Concepts of the development of the system of international relations have always been important components of the doctrines of the state's foreign policy, acting largely as the basis for the latter. At the same time, the new formulation of questions about the main subjects of international relations, the correlation of their forces, the main configurations of relations between them, the leading factors determining the development of world politics and the policies of individual states, is always a consequence of significant structural shifts in international relations, their subjective reflection.

As for the American bourgeois concepts of the development of international relations that have been published over the past 8-10 years, their appearance and character are connected with the weakening of the position of American imperialism, which occurred by the end of the 60s, with the change in the role and place of the United States in the system of international relations. The change in the balance of forces on the world stage: between capitalism and socialism, between the forces of peace, democracy, progress and the forces of imperialism and reaction played a decisive role. The Soviet Union's achievement of a new level of strategic military power by the end of the 1960s and the recognition (albeit forced) of this fact by the American ruling circles were of great political, moral and psychological significance .1 The failure of the US aggression in Indochina marked not only the collapse of American imperialism's attempts to stop the national liberation movement, but also a new balance of power between the major capitalist Powers and the developing countries. Significant changes have also taken place in relations between the United States and other capitalist countries - centrifugal tendencies in the economic and then political spheres have intensified. Various internal problems of the United States have also become increasingly acute: two consecutive economic crises-1969-1970 and 1973-1975, the energy crisis, the unprecedented decline in confidence in the government as a result of the Watergate scandal and the revelations of the activities of the FBI and CIA, inflation, unemployment, a sharp aggravation of social contradictions, the crisis of large cities, environmental pollution, etc. The whole combination of foreign and domestic factors has forced American political leaders to

1 For more information, see: G. A. Trofimenko. Evolution of the US military-political strategy after World War II. Voprosy Istorii, 1976, No. 3.

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We must begin a serious reassessment of the present and future position of the United States in the world. These attempts differ significantly from what took place in the late 50s and early 60s. At that time, it was mainly about the need for a new mobilization of American resources in response to the "challenge" from the countries of socialism, the world national liberation movement. At the same time, the question of preserving the primacy of the United States in international affairs, of strengthening its role as the leader of capitalism, a state called upon and able to impose and strengthen capitalist orders everywhere in the world, was not questioned. The debates of the late 60s and early 70s took on a different character in the United States. Not only were the resources, tools, and methods used in foreign policy discussed, but more fundamental categories that had remained virtually unshakable for almost 25 previous years were also questioned. There was a question of defining new long-term goals of the US foreign policy strategy and their place in international relations in general.

Sober-minded bourgeois political scientists and politicians thought not only about how much this or that structure of the future system of international relations would meet the interests and capabilities of the US ruling class, but also about how much it would correspond to the interests of the capitalist world as a whole. Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once remarked: "In the post-war period, we entered as a victorious country with huge resources. The last decade has shown that we can't do everything and achieve everything just by intensifying our efforts. On the other hand, since it was a difficult experience for us, we must gain a new understanding of the prospects that are opening up."2
Fulfilling the social order of the ruling circles, American international scholars, including historians, since the late 60s have written a number of articles and monographs that reflect their understanding of various aspects of the formation of a new system of international relations. 3 The purpose of this article is to critically analyze the main bourgeois concepts of the development of international relations that have appeared in American literature since the late 60s, their evolution and interrelationships. In Soviet historiography, various aspects of this topic are partially covered in the works of V. F. Petrovsky, G. A. Trofimenko, A. E. Kunina, in collective monographs and some other works .4
2 "The Department of State Ruiletin", February 10, 1975, p. 166.

3 H. A. Kissinger. Central Issues of American Foreign Policy. "Agenda for the Nation". Washington. 1968; ej usd. The Peace We Envisage. "American Foreign Policy". N. Y. 1974; W. R. Kintner. A New International System? Philadelphia. 1971; ej usd. Arms Control for a Five-Power World. "SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's". Pittsbourgh. 1973; S. Hoffman. Weight in the Balance of Power. "The Great Nixon Turnround". N. Y. 1973; S. Brown. The New Forces in World Politics. Washington. 1974; ejusd. Emerging World Poliarchy. "The Next 25 Years". Washington. 1975; "The World and the Great Power Triangles". Ed. by W. Griffith. 1975; Z. Brzezinski. The International Community in the Next Two Decades. "Appendicies. Commissions on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy". Vol. 1. Washington, 1976; ejusd. America in a Hostile World. "Foreign Policy", 1976, N 23; E. Morse. Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations. N. Y. -L. 1976, a. o.

4 A. E. Kunina. Ideological foundations of US foreign Policy. Moscow, 1973, pp. 173-215; "USA: scientific and technical revolution and foreign policy trends". Moscow, 1974, pp. 4-41; "USA: Political thought and History". Moscow, 1976, pp. 146-299; V. F. Petrovsky. American Foreign Policy Thought, M. 1976, pp. 192-234; G. A. Trofime N. K. O. USA: politics, war, ideology, M. 1976, pp. 271-332, et al.

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When analyzing American concepts of the system of international relations, one should not forget about their subjectivism, which follows from bourgeois methodology. It is necessary to distinguish between the objective course of development of international relations (including the evolution of the economic and military potentials of individual countries, their internal socio-political development), the reflection of this evolution in the minds of bourgeois scientists and politicians, long-term foreign policy planning, and analytical activities of a normative nature, which are conducted both by individual specialists and political groups, and In addition, it is necessary to take into account the changeability and development of the very concepts of the system of international relations put forward by American authors. Often, concepts designed for a 7-to 10-year period become obsolete (at least morally) within 2 to 3 years due to the high rate of changes in the development of international relations and the methodological failure of bourgeois political science. The confrontation on foreign policy issues, which is waged by various groups in the domestic political arena in the United States, also affects.

At this stage, the following approaches of bourgeois authors to the future system of international relations are outlined: a) variations on the "five-pole" structure, which presupposes the presence of five main "centers of power" in the world as determining subjects of international relations; b) the structure of international relations with the allocation of two main "triangles" of states; c) various variants of the " multipolar systems with a significant number of "regional centers of power" and a developed" multi-storey "hierarchy; d) a" polyarchic system " of an even more complex and intricate configuration with overlapping and intertwining links and interests of an ever-increasing number of individual subjects of international relations.

