The book under review will undoubtedly become a notable phenomenon of modern Russian science about Korea. It recreates the history of this country not only after the Second World War, but also practically throughout the entire XX century. It examines the path taken by each of the states that emerged on the Korean Peninsula-the DPRK and the ROK, identifies changes in their development at different stages and in relations, and shows the impact of the international situation on Korean problems. The book contains extensive factual material, presented in a fairly logical and reasoned manner, and each section ends with a brief summary summarizing the author's judgments and assessments. All this makes the monograph interesting and useful for a wide range of readers.

I would especially like to mention the method of scientific periodization of the history of such divided nations and states as Korea proposed in this paper. "Domestic and foreign authors," it says, " usually cover the political, socio-economic history and cultural evolution of the divided parts independently, which significantly narrows the holistic historical landscape of their co-evolution. While appreciating the importance of research on the North and South separately, the authors of this book sought to create a comprehensive work that does not lose sight of the genetic, cultural and traditional integrity of the Korean ethnic group." This refers primarily to " the internal, though contradictory, genetic unity of the historical object (nation), which is combined with a very significant independence of its constituent parts (North and South). The emphasis is placed on the deep patterns of co-evolution of a divided nation. This is most clearly reflected in the processes of divergence, on the one hand, and convergence of the national culture of the Korean ethnic group, on the other " (p. 5-6).

It seems that this approach is necessary both for periodization of history and for research of many problems of modern development of North and South Korea. It is extremely important to analyze not only what distinguishes and contrasts them with each other today, but also everything that stems from their belonging to one nation, one centuries-old history, one national and cultural origins and values, and therefore prevents the final disintegration of the Korean nation, makes it possible to search for ways of mutual understanding and rapprochement between the two parts of Korea. for a better understanding of what is happening in them and between them now and in the future.

Unfortunately, interesting and informative work is not free from serious omissions, annoying inaccuracies and errors. Thus, describing the state of Korea by the beginning of the XX century, the authors state "almost complete paralysis of the state machine" (p. 14). This is true, but not all of it. At the same time, the process of awareness of the need for radical changes in society was gaining momentum in Korea, the reform movement was developing, the first political and educational organizations were emerging, and the country was moving towards a radical reconstruction of the entire state structure. Without recognizing and showing this, at least in general terms, the subsequent conclusion that "Japanese colonial rule paralyzed the natural development of the sovereign Korean state, its enlightenment, science, and national Korean culture for an entire historical epoch" hangs in the air (p.18). Therefore, such a development still took place, but it remained out of the authors ' field of view.

The annexation of Korea by Japanese imperialism in August 1910, the authors argue, occurred because Japan "proved to be stronger than other Far Eastern rivals, primarily China and Russia" (p.14). On this basis, one might think that Russia, like Japan, then sought to seize Korea. Meanwhile, its plans, as is well known, did not go beyond strengthening economic and political influence in sovereign Korea and preventing the domination of states hostile to Russia in it. By the way, the Annexation Treaty imposed on Korea in August 1910 was not a treaty of "influence" (p. 33), but of "merging" Korea with Japan.

The first partisan detachments of the Army of Justice (Uiben) appeared even before the signing of the treaty on the protectorate of Japan in 1905 (p. 33). With varying degrees of scope and intensity, they have been operating since 1895, since the brutal murder of the queen organized by the Japanese

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Min Myung-seong [Lee Gi-baek, 2000, p. 312]. After 1905, there was a strong rise in the guerrilla movement in Korea.

The authors ' presentation of the history of Korea during the colonial period (1910-1945) also suffers from one-sidedness. The main attention is paid to exposing the predatory policy of Japanese imperialism, its strangling of Korean national culture, which, of course, had a heavy impact on the entire Korean people. But even in this terrible time of "paralysis", there was no natural development of Korea. Despite all the difficulties and limitations, Korean industry emerged, the national bourgeoisie was formed with all its weaknesses and contradictions, the working class grew in quantity and quality, and the peasantry also changed. All this was reflected in the spheres of ideology and culture. Thus, a socio-economic, political and ideological foundation was created, on which the existence of two Korean states began later, after liberation from the Japanese colonial yoke. The authors should have at least mentioned this.

