The Tumangan Project, about which much has been written over the past 15 years, has its own little-known history. The first attempt to create an enclave with a special international legal status in the border river valley was made a hundred years ago, in 1907-1909. It involved three parties: China, Japan, and Korea, where Japan was the aggressively creative participant. The lower reaches of the Tumangan River and adjacent territories have always been, figuratively speaking, a "geopolitical counterpoint". Located on the Russian side of the Expedition Bay in the VIII-X centuries. there was one of the centers of the state of Bohai-the port that connected it with Japan. At the beginning of the XX century. Japanese expansionists called the Chinese territory adjacent to the Tumangan River "the back door to the mainland" (Murata and Usimaru, 1927, p. 393).

The fertile land of the Tumangan River Valley on the Chinese side was settled and developed by Koreans much earlier than the Chinese (from the middle of the XIX century). Later penetration of the Chinese is explained by the remote nature of the area surrounded by mountains. From the Korean side, it was quite easy to get there by crossing the Tumangan River. As a result, by the beginning of the 20th century, the Chinese territory adjacent to the river bordering Korea was settled by Korean immigrant peasants. This region was named Jiandao. According to the 1907 census, 72,076 Koreans and only 21,983 Chinese lived in Jiandao (Tesen..., 1970, p. 326). Today it is the Korean autonomous region of Yanbian, which should become the territory of the implementation of the "Tumangan Project".

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After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Japan established a protectorate over Korea. In February 1906, the Japanese Government established the post of Resident General in Korea with broad powers. In the same year, an expansion plan was developed in Jiandao. In December 1906," at the request of the Korean government", apparently inspired by the Japanese authorities, the resident General "decided to establish a Branch of the Korean general residence in Jiandao to protect the Korean population and send a detachment of Japanese gendarmes there" [Tesen..., 1970, p.286]. It was supposed to give the Department the authority to manage this region of China and, without coming into conflict with the Chinese administration, expand Japanese influence here.

Control of the Tumangan River valley was necessary for Japan for three reasons. First, Jiandao was a strategically important area. Ideologists of Japanese expansion called it the " back door to the mainland "(in contrast to Liaodong, which was called the main entrance). The route from Korea to Russia passed through Jiandao. The second driving force behind the expansion was the region's fertile land and mineral resources. In this regard, Jiandao was assigned the role of a raw material appendage of Japan. And third, the Japanese, fearing that Jiandao would become a base for the struggle for the liberation of Korea, intended to stop anti-Japanese agitation and organizational work of patriots among the Korean population of the region.

On July 24, 1907, a Treaty on the Administrative Administration of Korea was imposed on the Korean government, making the Japanese Resident General the absolute master of the country. On August 19, the expedition, consisting of Branch officials and 50 gendarmes, left the Korean city of Hweren, crossed the border river Tumangan to China and arrived in the village of Longjingcun, intended as the center of the Korean general residence Branch. A dubious official prerequisite for the establishment of a Branch in Jiandao was the thesis postulated by the Japanese: "Jiandao is a no-man's land" [Tesen..., 1970, p. 303]. The reason was the presence of Korean subjects in the region, who suffered from the raids of the Hunghuz and the arbitrariness of the authorities. A letter was sent to the Chinese authorities stating that the Department will protect Koreans until China and Japan decide on the territorial affiliation of Jiandao. In a reply note, the Chinese authorities pointed out that there is a Chinese administration in this area, which manages Jiandao, as well as protects Koreans, and demanded the elimination of the Branch from Jiandao [Tesen..., 1970, p.304].

The department has started organizing gendarme stations in large settlements with Korean officials and police officers attached to them. In Korean villages, notices were posted informing residents that they were under the protection of the Department.