In addition to the classification based on the difference in the structure of the system, there is another one that involves determining the main axes of confrontation in world politics, around which groupings of states are formed. In the works of bourgeois scholars, such lines of confrontation are distinguished, in particular, as the confrontation between capitalist and socialist states ("East-West"), the struggle within the capitalist camp itself ("West - West"), and the confrontation between "industrially developed powers" and developing countries ("North - South"). A more complex version of this aspect of relations is to describe the situation in the form of a "triangle":" industrial democracies of the West "(including Japan) - "communist world" - developing countries. As for the role and place of the United States itself in one or another configuration of the future system of international relations, they are revealed in these constructions both directly and indirectly (that is, by the role assigned to other subjects of world politics in one or another variation of the international system). In more direct terms, this is reflected in experts ' assessments of the degree of desirable activity of American foreign policy at the global and regional levels, the amount of resources that can be allocated to the implementation of foreign policy, and the ratio of various means and methods that can be used by the US political leadership.

When considering all these constructions of American foreign policy theorists, it seems most appropriate to take a systematic approach based on the classification of possible structures of international relations - differences in the number of the main subjects of these relations, in their relative power, degree of influence, etc.-

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They were founded by K. Marx and F. Engels and profoundly developed by V. I. Lenin 5 . The concept of a "system of states" and a "system of international relations" was developed by Lenin in a number of his works. He emphasized that "capitalism has developed into a worldwide system of colonial oppression and financial strangulation by a handful of 'advanced' countries of the vast majority of the world's population", that "people live in a state, and each state lives in a system of states that are relatively in a certain political equilibrium" 6 .

Before proceeding to the analysis of various bourgeois concepts of the development of international relations on the basis of a systematic approach, it seems necessary to highlight the main features, the main contradictions that determine the nature of the modern system of international relations, and the main processes taking place in it. American bourgeois scholars are more or less characterized by a denial or at least a lack of understanding of the main driving forces in the development of international relations, their deep socio-economic and political class essence, in particular those that arise from the competition of two opposing socio - economic formations - the central problem of the development of international politics. This competition, determined by class interests and goals, the scale of influence of the countries of socialism and capitalism, has acquired a global scale, encompassing the ideological, economic, political, scientific, technical and cultural life of the world. The competition between socialism and capitalism, being realized in the sphere of international relations, has through it an increasingly strong impact on the development of individual countries and the whole of humanity. At present, the main trend in international relations is a progressive change in the balance of forces in favor of socialism.

In the international political sphere, there are very significant contradictions of a different kind: first of all, the contradictions between the leading capitalist countries: the United States and the emerging new centers of imperialist competition - Japan and the countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) - persist and sometimes become more acute, despite the desire to unite efforts in the face of socialism. However, this by no means eliminates the dominant role of the central contradiction of our time - between socialism and capitalism. This polarization is obscured by bourgeois researchers who reduce the contradictions in international relations to a clash of interests between "two superpowers "or talk about the transition of the system of international relations to a state of political"multipolarity". Of course, a number of specific international political problems reflect the special role and responsibility of the two great Powers - the USSR and the United States, which are the leading states of the opposing forces of socialism and capitalism. At the same time, the world is not built according to the scheme of those American scientists and politicians who see it in the so-called "bipolar configuration". Such a configuration of current and future international relations is a secondary, formal phenomenon in relation to the socio-economic processes that determine these relations in general terms, and political conclusions resulting from such a structure of the system of international relations.-

5 See more on this topic: A.V. Sergiev. Foresight in Politics, Moscow, 1974; L. I. Golman, F. Engels and Some questions of Historical Knowledge. Voprosy istorii, 1976, No. 3; E. A. Pozdnyakov. System approach to the study of international relations, Moscow, 1976.

6 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 27, p. 305; vol. 42, p. 59.

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However, they cannot be interpreted in any way in the sense that the USSR and the United States have any special rights to "manage" the main political processes. Speaking on American television on June 24, 1973, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev said about the role of the USSR and the United States in modern international relations: "The general atmosphere in the world largely depends on the climate prevailing in relations between our two countries. Neither economic nor military power, nor international weight gives our countries any additional rights, but imposes on them a special responsibility for the fate of universal peace, for the prevention of war. " 7
Even more confusing are those bourgeois researchers who see in the current trends in the political independence of the countries of Western Europe and Japan in the near future a transition to such multilateral, "multipolar" relations in which these countries will become to a certain extent equivalent to the USSR and the United States in all basic parameters of power and influence. The analogies used in this case with the" concert of European powers " of the XIX century do not stand up to serious criticism. A certain decentralization of political influence in the capitalist camp occurs primarily as a result of the law of uneven economic and political development of individual countries under imperialism, which is reinforced by the development of the scientific and technological revolution. The emergence of new centers of economic and political influence in the capitalist world, which challenge the United States in a number of ways, to some extent changes the structure of international relations in the 1970s and subsequent decades. The foreign policy of these centers depends on the growing power of the socialist community, taking into account the possibilities of competition and competition with it. At the same time, by changing the structure of international relations, the new centers of influence do not affect the class-political essence of these relations, and do not lead to the erasure, much less the disappearance, of the main contradiction of our era.

1. Concepts of the "five-pole" structure of international relations. For the first third of the seventies, American bourgeois thinking was characterized by the predominance of arguments around the idea of transforming the system of international relations from "bipolar" (that is, based on the "tough" military-political confrontation between the USSR and the United States and the groupings of states led by them) to "multipolar"8 . The main "actors" of the emerging new structure of world politics were the United States, the USSR, China, Western Europe (usually the "nine" countries forming the EEC) and Japan. A significant number of American scientists have built their models of the future system of international relations around the options for "distributing power and influence" between these main "centers of power" (taking into account their ability to attract third world countries to their side).

In this formulation of the question of the structure of international relations, the parameters of their changes, the traditions of the school of "political realism" are manifested, which is characterized by the prominence of such a category as the "strength" of the state. The latter, like other operating systems-

7 L. I. Brezhnev. Lenin's Course, vol. 4, Moscow, 1974, p. 173.

8 См. Н. A. Kissinger, Central Issues of American Foreign Policy.

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The new categories used by representatives of this school are interpreted in isolation from the laws of socio-economic development, class contradictions existing in the world and in individual countries. 9 Differences in the approach of bourgeois authors to the question of the upcoming role of the United States in international relations relate to the number of future main "centers of power", the distribution of the degree of influence between them in different regions of the globe, and the prevailing form and means of foreign policy influence of one or another major subject of international relations.