One cannot agree with their assessment of the anti-Japanese demonstration in Seoul on June 10, 1926, as a protest action only by students of Seoul University, which did not receive widespread support (p.38). In fact, this was the largest protest against the Japanese colonialists in Korea since the May Day Popular Movement of 1919, which had a wide international resonance. In addition to students, many residents of the Korean capital took part in it. The authorities had to send large forces of the Japanese army and police to disperse the demonstration. A notable feature of the June 1926 demonstration was the attempt by underground organizations of Korean communists and nationalists to jointly prepare and conduct it.

By 1936, the book says, the active activities of Korean partisans in Manchuria had ceased (p. 42). But then it is reported (p. 44) about the "most famous combat operation" conducted by Kim Il Sung's detachment in June 1937 near Pocheonbo (on the Korean-Manchurian border). Kim Il Sung's squad was not the only one at that time. This required Japan in the late 1930s to step up punitive actions against Korean partisans in Manchuria (p. 45).

The Korean Communist Party, formed in 1925, was not dissolved by the Comintern, as the authors mistakenly believe (p. 39). From the very beginning of its existence, the party was undermined by factional strife. In 1928, several factions appealed to the Comintern for sole representation of the entire Korean Communist Party. The Comintern did not recognize any of the factions as such. The Comintern did not make a formal decision on its dissolution [CPSU (b), Comintern and Korea, 2007, pp. 27-28].

The book speaks about the liberation of Korea in the traditional spirit of our historiography: "It was not the Renaissance Army, partisan detachments, or American troops that brought freedom and independence to Korea, but the Red Army, which defeated the powerful Kwantung grouping of the Japanese armed forces in August 1945 and liberated the Korean people from 40 years of colonial yoke" (p.47). Without detracting from the historical significance of the contribution of the USSR and its Armed Forces to the liberation of Korea, the above interpretation still needs to be clarified. The Soviet army was the only one that fought for the freedom of the Korean people directly on Korean soil, but it was not the only one that freed Korea from the Japanese colonial yoke. The role played in the defeat of Japan and the liberation of its enslaved countries, including Korea, the rest of the allied States, as well as the Korean, Chinese and other peoples, cannot be discounted. The authors themselves then clarified their position: "The Soviet Union and other allied powers crushed the bastions of Japanese colonialism and militarism, freed Korea from foreign slavery" (p.76).

Information about the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces during the liberation of Korea needs to be clarified. The figure mentioned in the book (p. 49) (about 5 thousand soldiers and officers) is the total losses of the 25th Army incurred not only in Korea, but also during the advance with battles to it through the hard - to-reach territory of North-Eastern Manchuria. In Korea itself, according to official data, the land forces, aviation, and the Pacific Fleet of the USSR lost 1,963 people killed, wounded, and seriously ill [Classified removed, 1993, p.325].

There are also some inaccuracies in the account of the events of the first years after the liberation of Korea. The authors ' claim that the US military administration "in November - December 1945 declared itself the owner of all property in the South without exception"is clearly erroneous

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(p. 95). Under its control, it took only Japanese property, which absolutely prevailed. The Korean version was an exception.

It is not true that the first and last meeting of the Joint Soviet - American Commission on Korea was held in March-May 1946 (p. 63). In May-September 1947, the second round of its work was held, after the failure of which the USSR and the United States put forward their well-known proposals on the Korean question (p. 82). Considering the circumstances of the emergence of two states on the Korean peninsula, the authors missed an important fact - the decision of the Interim (Inter-Sessional) Committee of the UN General Assembly formed in violation of the UN Charter, which illegally sanctioned separate elections in the South. The claim that the Joint Meeting of Representatives of the North and South, convened in Pyongyang in April 1948 to oppose the holding of separate elections, "was mainly aimed at consolidating the Communist monopoly in the power structures" is completely groundless (p.127). This is not what worried its participants on the eve of the end of the Korean split.

