A. M. VASILIEV Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Keywords: Afghanistan, "April Revolution", introduction of Soviet troops, B. Karmal, Najibullah The war, in which the Soviet leadership dragged its armed forces, continued for almost a decade and cost the Soviet people more than 13 thousand lives, according to official casualty figures. Tens of thousands were wounded, maimed, and hundreds perished in Afghan captivity. "After many years, it is clear that all our sacrifices in Afghanistan, alas, were in vain," wrote Lieutenant General V. Kirpichenko, former first deputy head of foreign intelligence.1 On December 27, 1979, at 12 a.m., L. P. Bogdanov, a representative of the KGB under the security agencies of Afghanistan, received a call from Yu. V. Andropov's deputy, V. A. Kryuchkov, head of the First Main Directorate (Foreign Intelligence, PSU): "We need to give instructions to cover up our tracks." All written plans of the operation, all combat logs were destroyed. LOGIC OF THE FATAL DECISION The logic of making a decision on intervention had several levels. The first is military-strategic considerations. In the context of a global confrontation with the United States, they reasoned like this:"If not us, then they". If Afghanistan is not our ally, then if the opposition wins, it will be the American one. Having lost Iran, Washington "should" rush to Afghanistan either by itself or through its ally, Pakistan. To prevent the creation of Western military positions in Afghanistan, perhaps even its missile bases - this was the logic of the Soviet Union's "defensive aggression", as the London Times called the Soviet military intervention.2 In Western Europe, NATO has just decided to deploy medium-range missiles covering the European territory of the USSR (formally-in response to the appearance of Soviet medium-range missiles, referred to in the West as "SS-20"). What if the same bases appear in Afghanistan? The flight time of Pershing-2 rockets is 6-8 minutes. E ... Read more