As the first variation of the system of international relations, we can consider the scheme of five mutually balancing (according to these scientists) "centers of power"mentioned above. The relative comparability of the influence of each of these main subjects of international relations was deduced by American political scientists based on the assessments of a number of bourgeois authors about the possible strengthening of the military-political positions of Japan and Western Europe, including in the case of their creation of significant nuclear forces .10 As W. Kintner, director of the Institute for Foreign Policy Studies (Philadelphia), tried to prove in his developments, this option would mean a "greater degree of stability" of the entire system of international relations compared to its current state. Professor M. Kaplan of the University of Chicago supports W. Kintner's argument 11 .

Proponents of such views reasonably believe that in this case, both Japan and a "united" Western Europe would be much less dependent on the United States, and therefore the latter would have some additional political problems. And yet, in their opinion, in these conditions there would be a lot of positive things for the United States - these two " centers of power "with the appropriate American policy could remove some of the" burden " from the United States and reduce the degree of their direct confrontation with the Soviet Union and China. These American authors practically did not disguise their desire to achieve a military and political encirclement of the Soviet Union by returning-albeit in a modified, so to speak, less Americanized form - to the idea of "containing" the USSR. Bourgeois political scientists belonging to this group envisage the United States retaining the role of the main "center of influence" and thereby reducing the role of the Soviet Union.

Bourgeois authors also make similar judgments about the "three-pole" (USA - USSR - PRC) structure of international relations, which is supposed to be typical for the end of the current decade or the beginning of the next. According to a number of American researchers, the" three-pole " US diplomacy will lead to a higher level of economic growth.-

9 For a detailed critique of "political realism", see A. A. Karenin. About the school of political realism. "American Historiography of US foreign Policy", Moscow, 1972, pp. 56-90; " Modern bourgeois theories of international relations. Critical Analysis", Moscow, 1976, pp. 24-30; V. F. Petrovsky. Op. ed., pp. 74-92; G. A. Trofimenko. USA: Politics, War, Ideology, pp. 121-126.

10 These assessments were made back when Japan had just initialed, but not ratified, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the question of the possibility of creating a Japanese nuclear force in the medium or long term was discussed with varying degrees of frankness quite actively not only in the United States, but also in Japan itself. However, the overwhelming majority of experts, while appreciating the scientific, technical and economic capabilities of Japan, expressed considerable doubts and even an indisputably negative attitude to the strategic and foreign policy expediency of such a step (see, for example, M. Kasak. Japan's Nuclear Option. "Superpowers in a Multi-Nuclear World". L.' 1974, pp. 91 - 103).

11 "SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's", pp. 176 - 186, "SALT: Problems and Prospects". Ed. by M. Kaplan. N. Y. 1973, pp. 23 - 24.

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It also highlights the concerns of its allies about the existing "special" relationship with the United States. Such a US policy, as J. Newhouse (a former senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and now a senior State Department official) writes, will further contribute to the transformation of the United States into a kind of Palmerston Britain, which "had no allies, but only interests" 12, which is associated with irreparable damage to US relations with Japan and Western European members of NATO. According to some bourgeois authors, the distrust of the main American partners in the "three-pole" diplomacy conducted by the United States can be eliminated by more active assistance provided by the United States in creating independent armed forces by its allies, as well as by using a set of broad political, diplomatic and economic measures. They believe that the effectiveness of the" containment " of the Soviet Union and the PRC by Western Europe and Japan, respectively, will depend on the support that the United States can provide them with its constant superiority in nuclear and other weapons over its allies, both individually and together.

Thus, as one of the most important issues of the formation of a "five-pole" system of international relations, these experts single out the question of the ways of military and political development of Japan and Western Europe. We believe that the concept of a "five-pole" system of world politics is more a figment of the imagination than the result of a scientific study of the state and prospects of international development and the development of individual countries. This was also shown by the events of 1973-1977. In the 1970s, although with great difficulties and partial deviations, there was a progressive development of detente in international relations. Japan has not made any political progress towards acquiring nuclear weapons, and on the contrary, it has ratified the Treaty on the Non - Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The development of Western European economic and political integration is clearly lagging behind all the previously outlined plans. In general, it turns out that the policy recommended by American authors is actually not only very difficult to implement, but also irresponsible from many points of view. Such a policy is undoubtedly contrary to the cause of peace and detente, since it is designed for a new hostile encirclement of the USSR and an even more intense strategic arms race. Apologists for such a policy clearly ignore the growing power and influence of the USSR, the entire socialist community, and progressive and democratic forces.

2. The concept of two "triangles". Doubts about the probability of a" five-pole " world and concerns about these forecasts have been expressed and continue to be expressed by many American authors. In this regard, several different concepts of the development of the system of international relations are put forward. A certain number of critics do not reject the idea of five main "centers of power", but emphasize the uneven distribution of individual components of" power " between these centers. 3. Brzezinski, J. Ball and some others believe that the grouping of "forces" in international relations will consist of two" triangles":" military - political "in the USSR, the United States and China, and" political-economic " - Japan, the EEC and the United States.

Japan and the members of the EEC, as estimated in the early 70s, are able to achieve the status of leading "centers of power" without making any significant efforts in the field of creating comparable to the USSR

12 J. Newhouse. Cold Dawn; The Story of SALT. Washington. 1973, p. 271.

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and the United States strategic potential. Although the United States will surpass Japan and the EEC countries in economic power, it will gradually lose its dominant position in the economy of the capitalist world, acting only as "first among equals", which will lead to significant changes in political relations. Brzezinski, for example, wrote in June 1973: Western Europe is "emerging as a political force", "developing its own political view of the world", and it is not improbable that in the next 10 years it can become a source of "more significant conflict and tension with the United States than the states with which it is associated." Today, we have mostly antagonistic relations. " 13
This led to relevant recommendations for the US foreign policy strategy for the 70s. Brzezinski, as well as a number of other international experts in the United States, such as G. Owen (Brookings Institution) and J. R. R. Tolkien. They also advised that the United States should first shift its focus to developing relations with a potentially politically integrated Western Europe and an increasingly influential Japan. In the Brookings Institution's monograph, "The Next Phase in Foreign Policy," Owen formulated the main long-term goal of the United States: "Creating a capable community of developed nations that would include the United States, Western Europe,and Japan should be our first priority. And the economy is the area where such a community is most likely to take shape. " 14 These authors emphasize the primary importance for the United States and other leading capitalist states to focus their efforts within this " political and economic triangle."