As a result of the authors ' lack of attention to the socio-economic processes in Korean society of the colonial period, the mention of the "top of national-bourgeois circles" in the early ROK is somewhat unexpected (p.97). When and how these " circles "were formed, how they were transformed under the conditions of the American occupation regime, who their" top " consisted of, what their ideological and political views are, etc.-all these are questions that need to be clarified (at least briefly) in order to understand the nature and ways of development of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan could not sign the Treaty of Friendship and Trade with the United States in February 1948 (p. 98), since neither the Republic of Kazakhstan nor its Government existed at that time. Having reported on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the DPRK by the end of 1948 (p. 117), the authors forgot to say that the US army also left the ROK in June 1949.

From the memoirs of Kim Il Sung, it is now known that he and his detachment returned to their homeland on September 19, 1945 [Kim Il Sung, 1998, VIII, p. 553], and not at the end of September 1945, as indicated in the book (p.105). The agrarian reform in the North in March 1946 did not deprive landlords of all their land (p. 113), but only of possessions over 5 chonbo [The Constitution, 1952, p. 128]. Having reported that the US military authorities in the South first partially sold Japanese property to the Koreans, and returned the bulk of it to them after the formation of the ROK (p. 96), the authors overlooked that the Soviet command had previously transferred Japanese property at its disposal to the North Korean authorities in 1946 and 1947. The trade turnover between the USSR and the DPRK was estimated in 1950 not at 700 million rubles (p. 118), but only at 101 million rubles. [Relationships..., 1981, p. 400].

The authors ' conclusion that when the Korean War broke out, Washington was "ready to reach a compromise settlement" is highly doubtful (p.137). This conclusion is based on the UN Security Council resolution of June 25, 1950, which contains no hint of compromise. The authors themselves write that from June 27 to 30 (July is erroneously named in the text), President Truman issued a series of orders to provide military assistance to Seoul (p. 138). In fact, decisions on this were made even earlier, and by July 1, 1950, the United States was fully involved in the Korean War.

The Korean People's Army captured Seoul not on June 30, 1950 (p. 132), but on June 28. It is not known where the information comes from that many tanks in the KPA were commanded and controlled by "ethnic Koreans from the USSR" (p. 140). The Incheon amphibious operation carried out by the UN Forces Command took place in mid-September, not October 1950 (p.151). The effectiveness of partisan actions in the rear of the advancing UN forces is unnecessarily underestimated (p. 149). Partisans there were mainly KPA soldiers who failed to leave with the units retreating to the north, and up to 30% of the UN forces had to be diverted to fight them [United Nations, p. 81-2].

The Soviet Aviation Corps, which had been based in Manchuria since the autumn of 1950 at the request of the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the DPRK, was not intended to provide an "air umbrella" over the DPRK (p.154). He had a more modest task: protecting the Chinese border with Korea and the Suphun hydroelectric power station on the Amnokkan, countering US bomber aircraft no further than the Pyongyang - Wonsan line. Soviet pilots inflicted great damage on the enemy, but it would be an exaggeration to say that thanks to them, "American aviation could not act with impunity in the airspace of the DPRK" (p. 154).

The armistice that ended the Korean War was signed on July 27 (p. 165), not on July 26, 1953 (p.527). Strange seems the final conclusion of the authors that " the military conflict is over-

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He outlined all previous international agreements on the decolonization of Korea and the creation of a single democratic state on the peninsula " (p. 179). All the previous content of the book shows that these agreements were crossed out in 1946-1947 by the actions of the United States and the USSR, the formation of two Korean states in 1948.

The bulk of the book under review covers the period from the end of the Korean War to the beginning of the twenty-first century. There are also a lot of annoying flaws in this most important section.

