLA grouping there to a million people, otherwise "great difficulties will arise" [Jiefang Zhanzheng..., 2007, p.53].

Liu Shaoqi was somewhat more cautious.8 After telling party members that "we have decided to send troops after all," he initially talked about the need for the PLA to advance to the borders of Dongbei. "Everything will depend on the situation," he explained, " we will find voids, we will occupy...". He concluded his speech, however, quite definitely: "You must hurry up to capture" [Jiefang zhanzheng..., 2007, p. 63]. The new course was also supported by the secretary of the East China Bureau of the Central Committee, Zhao Shushi 9, who proposed to redeploy part of the forces of "his" New 4th Army from the south to Shandong for subsequent dispatch to Dongbei by sea. Zhao Shushi's initiative came in handy: Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De would have faced serious difficulties if they had only relied on the CCP's available forces in Northern China. As a result, the PLA's strategic re-targeting was planned in such a way as to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of gaps in the battle formations, especially in the south, which could arise as troops concentrated in Manchuria. In this regard, it was decided to significantly reduce the Line of contact between the parties. From the southern bank of the Yangtze, units and formations were diverted to the north, to Central China, from there to Shandong, and from Shandong to Dongbei. At the same time, they were regrouped in order to prevent a significant decrease in the combat power of the units that remained in place. In general, the calculations carried out showed the need to create and strengthen two key bases of the party and army in the event of a war with the Kuomintang - the main one in Dongbei and the "transshipment" one in Shandong, all the others will become their "satellites".

On September 14, 1945, Liu Shaoqi held a" historic " meeting of the Politburo [Zhonghua Mingguo..., 2000, pp. 74-75]. At the meeting, it was decided to send 100 thousand fighters and 20 thousand to Dongbei. and four members of the Politburo and more than a quarter of the Central Committee members, and establish a North-Eastern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee headed by

8 According to Liu Shaoqi's own admission, it took him more than 40 days to think about and implement some preparatory measures for mastering Dongbei [Jiefang zhanzheng..., 2007, p. 52].

9 At first, Zhao Shushi recommended that Huang Kecheng, his subordinate, "mind your own business", but then, after thinking about the brilliant idea of the divisional commander, he became an ardent supporter and guide of it [Huang Kecheng, 1988, p. 340].

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with Peng Zhen. On the same day, a telegram was sent to Mao Zedong outlining the decision and details on the creation of bridgeheads on the approaches to Manchuria and the routes (by land and sea from Shandong) for the entry of troops into it; on September 17, another one was sent with the postscript: "... otherwise we will disperse our forces." Mao Zedong agreed [Liu Shaoqi nianpu, 1996, p. 492; Zhonghua mingguo..., 2000, p. 74-75]. Moreover, Mao informed his colleagues that for this "extraordinary period" he was giving each member of the top leadership the joint prerogatives of the Politburo and the chairman of the CPC Central Committee, which in fact meant the transfer of all party power into the hands of Liu Shaoqi and at the same time recognition of his outstanding leadership talent [Jiefang Zhanzheng..., 2007, p.56].

The activity of the Chinese Communists in Dongbei and the associated demarches of Chongqing and Washington caused Soviet representatives to visit the CPC headquarters to resolve the "misunderstandings" that had arisen. On September 14, Lieutenant Colonel "Belousov" (a front-line pseudonym), commissioned by the commander of the Trans-Baikal Front, R. Y. Malinovsky, arrived in Yan'an and handed over the marshal's statement to Zhu De 10. The latter reported that until the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Manchuria, the troops of Chiang Kai-shek and the 8th Army should not enter this area, and the CCP units that have already arrived in Shenyang, Dalian (Dalny), Changchun and other localities should leave them. Undeterred, Zhu De firmly challenged this approach, pointing out that the CCP had already conducted military activities and established support bases in these areas at the beginning of the war with Japan. In a letter sent to Malinovsky, the commander-in-chief outlined his arguments and asked to leave the formations of the 8th Army in the places where they were located [Jiang Tejun, 2007, p.3].

The Soviet side, after consulting with the center, gave the" go-ahead " to transfer under Communist control all territories in the area of Jinzhou and Zhehe Province, located, according to Zhu De, within the CCP's support bases during the anti-Japanese war, and also promised not to interfere with their military and political work in Manchuria proper, if such work is conducted behind the scenes. In a conversation with one of the comrades accompanying Belousov, the commander-in-chief casually remarked:: "The people of Dong Bei have been oppressed by the Japanese aggressors for more than ten years. If he feels the concern of our party, feels his support in the party and the people's army, the influence of the party will penetrate into the hearts of the people. Your troops were the first to enter Dongbei, and your responsibility is even more serious" [Jiang Tejun, 2007, p. 3; Zhu De nianpu, 1986, p. 278].