What role was assigned to the United States in the "triangle" of the leading capitalist "centers of power"? In 1972-1974, American theorists were apparently prepared for a relative decrease in the political role of the United States within the framework of this "triangle". The first indicator of this was Japan's insistence on joining the traditional US - Western European alliance as a more or less equal partner .15 In addition, Brzezinski, Owen, and others have consistently emphasized increasing the degree of equality between Western Europe and Japan in relation to the United States in the development and adoption of major foreign policy decisions, creating not only a mechanism for regular political consultations, but also "general political planning" .16
There were several reasons for this approach. The real balance of power that had developed by 1973 between the United States and its main capitalist competitors affected the medium-and long-term forecasts. At that time, Brzezinski and many of his colleagues were still impressed by the unusually high growth rates of the Japanese economy for the capitalist world, Japan's foreign economic expansion, and certain achievements of the EEC countries (compared to the United States). Willingness to recognize (at least in words) the equal rights of the union-

13 Z. Brzеzinski. The International Community in the Next Two Decades.

14 "The Next Phase in Foreign Policy". Ed. hy H. Owen. Washington. 1973, p. 356.

15 Z. Brzezinski. US Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus. "Foreign Affaires", July 1973, p. 724.

16 In particular, Z. Brzezinski, arguing with his main opponent H. Kissinger, emphasized that it is impossible to strengthen the "Atlantic ties" first, and then "invite" Japan. In his opinion, it is necessary to immediately involve Japan in the "community" of the three "centers of power" mentioned (ibid., p. 723).

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The situation of these American political scientists also developed under the influence of the numerous defeats (the largest of them was Vietnam) that the United States suffered as the sole leader of the capitalist world.

However, just a few months later, events occurred that, with all their consequences, were in no way predicted by most American international scientists. The October War of 1973 in the Middle East, the energy crisis, the world crisis of the capitalist economy in 1974-1975, and a number of other important phenomena (mainly in the political and economic sphere) required further focus of American specialists ' attention on relations between the leading capitalist countries. It has become clear that, despite a certain narrowing of the gap in economic power and political influence between the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, in situations that are most critical for the capitalist world, the United States remains the main support for all other capitalist countries, both economically and, to a certain extent, politically.

It also revealed the superiority of the United States over its main capitalist competitors in several major battles in the trade and economic sphere .17 In this regard, Brzezinski stressed in 1976 that neither Western Europe nor Japan were yet ready to deal with both traditional and new global problems on a par with the United States. He justifies this thesis by saying that of all the developed capitalist countries, only the United States makes detailed proposals in the UN debate on the "new economic order", that France, which tried to take the initiative in 1974-1975 in solving the problem of providing the world capitalist economy with raw materials, is forced to constantly look back at the Americans, and so on. In general, as Brzezinski points out, " the economic difficulties experienced by developed industrial (capitalist. - L. K.) countries, especially due to the increase in oil prices produced by OPEC, have emphasized the most important economic and political role of the United States, no doubt making it more fundamental than it was in almost 20 previous years " 18 .

In the same perspective, such a well-known American expert on political and economic issues as F. Bergsten considers this issue, who, in particular, believes that since the development of integration processes in the UES has entered a period of stagnation due to the collapse of the idea of creating a "monetary and financial union", the United States will again be significantly ahead of Russia. other" power centers " of the capitalist world. As early as 1975, forecasts appeared that similarly overestimated the future role of Japan, 19 which lost its capitalist economy as a result of the world crisis of 1974-1975.

17 One of the most striking examples of such clashes is the struggle over the so-called "deal of the century". In 1974-1975, four Western European countries (Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark) decided to replace the outdated Starfighters with a new fighter-bomber. The United States entered the fight, offering two types: "F-16" and "F-17", France with the Mirage 1/M53 aircraft and Sweden with the Viggen 37E machine. Having overcome the most stubborn resistance of Western European competitors, using methods of political and economic pressure, the United States emerged the winner, as a result of which Belgium had to buy 116, Holland - 102, Norway - 72, Denmark - 58 F-16 aircraft. The total cost of their order is $ 10 billion.

18 Z. Brzezinski. America in a Hostile World, p. ЭЗ.

19 See, for example, R. Panero. The Pacific Basin: An Owerview of Economic and Political Factors. "PRA Series", N 3/75, May 1975, pp. 35 - 36.

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almost all of its "dynamism" and faced the most acute domestic socio-economic problems (exports, foreign investment, providing industry with imported raw materials at "reasonable prices"), supplemented by a deep crisis of the ruling party of the big bourgeoisie. At the same time, American experts draw attention to the noticeable strengthening of the German economy within Western Europe. "West Germany has become economically not just a European power, but a world power," Bergsten said. He recommends that the situation in the world capitalist economy and political relations of the capitalist world should be stabilized primarily on the basis of the "American dollar - West German mark" cooperation .20 According to another expert, R. Ullman, the Federal Republic of Germany cannot serve as a de facto "pole of the trilateral plan" for the United States for a number of reasons, including historical ones .21
Recently, American political scientists have increasingly put forward the idea that the United States will come out of the crisis with relatively smaller losses than other countries, and even strengthen its position in the face of rival partners. Harvard Professor J. R. R. Tolkien Nye, for example, notes that in the second half of the 1970s, the dollar remained the "key currency" of the Western world, despite the fact that the entire monetary and financial system of capitalism has undergone significant changes and is no longer controlled, as before, by the United States. He also emphasizes that the US economy is 3 times more powerful than the economy of Japan and 4 times more powerful than the economy of Germany - their closest competitors. The military and political superiority of the United States over other capitalist States remains absolute. On this basis, Nye concludes that although "the traditional hierarchy of states has weakened," the United States may remain at the head of this hierarchy, even if it does not have the "capacity for hegemony."22
There is a certain basis for such hopes, including from the point of view of such a big economic and political problem as the increased dependence of all developed capitalist countries on external sources of raw materials and the jump in prices for raw materials. Here, the US position looks relatively more preferable, including in the long term. American political scientists also note that in the conditions of any military-political crises, the United States will be less vulnerable to violations of the supply of imported raw materials than Western European countries or Japan. So, while the US economy depends on imports for only one-third of its oil needs, Japan-almost 100%, and Western European countries-an average of 97%. Even with the accelerated development of the North Sea oil fields, they will cover the needs of Western Europe by no more than 15-20% by 1980. For other types of raw materials for industry, the picture is roughly the same: while the United States on average depends on imports by 15%, Western Europe - by 75%, Japan-by 90% 23 .