The United States was indeed the main sponsor of the" odious Lisynman government", but not its "protégé" (p.239). The authors write that the Republic of Kazakhstan concluded a mutual defense treaty with the United States in September 1953 (p. 273), then on October 1 (p.227, 527). General Park Chung-hee, who seized power in the Republic of Korea in 1961, is named on two adjacent pages (245 and 246) as Deputy Commander of the 2nd Army, Deputy Chief of Staff of the same Army, and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army. Jang Myung, the head of the government who ceded power to him, announced his resignation either at an official cabinet meeting (p. 242), or from the convent where he had taken refuge after the military coup (p.246). General Roh Dae-woo became President of the ROK not in 1987, but in 1988 (p. 319). President of the Republic of Korea Kim Dae-jung provided the DPRK with assistance in the amount of 500 million dollars (p. 392), then 500 thousand (p. 399). Ho Jung could not become Acting President of the Republic of Korea on March 3, 1960, because then Lee Seung Man was elected President (p. 535). After connecting the Trans-Korean railway with the Trans-Siberian Railway, it is not the delivery of goods to Western Europe that will be reduced for the Republic of Kazakhstan, but only the time required for this (p.458).

Immediately after the end of the Korean War, the USSR provided 1,300 million rubles in aid to the DPRK (p. 222). The total amount mentioned earlier in the book (over 800 million rubles) of aid from the social countries, including the USSR, is calculated in prices not of 1953, but of a later time (p. 189). The authors twice (pp. 196 and 222-223) described the August 1956 plenum of the WPK Central Committee, where they tried to oust Kim Il Sung.

The DPRK's treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with the USSR and the PRC were signed not in June, but in July 1961 (p.273). The most important article of the treaty with the USSR is cited inaccurately (p. 224). It was omitted that it provided for repelling an attack not only by a State, but also by a "coalition of states" [Relationships..., 1981, p. 196]. This emphasized the intention of the contracting parties to prevent a repeat of the situation of 1950-1953, when a coalition of states led by the United States opposed the DPRK. The other party, according to the contract, was obliged to help the victim of the attack with all the means at his (and not his, as stated in the book) disposal.

According to the authors, the DPRK is deprived of the opportunity to integrate into the world economy due to "methods of forced mass mobilization that ignored the laws of the market and reproduction, as well as forced military preparations" (p.340). Such a categorical judgment is not always fair, in particular regarding the DPRK's consideration of the"laws of the market and reproduction". It omits, perhaps, the main thing - the tough blockade that the United States and its allies have been subjecting the DPRK to almost from the very first days of its existence. This is mentioned only once in passing in the book (p.459). The DPRK is probably aware of the need to integrate into the global economy, but its access there is blocked.

The situation is much the same with the identification of factors that "sharply raised the question of the survival of the regime for the North Korean political elite" (p.423). Only the disintegration of the USSR, the normalization of relations with Kazakhstan by Russia and China, and the deep economic crisis are mentioned. But the authors did not say a word about the fact that the DPRK lives in an environment of relentless military tension near its southern borders, with open threats of "pre-emptive strikes" on it from the United States, even with the use of nuclear weapons. The DPRK can only defend itself by relying on its own strength (there is no USSR behind it, and support from the PRC is very problematic). This is what first of all pushes it to activate its nuclear missile program and create "nuclear deterrent weapons". By the way, let me clarify: the DPRK joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1985, and not in 1983 (p. 530).

Describing the recent struggle for the peaceful unification of Korea, the authors are also not entirely accurate. The confederation that the DPRK insists on is not something self-sufficient and final, but also (in the same way as the "Korean community" proposed by the ROK) is conceived there as a stage on the way to complete and final reunification of the country (p.489). It is strange to read that " dozens, hundreds of initiatives, doctrines and concepts declared by the authorities of the North and South of Korea-

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rei in order to unite the country, and remained on paper " (p. 523). To write like this is to ignore what has already been done for rapprochement and cooperation between the two Korean states. The authors themselves refute themselves: "The end of the 20th century went down in the history of relations between the two Korean states with the actual and legal recognition of each other and the establishment of dialogue structures, economic ties and exchanges, and limited humanitarian contacts. This was initiated by the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang in June 2000 and the North-South Joint Declaration adopted there" (p. 524).