Weakened by the war with Russia, Japan could not afford at that time a broad intervention in Jiandao, which would have risked a war with China. China did not dare to expel the small Japanese military expedition by force, fearing that in the event of a collision with Japan, it would completely lose Jiandao. The situation created in the Tumangan River valley can be characterized as a dual power - far from peaceful coexistence of two administrations, whose confrontation over the next two years was expressed in a permanent "cold war" in three spheres: political, economic, and ideological.

In the political aspect, the struggle was expressed in Japan's attempts to establish administrative and legal control over the territory of Jiandao and in active opposition to this by the Chinese authorities. An integral element of the Japanese plan, along with the organization of gendarme stations in key points, was the creation of a system of local authorities parallel to the already existing Chinese ones. Jiandao was divided into counties and districts, which were headed by village heads, and each village had a village chief elected. Four district, 41 district, and 290 village heads were appointed. The Chinese police did everything possible to prevent Japanese activity in this direction.

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The establishment of a branch in Jiandao was followed by the opening of a branch of Ilchinhwe (a pro-Japanese society founded in 1904 in Korea as the "fifth column" of Japanese imperialism). Members of the society, whose number in Jiandao, according to Japanese data, reached several thousand, were conductors of Japanese colonial policy. From among them, the Japanese appointed prefects of administrative divisions. They were also primarily targeted by the repressions of the Chinese authorities [Tesen..., 1970, p. 410, 313].

On September 10, 1908, the "Jiandao Korean Memo" was published, which included the following points: Koreans living in Jiandao are protected by the Department; if an unknown person or rebel appears in the village, it is necessary to report this to the gendarme station; in case of harassment by the Chinese authorities or incongruously large taxes, Koreans must ask for protection from the Department; Koreans should not hold meetings or form organizations without the permission of the Department; Jiandao Koreans should not lose their Korean citizenship under any circumstances [Tesen..., 1970, p. 310]. This instruction, written by the Japanese colonialists for the Koreans of Jiandao, attempted to secure the right of the Japanese to protect the Koreans. Special attention was paid to involving Koreans in the fight against the national liberation movement and preventing the emergence of anti-Japanese organizations.

In December 1908, at a meeting of the chiefs of the Jiandao gendarmerie stations held in Longjingcun, the head of the Department, Lieutenant Colonel Saito, stated that: 1) Jiandao is a Korean territory; 2) Koreans are not subject to Chinese courts; 3) The Department does not recognize the right of the Chinese authorities to collect taxes from Koreans [Tesen..., 1970, p.436]. Saito's performance marked the beginning of a qualitatively new stage of Japanese expansion. For the first time, Jiandao was explicitly called Korean territory. The intention to strengthen administrative and legal control was clearly expressed. Since March 1909, district and community elders have been receiving salaries from the Korean budget.

The Chinese authorities actively resisted the establishment of the Japanese in Jiandao. Pro-Chinese administrative bodies were established in 14 important localities. The number of Chinese troops in the region increased from 1,400 to 4,300 (the number of Japanese gendarmes from 1907 to 1909 increased from 50 to 200 plus 63 Korean policemen). Japanese gendarmes and Chinese soldiers occasionally clashed with a few victims [Tesen..., 1970, p. 312, 344].

Legal control over Koreans was another sticking point in Sino-Japanese relations. Almost all Japanese documents on Jiandao included a ban on changing Korean citizenship to Chinese, since the naturalization of Koreans would mean that there was no basis for Japanese expansion. The Department began to crack down on members of the anti-Japanese movement almost immediately. A private Korean school in Longjingtsung, where anti-Japanese propaganda was conducted, was broken up, and the leaders of the anti-Japanese Society for the Dissemination of Thought, created in opposition to Ilchinhwa and supported by the Chinese authorities, were arrested [Tesen..., 1970, p.316].