There are certain differences in the geography of sources of imported raw materials - the vast majority of oil for Japan and the West-

20 Germany's exports are currently equal to those of the United States, its per capita income is approaching that of the United States, and its foreign exchange and financial reserves exceed those of the United States by 2.5 times and Japan by more than 2 times (see Economic Impact, 1975, pp. 16-17).

21 R. Ullman. Trilaterism: "Partnership" for What? "Foreign Affairs", October 1976, p. 9.

22 J. S. Nye. Independence and Interdependence. "Foreign Policy", 1976, N 21, P. 145.

23 "International Economic Report of the President". Washington. 1975, p. 46.

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Most of Europe's oil comes from the Middle East, while Venezuela and Canada account for a significant share of US oil imports. Canada and Latin American countries are also a source of many other raw materials for American industry. At the same time, the main areas of non - energy raw materials import for Western Europe are Africa, and for Japan-Asia and Australia. In addition, the United States also has more powerful armed forces (primarily naval ones) that could "protect" the lines of communications that supply raw materials to Japan and Western Europe. It is also significant that it was in the United States, in the context of an oil boycott and a sharp increase in oil prices, that the possibility of an armed seizure of oil fields in Arab countries was publicly discussed.

Evaluating all of the above, we can assume that the idea of creating an "equal community" within the "political and economic triangle" is no longer as indisputable in the eyes of its authors as it was two years ago. There are many other weaknesses in the concept of the "community of developed industrial countries" in the form of the above-mentioned "triangle". But the central problem, insoluble for any, even the most skilful imperialist policy, remains the problem of inter-imperialist contradictions in both the economic and political spheres.

The Marxist-Leninist approach to the question of inter-imperialist contradictions in the context of the growing power and multiplication of the forces of socialism requires specific consideration of the correlation of centrifugal and centripetal tendencies both in the capitalist world and in the politics of any imperialist state. If in the first half of the 70s centrifugal tendencies clearly prevailed, now the picture has become more complicated. To some extent, the changed balance of power between the United States and other capitalist "centers of power" has stabilized, but at the same time a number of new problems have emerged in which Western European countries are challenging the United States. The authors of forecasts in the spirit of the "three-way community" concept also made other mistakes. The very idea of a US - EEC - Japan "triangle" looks like a big stretch. The economic and political relations between its components are full of sharp contradictions 24 .

It is also necessary to focus on other aspects of US foreign policy related to the division of the world into, as Brzezinski said, the "triangle of competition" (USSR - USA-China) and the "triangle of cooperation" (USA - EEC - Japan). The fact is that the policy aimed at creating a "trilateral community" aims not only to put relations between the three leading capitalist forces in the foreground, but also to influence the rest of the system of international relations. Such an extremely insistent emphasis on the priority of relations in the "political-economic triangle" actually disorientates American politicians and public opinion in the United States regarding the importance of other cardinal problems of modern international relations. Contrasting the "political-economic triangle" with the "military-political one", the authors of this model objectively divert the attention of the American public from the need to increase efforts in solving the problem of disarmament, preventing crisis situations, and from the need to further normalize relations with the United States.-

24 For example, Japan's trade with the EEC in 1975 was two times less than its trade with the United States and almost equal to its trade with the socialist countries (Foreign Affairs, October 1976, p. 3).

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The Soviet Union should expand the process of detente and develop large-scale trade, economic, scientific and technical contacts between capitalist and socialist countries.

3. The concept of "regional power balances". Due to the loss of a number of international positions by the United States and a clear crisis in its global strategy, a large number of American international researchers from 1972-1973 have been trying to find the most favorable combination of forces for the US ruling circles in certain areas of the globe. At the first stage, in the generalizing concepts of "regional multipolarity", the main attention was paid to the creation of subsystem" power balances "composed of the same components that formed the" pentagonal " (pentagonal) structures discussed above.

The influence of Japan in Asia, according to American experts, should have spread due not only to its own penetration into the countries of this region, but also to the possibility of forming a kind of European Economic Community in the East under the Japanese auspices. According to Mr. Kan, Japan's influence in the Pacific Asian basin may surpass that of the United States25 in the next 10 to 20 years . American researchers warned the US leadership not to ignore this factor. M. Halperin, in particular, wrote that " American officials should realize that US-Japanese relations are even more important to them than American relations with China." For this reason, Galperin insists, all "future American steps with regard to China should be taken only after consultation with Japan and should include an assessment of how the China issue will affect Japan's domestic political situation." 26
In another part of the world, some American experts assigned the same role to the countries of Western Europe, where, together with the USSR and the United States, the union of Western European states forms another regional political configuration. Thus, the proponents of this view of the future structure of international relations recognize the preservation of a global role in international affairs only for the United States and the USSR. But they do not seek to allow the Soviet Union to expand its influence freely in both the Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific regions. While appreciating the long-term prospects for increasing the role of the Soviet Union in the Pacific Ocean not only in terms of military and political, but also in terms of political and economic parameters, 27 some American experts put forward a number of recommendations for US foreign policy to limit Soviet influence in this region, even by strengthening the position of their main capitalist competitor, Japan, through the development of US - Japan - China relations.

Many bourgeois scholars in their research on the role of " regional forces "in international relations go even further and believe that in a number of regions of the world, such influential forces, in addition to the five main" centers of power", are states that can significantly influence the situation in their region, including the positions of leading powers. Among these countries, they name: India - for South Asia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, From-

25 H. Kahn. The Emerging Japanese Superstate. N. Y. 1972, p. 206.

26 "The Next Phase in Foreign Policy", p. 24.

27 Due to the development of the resources of Siberia and the Far East, the growth of foreign economic relations of the Soviet Far East with Japan, Canada, the United States, and the countries of Southeast Asia.

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rail for the Middle East, Brazil and Argentina for Latin America, Australia for the southern Pacific, the Republic of South Africa for Southern Africa, and so on .28 As can be seen from this far from complete list, the vast majority of potential new "centers of power" belong to developing countries. The analysis of American growth forecasts for these new influential actors in international relations is of considerable interest from the point of view of understanding the US approach to the role of developing countries in international relations. The number of predictions on this topic in American studies has increased significantly, especially since the end of 1973.