Having put forward an interesting and promising approach to the study of the dismembered Korean nation as an integral organism with "genetic unity" and "deep patterns of co-evolution" of the two Korean states, the authors did not sufficiently implement it in their book. Each state in all aspects of its existence is considered by them separately, independently. No attempt has been made to determine the impact of a single national culture and common historical traditions on their relations, to assess the parallels that were observed in the ideology and politics of the North and South. An example of such parallels is the increased introduction of Juche ("my own boss") ideas in the DPRK since the mid-1950s, reflecting the course of independence and the rise of the Korean nation, and the active use of these ideas in the ROK during the presidency of Park Chung-hee. The book only mentions the similarity of some of Park Jong-hee's views with North Korea's Juche ideas (p. 251, 265, 266), but this issue is not considered in detail, as he deserves.

Korean scholars ' mistakes related to Korean realities are particularly unpleasant. The book under review begins with one of them: "The etymology (origin) of the name "Korea", or"Country of Morning Freshness", goes back to distant historical times. This is a semantic translation of the two Chinese characters "chao" and "xian", which around the fifth century BC denoted an ancient principality on the peninsula" (p. 5). Without going into the discussion about the time and location of the "ancient principality", I will only note that the name "Country of Morning Freshness" refers to the state of Joseon. The name "Korea", which is common not only in the "European space", but also throughout the world, comes from the name of the state of Goryeo, which existed on the Korean peninsula in the X-XIV centuries.

There are other inaccuracies. Som ( or juice) is a measure of volume (180 liters) and weight, but not 80 kg (p. 24), but 100-150, depending on the type of agricultural product [Modern Korea, 1971, p. 416]. Hanguk Eunhyeong is simply "Korean Bank", not "Central Bank" (p.27). The democratic government Party is Minjondan, not Minjudan (p. 250). Not everything is correct in the names of Korean companies (p. 259, 368).

Some errors with dates have already been noted above. I'll point out a few more. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea was promulgated on July 17, 1948 (p. 90), then on June 17 (p.91), the year of the death of the prominent North Korean politician Cho Man-sik in 1950, not 1954 (p. 106). The photograph "Meeting of Soviet and American soldiers and officers in the area of the 38th Parallel in Korea" is dated in the book to August 1945, although it is known that US troops appeared there only in September 1945. The state of Parhae (Bohai) mentioned in the book existed in the VIII-X centuries, and not in the IX-X centuries (p. 461).

There are also errors in spelling names. Lee Bom Sung is Lee Bom Seok (p. 94, 207, 208); Im Yongsin (Im Hunza) is probably Im Louise (p. 94); Jung Bonam is Cho Bonam (p. 95); Kim Jae Gyu and Kim Jae Gyu are the same person (p. 271); Choi Du Ha is Choi Gyu Ha (p. 291); Lee Soo Kyung is Lim Soo Kyung (p.359, 382).

Readers can't help but cringe at such phrases, for example: "In these circumstances, on April 26, 1960, the National Assembly of the Republic of Kazakhstan was forced to adopt a resolution..." (p. 218); " Increased political activity... students began to play" (p. 241); "The army and above all its officers" (p. 242); "An important feature of Park Chung-hee's" military revolution " is closely connected with the development of the previously mentioned "yushin " doctrine" (p. 264); "The DPNT decisively invaded the holy of holies of Hannaradan" (p. 395).

These omissions, inaccuracies, and errors are mostly due to the authors ' carelessness, lack of control, and lack of demands on the part of the editor. As a result, the attractiveness and value of an interesting and useful publication, such as, I repeat, a book, decreases. This is all the more disappointing because it is recommended as a teaching tool for undergraduates and postgraduates.

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list of literature

The CPSU (b), the Comintern, and Korea. 1918-1941 Moscow: ROSSPEN PUBL., 2007.

The security label has been removed. Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, military operations and military conflicts. Statistical research.
Kim Il Sung. Memoirs. In the maelstrom of the century. Vol. 8. Pyongyang: Publishing House of Literature in Foreign Languages, 1998.

The Constitution and major legislative acts of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Lee Gi Baek. Korean history: a new interpretation.
The United Nations. The Security Council. Official reports. The fifth year. Supplement for September-December 1950. New York, [b. g.].

Relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Korea. 1945-1980. Documents and materials. Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1981.

Modern Korea. Reference edition.

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