In the economic sphere, the struggle was going on in three directions: agriculture, mining, and forestry. Chinese authorities banned the export of grain and ore from Jiandao to Korea. The decree banning the export of grain was issued on July 2, 1908, but the Japanese ignored this ban. The Chinese governor issued a decree prohibiting Korean logging, fearing that the forest would "float away" to Korea. In 1907-1909, the Japanese conducted a geological survey of Jiandao in order to search for and evaluate mineral deposits. A conclusion was made about the possibility of industrial extraction of silver, copper, and washing of gold sand [Tesen..., 1970, p. 366, 367, 353, 354].

Japanese ideological expansion was based on a campaign to protect Koreans from the oppression of the Chinese authorities and the Hunghuz. In an effort to knock this trump card out of the hands of the Japanese, the Chinese governors of Jiandao, when they took office, repeatedly stated that the authorities would fight banditry that harms the local population, punish criminals regardless of whether they are Korean or Chinese [Tesen...,

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1970, pp. 342, 349]. In Longjintsung, the Department established a school for Korean children. Three teachers were sent: two Koreans and one Japanese. The main goal of the training was to educate students in a spirit of loyalty to Japan. Private Korean schools were supplied by the Japanese with textbooks from Korea. The Chinese authorities also paid attention to Korean youth. On March 29, 1908, a Chinese official gathered students and their parents at the Korean school in Jeongseong County and explained to them that Jiandao was a Chinese territory since ancient times, so they should learn Chinese and not obey Japanese predatory officials, and finally threatened Koreans who did not comply with the order to wear Chinese clothes and hairstyles with expulsion abroad [Tesen..., 1970, p. 192].

The opening of a charitable hospital by the Japanese in August 1907 can be attributed to events of a more propagandistic than recreational nature. During the activity of the Department, the hospital was visited by Japanese - 1302 times, Koreans-10,641 times, and Chinese-1586 times [Tesen..., 1970, p. 328, 333].

Diplomatic negotiations on Jiandao began to get off the ground in early 1909, when the problem was tied to several issues that Japan needed to resolve in order to establish itself in Manchuria. These are the reconstruction of the Andong-Mukden railway to a broad gauge, the right to operate the Anshan and Fushun mines, etc. In exchange for these concessions, Japan allegedly relinquished its claim to Jiandao. The Chinese government was put under pressure. On August 3, 1909, the head of the Department, Lieutenant Colonel Saito, officially notified the Chinese governor that from that time on, the Department considered Jiandao as Korean territory. This statement "accidentally" coincided with a Japanese note from the same day about the construction of the Andong-Mukden railway [Tesen..., 1970, p.376].

The Treaty of Jiandao was signed in Beijing on September 4, 1909. However, the formal recognition of the region as Chinese territory did not mean a real assertion of Chinese sovereignty over Jiandao. The first clause of the treaty, which proclaimed the Tumangan River as the Sino-Korean border, was practically crossed out by the following: a clause that allowed Korean citizens to live freely in Jiandao; a clause on the placement of Japanese consulates in the region, on the right of Japanese officials to control Chinese courts over Koreans, on permission to trade with Korea and export grain there, and a clause on the construction of the Jilin railway- North Korea, passing through the territory of Jiandao (Manchuria..., 1921, p. 135). The combination of these provisions made Japan's presence in the Tumangan River Valley legitimate and realistic, and strengthened the territory's connection with North Korea. Here is what a Russian researcher wrote in 1912 about the plan for the construction of the Jilin-Hweren railway: "A new port is being created in the rear of Vladivostok, a base is being created near the Korean border, undivided economic domination (of Japan - V. G.) in two provinces of Manchuria will be allowed, and the Sungari River basin will be given away" (Akimov, 1912, p. VII].

After the conclusion of the Jiandao Treaty, Japan's position in the region continued to strengthen. If in 1909 North Korea and Japan accounted for only 20% of Jiandao's trade, then in the late 1920s 50% of the region's agricultural products were exported to Japan (Lee kwahak, 1967, p. 27).