In Yan'an, they were "very encouraged," as Chinese authors note, by the current situation in Dongbei, thanks to the constructive attitude and benevolence of the Soviet Army command. With virtually free access to Japan's crammed arsenals, storage facilities for clothing and food, and partly communications, the Communists thus gained a remarkable opportunity to quickly and massively transfer personnel to Manchuria, as they say, light - without weapons, equipment, or logistics support.11 In addition, the unprecedented patriotic upsurge among the local population liberated from Japanese occupation, as noted in Peng Zhen's reports, allowed an unlimited contingent of volunteers to be recruited into the PLA ranks [Jiefang Zhanzheng..., 2007, p. 50].

Given the above, as well as the underestimation of the Kuomintang's potential for retaliatory actions and, of course, the dominant external factor, the Yan'an leaders

10 On the Chinese side, only Zhu De took part in the conversation with the Soviet officers (Wu Xiuquan acted as an interpreter). Zhu De introduced himself to the guests as the commander-in-chief of the CCP's Anti-Japanese forces [Jiefang zhanzheng..., 2007, p.51].

11 For free movement in Dongbei, PLA soldiers posed as "labor migrants"; for" unofficial contacts " with Soviet commandant's offices, they were provided with relevant documents in Chinese and Russian [Jiefang Zhanzheng..., 2007, p.55].

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and Mao Zedong began to be inclined towards the rapid and complete capture of Dongbei even before the end of the meeting in Chongqing. To a certain extent, the euphoria that engulfed them also stemmed from the fact that Chiang Kai-shek did not put the Manchurian issue on the agenda of the negotiations and in every possible way avoided his direct conversations with the CCP delegation [Mao Zedong junshi..., 1993, p. 55]. Mao apparently perceived this either as a lack of plans to do anything in Dongbei until the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops, or as a weakness of his military machine, which was not yet capable of immediately seizing bridgeheads for advancing into the area.

As a result, at this stage, the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, headed by Peng Zhen12, has begun to carry out the task of preventing the possible breakthrough of Kuomintang troops into Manchuria and "completely capturing" it by taking control of cities and communications. The operation involved significant army forces and party cadres deployed to the northeast in a matter of weeks: more than one thousand fighters and 20 thousand gang members, including 13 members of the Politburo and 77 members and candidates for members of the CPC Central Committee (one-third of the total senior management)13 [Liao Shengping, 2009, pp. 91-92]. At the same time, and this is quite obvious, to hold a huge region ("boundless virgin land", as it was then expressed in Yan'an) in the conditions of an impending war with a multi-million-strong enemy army, such a modest and, last but not least, not familiar with the local conditions of the group was not enough.

The situation in and around Manchuria was changing rapidly. In October, the withdrawal of Soviet troops began, and in the middle of the month, American ships landed the first Kuomintang amphibious units on the coastal approaches to southern Dongbei. By this time, or rather in the last days of September, Liu Shaoqi, having assessed the unfavorable development of the situation for the CCP, had already ordered Peng Zhen to move to a new tactical scheme, namely, the dispersal of troops and party cadres in rural areas adjacent to the borders of the USSR, MNR and Korea, in order to preserve forces, form their own bodies local authorities, which, in his opinion, would eventually lead "through a prolonged war to the actual establishment of party control within the whole of Dongbei" [Liu Shaoqi nianpu, 1996, p. 507]. Mao Zedong, who had returned from Chongqing, disavowed all of Liu Shaoqi's dispersal directives as "not up to the moment" and on October 15 instructed the Dongbei Bureau to rally all forces, mobilize the masses, and firmly prevent the Kuomintang from advancing into Manchuria. A few days later, Peng Zhen got acquainted with the even more categorical order of the Chairman, which required "straddling the Jinzhou-Yinkou-Shenyang railway" and "establishing full control over Liaoning and Andong Province in the shortest possible time" [Liao Shengping, 2009, p. 93].

What did Mao expect when he returned to the old, now unrealistic, goal of "complete capture" of the area? No matter what the leader's public statements were, all his hopes were based solely on the support of the CCP's war effort from the Red Army. On October 27, Peng Zhen delivered a message to the Soviet side from the CPC Central Committee, in which Mao asked J. V. Stalin to postpone the withdrawal of troops from Dongbei until January-February 1946 (from Zhehe-at least until the end of this year); during the specified time, not to allow the landing of Kuomintang troops in the area; to allow the CPC

12 In order to ensure the proper status of their representatives in dealing with the Soviet military administration in Manchuria, Peng Zhen and other members of the Bureau were awarded military ranks from Lieutenant General and below by the Central Committee decision for the first time in the history of the CPC armed forces [Jiefang Zhanzheng..., 2007, p.53].