The most serious bourgeois scholars consider these problems not only in terms of shifting the center of gravity of the " world confrontation "from the" West - East "axis to the" North - South " axis, but also in terms of a more differentiated and complicated attitude to various categories of countries and individual developing countries. In this regard, the division of these countries into the "third world" and "fourth world"is significant .29
According to the new classification, the "third world" countries include those developing countries that have large mineral reserves and are able to accelerate their economic development on the basis of more favorable conditions for exporting raw materials than before, and even challenge developed capitalist states in a number of areas. The most striking example of this category of countries are some OPEC members. The "fourth world" refers to the rest of the developing countries, which are very diverse in their socio-economic and demographic indicators, but are united by the fact that there are no large mineral reserves on their territory that would be of interest to the world capitalist economy, and primarily to the United States. For this reason, the economic development of this group of countries, including through foreign economic relations, seems to bourgeois scientists to be very complex and more difficult than for the "third world"countries .30
Accordingly, US leaders are advised to focus on the emerging "middle-level power centers", taking them into account and at the same time using them in a direction that is beneficial for the United States. Johns Hopkins University professor J. Liska, for example, advises American political leaders to create regional "balances of power", relying on these states in their respective regions, helping them even increase their influence in the region to a certain extent by suppressing other, smaller and thus not so important for the interests of the United States .31
The most striking example of the policy regarding the formation of such a new "center of power" is the recommendations of the American poly-

28 См., например: "Foreign Service Journal", March 1973, p. 8.; "Second Synoptic Context for Discussing the 1970's and 1980's". Croton-on-Hudson. 1972; G. Liska. The Third World: Regional Systems and Global Order. "Retreat from Empire". Baltimore. 1973, p. 286; R. Alexander. The Growing Cap. "National Strategy in a Decade of Change". Lexington, 1973, pp. 86 - 87.

29 См., например: C. F. Bergsten, Jr. Threat from the Third World. "Foreign Policy", 1973, N 14; "World Politics and International Economics". Ed. by С F. Bergsten and L. B. Krause. Washington. 1975; B. Mannin. The Conduct of U. S. Foreign Policy in the Third Century. N. Y. 1976.

30 joules. J. W. Howe, a leading researcher at the Overseas Development Council research organization, identifies 46 developing countries in the "fourth world", of which 25, according to the UN, are "least developed" in terms of per capita income, literacy, and industrialization. Power in the Third World. "Journal of International Affairs", Fall 1975, pp. 114 - 115).

31 G. Liska States in Evolution. Changing Societies and Traditional Systems in World Politics. Baltimore. 1973, p. 153.

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tologov concerning Brazil. The territory of this country, its natural resources, its population, the pace of economic development - everything distinguishes it not only from Latin American, but also from developing countries in general. Brzezinski wrote that "Brazil has already begun the process of becoming a leading power in Latin America and, apparently, a source of future Latin American conflicts. Brazil will displace the US from Latin America in the very near future." In the longer term, according to Brzezinski, this country has a better chance of becoming a "superpower" than Japan, due to the optimal combination of population, resources, geographical location, etc. 32 .

The potential role of Brazil is also highly appreciated by American experts on Latin America. R. Alexander, a professor at Rutgers University, writes:: "At least by the end of the century, Brazil will be one of the world's great powers. Its population will reach 200 million people, and it will become one of the main industrial countries in the world. In all likelihood, it will become a nuclear power. It is unlikely that Brazil will refrain from using its economic, political and military power. " 33 R. Roett, director of the Center for Latin American Studies at Johns Hopkins University, also believes that Brazil is a "serious candidate" for great powers. He believes that Brazil is also historically prepared for this future role. Moreover, the growth of this country's power will most likely be accompanied by a "more aggressive and autonomous foreign policy" 34 .

This leads to the conclusion that it is necessary for the United States to recognize the role of this state in Latin America and even more broadly in the South Atlantic even before Brazil itself forces the United States to do so, and by recognizing it, to contribute to a certain extent to strengthening its influence in this region, while channeling this influence in directions that are most favorable from the American point of view. One of these areas can be considered the newly proposed idea of creating a kind of similarity of NATO in the South Atlantic - a regional military-political organization without direct participation of the United States, in which Brazil would play a leading role. This block is intended to serve as a means of suppressing the national liberation movement in South America. South Africa, take over the former gendarme functions of the United States in Latin America and European states in Africa.

Those who promote this idea clearly proceed from the common class interests of the American and Brazilian monopolistic circles, a number of other Latin American countries and South Africa, which should join the new bloc. But who can guarantee that such an alliance, or any semblance of it, should it ever arise, will fully meet American intentions? The common class interests of potential participants in the new bloc and the United States do not exclude the most acute conflict situations between them. Such conflicts between Brazil, as a state of the younger and more greedy bourgeoisie, and the United States can take more complex and unexpected forms than is the case in relations between the United States and Japan, the United States and Western Europe. Looking at this problem in a broader social context, we can fully agree with G. Mirsky, who writes that "the formation of even capitalist social relations in the United States is a very important factor."-

32 Z. Brzezinski. The International Community in the Next Two Decades, p. 14.

33 R. Alexander. The Growing Gap. p. 87.

34 R. Roett. Brazil Ascendant: International Relation and Geopolities in the Late, 20th Century. "Journal of International Affairs", Fall 1975, p. 139.

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In a number of third world countries, this does not automatically lead to the strengthening of the world capitalist "center," which means that the "centers" of world capitalism will still have to deal with the "periphery," even the one that is following the capitalist path itself. " 35
It is quite obvious that relying on a new "center of power" in the person of Brazil will in no way contribute to the overall reduction of international tensions. On the contrary, it will give an impetus to the intensification of the arms race in this region of the world, which until recently remained a relative periphery in terms of saturation with the latest weapons. And given the degree of tension in relations between Brazil and some of its neighbors, in particular Argentina, and the significant possibility of the two countries developing nuclear weapons, we should be wary of the emergence of new hotbeds of acute international conflicts that can easily go beyond the region.

Similarly, the prospects for US relations are assessed. and with many other future "centers of power" from among the current developing countries (taking into account, of course, the full range of economic, socio-political and historical features of each of them, their relations with the outside world).