Describing the two-year activity of the Department, the director of the Japanese Institute for Korean Studies in 1970 noted that " protecting the lives and property of Koreans was an occasion. The real goal was to "encourage the relocation of Japanese people to Jiandao, develop agriculture, industry and trade" (the point of the Department's program of activities is quoted) - to create the base for Japanese colonial expansion" [Tesen..., 1970, p.5, 6].

The experience of the first Tumangan project is still relevant today. It shows how dangerous it is to have an autonomous region on the territory of a country inhabited by ethnic representatives of a neighboring state. Now that Koreans who were evicted from Primorye in the 1930s are being returned to the Far East, we should consider whether these people should be resettled.

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hardworking citizens of the Russian Federation on the territories bordering China and Korea. And also think about the consequences of creating national districts, even in the hinterlands of the region.

The modern Tumangan project does not bode well for us. First, a powerful competitor port may appear in the rear of Vladivostok. Secondly, the Eurasian transport corridor will be created as part of the "Project" with the final destination - Tumangan, the "twin" of the Trans-Siberian Railway. As a result, the cargo flow from Europe to East Asia will pass by Russia.

However, some complacent observers believe that the Trans-Siberian Railway has a more advantageous position due to the fact that it is shorter than the "corridor". Unfortunately, our geographical advantages cannot compete with the East Asian dynamism of economic development and organization of production. The longer "Eurasian Transport Corridor" will certainly be faster than the Trans-Siberian Railway, providing a truly end-to-end container traffic. As a result, Vladivostok will turn from a potential "eastern capital" of Russia into its "distant outskirts".

The initial ("trunk") concept of the Tumangan project (officially called the Tumangan River Basin Development Plan) was to create a cross-border territorial enclave at the mouth of the Tumangan River at the junction of the borders of three states, consisting of three segments (Chinese, Korean, Russian), which will be managed by an international structure (with gradual internationalization of the enclave).

The lack of real progress in its implementation during the first 15 years (since 1991) was explained, in particular, by the Russian authorities ' awareness of the role of the "Project" in its original form as a "killer" of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the seaport of Vladivostok. The brusque revelations of political scientists who voiced the position of Western leaders also played a role. Heinz Timmermann, Director of the Cologne Institute for Eastern Europe, wrote in a memorandum article: "The goal of Western policy should not be to legitimize and strengthen the artificial construction of the CIS, but to support the natural formation of sub-regional entities like GUAM within its framework... Thus, support for the "Eurasian Transport Corridor" project should be strengthened [Timmerman, 1998, pp. 45-46]. The very date of the "Project" (1991) - the year of the collapse of the USSR and the emergence (in its underbelly) of independent Central Asian states-was also striking, which made it possible to build a "Eurasian Transport Corridor" on their territory and isolate Russia.

As a result, China and the UN promoters of the Project decided to change its image. At the 8th meeting of the UN Advisory Commission on the Development of the Tumangan River Region (Changchun, China, September 2005), it was decided to rename it the apparently amorphous and non-binding "Expanded Tumangan Initiative" [Russia..., 2008, p.14]. The essence has also changed: now China no longer insists on building a port at the mouth of the Tumangan River. This enterprise was also difficult for technical (hydrological) reasons: the rocky bottom, shallow depth, and the possibility that dredging will lead to the disappearance of the Tumangan River as a waterway. And for international legal reasons-the lower reaches of the river belong to Russia and the DPRK.

Nevertheless, China still needs access to the Sea of Japan. In 2002-2003. China tried to lease the Russian port of Zarubino for 49 years, which would mean its complete economic subordination to the Chinese administration (it is noteworthy that of all the options for using Zarubino as a port point for Chinese cargo, the PRC was satisfied only with a long-term lease). For this, the Chinese side promised huge investments in the port infrastructure and its complete re-equipment with an increase in capacity by 40 times. According to the Vice-Governor of Primorsky Krai V. V. Gorchakov, " the port should remain Russian property. If we lease it now, the issue of leasing a special transport corridor will also arise" (Zolotoy Rog, 2003). As a result, as in the case of the CER, this may lead to the creation of a new economic model.-

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a large "extraterritorial" zone with de facto foreign administration on the territory of Primorsky Krai. The Russian Ministry of Transport opposed the Chinese lease of the ports of Zarubino and Posyet [Vedomosti, 2003].