13 Together with Soviet troops, units of the 88th Separate Rifle Brigade of the Far Eastern Front entered Manchuria, formed from Chinese and Korean Communists who fought as part of the Dongbei Joint Anti-Japanese Army in this area before withdrawing to the USSR in early 1941. We do not include this formation (referred to in Chinese historiography as the OAAD training brigade) in the data provided, since its military personnel mostly operated independently of the Dongbei leadership of the CCP.

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"take power", "democratically elect a local administration and create an armed force". The most important of Yan'an's three requests was to prevent Chiang Kai-shek from landing troops in Dalny. His "joy knew no bounds" when a positive response came [Jiefang zhanzheng..., 2007, pp. 76-77]. After the PLA's failure to defend Shanhaiguan, a strategic passageway to Manchuria, the Soviets resumed the group's withdrawal in early November, notifying the Chinese government in Chongqing that the temporary ban on entering the northeastern territories under its jurisdiction was being lifted. At the same time, the Soviet authorities, having previously handed over weapons, ammunition and other property stored in warehouses to the Chinese Communists, warned the leaders of the CCP in Dongbei to immediately withdraw their armed detachments from areas adjacent to large settlements and railway lines, otherwise threatening to use force. [Liao Shengping, 2009, p. 94; Huang Kecheng, 1988, p. 333-334].

The Shanhaiguan defeat of the PLA and the "Soviet trick" finally incapacitated the party leader, but at the same time allowed Liu Shaoyi-15 (against the will of Mao Zedong, who continued to insist on dispersing forces in the village all this time) to return to the first line of political leadership, as well as to put Lin, who supported him, at the head of the PLA military group in Manchuria Piao, who arrived in Dongbei in early November 1945. Peng Zhen and some other members of the Central Committee Bureau in Shenyang, who had indulged Mao's high expectations with their dubious reports about success and "Soviet guarantees", gradually left their posts at the insistence of the military commander [Zhonghua mingguo..., 2000, p.488]. During the following period, until the end of military operations in Dongbei (October 1948), the future marshal of the People's Republic of China, showing outstanding military talents in battles with Kuomintang generals, remained, in fact, the main figure in the party in the northeast of the country. It was he who had to carry out the CCP's plan to seize the most important region of China to the victorious end.

"It can be considered that thanks to the proclamation of this course ("development to the north" - I. P.), as well as a number of important measures to balance forces, - we read in the most authoritative publication on the topic, recently published in the PRC, - Chiang Kai-shek, who dared to unleash an anti-communist civil war, was dealt a fatal blow " [Jiefang Zhanzheng... , 2007, p. 57]. The conclusion, frankly, is rather controversial and does not quite correspond to the documentary sources on which the work itself is based. We will not try to change it. Let us limit ourselves to the important point that the CCP's advance in Dongbei - and this must be borne in mind-would not have taken place under any circumstances if the Soviet side had taken a different position in complying with the terms of the treaty with the Kuomintang government.

list of literature

The CPSU (b), the Comintern, and China. Documents, vol. V. 1937-May 1943, Moscow: ROSSPEN Publ., 2007.

Sapozhnikov B. G. People's Liberation War in China (1946-1950). Moscow: Voenizdat, 1984.

Yuryev M. F. The Armed Forces of the CPC in the liberation struggle of the Chinese people (20-40s). Moscow: Nauka, 1983.

Liu Shaoqi niangpu (Biographical Chronicle of Liu Shaoqi), Vol. 1. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1996.

14 The military commander of Shenyang A. I. Kovtun-Stankevich, according to Peng Zhen, directly stated that "I will send tanks if you do not leave" [Zhonghua mingguo..., 2000, p.421]. The fact is that the Chinese Communists simply ignored the first proposals of the Soviet command to leave the cities.

15 The Central Committee's directives and orders to the leaders in Dongbei were prepared by Liu Shaoqi until almost the beginning of 1946, and Mao Zedong, who was" ill, "allegedly" edited " them. Taking advantage of this, Lin Biao, who was already distinguished by a stubborn character, did not always and not in everything follow the instructions of the Central Committee, relying primarily on his own vision of the situation [Liao Shengping, 2009, p.94; Zhonghua mingguo..., 2000, p. 400 - 403].

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