4. Concepts of the "polyarchic" system of international relations. At the beginning of the current decade, when many American international experts were still discussing what the structure of a "multipolar" world would be, the United States published works that drew attention to other aspects of the development of the system of modern international relations. The authors of these works, recognizing that the structure of relations in world politics is undergoing the most significant changes since the end of World War II, argued that the international relations of the future will not be either "bipolar" or" pentagonal", but will gradually take a less distinct configuration. The source of this" blurring " of the hierarchical structure of relations between states was considered by this group of American scientists to be the emerging stable trends in changes in the concept of "forces" in international political relations.

S. Brown, one of the leading researchers at the Brookings Institution, for example, considers the relative decline in the role of the military factor in the foreign policy of states to be an essential feature of the emerging new international system, and not only at the level of two "superpowers", where this occurs due to the balance of the strategic balance of nuclear forces, but gradually and at on an increasingly large scale. In the opinion of this author, military force in its direct application will play an important role in such a system of international relations only in local armed conflicts, and its use in these cases will be increasingly fleeting and have increasingly limited (tactical) military and political goals. In general, concludes S. Brown, "military force will have no practical application in daily political bargaining." 36
Another well-known American researcher, St. Hoffman, compares the transition to a new character of political relations with the transition of foreign policy from playing on one strategic and diplomatic board to playing on many chessboards at the same time. This is, he said, partly a result of the "nuclear impasse", but also a product of the economic and social process and scientific research.

35 G. Mirsky. The changing face of the "third world". "Kommunist", 1976, N 2, p. 115.

36 S. Brown. Changing Essence of Power. "Foreign Affairs", January 1973, p. 290.

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there are 37 discoveries . The long-term decline in the role of the military factor not only at the nuclear level, but also at the level of conventional armed forces is attributed by some American researchers to the fact that the Soviet Union is "expanding its global capabilities in sub-nuclear military technology"38 . And just as the Soviet Union managed to balance the power of its nuclear missile forces with the American strategic forces, thereby changing the nature of the role of the military factor in international relations, so in the field of conventional, non-nuclear weapons, it will be able to achieve this in the near future. First of all, this applies to the Soviet Navy. In this regard, Hoffman believes, Soviet military power will increasingly deter potential US military actions in various parts of the world. The above-quoted Professor of Columbia University, V. Bazyak, agrees with him, who writes:: "A Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean will make the United States Government think twice before undertaking an action similar to the landing in Lebanon." 39
These remarks seem to reveal new features of the thinking of those bourgeois international scholars who have been able to rise above the propaganda cliches that are still widespread and constantly updated in academic and political circles in the United States about the growing "Soviet military threat" , etc. Based to a certain extent on such ideas, these authors rightly speak of a very likely increase in the role of non-military factors in international relations - multi-faceted trade and economic activities, scientific, technical and cultural ties. These authors, as well as many other experts in the United States, are not without reason paying attention to the increasing importance of global human problems in world politics, which inherently require large-scale cooperation between countries, including those representing various socio-economic systems and political groupings. These problems include: rational use of natural resources, conservation of the environment on a regional and global scale, development of ocean resources, disease control, solving the world food problem, etc. "Recent years have demonstrated an increase in the number and range of issues on the foreign policy agenda. Moreover, traditional perceptions of national security are no longer adequate. Protection from military threats will continue to be a major foreign policy issue, but national security may be threatened by developments outside the military-political sphere. The melting of the Arctic ice sheet, the destruction of the ozone layer, the leakage of radioactive waste, or the non-stop growth of the global population may threaten the safety of Americans (and other peoples). as serious as the events that may arise in the traditional military-political field, " write R. Cohain and J. Smith. Nai 40 .

Similar thoughts about the growing role of an increasing number of new factors in international relations are expressed by S. Brown. He emphasizes the increasingly complex "complexity of the emerging global political system", in which the problems for relations between states are not only the economy and military security, but also such issues as, for example, the threat in one place or another.

37 S. Hoffman. Choices. "Foreign Policy", 1973, N 12, p. 5.

38 V. Basiuk. Technology, World Politics and American Policy. N. Y. 1977, p. 11.

39 Ibid., p. 13.

40 R. O. Keohane and J. S. N у e. Organizing for Global Emiron mental and Resource Interdependence. "Appendicies. Commissions on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy", p. 40.

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for a number of States in the regional ecosystem, joint and increasingly intensive use of rivers, fish resources, sea communications, air corridors, radio frequencies, satellite orbits, weather management and its possible negative consequences 41 . Brown believes that the growing importance of these and similar issues is leading to the erosion of coalitions. In this regard, he has a negative attitude to the projects discussed above for the formation of new "power balances" or blocs in various forms. The development of relations between individual peoples and States on an ever-expanding range of issues (or, in Brown's words, the development of "multiple interdependence") can take the form of a "paranoid variant", that is, lead to an even greater aggravation of the situation in international relations due to the emergence of new conflict areas and close interdependence between them. That is why he opposes traditional, mostly forceful approaches to foreign policy, calling on American diplomacy to be more flexible and sophisticated, to take full account of the full range of scientific and technical factors, and to rely less on brute military force. Based on its scientific and technical potential and extensive foreign policy ties, the United States, Brown believes, could remain a leading power in international relations along with the Soviet Union.

Brzezinski also expresses his thoughts about the erosion of the hierarchical and multipolar structure of international relations, but from a different perspective. A growing "pluralism" characterizes the modern world, and a large number of young States have emerged that, as this author notes with regret, do not follow the path of socio - economic development shown by the United States .42 The growing interdependence between states, the diversification of their international activities, mainly under the influence of the scientific and technological revolution, and the corresponding deformation of the entire structure of relations in the world are also noted in the works of other bourgeois researchers, among which the report of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, entitled "Analysis of Global Interdependence", commissioned by the State Department's policy planning group, stands out. This report focuses on the growing dependence of the United States on the outside world in the economic sphere, including the provision of energy and industrial raw materials .43 The result of this study is also a whole set of recommendations for American foreign policy. L. Bloomfield emphasizes the impossibility of a noticeable weakening of the US dependence on the outside world, which was determined by the mid-70s. The authors focus on how the United States could adapt to the current situation in the most profitable and painless way (and even use it to somewhat improve its international position). Seeing a threat to the long-term interests of the United States in the attempts of other states to achieve autarky, Bloomfield, for example, calls on the American government to be guided by "norms of moderation, cooperation and reduction of tension." He opposes the postulates of foreign policy in conditions of "interdependence", which were put forward by the Republican administration in 1973. They, according to Bloomfield, focused the United States on the struggle for obtaining