Having given up the secondary issue (renaming the "Project"), China left the main thing: the formation of a cross-border economic enclave in the adjacent territories of China, the DPRK and Russia (although the management of the enclave by an international administrative committee is no longer mentioned). In China, the territory of implementation of the "expanded Tumangan initiative" is the Korean national district of Yanbian. It should be noted that Koreans in Yanbian are historically able to perceive innovations, that they are bilingual, quadrilingual - Korean, Chinese (Russian, English), and that the level of urbanization in Yanbian is the highest among the provinces of the PRC - 56% (twice more than the average for China - 27%). [Polpred.com..., 2008]. The North Korean part of the future enclave is the Rajin Free Economic Zone, which is being built and developed even under a totalitarian regime. In the border areas of Primorye, everything is exactly the opposite: depopulation, the collapse of industry, etc.

The cross-border economic region is doomed to internal specialization: high-tech production based on cheap North Korean labor and Chinese capital-in the Chinese and Korean segments of the enclave, the colonial economy - in the Russian (Primorye) segment, the contours of which are already beginning to emerge today (creation of rice-growing complexes with Japanese, Chinese, and Korean money, logging and processing of forests,etc.). the role of a railway (sea) coachman). As the People's Daily wrote: "Making full use of the rich natural resources of the neighboring countries of Russia and the DPRK, including forests, minerals, and marine resources, Yanbian is intensively developing export processing industries, while at the same time a number of powerful enterprises in the district are investing capital in the economy of Russia and the DPRK.", 2006].

The territory of Primorye adjacent to the border will gradually be populated by Koreans (Russian and foreign), who will work in forestry and agricultural enterprises owned by a foreign (Chinese, Korean...) to capital. The export of skilled labor from Yanbian is one of the main sources of income for this district. In 2005, labor was exported to 20 countries around the world (the district's income from labor exports amounted to $ 880 million in 2005, 2.3 times higher than all domestic financial revenues) [China Weekly, 2006].

It is Russia that will have to play the role of an integrating force (West-East) due to the fact that the Trans - Siberian Railway passes through its territory-a ready-made artery connecting Europe with both Central Asia and the Far East. Efforts should now be made to restore the Trans-Siberian freight turnover that existed in the 1980s. This is a question not only of the current economic benefits derived from the operation of the highway, but also of strategic benefits related to the future of the planet and Russia's place on it. The role of the Trans-Siberian Railway will consist in the "correct" organization of the Eurasian space. Accordingly, the "Eurasian Transport Corridor", which is planned to be created bypassing Russia, will play a disorganizing role. This project, which is related to the Tumangan project, will be supported by the West at the UN. The UN report on the Tumangan project states: "The significance of this route is that it will pass through North-East and Central Asia. The extensive trade links established through the project will become the main nerve trunk for approximately 300 million people in Northeast Asia, and, as a result, in 10 to 20 years there will be a port equal to Amsterdam. Thus, this project can be called a "Dream Project of the 21st century" [Customs Policy..., 1999, p. 33]. In fact, there is nothing positive about this. The construction of a transport corridor bypassing Russia will primarily unite the Central Asian world, and not the whole of Eurasia, and the mouth of the Tumangan River can become a megacity of the "Eurasian Transport Corridor".

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Leaving Russia with nothing, the Europeans will face a much more dangerous opponent - a powerful bloc of Asian states created with the active participation of the UN. The West should have realized that the perceived benefits it will gain by excluding Russia from the West-East integration system will lead this process to a dead end and hit the West with a boomerang.