41 S. Brown. The Emerging World Polyarchy, p. 25.

42 Z. Brzezinski. America in a Hostile World, pp. 94 - 95.

43 H. Alker, L. Bloomfield, N. Choucri. Analyzing Global Interdependence. Vol. I. II. Cambridge. 1974.

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one-sided advantages, waging "trade wars with allies", confrontations with countries that produce raw materials, and actions that ultimately threaten the development of the detente process. In the face of the increased vulnerability of the United States, he believes that retaliatory actions by interested countries would cause very significant damage to American interests .44
In recommending "moderation," Bloomfield has in mind a number of measures: a "modest" curtailment of those political ties of interdependence that are most likely to threaten any conflict, including a certain, already partially de facto reduction in the US "overseas military presence" and its "peripheral commitments"45 ; a reduction in the level of overall military cooperation between the two countries."foreign presence" of the United States in the economic sphere - both on the state and private lines-by exercising direct state control over all types of foreign investment, similar to how American foreign economic relations with socialist countries are regulated (in general, it is planned to extend the system of state regulation of monopolies that has developed within the United States to the sphere of international activity of transnational corporations46 ); the conclusion of a whole series of international commodity trade agreements fixing prices, volume and terms of sale, which would mean moving away from relying on purely market mechanisms in international commodity trade; the rapid expansion and complication of relations between the United States and the "main importers" of oil by obtaining their portfolio and even direct investments in the US economy expanding sales of American machinery and equipment, spare parts, and "know-how"; promoting tourism and cultural ties, etc.

In dealing with the leading capitalist countries, Bloomfield calls not only, as other American political scientists have repeatedly done before him, for expanding consultations with key allies in order to avoid unilateral uncoordinated steps, but also for the United States to provide direct and indirect support to Japan and Western European countries in strengthening their influence in certain areas of the world, in particular in the area of certain areas of international relations.

In the new conditions, S. Brown, who should probably be considered the main preacher of the "polyarchic system", also pays a lot of attention to the relations of interdependence between the United States and developed capitalist countries. It is he who emphasizes that for the entire foreseeable period, the United States, and its partners, should proceed from the fact that, despite some success of the latter's economy in comparison with the United States, the main source of their international political influence will be their positions in world trade, while the United States will remain the main source of capital, a country with the largest size of the gross national product, the most advanced technology, "know-how", and therefore the leader in relation to these countries. So Bloomfield, Brown, as well as other American experts who are close to them in their views, calling for studying non-gp-

44 "Toward a Strategy of Interdependence". "The Department of State Special Report", N 17, July 1975, p. 3.

45 Calls for a "reduction of the US military presence" abroad suggest that the focus of gravity of the US naval, air and amphibious forces should be shifted from the territory of certain countries to sparsely populated and remote islands. Most clearly, the new "island strategy" is being pursued by the United States in the Pacific basin.

46 For similar suggestions, see: G. W. Ball. Diplomacy for a Crowded World. Boston. 1976, p. 297.

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the role of new parameters of power and influence in international relations, but all the time, referring to the system of priorities of US foreign policy, they think about what a new pyramid of relations should be that would allow the United States to remain the leading state in the capitalist world. It is only a question of taking into account all the parameters of relations as much as possible and using them in the best possible way in the "national interests" of the United States.

As the analysis shows, in a relatively short period of time, approximately from the end of the 60s, serious changes have taken place in the American concepts of the development of the system of international relations. The evolution of these concepts has largely followed the path of complicating the understanding of the system of international relations-both in terms of the composition of various subjects of world politics, and in terms of taking into account an increasingly wide range of factors. The development of these concepts was decisively influenced by the shifts in the balance of power between capitalism and socialism in favor of the latter, the success of developing countries in strengthening their political and economic role, as well as the deepest crisis in the post - war history of the world capitalist economy in 1974-1975. It is precisely as a result of this crisis that the essence of imperialist foreign policy has been revealed more than ever before, determined not by any vague general "national interests", but by the class structure of the capitalist state, the interests of the dominant monopolistic circles.

The largest post-war upheaval of the global capitalist economy in the context of increased interconnections between its constituent parts, 47 the weakening of the international political position of the United States as the world's gendarme, combined with a significant erosion of the role of the United States as the leader of the capitalist world in the economic field, and a number of other factors caused by this, forced the US ruling circles to link economic, political, and military ties more closely foreign policy activities, paying increasing attention to central economic issues 48 .

As a result of the evolution of the concepts of prospects for the development of international relations in the academic elite of the United States, which is closest to the ruling circles, if there is no semblance of a certain unity of view, then at least the gap in ideas about the new structure of international relations that has emerged has somewhat narrowed. Here it is worth noting the revival of ideas about preserving the clear leadership of the United States in relation to Western Europe and Japan, although, of course, not to the same extent as it was in the 50s. There is also a certain consensus that relations with these "centers of power" should take the main place in the system of foreign policy priorities of the United States, and, as already noted, on the basis of de facto American superiority. Concerning

47 According to a number of Soviet international economists, the increased interconnection of the national economies of capitalist countries by the early 1970s contributed to the synchronization of the world capitalist crisis of 1974-1975 (see, for example, Y. Pokotaev. The origins and characteristics of the current economic crisis. "World Economy and International Relations", 1976, N 6, p. 86).

48 As the former US Secretary of Commerce, P. R. McCarthy, put it in this regard. Peterson, paraphrasing a well-known statement by J. Clemenceau, "trade is too important a problem to be left in the hands of trade ministers, and finance is too important to be handled only by finance ministers, and certainly energy is too important to be handled only by finance ministers" (P. Peterson. The New Politics of the Emerging Global Economy. Washington. 1973, p. 6).

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In developing countries, American political scientists are increasingly insistent on pursuing differentiated policies in this area, acting on the old, proven imperialist principle of " divide and rule."

In general, it is suggested that, using its economic, scientific and technical potential, military and political superiority over other capitalist states, the United States at this stage of the development of international relations should strive to maintain its role as the leader of the capitalist world, and not allow further weakening of its position in the face of capitalist competitors. Basically, the US foreign policy strategy is subordinated to the task of preserving the socio-economic status quo in the world due to some restructuring of the hierarchy of relations in the capitalist part of it. This realignment goes mainly by making it more complex, adding new levels and elements. The United States is also ready to reduce the distance between them and the individual components of this hierarchy, both in relations with the leading capitalist countries and with a number of new "centers of power" from among the developing countries, but not so much as many American political scientists thought two or three years ago.

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