In the Eurasian system, Russia will have to become the third integrating center (along with the European Union and China). Its goal is to win over the Central Asian countries, Korea and Japan, and get ahead of China in its natural desire to create its own union of states (China, Korea, Japan, Central Asia).

The creation of the Eurasian (Economic) Community in Astana in October 2000 is not a whim of the "Kremlin elite", but a logical stage of the world historical process. The logic of historical development will require Mongolia, Korea, and Japan to join this union (the Trans-Siberian Railway will become the axis of the new bloc). It is not necessary, but it is realistic and desirable to expand this bloc at the expense of India, Iran, and Afghanistan. Two projects that are currently being discussed will be a real step towards the implementation of this plan: the project of an underwater tunnel between Japan and the mainland with access to the Trans-Siberian Railway and the project of the Trans-Korean railway, also with access to the Trans-Siberian Railway.

The international community has no other choice but to work together to build the structures of a future secure world. In this future world, Russia may become the third (multi-racial) power center of Eurasia (along with the European Union and China), reducing to a minimum the "racial tension" between the Europoid and Mongoloid poles of the planet.

P.S.

On July 16, 2008, the RasonKonTrans joint venture was established with the participation of the Russian Railways Trading House and the port of Rajin to implement the Khasan-Rajin project. The joint venture is registered in the DPRK, in the Rason special Economic Zone, for a period of 49 years. The Russian side holds a 70 percent stake in it, while the North Korean side holds a 30 percent stake. According to the agreements reached, the Russian side makes investments, the North Korean side has property rights to the port (the 3rd berth and the adjacent territory). The joint venture will be engaged in the reconstruction of the railway, construction of a container terminal in the seaport of Rajin with a potential capacity of up to 400 thousand TEU 1 per year, as well as the subsequent operation of this infrastructure. Investments in the reconstruction of the Tumangan-Rajin railway section and the construction of the terminal will amount, according to preliminary calculations, to 140 million euros.

On August 8, 2008, the Russian-Korean Joint Venture RasonKonTrans (a joint venture between Russian Railways Trading House and the Port of Rajin, North Korea) and the Tonhae Railway and Transport Company of the Ministry of Railways of the DPRK signed a 49-year lease agreement for the railway infrastructure on the Tumangan-Rajin section [www.Гудок.ги, 08.08.08].

On October 4, 2008, a solemn ceremony of laying the first link in the modernization of the railway from the Russian Khasan station to the North Korean sea port of Rajin with a length of 52 km was held at the Tumangan border station in the DPRK (Gudok, 2008).

This is a pilot project within the framework of a large-scale plan to unite the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Trans-Korean Railway and create a transcontinental transport corridor with a length of more than 10 thousand kilometers. km, which will allow cargo to be delivered from the Asia-Pacific region in just two weeks instead of 45 days by sea.

1 TEU - a conventional unit of measurement for the quantitative side of transport flows, the capacity of container terminals, or the capacity of cargo vehicles.

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list of literature

Akimov. Yanjifu: materials for the Military Statistical Review. Khabarovsk, 1912. Vedomosti. M., 03.03.04. Gudok. M., 06.10.08. En kvahak. Pyongyang, 1967, No. 1. The Golden Horn. Vladivostok, 18.03.03.

China in a week. Weekly electronic magazine. Beijing, 24.07.06.

Murata Yoshimaro, Usimaru Junsuke. Saikin Kanto jijo (The current state of Jiandao). Seoul-Tokyo, 1927.

Russia China-Business World. Vladivostok, 2008, No. 1.

Customs policy of Russia in the Far East. Vladivostok, 1999, No. 1.

Tesen toji shire (Materials on the Colonial Administration of Korea), Vol. 1. Tokyo, 1970.

Timmerman H. Processes of disintegration and reorganization of the CIS. 1998. N 12.

Manchuria Treaties and Agreements. Washington, 1921.

www.Гудок.ru

www.Poipred.com>China>Yanbian (Internet site)

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